Battle on a Kursk arc. Kursk arc or Orlovsk-Kursk arc - how to properly

At the headquarters of the High Command, the land forces, when the Present Person of Hitler-Strateg was manifested when Klaus arrived in the Organizing Department of the OK, he was still under the impression of a victorious campaign in France. It was an incredible success, Victory Euphoria was equal

Appendix 1. Heads of intelligence departments of headquarters of fronts who participated in the Kursk battle Peter Nikiforovich Chekmazzgeneral Major?. N. Chekmazov during the Kursk battle was the head of the reconnaissance department of the central front headquarters (August - October

Kursk Battle of 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) Operations conducted by the Red Army in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk Provider on the disrupting the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad and its subsequent overall offensive in the winter of 1942/43 in a huge space from the Baltic to the Black Sea, undermined the military power of Germany. In order to prevent the decline of the moral spirit of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal trends inside the Hitler's aggressor block and his generals decided to prepare and spend a large offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With her success, they associated hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and turn during the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go to the offensive. However, in mid-April, the TGC rate revised the method of scheduled actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command plans to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk ledge. The rate decided to urge the enemy with a powerful defense, then proceed to counteroffensive and defeat his shock forces. The case rare in the history of wars occurred when the strongest side, owning a strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not on the onset, but defense. The development of events showed that this bold design was absolutely justified.

From the memories of A. Vasilevsky on strategic planning by the Soviet command of the Kursk battle, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to once again open the training of the Hitler's army to a major offensive in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusion using the newest tank technology on a mass scale, and then establish the enemy transition time in the offensive.

Naturally, in the current conditions, when an alleged blow to the enemy was completely obvious, the most appropriate solution was required. Soviet command turned out to be in front of a complex dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the forthcoming actions of the enemy and on its preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the rate were increasingly inclined to the idea of \u200b\u200btransition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and the Deputy Supreme Commander G.K. Zhukov at the end of March - early April. We took the most particular conversation about the planning of combat operations in the near future, on April 7, when I was in Moscow, in the General Staff, and G. Khukov - on a Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, sick of G.K.zhukov was sent by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Report with an assessment of the situation and considerations about the plan of action in the Kursk area of \u200b\u200bKursk, in which it was noted: "The transition of our troops in the coming days in the coming days to prevent the enemy consider it inexpedient. Better It will be if we are exhausting the enemy on our defense, we'll throw it tanks, and then by introducing fresh reserves, the transition to the overall offensive finally achieve the main grouping of the enemy. "

I had to be at when he received the report G.K.zhukov. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commands." Giving the general staff order on the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held on the evening of April 12, attended by I.V. Stalin, who arrived from the Voronezh Front of G. Zhukov, Head of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made for deliberate defense (...)

After making a preliminary decision on deliberate defense and, a comprehensive and thorough preparation for the upcoming actions turned into a subsequent transition to the counteroffensive. At the same time, intelligence actions of the enemy continued. The Soviet command was exactly known for the start of the commemorative offensive, which were transferred three times with Hitler. At the end of May - early June 1943, when the Enemy's plan was fully paid for a strong tank blow to the Voronezh and central fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, a final decision was made to deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan of the Kursk battle, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan of the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest authorities of the strategic leadership, and not other command instances (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Kursk battle. Kursk battle. M.: Science, 1970. P.66-83.

The beginning of the Kursk battle in Central and Voronezh fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and sau, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of Kursk speakers, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was a bet of bet. He had to prevent a deep breakthrough as from the eagle, so Belgorod, and when switching to a counteroffensive, increase the force of impact from depth.

The German side part of two shock groups intended for the offensive in the North and South Face Kursk protrusion, introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized, which amounted to about 70% of Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. Total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the attacks of the enemy was assigned to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger tanks and Panther, assault guns "Ferdinand", as well as new aircraft "Foke-Wulf-190A" and "Henchel-129".

The appeal of the Fuhrer to German soldiers on the eve of the operation "Citadel", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you start a great offensive game, which can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory is stronger than before, the belief is strengthened about the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces. In addition, the new brutal time of the Russians is even more shakebel a faith in the possibility of success of Bolshevism, which has already been shameful in many co-unity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, faith in victory from them, no matter what will disappear.

Russians sought one or another success primarily with their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have the best tanks than the Russians.

They seemed to be inexhaustible human masses so they were deferred in a two-year struggle that they were forced to prize-put the most young and old people. Our infantry, as always, in the same extent exceeds Russian as our artillery-ry, our tank fighters, our tankers, our Sa Pens and, of course, our aviation.

A mighty blow, which will overtake the Soviet army today, should shake them to the ground.

And you need to know that everything may depend on the outcome of this battle.

I as a soldier clearly understand what I demand from you. In a coast, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and severe is one or another separate battle.

The German Motherland is your wives, daughters and sons, Sa-Musselly confused, meet enemy wagon blows and while tirelessly work in the name of victory; They look with hot hope for you, my salt-dates.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is subject to destruction in the division headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz Des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

Battle's move. On the eve

From the end of March 1943, the rate of the Soviet Supreme Commands worked on a strategic offensive plan, whose task was to defeat the main forces of the South Army Group and Center and crush the enemy defense at the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of these army intelligence, the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to strike under the foundation of Kursk protrusion, in order to surround our troops there.

The plan of the offensive operation near Kursk arose at the Hitler's bet immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943, the configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrere to apply strikes on the converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, adhered to the point of view that they should not be used as the main impact force in a large battle - this could lead to a vain waste of forces . Wehrmacht's strategy for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, should have become an exceptionally defensive, as much as possible in terms of consumption of strength and funds.

However, the majority of German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation that received the code name "Citadel" was determined on July 5, and German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored cars exceeded their firepower and armoredness the main Soviet Tank T-34. By the beginning of the "Citadel" operation, the German forces of the Army Groups "Center" and "South" were at their disposal to 130 "tigers" and more than 200 "Panther". In addition, the Germans have significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-II and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting 88-mm gun on many cars. In total, about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault implements, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars were located in the drum groups of the Wehrmacht in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusion for the beginning of the offensive. At the southern wing of the protrusion, the strike forces of the Army Group "South" were focused under the command of Manstein, where the 4th tank army of General Gota and the Kempf group were. On the northern wing, the troops of the Center for Army Center "Center" The kernel of the shock group here was the strength of the 9th army of General Model. The South German group was stronger than North. Tanks among generals Gota and Keff numbered about two times more than the model.

The TGC rate decided not to move the first in the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet command was to first bleed up the power of the enemy, knock out his new tanks, and only then, introducing fresh reserves, go to the counteroffensive. I must say that it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, other representatives of the Supreme Soviet Command remembered well that it was never since the beginning of the war of the Red Army could not organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive exhausted at the stage of a breakthrough of Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war under the Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals who advised not to rush with the beginning of the offensive. Under Kursk built deeply echelonized defense, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, in the northern and southern sections of the Kursk protrusion, was created another - the steppe front, designed to become a reserve association and enter into battle at the time of the transition of the Red Army to counter-project.

Military factories of the country uninterruptedly worked on the release of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty parts" and powerful SU-152 self-propelled guns. The latter could already deal with the "tigers" and "panthers" with great success.

The organization of Soviet defense under Kursk was the idea of \u200b\u200bdeep echelonation of combat orders of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive frontiers were erected. Along with this, a defensive border of the troops of the steppe military district was created, and on the left bank of the river. Don prepared state border of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, at the beginning of the Kursk battle, Soviet troops significantly exceeded the enemy both in humans and in the technique. The central and Voronezh fronts had about 1.3 million people in their composition, and the steppe front behind them was still additional 500 thousand people. At the disposal of all three fronts there were up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand. We are against about 2 thousand in Germans.

Battle's move. DEFENSE

The closer the date of commencement of the "Citadel" operation was approaching, the harder it was to hide its preparation. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it will begin on July 5. From the reports of intelligence, it became known that the opponent's offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. Headquarters of the Central (Commander K. Crosovsky) and Voronezh (Commander Natutin) of the fronts decided to produce artillery counterpropasia on the night of July 5. It began in 1 hour. 10 min. After the hum of cannonade verse, the Germans could not come to themselves for a long time. As a result of a predetermined artillery counterpropitation, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive by 2.5-3 hours later than scheduled time. Only after some time, German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry compounds began about half of the sixth in the morning.

The German command pursued the target of the shock to break through the defense of the Soviet troops and go to the coupie. In the center of the central front, the main blow of the enemy took the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans introduced up to 500 tanks here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the central front caused a part of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps on the advancing group. The offensive of the Germans here was detained here, and on July 10, it was finally broken. For six days, the fighting enemy wedged into the defense of the central front wax only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wing of Kursk protrusion was that Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns of tanks, burned to the ground, opened an effective fire on German armored machines. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them in some areas to pierce Soviet defense and wed up into combat orders of parts of the Red Army. However, the rapid breakthrough did not work. Overcoming the first defensive line, German tank units were forced to seek help to saperes: all the space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in mineral fields were well shot by artillery. While the German tank worms were waiting for sappers, their combat vehicles were exposed to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to keep the domination in the air. All over the battlefield appeared Soviet attack aircraft - famous IL-2.

Only for the first day of the battles, the grouping of the model, acting on the northern wing of Kursk speakers, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks participating in the first strike. Soviet losses were also great: only two companies of the German "tigers" who were against the strength of the central front, were destroyed for the period 5 - 6, 111 T-34 tanks. By July 7, the Germans, moving a few kilometers ahead, came to a large settlement of Ponyry, where the powerful battle between the shock parts 20, 2 and the 9th German tank divisions with the compounds of the Soviet 2nd tank and the 13th armies were established. The result of this battle became extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern shock group was forced to stop. Promulously forward just 10 - 15 km, the model in the end lost the impact power of his tank parts and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

In the meantime, on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion, an event developed in a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the Germanized Motorized Compounds "Great Germany", "Reich", "Dead Head", Leibstandart "Adolf Hitler", a few tank divisions of the 4th tank army Gota and Kempf Group managed to embry on Soviet defense to 20 and more than a few The offensive was initially in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong counteraction of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, the 6th Guards Army and other associations on this site, the Commander of the Army Group "South" von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It is from this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War has ringed, in which up to a thousand two hundred tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both parties.

Battle under Prokhorovka - the concept is largely collective. The fate of the opposing parties was decided not in one day and not in the same field. The theater of combat operations for Soviet and German tank compounds represented a terrain of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, this battle largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Kursk battle, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Ortamistrov from the composition of the steppe front to the assistance of the Troops of the Voronezh Front, who was delivered to the opponent's opponent's tank parts and make them move themselves at the initial positions. He emphasized, the need to attempt to join the German tanks in the near battle to limit their advantages in the armor and the firepower of the tower guns.

Focusing in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, in the morning of July 10, the Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they were superior to the enemy in the ratio of approximately 3: 2, but the fighting qualities of German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty parts" even on the approach to their positions. Fights continued here in the morning until evening. Soviet tanks broken forward met with Germanic practically armor to armor. But this was just a command of the 5th Guards Army. Moreover, soon the fighting orders of opponents were mixed so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to substitute their side armor under the fire, which was not so durable as the frontal. When the battle by the end began on July 13, finally, it was time to calm the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army practically lost its fighting impact. But the German losses did not allow them to continue to develop an offensive at the Prokhorov direction: the Germans remained in the system of all up to 250 good combat vehicles.

The Soviet command has hurriedly transfer new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that lasted in the area 13 and 14 July did not lead to a decisive victory of one or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually exit. In stock, Germans had the 24th tank corps, but send it to the battle meant to lose the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably large. On July 15, the rate decided to introduce the Southern Wing of the Kursk protrusion of the power of the steppe front of General I. Koniev - the 27th and 53rd armies with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks strongly focused on the northeastern Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go to the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in the new oncoming battle. German parts began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

On July 13, Hitler invited himself at the meeting on the meeting of Field Marshals. On that day, he ordered to continue the operation of the "Citadel" and not to reduce the heat of battles. Success under Kursk seemed to be no longer outside the corner. However, in just two days of Hitler, a new disappointment has suffered. His plans collapsed. July 12 switched to the offensive of the troops of Bryansky, and then, from July 15, the central and left wings of Western fronts in the general direction to the eagle (Operation "). The German defense could not stand here and shut up on the seams. Moreover, some territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion were negated after the battle under Prokhorovka.

At the meeting at the Führera rate on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt the "Citadel" operation. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion (although it was no longer possible on the northern wing of the protrusion). But the new efforts of the Manstein grouping did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the Command of the Ground Forces of Germany ordered the 2nd Tank Corps of the SS from the composition of the Army Army Group. Manstein did not have anything else, how to retreat.

Battle's move. Offensive

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle under Kurk began. July 12 - 15 switched to the offensive Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, and on August 3, after the Troops of Voronezh and Steppe Fronts dropped the enemy to the initial positions on the southern wing of Kursk speakers, they began to implement Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation (Operation "Rumyantsev "). Fights on all sites continued to wear an extremely complex and fierce character. The situation was also complicated by the fact that in the strip of the onset of Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the center of the central front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were not applied on weak, but according to the strong section of enemy defense. This decision was made in order to maximize the time of preparation for offensive actions, to catch the enemy by surprise, i.e., at that moment, when he was already exhausted, but did not yet occupy a strong defense. The breakthrough forward was carried out by powerful shock groups at narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aviation.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, competent use in battles of military equipment could not not lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Eagle and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war in Moscow, an artillery salute was made in honor of the valiant compounds of the Red Army, who won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, part of the Red Army, the enemy was dropped to the West for 140-150 km and released Kharkov a second time.

Wehrmacht lost in the Kursk battle of 30 selected divisions, including 7 tanks; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. There were even bigger losses of Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; Over 6 thousand tanks and sau; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the ratio of forces on the front has changed in favor of the Red Army. At its disposal there was an incomparably more fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The onset of the Red Army after entering into the battle of new connections continued to increase its pace. In the central portion of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts to Smolensk began. This old Russian city, who was considered since the XVII century. Gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, part of the Red Army in October 1943 came to the Dnieper in the Kiev district. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, Soviet troops carried out an operation to free the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was shot over Kiev.

It would be wrong to assert that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Kursk battle, the continued onset of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kiev, the enemy managed to apply powerful counterdads in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr on the advanced compounds of the 1st Ukrainian Front and to cause us a considerable damage, suspending the offensive of the Red Army in the Right Bank of Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more intense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, the Soviet troops came out by November 1943 to the areas of East Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, followed by the attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the rigid defense of the German Army Group "Center" did not led to any significant results. It was necessary to focus on the Minsk direction additional forces, to leisurely exhausted in previous battles of compounds and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for the new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944

And in 1943, Victory near Kurk and then in the battle for the Dnieper, they completed a radical fracture in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered the final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were in a state of war with the mains of the axis. The disintegration of the fascist block began. Among the remarkable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943. The soldiers and commander awards are the orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order "Victory", as well as in the sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. There was still a long and bloody struggle in front, but the root fracture has already happened.

Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Kursk battle was indeed the last attempt of the Germans to play the situation back. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicts a major defeat of the Red Army under Kharkov in early spring of 1943, the Germans received another "chance" to play a summer offensive map according to the samples of 1941 and 1942.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like Wehrmacht, was worse than biennial prescription. Two years of the bloody meat grinder did not pass for him for him, plus a wire with the beginning of the offensive to Kursk, made the fact of the offensive apparent for the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the errors of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily lost the right to start the offensive actions in order to urge They are in defense, and then smooth shock groups.

In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning of the Soviet leadership since the beginning of the war increased. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the "citadel" once again showed, the sedimentation of this level in Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic position with obviously insufficient means.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, did not give special illusions about the battle decisive for Germany, arguing in his memoirs, that if everything had developed differently, it would be possible to somehow jump off the USSR on a draw, that is, in fact Recommended that after Stalingrad, it was not about the victory for Germany.

In theory, the Germans of course could sell our defense and go to the coupie, surrounding a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful formation for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, for The military production of Germany by 1943 was already clearly inferior to the Soviet, and the need to close the "Italian hole" did not give the opportunity to collect any major forces to maintain further offensive actions on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to fool themselves an illusion of even such victory. Impact groups were bleed during a week of heavy defensive fights, and then rolled out the skating rink of our offensive, which since the summer of 1943 it was practically not stopped, no matter how many Germans would continue.

In this regard, the Kursk battle is indeed one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the soldiers and tens of thousands of combat equipment units. It was finally demonstrated to the whole world and, above all to the Soviet people, that Germany is doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this epocal battle and those who survived in it, reaching the Kursk to Berlin.

Below - a selection of photographs of the Kursk battle.

Commander of the Central Front General Army K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Military Council of the Front General Major K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the battle on the Kursk arc. 1943.

Soviet sappers establish TM-42 anti-tank mines before the front edge of the defense. Central Front, Kursk Arc, July 1943

The transfer of "Tigers" for the operation "Citadel".

Manstein and his generals "at work."

German adjustr. Rear RSO tracked tractor.

Construction of defensive structures on a Kursk arc. June 1943.

On a privala.

On the eve of the Kursk battle. Battering infantry with tanks. Red Army women in the trench and tank T-34, which overcomes the trench by passing over them. 1943.

German machine gunner with MG-42.

Panthers "are preparing for the" Citadel "operation.

Self-propelled Gaubes "VsePE" ("Wespe") of the 2nd battalion of the Artillery Regiment "Great Germany" on the march. Operation "Citadel", July 1943.

German tanks pz.kpfw.III before the start of the operation "Citadel" in the Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the tank column "Revolutionary Mongolia") and the attached landing on vacation. Kursk arc, 1943 year.

Rain in German trenches.

The peasant woman tells Soviet reconnaissance about the location of the enemy parts. North of the city of Eagle, 1943.

Starin V. Sokolova, Sannaster of the Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Parts of the Red Army. Orlovsk direction. Kursk arc, summer of 1943.

German 105-mm SAU "VESPE" (SD.KFZ.124 WESPE) from the 74th regiment of the Vehchite Self-propelled artillery of the 2nd Tank Division, passing next to the thrown Soviet 76-mm UIS-3 gun in the city of Orel. German offensive operation "Citadel". Oryol region, July 1943.

"Tigers" go to the attack.

Photocrust of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and Cameraman I. Malov are shot by interrogation of the captured Ober-Efreitor A. Baushhof, voluntarily over the direction of the Red Army. Interrogation leads Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator IONES (in the center). Orlovsk-Kursk Direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on a Kursk arc. From above, part of the B-IV radio-controlled tank case is visible.

Destroyed by Soviet artillery German robots-robots B-IV and pz.kpfw management tanks. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Interior FAS Kursk Arc (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing sapper demolitions (Sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the storming gun of Stug III AUSF F. Kursk arc, 1943.

Dried Soviet Tank T-60.

Lights sau "Ferdinand". July 1943, Ponyry village.

Two trimmed "Ferdinand" from the 654th battalion's headquarters. Station area Ponyry, July 15-16, 1943. On the left of the staff "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with a bottle with a kerosene mixture after shell was damaged by the shell.

Heavy assault tool "Ferdinand", destroyed by direct hit of air bombs from the Soviet picing bomber PE-2. Tactical number is unknown. District station Ponyry and Assistant "May 1".

Heavy assault tool "Ferdinand", the onboard number "723" from the composition of the 654th division (battalion), beaten in the area of \u200b\u200bthe state farm "1st May". The caterpillar is destroyed by the caterpillar and is riveted to the gun. The car was part of the "Major's shock group" in the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

The tank column moves to the front.

Tigers "from the composition of the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyusha lead fire.

Tiger Tanks of the Tank Division of the SS "Das Reich".

The company of American Tanks M3S "General Lee", which was delivered to the USSR on Land Lizu, put forward to the front edge of the Defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk arc, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers have a shot down "Panthers". July 1943.

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", onboard number "731", chassis number 150090 from the composition of the 653rd division, undermined on mine in the defense strip of the 70th Army. Later, this car was sent to the exhibition of trophy technicians to Moscow.

SAU SU-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed in the first battle during the Kursk battle of 10 enemy tanks.

Tanks T-34-76 support infantry attack at the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry before the tiger tank rank.

Attack T-34-76 under Belgorod. July 1943.

Those abandoned under Prokhorovka faulty "Panthers" 10th "Pantherbrigada" of a tank shelf von Lahukht.

German observers are watching the course of battle.

Soviet infantrymen are covered by the body of the destroyed "panther".

Soviet mortar calculation changes the firing position. Bryansk front, Oryol destination. July 1943.

The SS Grenader looks at the just beaten T-34. Probably he was destroyed by one of the first modifications of the "Parcelfaust", which were first widely used on the Kursk arc.

Baked German tank pz.kpfw. V Modifications D2, shot down during the operation "Citadel" (Kursk arc). This photo is interested in what the signature is present - "Ilyin" and the date "26/7". Probably, this is the name of the commander of the gun, which swept the tank.

The advanced divisions of the 285th Rifle Regiment of the 183rd Rifle Division are fighting with an opponent in captured German trenches. In the foreground, the body of a killed German soldier. Kursk battle, July 10, 1943.

SOP Division SOP "Liebe Stand Adolf Hitler" at the t-34-76 tank. July 7, area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Psesel.

Soviet tanks at the turn of attack.

Podted PZ IV and PZ VI tanks under Kurk.

Squadron pilots "Normandy-Neman".

Reflection of tank attack. District of the village of Ponyry. July 1943.

Dressed "Ferdinand". Near the corpses of his crew.

Artilleryrs are fighting.

Chuckled German technique during battles at the Kursk direction.

The German tanker examines the trail from getting into the frontal projection "Tiger". July, 1943.

Red Army launches next to a mounted dive bomber Yu-87.

Chuck "Panther". In the form of trophy reached the Kursk.

Machine gunners on a Kursk arc. July 1943.

SAU MARDER III and bubbergrenaders on the starting line before attack. July 1943.

Broken "Panther". The tower broke the explosion of the wip.

Burning German sau "Ferdinand" from the composition of the 656th regiment on the Oryol Farc of the Kursk Arc, July 1943. The photo is made through the hatch of the mechanic-driver of the PZ.KPFW tank control. III tanks-robots b-4.

Soviet soldiers have a shot down "Panthers". The tower is visible a huge platoon from 152-mm "Zvestica".

The burned tanks of the column "for Soviet Ukraine." At the torn explosion of the tower, the inscription "For Radyancy Ukraine" (for Soviet Ukraine) is visible.

Killed German tanker. In the background, the Soviet Tank T-70.

Soviet soldiers inspect the German heavy self-propelled-artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank fighters (Ferdinand) during the Kursk battle. The photo is also interesting for the 1943 steel helmet SS-36 on the soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers at the stuffed assault tool Stug III.

The German Tank Robot Robot B-IV and the German Motorcycle with the BMW R-75 stroller. 1943.

SAU "Ferdinand" after detonation of the wip.

The calculation of the anti-tank gun leads fire on enemy tanks. July 1943.

In the picture, the gentled German average tank PZKPFW IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

Commander Tank Pz.KPFW VI "Tiger" №323 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks Onther-Officer Fütermister (Futermeister) shows a trace from the Soviet projectile on the armor of his tank-Feldfel Hydenu (Heiden). Kursk arc, July 1943.

Making combat task. July 1943.

Picking front-line bombers PE-2 on a combat course. Orlovsk-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty "tiger". On the Kursk arc, the Germans carried significant losses due to the sky breakdowns of their technology.

T-34 goes to the attack.

The division "Das Reich" British tank "Das Reich" captured by the Churchipl British Tank "Das Reich" division.

Pt-saau Marder III on the march. Operation "Citadel", July 1943.

and the foreground on the right side of the Soviet tank T-34, then the left edge of the German pz.kpfw photo from the left edge. VI "Tiger", in the distance another T-34.

Soviet fighters examine the exploded German tank PZ IV AUSF G.

The fighters of the division of senior lieutenant A. Buraka with the support of artillery lead the offensive. July 1943.

The German prisoner of war on the Kursk arc in a broken 150mm infantry gun Sig.33. On the right lies the killed German soldier. July 1943.

Orlovsk direction. Fighters under the cover of tanks go to the attack. July 1943.

The German units, as part of which T-34-76 trophy Soviet tanks are preparing for an attack during the Kursk battle. July 28, 1943.

Ron's soldiers (Russian Liberation People's Army) among the prisoners of Red Army. Kursk arc, July-August 1943.

Soviet T-34-76 tank pitched in the village on a Kursk arc. August, 1943.

Under the enemy shelling, tankers pull off the t-34 of the battlefield.

Soviet fighters rise to the attack.

Division officer "Great Germany" in the trench. The end of July-beginning of August.

Participant of battles on the Kursk Dug Scout, Guard Senior Sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo was captured by Lieutenant Nikolay Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

Column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German soldiers from the SS troops in the trench with the MG-42 machine gun during the "Citadel" operation. Kursk arc, July-August 1943.

Left anti-aircraft self-propelled installation SD.KFZ. 10/4 on the basis of a half-car tractor with a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun Flak 30. Kursk arc, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol Direction, 1943.

A sovetalk T-34-76 Soviet tank T-34-76 and a killed tanker.

Column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.

German anti-tank guns Pak 35/36 captured on the Kursk arc. In the background, the Soviet truck ZIS-5, towing a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun 61-k. July 1943.

Soldiers of the 3rd division of the SS "Totenkopf" ("Dead Head") discuss the plan for defensive actions with the commander "Tiger" from the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks. Kursk arc, July-August 1943.

Captive Germans in the Kursk area.

Commander Tank, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the tower of the German tank "Tiger", beaten by the crew of Smelov, Lieutenant Lichniakevich (having kicked the fascist tank in the last battle). This hole made an ordinary armor-piercing projectile from a 76 mm tank gun.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German tiger tank fell.

Trofy Kursk battle.

German heavy assault tool "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition together with the crew soldiers of the Soviet 129th Orlovsky Rifle Division. August 1943.

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Infantry Division enters the liberated Belgorod.