The death of Brave: Commander of the South-Western Front, General Kirponos. Western Front as the main front of lesions and losses

West Front Formed on June 22, 1941, on the basis of the Order of the USSR NGO of June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District in the composition of 3, 4, 10th and 13th armies. In the future, it included 1st shock, 5, 11, 16 (from May 1, 1943, the 11th Guards Army), 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30 (from May 1, 1943 10th Guards Army), 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th Army, 3rd and 4th Tank, 1st Air Army.

Front's troops participated in the strategic defensive operation of 1941 in Belarus, in the Smolensk battle (July 10, September 10, 1941), in the Moscow battle (September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942)

During the Moscow Strategic Offensive Operation (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942), the troops of the front in cooperation with the troops of the Kalininsky and South-Western fronts were made by the first major defeat of the Troops of the Army Group "Center" and discarded the enemy by 100-250 km from Moscow.

During the Rzhev-Vyazemsky strategic operation (January 8, April 20, 1942), the troops of the front in cooperation with the associations of the Kalininsky front and with the assistance of the troops of the North-West and Bryansky fronts, the enemy was thrown in the Western direction for 80-250 km, liberated Moscow and Tula Areas, many districts of Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

On July 30- August 23, 1942, the Russian Troops of the Western Front, together with the Kalininsky front, held Rzhevsky-Sychevsky operation, were eliminated by the opponent's bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in Rzhev.

In the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (March 2-31, 1943), the troops of the Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalininsky front, were eliminated by the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge in the defense of the German troops, moving the front line from Moscow by another 130-160 km.

During the Kursk battle in July 1943, the troops of the left flank of the Front together with the troops of the Bryansky and Central Fronts participated in the Oryol Strategic Operation (July 12, August 18, 1943) to eliminate the enemy grouping. At the same time, the main forces of the front, using a favorable covering position, conducted on August 7-20, 1943, in cooperation with the arms of the left wing of the Kalininsky front, a Smolensk strategic operation. As a result of a successfully conducted operation, the front troops have advanced to the West to a depth of 200-250 km and freed part of the territory of the Kalinin region and the Smolensk region.

Front's troops during the offensive in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions at the end of 1943. early 1944 were published on the territory of the eastern regions of Belarus.

Based on the directive of the TGK rate of April 12, 1944 on April 24, 1944. The front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front. The three of his armies were transferred to the 2nd Belarusian Front.

Commander Front: General Army Pavlov D. G. (June 1941); Lieutenant General Yeremenko A. I. (June-July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union Tymoshenko S. K. (July-September 1941); Lieutenant-General, since September 1941, Colonel-General Konev I. S. (September - October 1941 and August 1942. - February 1943); General Army of Zhukov G. K. (October 1941- August 1942); Colonel-General, from August 1943, General Army Sokolovsky V. D. (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel-General Chernyakhovsky I. D. (April 1944)

Members of the FRONT Military Council: Corpus Commissioner of Phomini A. Ya. (June- July 1941); Army Commissioner 1 rank, from October 1942 - Lieutenant General Mehlis L. 3. (July 1941 and December 1943 - April 1944); Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus Ponomarenko P. K. (July 1941); Lieutenant General Bulganin N. A. (July 1941 - December 1943); Lieutenant General Makarov V. E. (April 1944)

Headquarters of the Front: Major General Klimovsky V. E. (June 1941); Lieutenant-General Malandin G. K. (July 1941); Lieutenant-General, from June 1942, General-Colonel Sokolovsky V. D. (July 1941.- January 1942 and May 1942. - February 1943); Major General Golushkevich V. S. (January-May 1942); Lieutenant General Pokrovsky A. P. (February 1943 - April 1944)

The environment of the main forces of the Western Front in the summer of 1941 is one of the largest tragedies in the history of Russian weapons, standing in one row with a battle on the river Kalka in 1223 or the death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia in the summer of 1914. Yes, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, we also had large losses, but this tragedy happened first, and it was she who largely determined the further adverse development of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front ...

Recognized That the main guilt is that Germany's attack was for the troops of the cover of Western cross-border districts and for the entire Red Army unexpected, lies on the highest leadership of the country. But questions remain. The main one, in my opinion, the following: Where does Stalin's responsibility and its closest environment ends and the responsibility of the lower link is the frontal command? The relevance of the question is determined by the highest price paid for the mistakes allowed.

The leadership of the country responded to the growing flow of reports on the consignment of German troops to the Western borders of the USSR by the partial appeal of the stock serviceman. About 800 thousand people - from the outlined in the case of full mobilization of 5 million - replenished in May-June division of Western districts. June 12 People's Commissar Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko signed directives on nomination to the border of rifle divisions located in the rear districts of border districts. However, due to the lack of vehicles, they moved extremely slowly. By the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, the army of the second strategic echelon, nominated from the depth of the country to the Dnipro line - Western Dvina, united into a group of reserve of the Chief Command - 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd Army.

However, the nominated troops were not equipped with sufficient people and technique, they arrived west in parts. It was worst with the willingness of the troops of the cover to the reflection of sudden aggression. According to I.V. Stalin commander of the troops of the districts was warned by G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Tymoshenko both about the need to increase vigilance and about preaching reasons for provocation. Any measures that might be interpreted by the Wehrmacht command as bringing the Soviet troops to complete combat readiness, prelenged to the Kremlin strictest way.

The result is known. The troops of the Wehrmacht and its allies given in full combat readiness - about 4.4 million people, 4 thousand tanks, 4.4 thousand aircraft opposed in the West, although large in the number of tanks and aircraft - 11 thousand and 9.1 thousand, but neboy, At the stage of formation and did not have a three million dollar Soviet group, which was not planned a deep defensive operation. Defense appeared to the Soviet command as a short-term phase of the initial period of combat operation ...

Could the commander of cross-border districts in any way affect the situation and thus soften the tragic consequences of reinsurance and the indecision of the highest leadership?

By the beginning of the war, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army, D.G. Pavlov was obeyed by the management of the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies located in close proximity to the border, and the 13th - in the rear area of \u200b\u200bthe district. 678 thousand people, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 tanks and more than 1.5 thousand aircraft. With approximate equality in the aircraft of the district, the group of the Army "Center" in people and artillery, but superior one and a half times in tanks. The 6th M. General M. Khackkylevich was considered the most complied with broncessed in the Red Army - 1.022 tank, of which 352 kV and T-34. However, most tanks were outdated T-26 and BT.

Information about the deployment on the other side of the border of the offensive grouping of the Wehrmacht began to flow into the headquarters of the wrapping since the beginning of 1941. On June 4, the headquarters of the district police officer, Colonel Blokhin, presented to General Pavlov Special Council "On the preparation of Germany against the USSR". As noted, in the second half of May, the Germans strengthened their grouping on 2 - 3 infantry, two armored divisions and the SS division. On the border, the deployment of air defense and PTOs was noticed. The unloading by the Germans of a large number of railway compositions with airbabs, gunpowder, landing at airfields of major aviation compounds. The movement of the local population in the border strip was minimized, and from many areas it was evicted in "deep districts". All civilian medical institutions in large cities and settlements were engaged in hospitals. Intelligence raised that "the hidden mobilization of officials for future posts western regions of the USSR ... In Czech Prague, there are parachutist courses for which members of the Belarusian Committee from Warsaw are mobilized. At the beginning of the fighting, they will throw in the rear of Soviet Belarus to perform sabotage problems ... "

The following item of Special Mession was drawn to: "On May 24, 1941, the branch of German intelligence in

g. CEZHANUV sent five agents to the territory of the USSR. Back no later than June 5, 1941. One of the agents said that it would not have time to return from Belostok and Grodno to this term. The head of the intellect to this replied: after June 5, it is possible to start hostilities from the USSR, so he cannot guarantee the life of the agent ... "All agents received, among other things, the following tasks: to establish the percentage of former royal officers who are in the Red Army and The mood of the population living in border areas.

Agency data confirmed that "the Polish population from the experience of the preparation of war in Germany with Poland in 1939 and the German soldiers on the existing experience of warfare also consider the beginning of hostilities from the USSR in the near future."

The head of the Department came to the conclusion: "Information on the forced preparation of the theater and the strengthening of the grouping of troops in the band against the registration deserve trust."

It is clear that the Kremlin and the General Staff were informed. But how did Pavlov himself responded to the detailed information about the German preparations? On this question, we help to answer the materials prepared after the war, when the cases began to revise on the generals of Pavlov, Klimovsky, Korobkov and others for the purpose of rehabilitation.

This is what I wrote, for example, the former head of the Operational Department of the headquarters Major General B. Fomin:

"Pavlov carefully followed the preparation of the theater of hostilities ... Throughout the border, field defensive stripes were created along the border. As for the level, they were not built and armed at the beginning of the war. Carefully follow the dislocation of the enemy's troops, Pavlov repeatedly I excited the question before the defense addict on the redeployment of the district's troops from the depths to the border area ... However, the 113rd, 121st, 143rd and the 50th rifle divisions in the areas planned by them did not have time to go out and the war was found in the campaign .. .

By the beginning of the war, the troops of the district were in the stage of Orgery. Five tank buildings were formed, the airborne building ... The flow of the material part went slowly ... The districts of the district was in the stage of training of the flight composition on the incoming new material part, but there were few rehabught crews.

For the preparation of the Germans of a sudden attack, Pavlov knew (ours. - MM) and asked to take field strengthening along the State British. On June 20, 1941, the cipher for the signature of the deputy. The head of the operational management of the General Staff of Vasilevsky Pavlov was reported that his request was reported to the addict and the latter did not allow to occupy field fortifications, as this may cause a provocation from the Germans ... "

In the actions and actions of Pavlova, General Fomin did not see permit, and even more than betrayal. In his opinion, the front has suffered a failure for the following reasons: Numerical superiority of the enemy; suddenness of the attack; insufficient security by means of air defense; The lack of the front of the reserves and defensive turn on the River Spling and removing the troops from him on the night from the first on the second day of the war, "as a result of which the enemy, having unhindered him, created the conditions for the surroundings of the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies"; late occupation of the frontier levels along the old government troops

The 13th Army, the illiterate intervention directed by Stalin from Moscow Marshal G.I. Klyka at the disposal of the Deputy Commander Front I.V. Boldin and Commander of the 10th Army K.D. Golubeva, "What led to the inglorious end of the moving group of the front."

In the note, Fomin mentioned the former headquarters of the headquarters of the Major General Klimovsky, who was "great efficiency and honesty". However, he noted the absence of non-sober assessment of the enemy and its capabilities. Klimovskogo did not believe that the enemy is able to plan its original operation so far and apply far to the depth of massive blows by aviation. "

In conclusion, Fomin wrote that all of the generals listed by him, arrested and shot in the summer of 1941, "were divorced from the management of troops at the time when their efforts have already become the pace of the enemy's operation, and the control of the troops was established."

Fomina's opinion is worthy of attention, but, unfortunately, it leaves the question behind the brackets: if Pavlov knew that the Germans prepare a "sudden" attack, what he did actually really - not in words, but in fact - in order not to Peel all your strength in the first days of the war?

Preservedpossed by the former commander of the 3rd army of Colonel General V.I. Kuznetsova. It said:

"All commanders of the armies, including me, reported Pavlov about the completely open training of the Germans to war. So, for example, we have definitely established the concentration of the largest forces of the Germans in the August forests southeast of Suwalki.

We also had acceptance letters in our hands, which indicated the approximate time of the German transition to the offensive -21, 22, 23 June. Nevertheless, Pavlov, a few days before the start of the war, ordered all artillery to send to artillery shooting a few hundred kilometers from the front line ... "

Next, Kuznetsov reported that he considered the instructions of Marshal Kulik about the organization on June 24 Kontrudar parts of the army in the general direction on Grodno - Suwalki in order to provide from the north of the flank of the front of the front as part of the 10th Army and the Hatskylevich mechanical circuit. The fact is that the case had then fuel just a half littering, the front aircraft was defeated, the front flanks are open. According to Kuznetsov, the transition to the "mobile defense" and Consturdar on the rear of the 2nd tank group of Guderian, who quickly moved to Baranovichi from the south-west.

Kuznetsov did not see anything treacherous in the actions of Pavlov or Klimovsky, but noted that they "simply failed to master and did not cope with the situation of the initial period of war."

Indeed, the view that Pavlov and his headquarters were not mastered and did not cope with the situation "in the initial period of the war, it seems true. But hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the Western Front and with a friend, more volitional or more experienced commander. However, it is obvious that the origins of the Western Front tragedy laid in the pre-war time, and General Pavlov did not make it possible to prevent the worst development of the combat scenario. One of the examples of this is the case with the front artillery, led before the war itself in the rear for shooting. It can be assumed that Pavlova faces the flair here, but you can think about a certain negligence manifested by employees of the headquarters.

The lack of the command of the wrap - is equal, however, as at the command of the CVO - proper demanding, it is seen on the example of construction in these districts of operational airfields. After all, it is because of the lack of in sufficient seating areas of the Western Front's aircraft on the first day of the war, about 750 combat vehicles lost, which amounted to about 60 percent of all of our aircraft destroyed on June 22 ...

June 18.1941, the Narc of Defense issued an order No. 0039 "On the state of the construction of operational airfields on the main construction plan of 1941". It said: "The situation with the construction of operational airfields is amazingly bad. On June 1, S.G is covered by construction only 50 percent of the plan approved by me ... Construction is particularly poorly maintained in QWW and wrap. The main reason is the lack of demanding from military councils of districts , defeat and exhaustive measures to use all the possibilities in the field. "

You can challenge the charges put forward in this document signed, by the way, S.K. Tymoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. Interestingly, his last item was reading: "There will be no additional limits on fuel," therefore it is necessary to "wider attract equestrian transport and grabares to the construction." It is known that the Commanders catastrophically lacked neither forces nor means for the construction of airfields, but it should be recognized that they were not responsible for the peacekeeping construction and were not simple administrators. They were responsible for the life of hundreds of thousands of people. It was about the combat capability of aviation, which in the case of the war was to cover them the subordinate personnel and technique ... It is not by chance, apparently, the losses in aviation among General Pavlov were much higher than in the neighboring fronts. Most of his aircraft were destroyed on Earth.

Nevertheless, hardly productively compare the degree of competence of a commander in the pre-war period or at the beginning of the war. To determine whose mistakes were harder, and who behaved more competently, very difficult. Quo - South-West Front - met the invasion of the enemy somewhat more organized than other districts, but he was the strongest district in the Red Army. Priba - the North-West Front - also managed to retreat without such brutal losses, which were on the Western Front, but in the Baltic States and the smaller grouping of the Wehrmacht's troops acted. At the defeat of our troops in Belarus, two tank groups were aimed at once, which objectively created the prerequisites for the surroundings of our major forces under the Bialystok and Minsk.

First of all, you need to look for general errors made by the Command Cities. Military councils could take more intensive measures aimed at reducing losses in case of sudden aggression. These include the creation of mine-fields in the directions of suspected strikes of the enemy, preparations for the explosion of bridges through border rivers, more active construction of airfields and dispersal on them Aviation, the organization of reliable protection of lines of communication - all these measures are purely defensive and could not give a reason for German provocation . It turned out everything is different: German tanks captured bridges across the Bug not damaged, and the communication lines in the first hours of war have made chaos to the organization of the management of troops. High rates of German promotion east were predetermined from the very beginning.

Troopsno morally prepared for the attack of the enemy. War and waited, and at the same time did not want to say goodbye to a peaceful life. Yes, there was a message TASS dated June 14, but there was no tough discipline in the troops themselves. The demanding was replaced by complacency, which did not slow down to affect the first day of war. The fighters and commanders were then tested the greatest shock, which can be judged by the text of the cipherogram of the Military Council of the Western Front, subordinate troops sent on the evening of June 22, 1941

"The experience of the first day of the war," said in it, "shows the inorganic and carelessness of many commanders, including big bosses. Thinking about ensuring flammable, shells, the cartridges begin only at a time when the cartridges are already on the outcome, while a huge mass of cars It is occupied by the evacuation of the families of the commanding composition, which, besides, accompany the redarmeys, that is, people of combat calculation. Wounded from the battlefields do not evacuate, the rest of the fighters and commanders do not organize, with a waste of cattle, the food leaves the enemy ... "

The cipherogram was signed by D. Pavlov, A. Fominy (a member of the Military Council of the Front), V. Klimovsky.

Unfortunately, the wines for the panic started on the first day of war, confusion from the rules of the Constitution largely lies with the generals themselves who signed this document. But is it possible to consider fairly comprehended by their kara? Was there no condemnation to send an attempt to self-excluded the highest leadership of the country?

Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Pictures: General Army D.G. Pavlov; They fought to the end.

Western Front

1) the operational-strategic association of the Russian army in the Western Strategic Direction in the 1st World War. Educated 4 (17) .8.1915 as a result of the separation of the North-Western Front for two - Northern and West. The Western Front at different times included 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10th army. In August - October 1915, the front troops were heavy defensive battles for Wilno (now Vilnius), eliminated the breakthrough of the 1st and 6th Cavalry buildings of the German troops in the city of Svenaqiana. In the spring of 1916, the western front troops conducted an offensive operation in Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. During the June 1917, the troops of the Western Front, taking the first position of the German troops in the Vilna region, under the influence of the Bolsheviks [By October 1917, about 21.4 thousand members of the RSDLP (b) and over 27 thousand sympathizers were refused to continue the offensive and returned In your trenches. 27.10 (9.11) .1917 A military-revolutionary committee (VRK) of Western regions and front was created on the Western Front. VRK displaced the command commander of the general from infanteria P. S. Buliyev, faithful to the temporary government, and prescribed instead of Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamshshchchikov. Congress of representatives of the troops of the front 20.11 (s.12) .1917 elected the commander of the Western Front of the Bolshevik A. F. Myasnikova. In early December 1917, the demobilization of the troops of the Western Front began. Despite this, in February 1918, his troops (about 250 thousand people) participated in the reflection of the onset of the German troops on the RSFSR. From 29.Z.1918 The Western Front Command promptly subordinate to the western section of the curtain detachments, formed by the RVSR for defense of the demarcation line in the west direction from the possible invasion of the German troops. 18.4.1918 disbanded, about 15 thousand people from the front ended in the ranks of the Red Army.

Commanders: General from infanteria A. E. Evert (August 1915 - March 1917), General from Cavalry V. I. Gurko (March - May 1917), Lieutenant-General A. I. Denikin (May - June 1917), General Lieutenant P. N. Lynnovsky (June - August 1917), General from infanteria P. S. Baluyev (August - November 1917), Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Mason (November 1917), A. F. Myasnikov (November 1917 - April 1918 ).

2) Operational-Strategic Association of the Red Army in the Western and North-West Strategic Directions in the Civil War of 1917-1922 in Russia. Educated in accordance with the Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army I. I. Vacetyis 19.2.1919 on the basis of the field control of the Northern Front. The Western Front at different times included 3, 4, 7 and 12th, 1st equestrian, Western (1Z.3-9.6.1919 - Belorussko-Lithuanian, from 9.6.1919 - 16th) and the Estland Army, Mozyr group of troops, army of Soviet Latvia (from 7.6.1919 - 15th Army) and Dniprovskaya Military Flotilla. The troops of the Western Front conducted military actions at the front with a length of over 2 thousand km: against the armed formations of the White Movement and the Armanta troops at the Murmansk direction; against the Finnish troops - on Petrozavodsky and Olonets directions and the Karelian Isthmus; Against the troops of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian bourgeois governments, white armies, German and Polish troops in the Baltic States and Belarus. Under the pressure of the oversized enemy forces, the troops of the Western Front were forced by July 1919 to retreat from the Baltic state. In the July operation 1920, the troops of the Western Front defeated the main forces of the Polish northeastern Front. In the course of the Warsaw surgery, 1920, the front troops came to Warsaw, but were defeated and were forced to move away from Poland. The Western Front's troops participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt Uprising 1921.

8.4.1924 The Western Front was converted to West.

Commanders: D. N. Rodnaya (February - July 1919), V. M. Gittis (July 1919- April 1920), M. N. Tukhachevsky (April 1920 - March 1921, January 1922 - March 1924), I. N. Zakharov (March - September 1921), A. I. Egorov (September 1921 - January 1922), A. I. Cork (March - April 1924), A. I. Cook (April 1924).

3) the operational-strategic association of Soviet troops in the Western strategic direction to the Great Patriotic War. Educated 22.6.1941 on the basis of Western special consisting of 3, 4, 10 and the 13th of the general army. In the future, the Western Front at different times included 5, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 61, 68, 43, 31, 33, 39, 30, 31, 32, 61, 39, 30, 31 , 1st shock, 10th and 11th Guards, 3rd and 4th tank, and also the 1st air army. The troops of the front in 1941 participated in a strategic defensive operation in Belarus, in the Smolensk battle of 1941, in the Moscow Battle of 1941-42.

During the Rzhev Operations, 1942-43, the troops of the Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalininsky front, were eliminated by the enemy's bridgeheads on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev district (July - August 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazhemsky ledge in the defense of the German troops (March 1943). In July - August 1943, the troops of the left wing of the front during the Kursk Battle of 1943, together with the troops of the Bryansky and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol Strategic Operation on the Elimination of the Orythic Unit Grouping. At the same time, the main forces of the Western Front, using a profitable cover, in August - September, together with the troops of the left wing of the Kalininsky front, held a Smolensk operation 194s. In the late 1943 - early 1944 the troops of the front, coming at the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, reached the eastern districts of Belarus. 24.4.1944 Western Front Based on the Directive of the Supreme Command District Rate from 12.4.1944, renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front, and 2 of his armies were transferred to the 2nd Belarusian Front.

Commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General A. I. Yeremenko (June - July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tymoshenko (July - September 1941); Lieutenant-General, from 11.9.1941 Colonel-General I. S. Konev (September - October 1941 and August 1942- February 1943); Army General G. K. Zhukov (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel-General, from 27.8.1943 Army General V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel-General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944).

In the German military-historical literature, the Western Front is called the sections of the hostilities of German troops in Western Europe against the British, French and American troops in the 1st and 2nd World Wars.

Lit.: Military Persons of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Reference statistical materials). M., 1963; Directives of the Chief Command of the Red Army (1917-1920): Sat. documents. M., 1969; Leaders of the front army fronts (1917-1922): Sat. documents: at 4 t. M., 1971-1978; Strokes A. A. Armed Forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; The history of the First World War. 1914-1918: in 2 tons. M., 1975; History of World War II. 1939-1945. M., 1975-1977. T. 4-8; Rostunov I. I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976; Civil War in the USSR: in 2 tons. M., 1980-1986; Red-known Belarusian Military District. 2nd ed. M., 1983; Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections: in 2 tons. 13th ed. M., 2002; Fronts, fleets, army, fleets of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Handbook. M., 200z.

A new appointment was quite satisfied with Ivan Stepanovich Konev (27). The command of the forces of the Kalininsky front was grateful, and the refund to the command of the glorified troops of the Western Front could not help but cause alike. Konev and first served on the Western Front and commanded them, but preferred not to remember these difficult times. However, his memories of the tragedies of the summer of 1941 were still too fresh. At that time, he commanded the famous 19th army translated on the eve of the war to the North Caucasus Military District. An invincible army of two rifle and one mechanized corps was to be the strategic reserve of the south-western front in critical periods of wartime. But in Chaos generated by the Barbarossa operation, once the proud Army of Konev hastily progressed to the central sector and were thrown into battle to the west of Smolensk. Exhausted by the upcoming German tank troops, the army dissipated; Part of the divisions was destroyed in Smolensk, the rest were in confusion moved into the defense to the east of Smolensk, where they helped to temporarily suspend the indomitable offensive of the Germans.

After in September 1941, Stalin sent Zhukov to Leningrad, Konev accepted the command of the Western Front - only to see how his front almost completely stopped existence during the Oktyabrsky offensive of German troops to Moscow. After the death of two thirds of his troops in Vyazma Surrounded by Vyazma, Konev was commissioned by the command of the remnants of the Rightflange Compounds of the Western Front, rearranged and renamed to the Kalinin front. Konev commanded the Kalinin front during the defense period of Moscow and headed him during the partially successful winter counteroffensiveness of the Soviet troops near Moscow. At the height of the winter, Konev's troops (most of the army) joined a brutal match with counterattaking German connections under the command of General Model. Once again, Konev and the model crossed the swords in August 1942, when the model has already commanded the 9th Army. Konev was looking for a new meeting with a sworn enemy, this time in the role of the commander of the Western Front.

August 26, accepting the command of the Western Front from Zhukov, Konev immediately began to prepare for the resumption of the fight not for life, but to death. Carefully re-re-educating his tank troops, by directive of September 11, he conducted a reorganization of mobile forces, turned them into a single powerful weapon, capable of continuing offensive operations across the depth of the enemy defense line (28). From the hardened oh in battles of the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, it formed a mobile equestrian group and gave it under the command of the experienced commander of the Cavalry Corps, Major General V. V. Kryukov. At the same time, during September and in early October, the front-line headquarters of Konev issued a whole flow of directives and orders in order to eliminate errors that caused such a damage to the front during the August operation. The most important component of these orders was the introduction of new interaction procedures to make the actions of mobile groups to make coordinated, to ensure a constant relationship between them and acting jointly by infantry, artillery and aviation (29).

Konev was proud of its combined forces. He believed that never else such troops were so powerful and were not under the guidance of a more experienced team formulation. By October 15, they included 11 combined armies (30s, 29-Yu, 31st, 20-Yu, 5th, 33rd, 49th, 50s, 10th, 16th and 61 -You), unfolded along the front line from Rzhev on! North to Bryansk in the south. It was one of the strongest Soviet fronts. The two elite guards rifle buildings (5th and 8th), the armored core was six tank buildings (3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th), And also well re-equipped 3rd tank army of Lieutenant General P.S. Fishing (30). The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General Kryukov and the famous 1st Guards Cavalry Corps completed a list along with an impressive arsenal of the artillery of the cover and engineering units, selected by the bid (see the exact combat order of the Western Front in Annexes).

The initial directive of the start of the start of the Mars operation on October 12 reached the headquarters of the Western Front, on October 1, 1942, but the bad weather prevented the plan to execute. Therefore, the bet has prepared a new directive, postponing the offensive until October 28, and sent it to Koned on October 10. With difficulty holding back the growing impatience, Konev shared hopes with officers of his headquarters and ordered them to immediately begin the complex and time-consuming process of developing a new offensive plan. Since the rates gave an order about the detailed preparation of only the first step of the offensive, the headquarters officers focused on all the attention to the operations "Mars", while Konev alone thought of the subsequent operation "Jupiter" in general terms. According to the experience, he knew too well how he was dangerous to awaken in people high hopes. But he could not get rid of thoughts about Jupiter, despite the fact that the Mars surgery was to start on October 28, just a few weeks later.

Five days later, Konev headquarters transformed the overall concept of the Mars operation, developed by the bid, in a detailed front plan. Having received it from the head of the headquarters of the Front, Colonel-General V.D. Sokolovsky, and having familiarized himself with him, Konev remained satisfied:

"The main blow has applied parts of the 20th Army in the overall direction of Gredyakino, boat. After a breakthrough, the tactical depth of the enemy defense was supposed to be introduced into a breakthrough an equestrian-mechanized group. This group in cooperation with the armies of the left wing of the Kalininsky front was to play a crucial role in the environment and destroying the Rzhev-Sychevskaya group of the enemy.

To ensure success in the direction of the main strike, the superiority of forces and funds over the enemy in a living force and the technique of almost two or three times was created on the site of breakthrough of the 20th Army. The inscription of the front line as a whole favored the onset of the armies of the left wing of the Kalininsky and the right wing of the Western fronts, despite the strong fortifications and unprofitable for the upcoming country conditions.

The 20th Army applied the main blow to his right flank with the task to break through the defense of the enemy at the front of Vasilki, Gredyakino, ponds, master the first and second defense lines at the turn. Petrakovo, Bol. and small. Kropotovo, Support, stallion. In the future, the army was supposed to leave the Rzhev's Rzhevka railway. On the first day of the operation, it was assumed to forward an equestrian-mechanized group on the West Bank. Vazuza.

On the second day of operation 326, 42, 251, 247th rifle divisions were to master the line of the railway, after which the first three divisions turned the front of the offensive to the North-West, and the latter - to the south-west. Such a maneuver of the troops was supposed to provide a 15-18 km wide corridor for input to a breakthrough of the equestrian group.

The further task of the equal mechanized group by the front commander was determined as follows (Scheme 24):

6th tank corps of the focused strike and direction of Sychevka and master this settlement in collaboration with parts of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, coming from the northeast;

The 20th cavalry division step on Andreevskoye, not allowing the approach of the enemy's reserves from the south-west, and romance from the owl of the opponent's part;

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (without the 20th Cavalry Division) to step on the Chertolino, in order to cut the Rzhev-Olenine railway and in the future in cooperation with parts coming from the front, destroy the Rzhevskaya grouping of the enemy "(31).

Konev understood perfectly how much work is required to turn this sleek scenario into a detailed operation plan of the operation. Staff developers have encountered serious problems. Apply powerful blows simultaneously with the forcing of a large river is difficult, even if the horse hoped, this river will freeze. In addition, after the first strike, the river was to become a serious obstacle to move forward and a bottleneck for transport that brightening ammunition. At the right flange of the 20th Army, the Oregu River limited the freedom of action and forced the offensive in the close "corridor". Through it, she also had to be fermented so that the offensive was developed at the required rate. Conducting a distinctionary feature between the 20th and 31st armies along the Oreagi River, partly eliminated this difficulty, but the terrain still was by no means ideal for the offensive.

Cones conceived and about the adversary. Although German infantry divisions have not yet managed to recover after the August battles, they have already gained in a thoroughly prepared durable defense line. When the intelligence reported Koned, that the German 5th tank division still covers the front edge of the defense, he shuddered, recalling how damage was made by this division in August the upcoming Soviet troops. Moreover, there were other tank connections somewhere in the rear, but reconnaissance failed to find out their number or accurate location. Konev sincerely hoped that with the agreed offensive of the Soviet troops on all sectors of Rzhevsky protrusion, these dangerous reserves of the enemy would be thrown into other places, but in the depths of the soul he knew that they would be enough for his stake.

Driving up terrible thoughts, Konev left the headquarters, providing officers to perform their work.

The names of the famous marshals and generals who became the immediate blacksmiths of the Great Victory are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... It is unlikely that there are those who are not familiar with these surnames in Russia. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders were repeatedly described in historical and memoir literature. Much less in this regard, the Soviet military leaders (as well as simple officers and soldiers), who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war, never disabled the joy of victory over the Nazis. But all of us we must hurt no less than those who reached Berlin. After all, these people, the real heroes and patriots of their homeland, beat to the latter, trying to keep the enemy outstanding on the armament and technical equipment of the Soviet country. This article will talk about one of these heroes.

The Kiev Special Military District in the period preceding the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was considered by the High Command as one of the Key Military Districts of the country. The Kiev Military District was created on May 17, 1935 - as a result of the division of the Ukrainian Military District to the Kiev and Kharkov Military District. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kiev Military District to the Kiev Special Military District (hereinafter - Coo). In the Western direction, his role was determined, since it covered the strategically important territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, he covered Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kamenets-Podolskaya, Stanislavskaya, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lviv and Drohobych region of the Ukrainian SSR.

The district was border, and this determined its strategic significance for the defense of the Soviet state. On the territory of the district, the largest grouping of Soviet troops was stationed in the westerv. Naturally, a person who enjoyed by the confidence of Moscow should have commanded such an important district. Since the formation of the Kiev Special Military District, the commander's position occupied such glorified Soviet commander as commander of the 2nd rank Semyon Konstantinovich Tymoshenko (in 1938-1940) and the general of the Army of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1940-1941).
On February 28, 1941, Georgy Zhukov, who became the winner of two major military games, worked out the offensive of the Soviet troops in the west direction and, accordingly, defense in the West direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin to the post of chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The question was who will replace George Konstantinovich as the commander of the Kiev Special Military District. It was supposed to be no less worthy and talented warlord. Ultimately, Stalin has chosen on Lieutenant-General Michael Petrovich Kirponos. The Sorodiete-year-old Lieutenant-General Kirponos before appointing the position of commander of the Kiev special Military District commanded the Leningrad Military District. It was a warlord with great combat experience, who received a high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union for the Soviet-Finnish war.

From the Peasant Son to the Red Commander

Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was what is called a man from the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9, according to the old style) of 1892 in the town of Vertiyivka Nezhinsky Chernihiv province - in a poor peasant family. His formation was brought in adolescence by the year of the church-parish and three years of the Zemstvo school. Since the funds of the family had not so much, school had to stop and like many peers from the village, go to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a guard, a forester in the forestry of the Chernihiv province. In 1911, he married the daughters of Crusher Olympiad Polyakova (afterwards he divorced her in 1919, leaving himself two daughters and in the same 1919 he married Sofary Piotrovskaya). When the First World War began, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 years old.

In 1915, a young man called for military service. He graduated from instructor courses in Oranienbaum Officer Rifle School, after which it was distributed in the 216th Punchy Regiment, stationed in Kozlov (now - Michurinsk city on the territory of the Tambov region). In 1917, Kirponos changed military specialty - he graduated from the military-paramedic school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258th Olgopol infantry regiment. Twenty-five-year-old Mikhail Kirponos becomes chairman of the soldiers 'regimental committee, in November of the same year - chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26th Army Corps.

Apparently, during these years, young Kirponos not only sympathized with a revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized a brother with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 demobilized from the Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to the Motherland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops hung, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and Austrians and against the troops of the Central Rada. Joining in August 1918 to the Red Army, the Kirponos almost immediately (next month September), as an experienced military, was appointed commander of the company as part of the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. Division, by the way, commanded the legendary comdive Nikolai Schors.

In the Red Army, the Career Kirponos went rapidly - in December, two months before the company, he became a battalion commander, and then the head of the headquarters and the commander of the 22nd Ukrainian Rifle Regiment as part of the 44th Rifle Division. In this capacity, the compolate Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhytomyr and Kiev. In July 1919, a new appointment came - Assistant Chief of the Division School of Chervonian Starin (Red Commanders) of the same 44th Rifle Division. Here it begins a temporary decrease in the brightness, apparently connected with his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became an assistant to the head of the economic team of the 2nd Kiev School of Chervonian Starishin, and in June 1921, in a year, - the head of the economic part, then - the assistant commissioner of the same school. In 1922, Kirponos graduated from the 2nd Kiev School of Chervon Starin, thus having received a military education without separation from the School service.

After receiving military education, Kirponos continued throughout the year in the Kharkov School of Chervonian Starshin (October 1922 - September 1923), where he served as an assistant chief of political part. Then followed the study at the RKKA Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, which Kirponos graduated in 1927 and was distributed by the battalion commander in the 130th Bogun Rifle Regiment. However, in December 1928, he again returns to the system of military schools - this time as an assistant chief - the head of the classroom of the Kharkiv military school of Chervonny Starin. Wf. From April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant, and then the head of the division headquarters.
In March 1934, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed Head and Military Commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir United Military School. CEC Tatar ASSR. By this military school, Kirponos led more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school has undergone several renaming - in December 1935, she was renamed the Tatar-Bashkir military law school named after the CEC Tatar ASSR, in April 1936 - to the Kazan Infantry School. CEC Tatar ASSR, in March 1937 - to the Kazan Infantry Military School. CEC Tatar ASSR and, finally, in March 1939 - to the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Council of the Tatar ASSR. Since March 1937, a military school has become a union and young people from all the Union republics of the USSR were able to enter it. For those five years that Kirponos was led by the Kazan School, many decent commanders were prepared in the troops, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself during the school leadership and the school grew up in the ranks. On October 26, 1935, he was awarded the title of Combridge, and four years later, November 4, 1939 - the title of Komdiva.

The cadets of the school recalled the KirPonos as an excellent commander and the educator - military-pedagogical activities were his hereby. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was engaged in both administrative and economic work - because at that time the organization of the normal supply of the school was also quite complicated and, at the same time, very necessary. Party and political activities remained the most important for the KirPonos - since the time of the end of the First World War, when he was elected Chairman of the Regimental Soldier Committee, Kirponos was actively engaged in public activities. A convinced communist, he took the most active part in all party meetings of the school and school. Naturally, in the spirit of time it was necessary to participate in the chinds of "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that the KirPonos is always, as they say, "knew the measure" - where there were real oppositionists to the Soviet course, and where - accidentally suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of an intercession. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unconditionally supported Stalin's politics, of course, also played a role in his subsequent rapid military career. In particular, if we take into account that in the late 1930s. Many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their posts were required to replace someone.

Soviet-Finnish war and service growth

In the meantime, the military-political situation in the Soviet borders was significantly aggravated. In the north-western direction, the Soviet Union entered the conflict with Finland. On November 28, 1939, a non-aggression agreement was denounced, and on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops stationed in the Soviet-Finnish border were ordered to go to the offensive. The official reason for the beginning of hostilities was the artillery shelling of Soviet territory from Finland. A impressive Soviet group of troops in the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies was concentrated against Finland. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for competent and talented commanders began to be felt, and therefore the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR appealed to the practice of transferring to the existing army of higher commander from other military units and military-educational institutions. In December 1939, the former head of the Kazan Infantry School Committee Mikhail Kirponos received a new appointment - the commander of the 70th Rifle Division, which was part of the 7th Army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, which actually did not have, except for short-term participation in the Civil War, the actual experience of the command of the military units, was given high confidence and, as it were, the possibilities were opened for further advancement of the career ladder in the event of a successful command of the entrusted Rifle Division.

The seventh army focused on the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to November 1939, in addition to the headquarters of the army, the 19th and 50th rifle buildings and in their composition of the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th rifle divisions, three tank brigades, six artillery regiments of RGCs, three artillery divisions of high power RGK. The air force of the army included the 1st and 68th easy-to-bombarding, 16-speed bomber and 59th fighter aviation brigades in the 12 aircraft regiments and 644 aircraft.

The seventies of the Rifle Division, which was to command Kryviv Kirponos, was part of the 19th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army and included three rifle shelf (68th, 252nd and 329th shelves), two artillery shelf (221 - Easy artillery regiment and the 227th Gobichic Artillery Regiment), 361th Tank Battalion, 204th Chemical Tank Battalion. In February 1940, the 20th tank regiment on the T-26 was included in the Division. On November 30, 1939, the division entered the territory of Finland. Taken on December 25, 1939, Division Kirponos changed her previous commander of Colonel Fedor Alexandrovich Prokhorov. To the honor of the latter, it can be said that he prepared his fighters, he was exceled and the division was considered one of the best in the army. Under the command of the KirPonos, she began on February 11, 1940. He began participating in the breakthrough of the famous Mannerheim Line. From February 11 to 14, division divisions took part of the field strengthening of the Karhulian region, on February 17, participated in the "Battle of Islands", February 21-23 - in the seizure of Liisaari Islands (Northern Berezova). On February 26, the division was translated from the 19th Rifle Corps to the 10th Rifle Corps. Her fighters managed to take part of the Koivisto Peninsula (Kiperort), Pukinsaari Islands (Koznyny) and Hannukkalansaari (Mayan).

On February 29, the Division was translated into the 28th Rifle Corps, as part of which participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then for Ravansaari Island (Small Vysotsky). The most famous feat of the division was forcing at night on the ice of the Vyborg Gulf. Making a six-sorted raid in the rear of the enemy, in March 1940 Division took a bridgehead on the northern shore of the bay and took control of the road Vyborg - Hamina. This throw of the division played a crucial role in the Vyborg storm, which could not not be ignored to the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252nd Rifle and the 227th Gaubic Artillery Shelves were awarded the orders of the Red Banner. Division commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos March 21, 1940 was awarded a high rank of the Hero of the Soviet Union and received the Order of Lenin and the Medal of the Golden Star.

Successful command of the 70th Rifle Division, which showed his prowess and combat learning to the Soviet-Finnish War, became the "Star hour" Comda Kirponos in the literal and figurative sense. It is from this time that his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-term, climbing on the steps of team posts of the Red Army. Prior to this, Kirponos led the military school for five years, for four years he increased only on one title. But the feat of the 70th rifle division contributed to the fact that Komdiv noticed. In April 1940, a month after the forcing of the elegance bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49th Rifle Corps, which was part of the Kiev Special Military District. However, in June of the same year, two months after the appointment by the commander of the corps, the KirPonos is waiting for the following tremendous increase - it is appointed by the commander of the Leningrad Military District. On June 4, 1940, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the military rank of Lieutenant (in connection with the introduction of general titles in the Red Army).

Kiev Special Military District

However, Mikhail Kirponos also stayed for the position of commander of the Leningrad Military District. Already in February 1941, less than a year after the appointment on the LAV, the Kirponos is appointed by the commander of the Kiev Special Military District. On February 22, 1941, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military title "Colonel-General". The appointment to the Kiev Special Military District shows that the Supreme Command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful managing part of the 70th Rifle Division during the Soviet-Finnish war, saw a promising commander who could well prepare the troops of a strategically important District and effectively command them.

Apparently, Stalin, appropriating the Kirponos commander of the most important in the defense system of the western direction of the Military District, expected that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district to the upcoming war, without causing suspicion from the enemy. After all, Kirponos, during the civil war, there was a rich experience of participation in the partisan movement - at first the command of his own rebel detachment, and then services in the schors division. The command of the same partisan formation requires the creativity of thinking, versatility, the ability to independently make decisions that sometimes does not receive commander parts of the regular army. Moreover, the KirPonos had to combine not only the military and political leadership, but also the functions of the administrator and the supplier. In general, it should be noted that in the choice of the KirPonos to the post of commander did not have an error commander - the Colonel-General really in his personal and professional qualities corresponded to his hopes. Although, nevertheless, there was one disadvantage of the new commander - the experience of the command of the acting combat units in time is too small in time.

In fact, if not to take into account the time of participation in the civil war in the Schorsov division, and later - in the Soviet-Finnish War, most of the military service Mikhail Petrovich fell on military pedagogical activities - he held various posts in military schools. At this disadvantage, the General of the Army of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who has taken the command of the Kiev Special Military District, was noted at Kirponos: "I was glad that the Kiev Special Military District got such a worthy commander. Of course, he, like many others, has not yet had the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border district, but life experience, hard work and a natural fence guaranteed that the first-class commander of the troops will work out from Mikhail Petrovich "(quota. By: Meretkov K. A. in the service of the people. SPb., 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized the promising commander in the KirPonos and was convinced that the Colonel-General would be able to fully reveal his commander talent, he was in the nuances of the Command.
Ivan Khristorovich Bagramyan, at the time in the rank of Colonel who served as the head of the operational department - the deputy chief of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District, recalls the appointment of Kirponos by commander district: "Soon after arrival, the new commander went around the headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to familiarize himself more quickly with the state of affairs, with people. He visited us, in the operational department. Its thin, the switched figure firmly faced a carefully rejected twig. On the chest gleamed the golden asterisk of the hero. Pale, smoothly shaved face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows hung over big blue eyes. Dark, thick hair is thoroughly cleaned on the sample. Only a light gray in the temples and deeply folds in the corners of the lips were given out that this boiled person is already under fifty "(quota. By: Bagramyan I.x. So the war began. M., 1971).

Much attention to the Commander Kirponos paid for military training for troops. Fine understanding, the most likely opponent of the Soviet Union is Germany, the command of the Red Army paid a lot of attention precisely the preparation of military units and compounds of the Kiev Special Military District. First of all, the task of working out actions in the event of a tank attack of the enemy was set. On the other hand, focus on improving the preparation of its own tank units. Thus, the most frequent guest commander-based Colonel-General Kirponos was in mechanized corps, where he checked the skipping of the crews to control tanks, and tank units - to act in combat.

In addition to combat training, the most important activities of the military of the Kiev Special Military District remained construction and equipment of defensive structures in border areas. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems characteristic of the RKKA in the pre-war period. First of all, we are talking about weak armed and lack of personnel in parts and connections. According to the memories of I.Kh. Baghamyan, only in the Kiev Special Military District lacked 30 thousand servicemen. And this is despite the fact that military schools were translated from a three-year training for the biennium, created courses of junior lieutenants for accelerated team preparation. As for the provision of troops with weapons and technology, then there was a disadvantage, communications and special equipment, vehicles everywhere. All this to fill overnight did not seem to be possible - the national economy of the country and so worked at the limit.

War

On June 22, 1941, Hitler Germany and her satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among their first, their blows and the military units and compounds that were part of the Kiev Special Military District were accepted. On the day of the beginning of the war, the Kiev Special Military District was transformed into the South-West Front. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the South-Western Front forces. The troops of the South-Western Front consisted of 957 thousand soldiers and officers. 12.6 thousand artillery guns and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft were in service. Against the South-Western Front, the Hitler group of Army "South" was concentrated in 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 9.7 thousand artillery guns and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft. That is, at first glance, Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in a living force, but also in service. However, in reality, the situation looked in one way. First, almost immediately after the beginning of the war, the Army Group "South" received reinforcements from 19 divisions, also joined Hungarian, Romanian, Italian and Slovak troops. The south-western reinforcement front did not receive in such quantities, but the state of his technical park, although superior at first glance the Germanic on the number of tanks, airplanes and artillery guns left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were stationed in close proximity to the border, while the enemy hit them at once with all the "fist" of the South armies, providing a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops in the border area and leveled the capabilities of the South-Western Front's troops to more Late steps of hostilities, since they entered into fighting alternately and, accordingly, could not use their advantages in more personality.

The rate of the Supreme Commander of June 22, 1941 gave an order to Colonel General Kirponos to provide a counteroffensiveness of the Soviet troops by the 5th and 6th armies and take Lublin. By itself, this task appeared difficulty, but nothing else remained Kirponos, how to try to fulfill it. In the command of the front there were opposite points of view. Member of the Military Council of the FRONT Corpsist Commissioner Nikolai Nikolayevich Vashgin made an immediate execution of the order of the rates of the Supreme Commander about the counteroffensiveness. The head of the headquarters of the Front, Lieutenant General Maxim Alekseevich Perkarev adhered to the opposite position. He understood that the front troops would simply do not have time to concentrate to apply a response hit and offered to organize defense, as long as possible while holding back the enemy in order to create fortified districts in the internal territories of the district.

Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos spoke with a slightly different idea - he suggested a blow to the founding of the German group, aimed at Kiev by three mechanized buildings and rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th army. The task of the counterdard would be the complete destruction of the avant-garde of the enemy and the maximum containment of the 1st Tank Army, who commanded General Evald von Clayst (the composition of the tank army included five tank divisions of the Wehrmacht). However, the offensive blow of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. There was no interaction between the mechanized cases. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicle, which was mainly equipped with mechanized front enclosures. Finally, the 34th tank division was surrounded and was able to break through to his, only losing all his tanks. Speaking of the causes of organizational miscalcies, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the insufficient practical experience of General Kirpyonos on the leadership of large military compounds. After all, in fact, before becoming the commander of the district, he commanded only a rifle division, and not in its composition of tank units. Accordingly, the experience of organizing the interaction of mechanized compounds Kirponos did not have (see: Burkin P.V. General Kirponos: Experience of historical and anthropological research).

However, in a certain extent, the troops of the South-Western Front still managed to significantly make it difficult to promote the enemy towards Kiev. Although the countertime plan failed, but Soviet troops stopped part of the Wehrmacht 20 km. To the west of Kiev. This forced the Nazis to change the tactics of the offensive. The command of the Wehrmacht temporarily refused to storm Kiev and sent all the forces on the left flank front. The enemy pushed the 6th and 12th Soviet army to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the South-Western Front. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe tarabia, the response offensive of the 26th Army was conceived, but ultimately it was suppressed by the opponent. Wehrmacht dropped the 26th Army to the North-East, after which the position of the South-Western Front has deteriorated even more. The opponents of the opponent approached Kiev. The Supreme Command required the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On August 8, Kirponos organized a counterattack on the position of the enemy, leaving all the power available at his disposal - 175th, the 147th Infantry Divisions, participating in the defense of Kiev, the reserve 206 and 284th divisions, 2nd and 6- JU airborne brigades. On August 9, the 5th airborne brigade and Kiev folk militia entered the battle. As a result, Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kiev. By August 16, the enemy was pushed back to the initial position with the heroic efforts of Soviet troops. The defense of Kiev played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, substantially slowing down the promotion of the enemy's troops deep into the Soviet territory and forcing the Hitler's command to change the trajectory of the Majmacht forces. Thus, for a whole month, that in the conditions of the war was very important, the Hitler's offensive was detained towards Moscow.

Since Hitler's troops were redirected from Moscow to the southern direction, the main task was to retreat from under Kiev. In this, the Kirponos himself, and the Marshals of Buddan and Shaposhnikov. However, Stalin permits for the troop of troops did not give. As a result, by September 14, the 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th army were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers died surrounded or when trying to be a breakthrough. The troops of the South-Western Front turned out to be separated and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to Khutora Dryukovshchina, which is 15 km away. Southeast of the Lohvitsa, the headquarters of the south-western front and the 5th army with the forces of escort were approached. Here they were attacked by parts of the Hitler's 3rd Tank Division. The Army Commander of the 5th Army General-Major Sothensky and officers of his headquarters were captured. The total number of staff columns at this point was about a thousand people, including approximately 800 commanders - generals and officers of the headquarters, as well as the Commandant Rota.

The column deployed to the Roshetyukovo grove. As part of the column, the Commander Commander General Kirponos, the head of the headquarters of the Tupikov Front, members of the Military Council of the Front Burmisthenko and Rykov, Commander of the 5th Army of Potapov and other top front commands. Parts of the Wehrmacht attacked Schuecuyukovo grove in three directions. The fight lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in his leg, then the mines of Mina got into his chest, which he also died. The subordinates rooted the commander of the front here, on the territory of the grove. The head of the Staff of the Staff, Member of the Military Council of Burmisthenko, was also killed in battle, many other commanders. The commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, was captured.

In December 1943, the remains of the Colonel-General Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos were reburied in Kiev in the Botanical Garden. A.V. Fomina, and in 1957 - transferred to the park of eternal glory. General Kirponosu fully could not be revealed to reveal his definitely, the colonical talent was present. He died at the very beginning of the war, making the most tragic moments - the retreat of Soviet troops, the exercise of a huge part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that General Kirponos has made a tremendous contribution to the defense of the country from the aggression of Hitler's Germany. Having delayed the German troops near Kiev, he delayed the offensive to Moscow, giving the opportunity to consolidate the RKKA forces on the protection of the Soviet capital. Despite all those mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops who pay attention to many modern historians, General Kirponos, with honor, passed its path of the Soviet warrior and died on the battlefield, in the battle, without having surrendered to the enemy. It remains only to lead to the completion of the article by the words from the memories of Marshal Soviet Union Cyril Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel-General Kirponos: "He was brave in a military relationship and showed himself a brave and volitional commander ... Brave, the courageous general died in the days of heavy tests, leaving Good and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... "(Moskalenko K.S. in the south-west direction. M., 1975).

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