The largest battle of World War II. The first tank battle of World War II

"Admiral Graf Spea" became the third German "pocket linker", built after the cruisers "Doychland" ("Lutsz") and "Admiral Sheer". In the first months, the Second World War he was unpunished to the British trade vessels, becoming the most famous ship of his type. And the results of its first and last battle give a rich material for analyzing the effectiveness of artillery weapons and armor protection of German hard cruisers.Why is the fight with La Plata and its results still cause so hot disputes?

At the time of the beginning of World War II, the heavy cruiser "Admiral Graf Spea" under the command of Captain-TsUR-Zee Hans Langsdorf was in Central Atlantic. He received an order for the opening of the cruising war, he received only on September 25, 1939 - until this point, Hitler was still counting on peacefully to settle the conflict with the UK. The war was to be conducted strictly according to the prizes of the rules, so there was no speech about unexpected artillery or torpedo attacks.

Almost two and a half months "Spea" and "Doychland" together with several supplies courts operated in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. For their search, the British and French had to highlight 3 linear cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 9 heavy and 5 lung cruisers. In the end, the group "G" of Commodore Henry Harwood (the heavy cruiser "Exeter", the lung cruiser "Ajax" and "Achilles") intercepted "Spea" off the coast of South America, close to the mouth of the La Plata River.

This fight has become one of the few classic artillery marine battles of the Second World War, giving a visual illustration for the old spike that more efficiently - the caliber of the guns or the weight of the volley?

"Admiral Graf Spea" passes through the Kiel Canal, 1939
Source - Johannes-heyen.de.

According to the total displacement, the three British cruisers exceeded the "sleeper" by about twice, by weight of a minute volley - more than one and a half times. In order to extend to achieve their part, some British researchers compared the weight of a one-time volley of the ships without taking into account the shooting pace - these figures reached the Soviet press and for some time disoriented fans of naval history. According to this data, the ship by standard displacement 12,540 tales turned out to be more powerful than three cruisers with total standard displacement of 22,400 tons.

Scheme of a heavy cruiser "Admiral Graf Spea", 1939
Source - A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Supalkov. German combat ships, 1939-1945. St. Petersburg, 1995.

"Spea" of the use of only six guns, but 283-mm caliber, issued per minute 4500 kg of metal. In addition, he had eight-150-mm guns in the lungs placed four on board (another 2540 kg of metal per minute, 1270 kg per board).

Feed Tower "Admiral Count Spea"
Source - Commons.Wikimedia.org.

Exeter also has six guns, but only 203 mm, since it was originally considered to scout a class "B", and not "a". The weight of his minute volley was only 2780 kg - two more times less than the enemy. The same type "Ajax" (Harwood flag) and Achilles had an eight-152-mm guns in two-handed towers and at maximum rapidity (8 shots per minute) could be released per minute of 3260 kg of metal (more than the flagship). Thus, the total side volley of the British squadron was 9300 kg, that is, exceeded the Spea volley, if not two, then at least one and a half times (taking into account the fact that the average caliber "German" could fire on board only a half guns) . Undoubtedly, the "sleeper" was much better protected, but there was a smaller speed on 5 knots. Thus, there was a classic example of a "asymmetric" battle, in which each side had its advantages.

One against three

The opponents discovered each other in the morning of December 13, 1939, almost simultaneously (about 5:50 GRINVICH), but the Germans realized that before them - the combat ships. True, they took the lung cruisers for the destroyers, so the Rader willingly moved to rapprochement. In the first minutes of fire, no one opened, although the distance was a little more than hundreds of cable.

At 6:14, Commodore Harwood gave an order to divide to take an opponent in "ticks". The heavy "Exeter" moved right on the "German", going to the left of him, while both light cruisers went on a wide arc, bypassing the opponent to the right and holding a large distance from him. This mannewer looks strange: holding a distance in a hundred cable, the British had little chance to get into the enemy, while the enemy 283-mm cannons remained very dangerous for them. On the contrary, the most effective tactics for them was quickly reduced distance and approach such a distance when 152-mm shells will be able to break through the "Spea" side. In addition, this would allow the British to use torpedo devices - the Germans were afraid of such an opportunity (the behavior of Lyuttsov and Hipper's behavior in the New Year's battle on December 31, 1942). "Exeter" really shot the torpedoes at the beginning of the battle, but "Ajax" used them only at the end of the battle (about 7:30), when the distance was reduced to 50 cab; A little earlier, one torpedo released a "sleeper". Even if the torpedoes did not fall into a German cruiser, evading them, one way or another, would lower the accuracy of his shooting.

English cruiser "Ajax" and "Exeter" (in the background). Montevideo, November 1939

In turn, "Exeter", with its longer-range guns, did not have any need to reduce the distance. The only explanation for his maneuver is that the British exaggerated the protection of the "Admiral Graf Spea Admiral" and tried to approach him closer. However, this does not justify the separation of forces: alone, a heavy cruiser was significantly inferior to the "pocket linous". In addition, entering different sides, the British allowed the enemy to introduce all eight 150-mm guns instead of four.

The first phase of the battle: a crushing blow to the "extere"

At 6:18 Spea opened fire on the "extere" from the nasal tower of the main caliber from the distance of about 90 cab. "Exeter" responded at 6:20 - first of two nasal towers, then, trusting to the left, pulled the feed tower into effect. At 6:21 started the shooting "Ajax", at 6:23 am "Achilles". All British ships led the fire by half-blooded shells ("Common") - for 203-mm guns, it was quite justified, but 152-mm shells did not have a chance to punch the German armor. It would be more logical to use fugasic shells who had a greater strike effect, but at the beginning of the war the British were simply not enough.

The Germans shot "Lestenka" - they gave the next volley, without waiting for the fall of the previous one - but for greater accuracy, the fire from the towers first, and switched to full six-sieves volleys after achieving the first covering. At first, the sleeper was shot by half-breeding shells, but after the first covers, I went to the fugasic instantive action: The main artilleryman of the German cruiser Paul Asher hoped to achieve the maximum defeat, considering the protection of the "Exeter" to the weak and incomplete.

Gravity cruiser "Exeter" in 1941

"Exeter" was covered by the third voltage, having received substantial fragmentation damage to unprotected equipment (in particular, an aircraft on the catapult was destroyed). The fourth volley gave one hit in the nasal part, but the half-armored 283-mm projectile penetrated the body through, did not have time to explode. The next hit was as low as the result - perhaps the Germans noticed this and therefore moved to the shooting of fugasic shells.

A 283-mm FUGE HERE FOUNTED TO "Exeter" (at 6:25) exploded, hitting the second tower - her light 25-mm armor broke was not, but the tower still failed before the end of the battle. The fragments twisted people on the bridge (the commander of the ship Capten Frederick Bell miraculously survived), and the cruiser lost his control for a while, and most importantly, the artillery fire management system was faced. It is unlikely that even an armor-piercing projectile could cause greater damage.

After that, the "sleeper" divided the fire, alternating the nasal tower on the lung cruiser - especially since after 6:30 Exeter was hidden by a smoke curtain. The distance to the new goal at this point was about 65 cab. At 6:40 283-mm, the projectile exploded at the Forshvnya "Achilles", damaging the command-range point and wounding the commander of the Edward Perry's ship (some sources write about the injury of an artillery officer), as well as disappointing a radio station that violated communication with the adjustment aircraft . Shortly thereafter, two other shells got into the "Exeter": one of them disappeared the first tower (and the charge caught fire, and in the avoidance of the explosion, the British had to flood her cellar), and the second body penetrated the body over the belt, destroyed the radio and exploded under Deck from left side. The second hit launched a 102-mm tool and caused a fire in the trails of the first shots.

La Fair fight on December 13, 1939
Source - S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Volume 1. M.: Milivdat, 1967

At 6:42 PM, the last shell came to the "Exeter" - the place of hit is unknown, but, apparently, it was in the nose in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Waterlinia, since by the end of the battle the cruiser had a meter differential on the nose and roll on the left side, and his The speed decreased to 17 nodes, although the machines remained intact. Finally, at 7:30 pm water closed the power cables of the feed tower and brought it out of the order - the cruiser lost his entire artillery.

In response, "Spea" received only two 203-mm projectiles from Exeter. One of them pierced the high tower-like superstructure and did not explode. But the second from the distance approximately 65 Kaby entered on the side almost at right angles (at that moment the "sleeper" turned back to the left, from 6:22 to 6:25 by changing the course by almost 90 °), selected 100 mm armor to the top of the belt over armor Deck, then struck the 40mm upper longitudinal bulkhead and in a very sharp corner with a 20-mm armored deck, where he exploded in the product pantry. The main fire industry was interrupted, a local fire arose, but in general the German ship was lucky: damage was insignificant. The booking system was worked out - it can be argued that it provided protection from 203-mm armor-piercing shells at a distance of at least 65 cabins and in the angles close to 90 °.

The second phase of the battle: "Spere" against light cruisers

At about 6:45 pm "Spea" suffered all his fire on the lung cruisers, who have long shot on him and achieved several hits (though, practically not affecting damage). Before them, at that moment there were about 90 kids, and this distance increased, since the "drier" left the British exactly on the traverse. Seeing this, Harwood, who was on Ajax, ordered his ships to unfold and catch up with the enemy, still holding him the right.

At 6:55, Harwood ships rejected to 30 ° to the left to put into action all their towers. At this point, distance between opponents was 85-90 cab. According to the Anglicis, after that, the second volley gave hit, but the German ship began to maneuver, knocking down the sight. After 7:10, the "Spea" again shot again for the "extere" from the smoke from the smoke from a distance of 70 cab, but did not achieve.

The actions of the German commander were extremely unsuccessful - maneuvering, Langesdorf prevented shooting not only the enemy, but also his own commanders. At the same time, Harwood, using the advantage at speed, has steadily reduced the distance, and this brought more benefits to light cruisers, all 152-mm guns of which were now entered into action.

Light cruiser "Ajax" in 1939
Source - S. Pattyan, A. Dashyan, K. Balakin. All cruiser World War II. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

Due to the high speed of shooting and the presence of an aircraft, the British, the British has already begun to achieve an increasing number of hits. By 7:10 in the "Spea" fell from 4 to 6 shells. One landed in 150 mm installing No. 3, destroying it together with the calculation, the other fell into the stern of armor citadel, killed two people, but did not bother (in English data, it was a training brave). Two more projectiles fell into a tower-like superstructure: one exploded over the top director of the main caliber (three people died, but the damage was minimal again), the other destroyed the right range finder and caused damage to the directories of the zenith and chief calibers (for a while the connection of the latter with the towers was violated) . The explosion was dismissed a weakly protected system for the supply of shells to the nasal group of 150-mm guns.

To get close to the enemy, after 7:10, Harwood changed the course, and now only the nasal towers can shoot his cruisers. At this time, the German ship was also to the British strictly fodder. As a result, despite the reducing distance, the hit stopped. However, at 7:16 pm "Spea" began maneuvering by entering into operation both towers and having achieved covers. The distance between the opponents began to quickly shrink.

The British were shot again: one of their projectile fell into the feed part "Spere" and disabled the equipment of the remote control of torpedo devices, one more disabled a 105-mm universal installation, and the third exploded at the base of the catapult, destroying the aircraft standing on it. Two more projectiles fell into the fodder tower, without harming her. Finally, it is known that one of the 152-mm shells fell into the surface of the armored belt (thickness - 100 mm) in the area of \u200b\u200bthe fodder, but did not break it.

At 7:25 German 283-mm projectile with a distance of about 50 hub through the barbet of the third towers "Ajax" and hit the barbet of the fourth tower, to dismiss both (at the same time it is not clear whether the explosion occurred). At the same time, the feed was faced with one of the guns in the second tower. Only three whole tools remained on the cruiser, but Harwood did not leave the battle.

Mutual maneuvers again shot down the tip of both parties for a while, but at 7:34 from the distance in 40 Spea Bab again achieved the coverage: fragments from a close rupture were demolished on Ajax, the top of the mast along with the antennas (S. Roskill describes it as hitting And relates at 7:38).

"Admiral Graf Spea" enters the Montevideo raid after the fight
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruiser types "Doychland" and "Admiral Hipper". M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

During this period, the fight "Spea" received at once three in the superstructure that destroyed the galley, but again there were no effect on serious damage. Another projectile fell into the nasal tower, without breaking through her armor, but, according to some data, the encoding of the average tool - perhaps temporarily.

The ammunition began to approach the ships of both sides, they shot more slowly and carefully, so no one has achieved hits. On Ajax, there were 7 killed and 5 wounded, on Achilles - 4 killed and 7 wounded. At 7:42, Harwood put a smoke veil, and under her cover, the British ships described a zigzag to dramatically increase the distance to the enemy. The British have tried not to release a German ship from the species, but at the same time hold on to him at a distance of a bowl of cable, and in the end "conducted" the enemy almost to the Montevideo.

Results of the battle

For all the time the battle in the "sleeper" fell two 203 mm and up to eighteen 152-mm shells. The latter is explained by the large number and high speed of six-inch guns: for a minute, the British cruisers could release over hundreds of shells and the side of the battle was almost exhausted. But the 203-mm experiencing "Exeter" could release only two ten per minute, and in the fire fight, he did not participate until the end of the collision.

Not all 152-mm shells rendered at least some impact on the "sleeper". Part of them did not explode, and some just passed through a high superstructure without much harm to the ship.

Damage received by "admiral CHEE Count" during the battle of La fees
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruiser types "Doychland" and "Admiral Hipper". M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

There are also places and consequences of 14 shells from 18 (they are described above). At least one projectile (perhaps more) got into the main belt, without breaking through it. Three shells fell in the Tower of the main caliber, which had 140-mm forehead (one - in the nasal, two - in the feed), also without breaking the armor and only temporarily disappointing one 283-mm gun. A more or less serious effect has entered only two 152-mm shells: one of them destroyed a 150-mm gun, the other disabled the supply of 150-mm shells and broke the control of the fire of the main caliber for some time. It is known that the "sleeper" had two holes with an area of \u200b\u200babout 0.5 m2 each (above the waterline and at the level of it), completely disposable in the sea. Thus, the main impact of six-tech shells affected only on the deck and superstructures of the German ship.

Impact of the 203rd shells turned out to be even less significant. One of them also passed through the superstructure, because the British used semi-convertible shells. Another (most likely, not "Common", and purely armor-piercing) fell into a "sleeper" at a very good angle, struck the belt and inner bulkhead, but exploded on a 20-mm armor deck.

Most of the German losses in people accounted for 152-mm shells: 36 people were killed (including one officer), another 58 - injured (though most of them are easy). However, damage to the ship itself practically did not reduce his vitality and very poorly influenced its combat capability. At the same time, the fact of almost complete breakdown of armor says that the real danger to the survivability of the "pocket linous" (at least in theory) was represented only by 203 mm shells.

The impact of the German 283-mm shells on the British ships was much more tangible. Although "Spea", even by leading fire to all the board, could issue a minute of no more than twelve shells of the main caliber, six such shells fell into Exeter (though, two of them were silent the tip and did not explode). As a result, the British heavy cruiser lost all artillery, reduced the move and accepted a significant amount of water, and its receipt could not stop for quite a long time. 61 people died on the ship (including 5 officers), and another 34 sailors were injured. If Langsdorf acted more decisively, did not "dor" his ship from side to the side and constantly did not change the goals, he would not have much difficulty to focus and sink "podrance" (in extreme cases, torpedoes).

Blurred and burning "switch"
Source - Illustrated London News, Dec. 30, 1939.

Spere shooting on light cruisers turned out to be much less successful - in fact, the Germans achieved only one hit by the main caliber in Ajax and two very close falls, mainly caused damage to the management and communication systems of both cruisers (in particular, at some time were broken Communication with the adjustment). But only one successfully hit the 283-mm projectile launched half the artillery of the flagship "Ajax", forcing Harwood to actually stop the artillery fight. It is noteworthy that the 150-mm "Spea" guns did not produce any hit - partly because the control system of their fire acted much worse (in many ways, due to the fact that they had limited angles of the tip and when maneuvering the ship were forced to constantly change goals).

In general, the second half of the battle (a fight with light cruisers) "Spea" spent markedly worse than the first one. The British have achieved twice the larger percentage of direct hits - and this is despite the fact that in the distance of 70-80 the German 283-mm machine should be significantly superb in an accuracy of 152-mm enemy tools. Such bad shooting is partly due to unsuccessful and ill-conceived maneuvering. On the other hand, the German 283-mm shell hit the enemy more damage to the enemy more damage than two dozen English 152-mm shells - the Spea itself.

Flooded "Spea". Photo taken by the British in 1940
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruiser types "Doychland" and "Admiral Hipper". M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The erroneous decision of Langesdorf go to Montevideo, which became a deliberate trap, was not taken due to losses and damage, and after the Spea commander received a message that 60% of the shells spent. Perhaps played a role and the psychological effect of the unsuccessful stroke of the second phase of the battle, which started so promising for the Germans. On the evening of December 17, 1939, Spea was blown up and flooded with his own team in neutral waters in four kilometers from the Uruguayan coast. The commander of the ship Langsdorf shot himself. This also testifies to the emotional instability of the German commander, which prevented him to adequately lead the fight and achieve victory.

Bibliography:

1. V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruiser types "Doychland" and "Admiral Hipper". M.: Yauza, ESCMO, 2012
2. S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Volume 1. M.: Milivdat, 1967
3. http://www.navweaps.com

In Stalingrad, the course of world history made a steep turn

In the Russian military history, the battle near Stalingrad has always been considered the most outstanding and significant event of the Great Patriotic and World War II. The highest assessment of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Stalingrad battle gives modern world historiography. "At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as a decisive battle of not only the Second World War, but also the epoch in general," the British historian J. Berertc emphasizes.

During the Great Patriotic War there were other, no less brilliant victories of Soviet - and in their strategic results, and in terms of military art. So why are Stalingrad singled out among them? In connection with the 70th anniversary of the Stalingrad battle, I would like to reflect about it.

The interests of historical science, the development of cooperation between peoples require to release military history from the spirit of confrontation, submit to the study of scientists in the interests of the deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of the Second World War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that someone wants to falsify the history of the Second World War, "re-sell" the war on paper.

About the Stalingrad battle is very written. Therefore, there is no need to retell its move in detail. Historians and the military fairly wrote that its exodus was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the fall of 1942, the high level of the commander of its command personnel, the mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers, the unity and dedication of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that our strategy, operational art and tactics during this battle made a new major step forward in their development, enriched in new provisions.

Play of Parties for 1942

When discussing at the expense of the Supreme Command (VGK) in March 1942, the Plans for the Summer Campaign, General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov proposed the main way of action to consider the transition to strategic defense.

Zhukov considered it possible to undertake private offensive actions only in the Western Front strip. Semen Tymoshenko proposed, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. At the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov about this suggestion, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin said: "Do not sit in defense in defense, do not wait for the Germans to strike first! It is necessary to apply a number of proactive shocks on a wide front and swell the readiness of the enemy. "

As a result, it was decided to take a number of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, at the Loan and Smolensk directions, in the districts of Leningrad and Demyansk.

As for the plans of the German command, then one time it was believed that it puts its main goal of mastering Moscow by deep bypass from the south. But in reality, according to the Directive of the Fuhrer and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Germany, Hitler No. 41 dated April 5, 1942, the main purpose of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was the mastering of the Donbass, Caucasian Oil and by violating communications in the depths of the country to deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these regions.

First, when applying a strike in the south, conditions were created to achieve suddenness and more favorable opportunities to achieve success, because Nashk in 1942 again expected the main strike of the enemy in the Moscow direction, and the main forces and reserves were concentrated here. There was no infant and a German disinformation plan "Kremlin".

Secondly, at the occurrence of the German troops at the Moscow direction, the German troops would have to break through the pre-prepared, deep-legged defense with the prospect of conducting protracted hostilities. If in 1941, near Moscow, German Wehrmachut could not overcome the resistance to the retreating losses of the Red Army, he was all the more difficult to count on the seizure of Moscow in 1942. At that time, in the south, in the area of \u200b\u200bKharkov, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops of the German army, our significantly weakened forces were opposed; It was here that the most vulnerable site of the Soviet Front was the most vulnerable.

Thirdly, when applying the main strike of the German army in the Moscow direction and even at the thin end of the mastering of Moscow (which was unlikely), withholding the Soviet troops of extremely important areas in the south created conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.

All this suggests that the strategic plans of the Hitler's command mainly correctly took into account the established situation. But even at the same time, the condition of the troops of Germany and its satellites would not be able to move so far and reach the Volga, if there were no major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of the opponent's possible strike, inconsistency and indecision in choosing a method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to move to strategic defense, on the other hand, a number of unprepared and unsecured financial offensive operations were taken. This led to spraying forces, and our army turned out to be unprepared for defense nor to the offensive. Whatever enough, but Soviet troops were again in the same indefinite position as in 1941.

And in 1942, despite the defeats of 1941, the ideological cult of the offensive doctrine was so continued to crush, the underestimation of defense, her false understanding was so deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Soviet command, which were shy as something unworthy for the Red Army and did not solve in full use.

In the light of the parties discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad Strategic Operation was interrelated part of the entire strategic action system of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in the separation from other operations carried out in the West direction. This also applies to the operation "Mars" of 1942, the essence of which is most perverted, especially in American historiography.

The main remark is reduced to the fact that the main, decisive strategic operation in the fall and in the winter of 1942-1943 were not operations in the south-west, but offensive operations conducted in the Western strategic direction. The basis for such an output is the fact that it was allocated for solving problems in the south than in the west direction. But in reality, it is not entirely so, because the southern strategic direction should be taken as a whole, and not just troops under Stalingrad, including troops in the North Caucasus and the troops of the Voronezh destination, which were practically directed to the southern direction. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the West did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were southeast of Moscow and could be deployed south.

Defensive operations on the approaches to Stalingrad

The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and follows from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the approaches to Stalingrad. During this period, there were most omissions and disadvantages in the actions of our command and troops. The military-theoretical thought still has to clarify how our army managed in catastrophically difficult conditions still restore in the summer of 1942 almost completely disturbed strategic front on the south-west direction. It is known that only on July 17 to September 30, 1942, the TGC rate sent 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades to strengthen the Stalingrad direction, including 24 tanks.

At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not put the tasks of the troops to stop the upcoming opponent only after the waste to the Volga. It repeatedly demanded to stop the enemy on a number of frontiers still on distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why didn't it succeed, despite the large number of reserves, the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, skillful actions of a number of connections and parts? Of course, there were a lot of cases of confusion and panic, especially after severe defeats and great losses of our troops in May-June 1942. To have a psychological fracture in the troops, there was a serious shake. And in this respect, the order of the People's Commissar No. 227, who gave an acute and truthful assessment of the situation and permeated by the main requirement, played his own positive role in this regard. " It was very stern and to the limit of a hard document, but forced and necessary in the conditions that were then.

Feldmarshal Friedrich Paulus preferred captivity of suicide.

The main reason for the failures of a number of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad was that in the organization of strategic defense, the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941.

After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and making a decision on defense on a particularly advantageous line, where the retreating troops were deployed with the battles, and fresh compounds from depths were tightened in advance, orders were given at all costs to keep the frontiers, even when it was impossible . Backup compounds and the incoming replenishment with the move went into battle, as a rule, to apply poorly prepared counterattacks and counterdovern. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops lost their opportunities to properly entrenched and organize defense at the new strokes.

A nervous reaction to each retreat further aggravated the already heavy, complex setting and conceded troops to new retreats.

It should also be recognized that the German troops quite skillfully led offensive actions, widely maneuvering and massively applying tank and motorized compounds on an open, tanque area. Having met resistance on one or another plot, they quickly changed the directions of strikes, seeking to go to the flank and rear of the Soviet troops whose maneuverability was significantly lower.

The formulation of unrealistic tasks, the purpose of the deadlines for the start of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum necessary time to prepare for their implementation, they were given themselves to know and when applying many counterattacks and counterdovern during defensive operations. For example, on September 3, 1942, in connection with the difficult position in the Stalingrad Front Strip, Stalin sent to the representative of the TGK telegram's bet: "Require from the commander of the troops standing north and northwest of Stalingrad, to immediately hit the enemy and come to the rescue to the Stalingrads."

There were many such telegrams and requirements. A person, at least a little sense in military affairs, it is not difficult to understand their absurdity: how can troops without minimal training and organization take and "hit" and go to the offensive. The defense activity was of great importance for sprinkling the enemy, breaking and delayed by its offensive actions. But the counterdasters could be more effective with more thorough preparation and material support.

In the course of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad, the air defense was extremely weak, and therefore had to act in the context of the significant superiority of the opponent's aviation, which especially difficult to maneuver the troops.

If at the beginning of the war, the inexperience of personnel has also affected the war, then after large losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, the problem of personnel stood even more acutely, although there were a lot of commanders who managed to harm and acquire combat experience. Many mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility on the part of commander of fronts, armies, commander of the compounds and parts were made. In their totality, they also seriously complicated the situation, but did not have such a decisive value as the miscalculations made by the VGK bid. Not to mention the fact that too frequent change of commander, commanders (only in July-August 1942, three commander of the Stalingrad Front changed) did not allow them to be mastered at the situation.

On the stability of the troops, the fear of the environment has adversely affected. A detrimental role in this regard was played by political distrust and repression against military personnel, which during retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942 came to the environment. And after the war of officers who were surrounded, did not attend military academies. The military-political authorities and the refivisions of the NKVD seemed that such an attitude to the "surripes" could be increased by the resistance of the troops. But everything was the opposite - the fear of the environment reduced the persistence of troops in defense. At the same time, it was not taken into account that the surroundings fell, as a rule, the most resistant defending troops, often as a result of neighboring deviations. It is this most dedicated part of the servicemen who was persecuted. No one for this wild and criminal incompetence suffered responsibility.

Features of the Stalingrad offensive operation

From the experience of the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943), when the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out counteroffensive, the important conclusions and lessons on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations on the surrounding and destruction of the enemy.

The strategic design of this countertime was to be concentrated by the blows of the south-western (Nikolai Vatutin), Donsky (Konstantin Rokossovsky) fronts from the north and Stalingrad Front (Andrei Eremenko) from the South Stalingrad district in the general direction to Kalach to surround and destroy the German-fascist grouping troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Far aviation and Volga Flotily also participated in the operation.

Different points of view are expressed about who owns the initial idea of \u200b\u200bcounteroffensiveness with the environment and the destruction of the essential forces of the enemy. Khrushchev, and Eremenko, and many others claimed. If we talk objectively, then this idea in general, as many participants in the war remember, literally "rushed in the air", for the configuration of the front already suggested the need to strike on the flanks of the enemy grouping under the command of Friedrich Paulus.

But the main, most difficult task was to specify and implement this idea, taking into account the established situation, how to collect and in time to focus the necessary forces and means and organize their actions where it is specifically to direct strikes and with what tasks. It can be considered the established fact that the basic idea of \u200b\u200bthis idea is definitely belongs to the BGK bet, and above all, George Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that she was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and front-line officers.

In general, I must say that the level of military art of team personnel and headquarters, combat mastery of the entire personnel in the preparation and management of offensive operations at the second stage of the Stalingrad battle was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many ways of preparing and conducting hostilities, appearing here for the first time (not always in complete form), then with great success were used in operations of 1943-1945.

Under Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and means on elected directions was carried out with great success, although not yet to such an extent as in operations of 1944-1945. Thus, on the south-western front on the breakthrough site 22 km (9% of the entire bandwidth) of 18 rifle divisions, 9 were concentrated; on the Stalingrad front on a plot 40 km (9%) of 12 divisions - 8; In addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% of artillery were concentrated in these sites. However, artillery density was only 56 tools and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough site, while in subsequent operations - 200-250 or more. In general, the highness of the preparation and suddenness of the transition to the offensive was achieved.

Essentially, for the first time during the war, there was not only a thorough planning of operations, but also carried out in the necessary scope of painstaking work on the ground with commander of all degrees to prepare hostilities, organizing interaction, combat, rear and technical support. Intelligence succeeded, although it is incomplete, open the enemy fire system, which made it possible to carry out his more reliable firing defeat than it was in previous offensive operations.

For the first time, an artillery and aviation offensive was applied, although in the methods of artillery preparation and support for the attack was not still quite clearly worked out.

For the first time before the onset on a wide front, in the bands of all armies, the fight was conducted by the fight of advanced divisions in order to clarify the location of the front edge and the enemy fire system. But in the strings of some armies, it was held in two days, and in the 21st and 57th armies - in five days before the start of the offensive, which under other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the extracted data on the enemy fire system was to significantly .

Under Stalingrad, for the first time when conducting a large offensive operation, new combat infantry orders were applied in accordance with the requirements of the order of the defense defense No. 306 - with the one-energous construction of not only units, parts, but also connections. Such a construction reduced the loss of troops, made it possible to more fully use fire facing. But at the same time, the lack of second echelons made it difficult to extend efforts to develop the offensive in depth. It was one of the reasons why the shooting divisions of the first echelon could not break through the defense of the enemy; Already at a depth of 3-4 km, the tank corps had to be introduced into the battle, which, at the situation, then the situation was forced to be forced. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations showed that in shelves and divisions, when there is an opportunity, you must certainly create second echelons.

Significantly increased material and technical support for troops. On three fronts, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated by the beginning of the counteroffensive. For example: In 1914, the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.

But if you compare with the needs of fire lesion, the November offensive operations of 1942 were relatively not fully ensured by ammunition - an average of 1.7-3.7 ammunition; South-West Front - 3.4; Donskoy - 1.7; Stalingradsky - 2. For example, in the Belarusian or Vorol-Oder operations, the provision of fronts by ammunition accounted for up to 4.5 ammunition.

According to the second stage of the Stalingrad battle associated with the actions of the troops on the destruction of the enemy's surrounded grouping and the development of the offensive on the external front, two questions arise, which various opinions are expressed.

First, some historians and military specialists believe in a serious withdrawal of the Soviet counterproactive operation under Stalingrad, the fact that it was formed a large gap between the environment of the enemy grouping and its destruction, while the classical position of military art says that the environment and the destruction of the enemy should be a single The continuous process, which is subsequently and has been achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Chisheven and some other operations. But what was done under Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if you remember that in the offensive near Moscow, under Demyansky and in other areas it was not even possible to surround the enemy, and under Kharkov in the spring of 1942, Soviet troops surrounding the enemy, They themselves went into the environment and defeated.

During the counter-offering near Stalingrad, on the one hand, all necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy during its environment, although it is necessary to take into account the major dimensions of the territory on which surrounded by an opponent was located, and the greater density of his groupings. On the other hand, the presence of a major enemy forces at the external front, striving to dress surrounded by the 6th Army of Paulus, did not allow the possibilities to focus sufficient forces to quickly eliminate surrounded by Stalingrad of the enemy troops.

In Stalingrad, the fight was for each house.

A bet of VGK was decided to combine the management of all troops engaged in the destruction of surrounded grouping, in the hands of one front. Only in mid-December 1942, a directive was received on the transfer of all troops involved in Stalingrad, to the Don Front.

Secondly, how a legitimate decision of the NGC rate on the direction of the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky for the defeat of the grouping of Erich Manstein on the Kotelnikovsky direction. As you know, initially the 2nd Guards Army was intended for action in the South-Western Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the surrounded enemy grouping. But with the appearance of the "Don" army on the Kotelnikovsky direction under the command of Manstein, a new decision was made at the request of General Yeremenko - to transfer the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front for Action on the Kotelnikovsky direction. This proposal was supported and Vasilevsky, who were at this time at the command paragraph of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army into the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the surrounded enemy grouping. Against the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front, and Nikolay Voronov also performed. After the war, he called such a decision of the "terrible miscalculation" rate of VGK.

But attentive analysis of the situation of that time with the attraction of the enemy's documents that became known for us after the war shows that the decision of the BGK rate to send the 2nd Guards Army to defeat the manstein, apparently, was more appropriate. There was no guarantee that with the connection to the Don Front of the 2nd Guards Army, it will be possible to quickly divide with the surrounded group of Powllus. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult the task was the destruction of 22 enemy divisions, consisting of up to 250 thousand people. There was a big, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of the manstein grouping and a punch towards her Pouryus army could lead to the release of the surrounded enemy grouping and breaking the further onset of the troops of the South-West and Voronezh fronts.

On the meaning of the Stalingrad battle for the course of the Second World War

In world historiography there is no single understanding of the meaning of the Stalingrad battle for the course and outcome of the Second World War. After the end of the war in Western literature, statements appeared that not the Stalingrad battle, and the victory of the Allied troops near El Alamein was the most significant turning point during World War II. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it is necessary to recognize that a large victory was obsessed with a large victory, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the general enemy. But still the battle near El Alamein cannot be made any comparison with the Stalingrad battle.

If we talk about the military-strategic side of the case, the Stalingrad battle occurred in a huge territory, almost 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation near El Alamein is on a relatively narrow African coast.

Under Stalingrad, more than 2.1 million people were participating at the Battle of Battle on both sides, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, 2.1 thousand tanks and over 2.5 thousand combat aircraft. The German command for battles near Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10,290 guns, 675 tanks and 1216 aircraft. While under Al-Alamein, the African Corps of Rommel had only 80 thousand people, 540 tanks, 1,200 guns and 350 aircraft.

The battle near Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and the battle near El Alamein is 11 days (from October 23 to November 4, 1942), not to mention the incomparableness of tension and fierce of two These battles. If under El-Alamein, the fascist unit lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand tools, then under the Stalingrad loss of Germany and its satellites were 10-15 times more. About 144 thousand people were taken captive. A 330 thousandth group of troops destroyed. Very bigger were the loss of Soviet troops - irretrievable losses amounted to 478,741 people. Many of the soldiers could be saved. But still our victims were not in vain.

Unauthorized military-political importance of events. Stalingrad battle occurred at the main European Theater of Military Activities, where the fate of the war was solved. Operation under El Alamein took place in North Africa at the Secondary Theater of Military Action; Its influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then riveted not to El Alamene, but to Stalingrad.

The victory under Stalingrad had a huge impact on the liberation movement of the peoples of the whole world. A mighty wave of the national liberation movement covered all countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.

In turn, major defeats and huge losses of the Wehrmacht under Stalingrad sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation of Germany, put it before the deepest crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and cars in the Stalingrad battle was equal, for example, the six-monthly productions of Germany plants, tools - four months, and mortars and small arms - two months. And in order to fill so large losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltage. The crisis of human reserves sharply aggravated.

The catastrophe on the Volga put his noticeable imprint on the moral state of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience of commander has increased, military crimes increased. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences endowed by the Hitler's Justice by the German servicemen increased significantly. German soldiers have become with less perseverance to conduct fighting, began to be afraid of blows from flanks and surroundings. Among the parts of politicians and representatives of the highest officers, opposition Hitler of the mood was manifested.

The victory of the Red Army under Stalingrad shook the fascist military unit, oppressively affected the satellites of Germany, caused panic in their camp and insoluble contradictions. The ruling figures of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, to escape from the impending catastrophe, began to look for prepositions to exit the war, ignored the orders of Hitler about the direction of troops on the Soviet-German Front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers, but also entire units and part of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies, have surrendered to the Red Army. The relationship between servicemen of the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies aggravated.

The crushing defeat of the fascist enhancement under Stalingrad sobfully affected the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They refused their intentions to speak to the war against the USSR.

Under the influence of the success achieved by the Red Army under Stalingrad and in the following operations of the winter campaign of 1942-1943, the insulation of Germany in the international arena increased and at the same time the international authority of the USSR increased. In 1942-1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay resumed previously interrupted diplomatic communications. The relationship with the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland have improved in London. On the territory of the USSR, the formation of military units and compounds of a number of anti-Hitler coalition countries - the French Aviation Squadron "Normandy", the 1st Czechoslovak infantry brigade, the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusch Kostyshko. All of them later included in the fight against the German fascist troops on the Soviet-German front.

All this suggests that it was the battle near Stalingrad, and not the operation near El-Alamein bated the Ridge by the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a fundamental flight in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this indigenous fracture.

Perhaps it will not be an exaggeration to say that the tank battles of the Second World War are one of the most important images. How are the steps of the first world or nuclear missiles of the post-war confrontation between socialist and capitalist camps. Actually, it is not surprising, since the tank battles of the Second World War largely determined its character and move.

Not the last merit in this belongs to one of the main ideologues and theorists of the motorized war, German General Heinz Guderian. It is largely owned by the initiative of the most powerful blows with a single fist of troops, thanks to which the Nazi forces sought such dizzying success in the European and African continents for more than two years. The tank battles of the Second World War were especially given a brilliant result in its first stage, in record time defeating outdated morally of Polish technique. Guderian divisions provided a breakthrough of German armies under the sedan and the successful occupation of the French and Belgian territories. Only the so-called "dunk miracle" saved the remnants of the armies of the French and the British from the total defeat, allowing them to be reorganized in the future and to protect the English in the sky and not to give the Nazis to focus absolutely all their military power in the east. Looking at the same little more about the three largest tank battles of the whole of this slaughter.

Prokhorovka, Tank Battle

Tank battles of the Second World War: Battle under Senno

This episode occurred at the very beginning of the German invasion of the territory of the USSR and became an integral part of the Vitebian battle. After the capture of Minsk, the German parts moved to the merger of the Dnieper and Dvina, intending to start an offensive in Moscow from there. On the part of the Soviet state, two numbered more than 900 combat vehicles participated in the battle. Wehrmacht had three divisions and about a thousand good-term tanks supported by aviation. As a result of the battle on July 6-10, 1941, the Soviet forces lost more than eight hundred of their combat units, which opened the opponent's ability to continue their promotion without changing plans and begin an offensive towards Moscow.

The largest tank battle

In reality, the largest battle occurred even earlier! Already in the first days of the Nazi invasion (June 23-30, 1941) between the cities of Brody - Lutsk - Dubno, that in Western Ukraine, there was a collision with the participation of more than 3200 tanks. In addition, the number of combat vehicles here was three times more than under Prokhorovka, and the battle duration flowed not one day, but a whole week! As a result of the battle, the Soviet corps were literally crushed, the army of the south-western front suffered a rapid and crushing defeat, which opened the opponent's path to Kiev, Kharkov and the further occupation of Ukraine.

Since its appearance, the tank was and remains the main threat on the battlefield. Tanks have become a blitzkrieg tool and victory weapons in World War II, decisive viscos in the Iran-Iraq war; Even equipped with the most modern means of destroying the live strength of the enemy, the American army cannot do without the support of tanks. The site chose the seven largest tank battles since the first appearance of these armored machines on the battlefield until today.

Battle of Cambrea

It was the first successful episode of the massive application of tanks: more than 476 tanks were involved in the battle of Cambra, combined in 4 tank brigades. There were high hopes for armored cars: with their help, the British intended to break through the strongly fortified line of Siegfried. Tanks, mostly the latest MK IV with reinforced to 12 mm on-board armor, were equipped with the latest know-how of that time - fascins (75 ligaments of twigs, bonded by chains), thanks to them the tank could overcome wide trenches and pivans.
On the very first day, the fighting was achieved by a deafening success: the British managed to embry on the defense of the enemy by 13 km, capture 8,000 German soldiers and 160 officers, as well as a hundred guns. However, it was not possible to develop success and did not succeed, and the previously followed counteroffensive of German troops carried out actually no effort to allies.

Irrevocable losses in the tanks at allies amounted to 179 cars, even more tanks failed for technical reasons.

Battle of Ann

Some historians consider the battle at Anne the first tank battle of World War II. It began on May 13, 1940, when the 16th Göpner Tank Corps (623 tank, while 125 were the latest 73 PZ-III and 52 PZ-IV, capable of fighting French armored vehicles on equal), which occurred in the first echelon of the 6th German The army, tied the battles with the advanced French tank parts of the body of General R. Prio (415 tanks - 239 "Gelki" and 176 Somua).

During the two-day battle, the 3rd french light mechanized division lost 105 tanks, the losses of the Germans were 164 cars. At the same time, German aviation had complete domination in the air.

Redeynyai tank battle

According to data from open sources, about 749 Soviet tanks and 245 German machines took part in the Rasynyai battle. On the side of the Germans there was superiority in the air, good connection and organization. The Soviet command threw their units into battle in parts, without artillery and aviation cover. The result was predictable - the operational and tactical victory of the Germans, despite the courage and the heroism of the Soviet fighters.

One of the episodes of this battle became the legendary - the Soviet tank KV was able to 48 hours to keep the offensive of the whole tank group. The Germans could not cope with a single tank for a long time, tried to shoot him from an anti-aircraft gun, which was soon destroyed, to undermine the tank, but everything was in vain. As a result, I had to apply tactical trick: kV surrounded 50 German tanks and began to fill out from three directions to distract his attention. At this time, 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was secretly installed in the rear of sq. She fell 12 times in the tank, and three shells struck armor, destroying it.

Battle of Frands

The largest tank battle at the initial stage of the Second World War, in which 800 German tanks opposed 2500 Soviet cars (the numbers differ greatly from the source to the source). Soviet troops occurred in the most difficult conditions: Tankists entered into battle after a long march (300-400 km), and the fragmented units, without waiting for the approach of the general support compounds of support. The technique on the march failed, and there was no normal connection, and the Luftwaffe dominated in the sky, the supply of flammable and ammunition was disgusting.

Therefore, in the battle for Dubno - Lutsk - Brody Soviet troops suffered defeat, losing more than 800 tanks. Germans did not make up about 200 tanks.

Battle in the Valley of Tears

The battle of the day that occurred during the war in the Valley of Tears visually showed that the victory was not at the number, but the ability. In this battle, the numerical and high-quality superiority was on the side of the Syrians who prepared for the assault of the Golan heights of more than 1260 tanks, among which the newest T-55 and T-62 at that time.

All that was Israel is a couple of hundreds of tanks and excellent preparation, as well as courage and high resistance in battle, the latter has never been from Arabs. Milnographed fighters could leave the tank even after the projectile hit it without breaking the armor, and it was even very difficult to cope with the Soviet sights of the Arabs.

The most grandiose was the battle in the Valley of Tears, when, according to data from open sources, more than 500 Syrian tanks attacked 90 Israeli cars. In this battle, the Israelites desperately lacked ammunition, it reached the fact that the dilution jeeps moved from the tank to the tank with 105-mm ammunition extracted from the charged "Centurions". As a result, 500 Syrians tanks and a large number of other techniques were destroyed, the losses of the Israelis were about 70-80 cars.

Battle of the valley of the Harhi

One of the largest battles of the Iran-Iraq war occurred in the valley of the Harhi, not far from the town of Sussengerda in January 1981. Then the 16th Iranian Tank Division, which is in service with the latest English tanks "Chifen" and American M60, faced in a counter-fight with the Iraqi Tank Division - 300 Soviet T-62.

The battle continued on the order of two days from January 6 to January 8, during which time the battlefield turned into a real bog, and the opponents became so closely that the use of aviation became risky. The result of the battle was the victory of Iraq, whose troops were destroyed or seized 214 Iranian tanks.

Also during the battle was buried the myth about the invulnerability of the chipten tanks, having a powerful frontal armor. It turned out that the 115-mm armor-piercing podkalibal shell of the T-62 gun breaks through the powerful armor of the "Chiflente" tower. Since then, Iranian tankers feared to go to the frontal attack on Soviet tanks.

Battle under Prokhorovka

The most famous tank battle in history in which about 800 Soviet tanks in the oncoming battle collided with 400 Germans. Most of the Soviet tanks were T-34, armed with a 76-mm gun, which did not pierce the newest German "tigers" and "Panthers". Soviet tankers had to use suicide tactics: to close with German machines at maximum speed and beat them aboard.
In this battle, the losses of the Red Army amounted to about 500 tanks, or 60%, German losses - 300 cars, or 75% of the initial amount. The most powerful impact group was buried. The Inspector General of the Tank Troops of the Wehrmacht General G. Guderian stated the defeat: "Armored troops, replenished with such great difficulty, because of large losses in people and technique for a long time there were fail ... and there was no longer calm on the Eastern Front days. "

Since the first armored vehicles began their march in the fused fields of battles during the First World War, the tanks became an integral part of the land war. Over the years there have been many tank battles, and some of them had a huge importance for history. Here are 10 battles that you need to know.

Battle in chronological order.

1. Battle of Cambrais (1917)

In late 1917, this battle on the Western Front became the first major tank battle in military history and precisely there, for the first time, the general forces were seriously involved in a large scale, which became a genuine turning point in military history. As the historian Hugh Strazhen notes, "the largest intellectual shift in the war between 1914 and 1918, the fact that the general-military battles were focused around the possibilities of guns, and not infantry forces." And under the word "general-purpose", stretched means the coherent use of various types of artillery, infantry, aviation, and, of course, tanks.

On November 20, 1917, the British attacked Cambre with 476 tanks, 378 of whom were combat tanks. The frightened Germans were caught by surprise, since the offensive instantly advanced a few kilometers deep into the entire front. It was an unprecedented enemy protection breakthrough. The Germans ended up rehabilitated by starting a counterattack, but this tank offensive demonstrated the incredible potential of mobile, armored war - the method that became actively used only a year later, during the final strike in Germany.

2. Battle on the Khalhin Gol River (1939)

This is the first major tank battle during the Second World War, where the Soviet Red Army came up with the Japanese imperial army from his border. During the Chinese-Japanese war, 1937-1945, Japan stated that the Khalkhin-goal is the border between Mongolia and Manzhou (the Japanese name of the occupied Manchuria), while the USSR insisted on the border lying east of Nomon Khan (exactly Therefore, this conflict is sometimes called the incident in Nomon-Khan). Military actions began in May 1939, when Soviet troops occupied the controversial territory.

After the initial success of the Japanese, the USSR collected the army of 58,000 thousand people, almost 500 tanks and about 250 aircraft. On the morning of August 20, General Georgy Zhukov took an unexpected attack after simulating the preparation for a defensive position. During this harsh day, the heat became simply unbearable, reaching 40 degrees Celsius, with the result that machine guns and guns began to melt. Soviet T-26 tanks (T-34 predecessors) exceeded outdated Japanese tanks, whose cannons lacked armor-piercing ability. But the Japanese fought desperately, for example, was a very dramatic moment when Lieutenant Sadakaya attacked the tank with his samurai sword, until he was killed.

The subsequent offensive of the Russians allowed to completely destroy the forces of General Komatsubar. Japan lost 61,000 people, unlike the Red Army, where 7974 people were killed and 15251 were killed. This battle became the beginning of the glorious Military Path of Zhukov, and also demonstrated the importance of deception, technical and numerical superiority in the Tank War.

3. Battle of Arras (1940)

This battle should not be confused with the battle of 1917, this battle was during the Second World War, where the British Expeditionary Corps (BEF) fought against German Blitzkrieg, and gradually hostilities were promoted along the coast of France.

On May 20, 1940, Viscount Mount, Commander BEF, began a counterattack against the Germans, under the code name "Frankforce". It was attended by two infantry battalions with a number of 2,000 people - and only 74 tanks. BBC describes what happened next:

"Infantry battalions were divided into two columns for the attack, which took place on May 21. The right column was initially successfully advanced, capturing a number of German soldiers captured, but soon they were faced with German infantry and SS, with the support of the air forces, and suffered heavy losses.

The left column also successfully occurred before a collision with the infantry unit of the 7th Tank Division of General Erwin Rommel.
The French cover to the night allowed the British troops to move away for the previous positions. The FrankForce operation was completed, and the next day the Germans were regrouped and continued their offensive.

During the "FrankForce", about 400 Germans were taken captured, both sides suffered about the same losses, a number of tanks were also destroyed. The operation surpassed itself - the attack was so cruel that the 7th tank division believed that was attacked by five infantry divisions. "

Interestingly, some historians believe that this shooting counterattack convinced German generals to declare to make a breather on May 24 - a short break in Blitzkrieg, which gave the BEF to win some extra time to evacuate his troops during the "Miracle in Dunkirk".

4. Battle for Brody (1941)

The Kursk battle in 1943, it was the largest tank battle of the Second World War and the greatest in history to this point. It happened in the first days of the Barbarossa operation, when the German troops rapidly advanced (and relatively easy) along the Eastern Front. But in a triangle formed by the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody, a clash arose, in which 800 universal tanks opposed 3,500 Russian tanks.

The battle lasted four exhaust days, and ended on June 30, 1941. The loud victory of Germany and the severe retreat of the Red Army. It was during the battle for Brody, the Germans first came seriously with Russian T-34 tanks, which were practically immune to German weapons. But thanks to a row of air attacks of Luftwaffe (which scored 201 Soviet tanks) and tactical maneuvering, the Germans won. Moreover, it is believed that 50% of the Soviet losses of armored vehicles (~ 2600 tanks) were on the account of the shortcomings of the rear, the lack of ammunition, and due to technical problems. In total, in that battle, the Red Army lost 800 tanks, and this is a big digit compared to 200 tanks from the Germans.

5. Second battle at El Alameine (1942)

This battle became a turning point during the campaign in North Africa, and this was the only major tank battle that was won by the British Sun without direct American participation. But the American presence was certainly felt in the form of 300 Sherman tanks (in total, the British had 547 tanks) hastily delivered to Egypt from the United States.

In the battle, which began on October 23 and ended in November 1942, there was a confrontation between the pedantic and patient general Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel, the fox desert. Unfortunately for the Germans, however, Rommel was very painful, and was forced to go to the German hospital before the battle began to unfold. In addition, his temporary deputy General Georg von Stream, died of a heart attack during battle. The Germans also suffered from supply problems, especially from a lack of fuel. That in the end led to a catastrophe.

Restructed 8th Army Montgomery Beginning Double Attack. The first stage, the Lightfoot operation, consisted of a powerful artillery bombardment with a subsequent infantry attack. During the second stage, the infantry cleared the way for tank divisions. Rommel, who returned to the system, was desperate, he realized that everything was lost, and telegraphed about this Hitler. And the English and German armies lost about 500 tanks, but allied troops could not take the initiative after the victory, which gave the Germans enough time to retreat.

But the victory was obvious that Winston Churchill prompted: "This is not an end, it is not even the beginning of the end, but this is perhaps the end of the beginning."

6. Kursk Battle (1943)

After the defeat near Stalingrad, and the emerging counter-offentenance of the Red Army on all fronts, the Germans decided to make a bold, if not to say a reckless, offensive under Kurk, in the hope of returning their positions. As a result, the battle near Kursk today is considered the largest and long battle with the participation of heavy armored vehicles in the war, and one of the largest single armored clashes.

Although no one can say the exact figures, the Soviet tanks initially exceeded the number of German twice. According to some assessment, in initially about 3,000 Soviet tanks and 2000 Germans closed on the Kursk arc. In the event of a negative development of events, the Red Army was ready to quit another 5,000 tanks into battle. And although the Germans caught up with the Red Army in the number of tanks, but it could not provide them with victory.

One commander of the German tank was able to destroy the 22 Soviet tank within an hour, but besides the tanks, the Russian soldiers were walking, who approached enemy tanks with "suicidal courage", selected close enough to throw a mine under the caterpillars. German tanker later wrote:

"Soviet soldiers were around us, above us and between us. They pulled us out of tanks, shoved. It was scary."

All German superiority in relation to communications, maneuverability, and artillery lost in chaos, noise and smoke.

From the memories of tankers:
"The atmosphere was suffocating. I chuckled, and the sweat of the streams glasses in my face."
"We expected every second that we would be killed."
"Tanks tagged each other"
"Metal burned."

The whole area on the battlefield was filled with burned armored vehicles, which produced a pillaby of black oily smoke.

It is important to note that at this time there was not only a tank battle, but also the air. While the battle was unfolding at the bottom, the aircraft in the sky tried to pour tanks.

Eight days later, the attack was stopped. Although the Red Army won, she lost five armored vehicles for each German tank. From the point of view of the actual number, the Germans lost about 760 tanks, and the USSR is about 3,800 (a total of 6,000 tanks and assault guns were destroyed or seriously damaged). In relation to the victims, the Germans lost 5,4182 people, we have 177847. Despite such a gap, the Red Army is considered the winner of the battle, and, as historians noted, the Hitler's long-awaited dream of the Caucasian oil fields was destroyed forever. "

7. Battle of Arrakur (1944)

During the Larring campaign, led by the 3rd army of General George Pattone from September to October 1944, a less well-known battle in Arrakur was the largest tank battle for the US Army to this point. Although the battle in Ardennes later will be larger, this battle happened on a much more extensive geographic area.

The battle is important that all German tank forces were amazed by American troops, mainly equipped with 75-mm guns. Tank "Sherman". Due to the careful coordination of tanks, artillery, infantry, and air force, the German troops were defeated.

As a result, US troops successfully defeated with two tank brigades and parts of two tank divisions. Of the 262 tanks of Germans, more than 86 were destroyed, and 114 are seriously damaged. Americans, on the contrary, lost 25 tanks.

The battle of Arrakur prevented the German counterattack, and the Wehrmacht was unable to recover. Moreover, this area has become the starting platform from which the Pattone's army will begin its winter offensive.

8. Battle of Chavinda (1965)

The battle of Chavinda became one of the largest tank battles after World War II. It occurred during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, where about 132 Pakistani tanks (as well as 150 units of reinforcements) were faced against 225 Indian armored vehicles. Indians had tanks "Centurion", while Pakistanis had "Patton"; Both sides also used Sherman tanks.

The battle that lasted from September 6 to September 22 was held at the Ravi-Chinab plot connecting Jammu and Kashmir with the mainland of India. The Indian army hoped to cut Pakistan from the supply line, cutting them from the Salcot district of Lahore. Events reached their peak on September 8, when Indian forces moved to Chavinda. Pakistani air forces joined the battle, and then the brutal tank battle happened. A large tank battle occurred on September 11 in the Phillora region. After several outbreaks of activity and the lull of battle, finally ended on September 21, when Indian forces were finally retraced. Pakistanis lost 40 tanks, while the Indians have lost more than 120.

9. Battle in the Valley of Tears (1973)

During the Arab-Israeli War of the "Judgment Day", the Israeli forces fought with a coalition, which included Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The purpose of the coalition was to oust the Israeli forces, which occupy Sinai. In one key point at the Golan heights, the Israeli team has 7 tanks from 150 - and in the remaining tanks there are no more than 4 shells left. But approximately at the very time, when Syrians were going to make another attack, the brigade was saved by randomly assembled reinforcements, consisting of 13 least damaged tanks managed by injured soldiers who were discharged from the hospital.

As for the war of the "Judgment Day", then the 19-day battle became the largest tank battle since the Second World War. In fact, it was one of the largest tank battles in which 1700 Israeli tanks participated (of which 63% were destroyed) and approximately 3430 coalition tanks (of which were destroyed from about 2250 to 2300). In the end, Israel won; The cease-fire agreement through the mediation of the United Nations entered into force on October 25.

10. Battle of Bittle 73 (1991)