Kursk battle is a turning point in the course of the Second World War, when Soviet troops caused such damage to Germany and its satellites, from which those were no longer able to recover and have lost the strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although there were many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of battles before the defeat of the enemy, but after this battle in the hearts of each Soviet citizen, an ordinary and general there was confidence in victory over the enemy. In addition, the battle at the Oryol-Kursk ledger was an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and a brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

A radical fracture during the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, when a large grouping of the enemy was eliminated during the Uranus operation. The battle on the Kursk protrusion was the final stage of the indigenous fracture. After the defeat under Kursk and the Eagle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After failure, the German troops were already fully defended to the end of the war, and our predominantly led offensive operations, freeing Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops were transferred to the offensive in two directions: in the North and South Face Kursk. So the Operation "Citadel" and directly Kursk battle began. After the offensive on the Germans slept, and his divisions were significantly bleeded, the command of the USSR held a counteroffensive against the troops of the Army Group Center and South. On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was released, which marked the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

Battle prehistory

After the victory near Stalingrad during the well-carried out operation of Uranus, the Soviet troops managed to hold a good offensive throughout the front and discard the enemy to many miles to the West. But after the counteroffensiveness of the German troops in the Kursk area and Orel, the protrusion arose, which was sent towards the West to 200 width to 200 and a depth of 150 kilometers formed by the Soviet group.

Starting from April to June, relative lulls reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat near Stalingrad, Germany will try to take revenge. The most suitable place was exactly the Kursk ledge, causing strikes in the direction of Eagle and Kursk from the north and south, respectively, it was possible to create a boiler, the scale large than near Kiev, Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

Another 8 April 1943, Marshal Zhukov G.K. He sent his report about the spring-year-old military company, where he made his thoughts about the actions of Germany on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk arc would become the place of depreciation of the opponent. At the same time, Zhukov expressed its plan countermeasures, which included sprinkling the enemy in defensive battles, and then applying the counterdard and its complete destruction. Already on April 12, Stalin was heard by General Antonova A.I., Marshal Zhukova G.K. And Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Supreme Commander's rates unanimously expressed in favor of the impossibility and uselessness of the preventive strike in spring and summer. After all, on the basis of the experience of past years, the offensive against large associations of the enemy, preparing for the application of impact, does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of their troops. Also, the formation of forces for the application of the main strike should have to weaken the groupings of the Soviet troops in the directions of the main strike of the Germans, which would also inevitably led to the defeat. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a defensive operation in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusion, where the main blow of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the bet expertly extinguish the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and put a decisive blow to the enemy. This contributed to the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction in contrast to the first two years of war.

In the spring of 1943, the word "Citadel" appeared in the intercepted radio data and more often. On April 12, the reconnaissance put the plan under the code name "Citadel", which was developed by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, but she was still signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany prepares the main blow, where the Soviet command was expected. Three days later, Hitler signed an operation plan.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create in the direction of the predicted impact of deep-butchelonized defense and creating a powerful group, able to withstand the head of the German parts and to carry out counterudresses at the time of the culmination of the battle.

Army composition Commander

For hitting the Soviet troops in the area of \u200b\u200bKursko-Orlovsky, planned to attract power Army Groups Centerwho commanded feld Marshal-General and army Groups "South"who commanded general Feldmarshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank, 8 assault guns, 2 tank brigades, as well as 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the MOP "Das Reich", those considered elite tank divisions, "dead head" and "Adolf Hitler" were pulled to the strike towards Kursk.

Thus, the grouping amounted to 900 thousand people of personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft, which were part of the two fleets of Luftwaffe.

One of the key trumps in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy tiger tanks and Panther, assault guns "Ferdinand". It is because of the fact that new tanks did not have time to get to the front, were in the process of refinement, the beginning of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service of the Wehrmacht consisted of obsolete pz.kpfw tanks. I, pz.kpfw. I I, PZ.KPFW. I I I have passed some modification.

The main blow was to apply the 2nd and 9th Army, the 9th tank army of the Center for the Center of the Center under the beginning of General Field Marshal Model, as well as the QUIPF operational group, the tank 4th Army and the 24th Corps of the Group Army "South", which commanded General Gota.

In the defensive battles of the USSR, three fronts of Voronezh, steppe, central.

Commanded the central front of the army general Rokossovsky kk .. The defense of the northern faca of the protrusion was commissioned. Voronezh Front, command who was entrusted to the General of the Army to Vatutin N.F., was to defend the South FAS. Colonel-General Konev I.S. The commander of the Steppe Front, the reserve of the USSR during the battle. In the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusions, about 1.3 million people were involved, 3444 tanks and sau, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft. Data can be varied with some sources.

Armament (tanks)

The German command during the preparation of the "Citadel" plan did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht's troops during the operation on the Kursk arc should have been performed by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To enhance the impact groups before the start of the operation, several hundred newest panther tanks and tiger were delivered to the front

Middle Tank Panther Manufactured by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification, he was considered heavy. For the first time participated in the battles on the Kursk arc. After the fighting in the summer of 1943, on the Eastern Front, it was actively used by the Wehrmacht and in other directions. It is considered the best tank of Germany in World War II, even despite a number of flaws.

"Tiger і" - Heavy tanks of the German Armed Forces of the Second World War. At distant distances of the battle, there was a minuse of fighter means of Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the creation of one combat unit of the treasury of Germany was spent 1 million Reichsmarocks.

PanZerkampfwagen III Until 1943 was the main middle tank of the Wehrmacht. Captured combat units were used by Soviet troops, they were created at their base.

Panzerkampfwagen II. Produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it was used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker similar samples of the enemy, not only on armor, but even by armament. In 1942, he was completely derived from the composition of the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, however, remained in service and was used by assault groups.

Light Tank Panzerkampfwagen I is the brainchild "Krupp" and "Daimler Benz", shot from production in 1937, was released in the amount of 1574 units.

In the Soviet Army, withstanding Naval, the German armored Armada had the most massive tank of World War II. Middle Tank T-34there have had many modifications, one of which T-34-85 is in service with some countries to this day.

Battle's move

On the fronts reigned calm. Stalin has a doubt about the loyalty of calculations of the rates of the Supreme Commander. Also, the thought of competent misinformation did not leave it until the last moment. Nevertheless, at 23.20 July 4 and 02.20 July 5, the artillery of the two Soviet fronts inflicted a massive blow on the estimated positions of the enemy. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of the two air armies committed an airline at the position of the enemy in the Kharkov and Belgorod area. However, this did not bring a special result. Only communications communications were corrupted on the German summaries. Losses in alive strength and technique were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful art preparation, significant Wehrmacht forces moved to the offensive. However, it was unexpectedly a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers, minefields with a high frequency of mining. Because of significant damage to connected communications, the Germans could not achieve a clear interaction between parts, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry remained without supporting tanks. In the Northern Face, the blow was directed to Olkhovatka. After a minor success and serious losses, the Germans sent a blow to Ponyry. But it was not possible to wed up into Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in the ranks.

* After the Germans switched to the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and gladly in his voice reported that the offensive began. Lady Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Kursk battle will not leave anywhere.

The Russian defeat in the south was put into the task of the 4th tank corps, the 2nd Tank Corpus COP and the Army Group "Cempf", which was part of the 4th Army. Here the events unfolded successfully than in the north, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th tank corps in the blow to Cherkasy carried large losses, not moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassky is one of the brightest pages of the Kursk battle, which for some reason it is practically remembered. The 2nd SS tank corps was more successful. He was tasked to go out into the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, where it was advantageous in the tactical battle of the terrain to give a fight to the Soviet reserve. Due to the presence of a mouth consisting of heavy "tigers", the Divisions "Leibstandart" and "Das Reich" managed to pretty quickly punch in the defense of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive borders and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to perform this task. In fact, Soviet tankers received an order about the lesson of the turn, already captured by the Germans, but the threats of the Tribunal and shooting were forced to go to the offensive. Having hit the 5th STK in the forehead "Das Reich" and was discarded. Tanks "Das Reich" switched to the attack, trying to surround the power of the hull. Partially it succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the divisions that were outside the ring, the communications were not converted. Nevertheless, during these fighting, Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is indisputable, the largest loss of Soviet troops in one day. Thus, on July 6, the Germans came out to the third border of the defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, after mutual art preparation and massaged air strikes, there were 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rothmistrova and 700 tanks from the 2 SS tank corps. The battle lasted all day. The initiative passed from hand to hand. Opponents carried colossal losses. The whole battlefield stood with thick smoke fires. However, the victory was left behind us, the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, Western and Bryansk fronts moved to the offensive. The next day the defense of the Germans was broken, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to free the eagle. Oryol Operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, the plans of the General Staff had the name "Kutuzov".

The operation of the "Rumyantsev" should have defeated the powers of the Germans in the area of \u200b\u200bKharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and the Steppe Front did an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was released. On August 23, Kharkov on the third attempt was released by Soviet troops, which marked the end of the operation of the "Rumyantsev" and together with her and the Kursk battle.

* On August 5, the first salute wage was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation from the German-fascist invaders of Eagle and Belgorod.

Losses of Party

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Kursk battle are definitely not known. To date, the data diverges dramatically. In 1943, the Germans in the battle on the Kursk ledger lost more than 500 thousand people killed and injured. 1000-1500 enemy tanks destroyed Soviet fighters. And the Soviet Asses and the forces of air defense destroyed 1696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and SAU were burned, out of order for technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the sky over Kursk and Eagle.

Results, meaning

Guderian and Manstein speak their memoirs that the Kursk battle became a turning point of war on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops caused a major damage to the Germans, which forever missed a strategic advantage. In addition, the armored power of the fascists could no longer be restored until the previous scale. Days of Hitler's Germany were considered. The victory in the Kursk arc became a great help to raise the morality of fighters on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Day of military glory of Russia

The day of the defeat of the Soviet troops of the German fascist troops in the Kursk battle in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is the day of memory of all those in 1943 in July-August during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations of Kutuzov and Rumyantsev on the Kursk ledge managed to turn the ridge to a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. In 2013, large-scale celebrations are expected to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory on the fiery arc.

Video about the Kursk arc, key moments of battle, be sure to view:

Kursk battle (July 5, August 23, 1943) - a historical event that is often given ambiguous characteristics. There is an opinion that only the cost of huge losses of the Soviet army managed to stop the enemy. However, this is a simplified look. The fracture in the Kursk arc was possible thanks to a number of factors.

Decisive moment

For the German government, the offensive operation "Citadel" was emergency. Total mobilization was carried out throughout the country, a huge number of live strength and technology was put into the area of \u200b\u200boperation.

The Supreme Command has a thoroughly developed a plan of the action of troops: literally by the clock and square meters, the movement of each unit was shown. Only offensive! No other options for the operation provided. By decree of Hitler, it was necessary to smash the main forces of the Red Army and quickly deal with its disparate and demoralized residues.

In the area of \u200b\u200bKursk speakers, the Germans focused 50 divisions, about 900 thousand soldiers. Powerful was technical support: three tank divisions (2758 tanks), about 10 thousand self-propelled artillery plants (SAU) and 2050 aircraft. In addition, about 10 thousand anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk area.

The Soviet army on quantitative indicators exceeded the Germans in all types of weapons and in terms of human resources. At eight defensive borders were at least 1 million 300 thousand soldiers (about 600 thousand in reserve), 3444 tank, 19 thousand guns and mortars, 2172 aircraft. However, in the General Staff perfectly realized that the technical equipment of the army was obsolete, which practically reduced the numerical advantage. The final success in the battle depended on whether the tank tanks will be able to "cut" the tank tanks of the German army that comes from two sides.

Did not lose, but moved away

German General Erich von Manstein did not stop bragging that the Wehrmacht destroyed 1800 Soviet tanks under his command, while German losses were several times less. Even then, German historians went further, that the German army in the fields of the Kursk Arc left no more than 10% of the personnel, and irrevocable losses in tanks and the SAU did not exceed 300 units.

There is a reasonable question, why with this situation, the Wehrmacht not only did not surround the Soviet troops, but also appealed to flight? This in German historiography prepared the answer. Recently, the German magazine Welt published an article in which "irrefutably proved" that the Wehrmacht defeated near Kursk, since the loss of personnel and technology in the Red Army was several times more. And if it were not for the landing of allies in Sicily, which forced Hitler to take the troops from the Eastern Front, then Germany would finally broke the Russians.

So Manstein is one of the main actors of the Kursk battles, recognizing the defeat, after all, he emphasized in his justification, that Russians managed to crush the German army only due to its mass and the price of monstrous losses.

Intelligence service

No matter how they displaced their achievements, and the Soviet leadership for events in the Kursk arc approached the fulfillment. From the beginning of 1943, our intelligence regularly reported on the preparing operation "Citadel" and in general revealed Hitler's plans. On April 12, Stalin was familiar with the exact text of Directive No. 6 "On the Plan of Operation" Citadel ", which only three days later signed Hitler.

There are several versions regarding sources of information. One of them is called John Carckross - English Decipherter, a member of the Cambridge Five, who collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

Former Scout Lieutenant-General Vadim Kirpichenko writes that "John Carcross at the end of April, for two more than a month before the start of the Kursk battle, handed over to Moscow that the German offensive will begin in early July. It was an decryption of telegrams in Berlin German General Field Marshal Maximilian von Wehs, who was preparing a German offensive in the south of Kursk, in the Belgorod district. "

According to Kripichenko, in the telegram it was exactly indicated, what the Germans will use in the offensive, which units will move from the eagle, and which of Belgorod, which will be deployed by the technique. There also reflected the location of German field airfields.

In his memoirs, Georgy Zhukov argued that he predicted the power and direction of German strikes on the Kursk Argu on April 8, relying on these intelligence bodies.

Deep defense

On the eve of the German offensive operation, the Soviet troops at the Kursk direction created a powerful deep-elapted defense system. The command was decided to conduct a defensive battle with applying counterparts of counterdovern in critical moments.

In the sweat of the face had to work out saves, mined almost the entire front-line zone. The reports were recorded that the average mining density in the direction of expected strikes of the enemy was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

Tanks

Without a doubt, the tanks played in a Kursk battle one of the decisive roles. Soviet losses in the technique are recognized as large than German, however, the German military leaders, unlike historians, call the impressive figures of their own losses. So, according to General Walter Wreath, by July 7, 1943, only one 3rd tank German division lost over 67% of his tanks. Common losses in various military units reached up to 70-80%. It is for these reasons, according to the reports of the German command, the Wehrmacht was forced to slow down promotion.

After the defeat on the Kursk arc, where the tanks of the Urals and the German Concern "Krupp" were concerned, the head of the German company Alfred Krupp was aroused in the bet. Hitler in rage shouted: "Your tanks are worse than the Russians, we lost the battle under Kursk because of you! You are the main culprit of our failures! "

Führer became mistaken. Rurie steel did not inferior in the quality of the Ural, and something was better. Moreover, even on the third year of war, German tank troops in their tactical and technical training exceeded Soviet. A particularly tangible advantage was scheduled with the release of "Tigers" and "Panther".

But in fact everything turned out to be different. In battles near Kursk, 144 "Tiger" were established (or 7.6% of the total number of German tanks), but for a month and a half the Germans permanently lost 73 such cars. Soviet tankers found Breshi in, it would seem invulnerable new technique. In addition, they fully used the speed and maneuverability of the T-34, and the ambushes tactics were used, which leveled the qualitative superiority of the German tank troops.

In the largest in the history of the tank battle - the battle under Prokhorovka - about 5 thousand units of equipment were involved on both sides. The losses of the Germans, according to Soviet data, amounted to 80 tanks, our - up to 180 cars. An unequivocal victory under Prokhorovka was failed to observe anyone. But Soviet tankers were able to stop the enemy, albeit the price of great blood. This gave the opportunity to the Soviet command to strengthen its position, tighten the reserves and prepare for the offensive.

Aviation

Another important reason for which the German attack chokes, historians call the inability of Luftwaffe to conquer domination in the air. During the defensive operation, the Soviet pilots destroyed about 1.5 thousand German aircraft, while themselves lost about 460 cars.

In the air battles above the Kursk Arc, the enemy almost for the first time since the beginning of the war experienced all the power of Soviet assault and bombardment aviation for the first time since the beginning of the war. The air barrier was an insurmountable obstacle for German aircraft not only because of the quantitative superiority of technology, but also due to the dedication that the Soviet pilots were demonstrated in each fighting.

Tactics

The success of a defensive operation under Kursk is due to the fact that the Soviet command had an idea of \u200b\u200bthe plans of the Wehrmacht and managed to accurately determine the time and place of applying the main blows of the enemy. In the areas of alleged host, the General Staff focused the main forces, which allowed not only successfully defended, but also to need to control the counteroffensive. Kursk battle can be called one of the most successful defensive operations during the Great Patriotic War.

The defensive frontiers, designed primarily for reflection of massive tank strikes, were unparalleled in depth, engineering equipment of positions and strips, density of forces and means. The German attack literally jerked in the echelonized redtakes lined on her way.

Without yielding to the temptation to go to the offensive earlier than the situation required, the Soviet command waited for the extreme point when the defense had already started to give a crack. And instead of throwing reinforcements to defensive lines, General Staff unexpectedly for the German military organized two offensive operations ("Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"), the result of which was the breakthrough of the front and the final defeat of the enemy.

Prindrude Exodus

Despite the fact that the battle on the Kursk arc is recognized as a turning point in both the Great Patriotic and World War II, many historians say that the defeat of Germany was predetermined earlier - near Moscow and in Stalingrad. This point of view express some German researchers.

For example, Publicist Bertold Zeevald writes that "the Kursk battle confirmed that it has long been determined by the course of hostilities: the third Reich could no longer oppose Soviet performance. In essence, nothing has changed since the time of the defeat near Moscow, nor since the times of the Stalingrad battle. "

Historian Karl-Heinz Fritzer, recognized as the best German expert on the analysis of the "Citadel" operation, came to the following conclusion: "Although from an objective point of view, the German army has been obvious long ago, now and simple infantrymen in the trenches in the forefront faces it became clear that the war Already not to win. In this regard, Kursk can still be viewed as a peculiar line, after which the perception of defeat has gained different character. "

Kursk battle was planned by German-fascist invaders under the leadership of Hitler in response to the battle near Stalingradwhere they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but accidentally captured by the Saper-Fascist, passed his own. He reported that at night of the fifth of July 1943, the Nazis would begin to surpass the "Citadel" operation. The Soviet army is decided to start the battle first.

The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe "Citadel" was to apply a sudden strike in Russia with the involvement of powerful equipment and self-propelled installations. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the General Staff of the Soviet Army was developed a plan aimed at the liberation of Russian troops and the defense of the battle.

The battle received its interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk arc, due to the external similarity line of the front with a huge arc.

Change the course of the Great Patriotic War and to solve the fate of Russian cities, such as Eagle and Belgorod, was assigned to the "Center" army, "South" and the "Cempf" operational group. On the defense of the eagle, the troops of the central front were delivered, and on the defense of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

Date of the Kursk Battle: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 marked the greatest tank battle on the field under the station Prokhorovka. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack on defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and defeat 400 tanks. Further, in the Eagle area, the Bryansky, Central and West Front continued, by going to the Kutuzov operation. For three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Central Front was eliminated by the Hitler group. In the future, they betrayed aviation persecution and thus were discarded 150 km. west. Russian cities Belgorod, Eagle and Kharkov sighed freely.

The results of the Kursk battle (briefly).

• sharp turn of the course of the events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the fascists failed to turn their "Citadel" operation, at the global level it looked like a full defeat of the German campaign before the Soviet Army;
• the fascists turned out to be morally suppressed, disappeared all confidence in their superiority.

The meaning of the Kursk battle.

After the most powerful tank battle, the Soviet army turned the events of the war to reverse, took the initiative to their hands and continued to promote to the West, exempting Russian cities.

Causes of the defeat of the German troops in the Kursk direction in the memoirs of the commander

Relevance of the topic.Kursk battle in the definition of domestic historiography is a "radical fracture" during the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, Currently, the consideration of the Kursk battle is reduced to the catering of the fact of the fierce battle and the serious victory of the Soviet troops over the troops of Hitler's Germany.

The relevance of the research topic is due to the fact that in the educational literature, in the disclosure of the causes of the victory of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, the numerical superiority of the troops of the Red Army allocate. In the memoirs of the German commander, another number of facts that influence the outcome of the battle are clearly traced.

In this paper, an attempt is made to consecrate the causes of the defeat of Germany from the point of view of the German command.

Purpose of work: Based on the analysis of the memoirs of the German commander, consider the reasons for the defeat of the German troops in the Kursk arc.

To achieve the goal, it is assumed to resolve the following tasks:

1. 1. 1. Light the point of view of the German military officers to the readiness of the Wehrmacht's troops to the Kursk battle;

         Analyze the reasons for the victory of the Soviet troops in the battle on the Kursk arc from the point of view of the German command;

Methodological basis research.In the course of the study, a set of scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, systemics, comprehensiveness, sustained an unbiased approach to the analysis of the problems studied, critical attitude to sources, the imposition of judgments on the basis of a comprehensive understanding of the entire totality of the facts was used. From among the specific historical methods, a historical and genetic method was used, when analyzing the views of the representatives of the German command of the period under consideration.

Source basepresent2 Groups: The first group includes the work of representatives of the German team composition and the work of historians in which the memories of the Wehrmacht officers are given; The second group includes memories of the command composition of Soviet troops.

I. The reasons for the defeat of the German troops at the Kursk direction in the memoirs of the German commander.

The first, most mentioned, the reason that he influenced the result of the Kursk battle is "the colossal numerical superiority of the enemy (Soviet troops - A.G.)." The numerical superiority of the Soviet troops says and Lidde's saying that "Now they (Russians - A.G.) have sufficient resources to maintain the right pace, and the Germans after their last adventures, on the contrary, the strength of the strength of the Force ...".

This is the most common "justification" of the defeat of the German troops. But the numerical superiority of the USSR was achieved only due to the error of the German command, "who had no correct and deep assessment of the situation and unity in the plans and methods of the upcoming actions." Manstein was offered two opposite options each other, one of which was assumed to strike at the beginning of May, "Hitler agreed with this plan, but put an attack," the delay lasted until July, and they won mostly Russians. " Lidde's conclusion comes to the same conclusion, "the model missed his chance, convincing Hitler to postpone the beginning of the offensive in order to have time to bring more tanks. The delay gave the Russian time to prepare that otherwise they would probably be enough." But if Leedel shifts the blame for the imperfect attack on Field Marshal model, then the Kurt Visor Tippelskirch, the chief culprit of unaccompanies considers Fuhrera: "Hitler has transferred the deadlines for this long ago, despite the opinion of military leaders, that should either start him in the near future or In general, abandon his holding. ... Hitler wanted to apply a large number of tanks in this operation ... ". In addition, according to the approval of Tippelskir, Hitler could not free themselves from his old desire to constantly move away the strength of the Russians ... ".

Thus, another reason, in addition to the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, are the mistakes of the German command.

From the above, it is clear that the Führer focus on the offensive did the technical power, and in particular the new tanks "Panther", but according to Guderian "at the Tank" Panther ", on which the head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (as in other times and A. Hitler - A.G.) laughed great hopes, many disadvantages of each new design were found. " Such a circumstance, although it could not fundamentally affect the outcome of battles, but one way or another it can be another reason for the failure of German offensive. Next, Guderian indicates another possible reason for the failure: "The Eastern Front took all the forces from France and so weakened those who were there (on the Eastern Front. - A.G.) occupying parts, which required replenishment ... It was necessary to teach people to master the technique. .. to know with experience doing the fighting on the Eastern Front. "

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the German side was not largely ready for the conduct of offensive operations, which was naturally related to the revaluation of their own capabilities.

But there is another reason. Lieutenant General Kurt Ditmar talks about the highest moral qualities of Russian soldiers "If Russians participate in hostilities, the struggle becomes hard, ruthless and uncompromising. If the Russians are defended, they are almost impossible to win, even if the blood rivers are almost impossible. Further, Ditmar adds: "At the special order of Hitler, an attempt was made to instill Russian mentality in our army. We tried to copy their mentality, and they (and more successful) - our tactics." Another German officer, Günther Blumenitrite, affects questions no less important than the moral spirit - "Russians are completely incomprehensible to do without normal supply." More "bright" Description of the Russian Hero gives General Tank Forces Hasso Eckert von Mont ethell, which describes his impressions as follows: "Western man will never be able to imagine what the coming of the Russian army. For tank avant-garde, a real horse house should be The soldier behind his back bag with breadcrumbs and raw vegetables ... They cannot be stopped, like any other army of a civilized country, cutting off from worm, since there is something often absent. "

Thus, we can talk about the greatest heroism and the unprecedented "Spartan" endurance of the Russian soldier, which was manifested not only in the Belgorod meat grinder, but also throughout all the battles and probably decided the outcome of the entire length and bloody war.

As a result, we come to the conclusion that the victory of the Soviet troops at the Kursk direction lies a number of reasons that allocate the German commanders themselves - the first cause is the numerical advantage of Soviet troops, which will mention E. Manstein and B.G. Lidde Garth. The second reason to indicate E. Manstein and K. Von Tupilskirm, are numerous errors of the German command, and as a result of these errors, the numerical advantage of the Red Army. Guderian in his essay indicates the unaware of German troops to keep the company in the Kursk direction, which is the third cause. But the very main cause of German defeat, according to K. Ditmar, Bluemenitrite and H.S. Montefel von, became the Russian soldier, with his unsurpassed moral and unstable physical qualities, which in spite of any difficulties and do not regret himself, went forward, defend his homeland.

II. The reasons for the defeat of the German troops at the Kursk direction in the memoirs of the Soviet team.

In the works of the German team composition, as one of the main reasons for the defeat of the German fascist troops, a superior numerical power of Soviet troops was allocated.

The numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the problems in the recruitment of the Army of Germany in their work mentions A.M. Vasilevsky saying that: "The main problem for the fascist command was to replenish losses in people and weapons and creating appropriate offensive groups. Strongly held in January 1943 total mobilization with a call to the army even 50-year-olds. Nevertheless, mobilization replenished strongly Drained troops on the Eastern Front, the number of which by the summer of 1943 was brought to 4.8 million "[A.M. Vasilevsky]. It has already been mentioned above that the Eastern Front demanded the transfer of German military units from the Western Front, in particular from France. Alexander Mikhailovich does the following conclusion: "Despite the measures taken and the possibility of transferring divisions from the West, where there was still no second front, the enemy could not fill all his losses and bring the number of troops on the Eastern Front to the autumn level of 1942 ..." [A.M. Vasilevsky]

The numerical superiority of the Soviet troops indicates Major General Zamyatin N.M., Colonel Boldyrev P.S., Colonel Vorobiev FD, Lieutenant Colonel Artemyev N.F. and Parotkin I.V. In my work "Battle under Kursk. A brief essay. From the experience of the fighting of the Patriotic War": "... The Germans who have not located in the necessary number of free reserves and who were afraid to get involved in a protracted, expensive battle, did the main bid for a quick, lightning breakthrough of our defense powerful blows of tank Tarana ... "[Major General Zamyatin N.M.].

Zhukov GK It mentions the significantly increased power of tank and mechanized corps and aviation: "By the number of aviation, our Air Force has already been superior to German air forces. Each front had its air army in 700-800 aircraft" [Zhukov G.K.]

Thus, the numerical superiority of the USSR on the eve of the Kursk battle in the opinion of domestic commander is one of the defining victory factors in the battle.

There is no doubt that the success of the majority of operations is the fruit of not only the heroism of the Soviet soldier, but also the talent of domestic commander. German commanders mention errors that made their leadership. In the memoirs of the Soviet General, there is also a mention of the mistakes of German commanders, so A.M. Vasilevsky speaks of the miscarriages of the German command: "By concentrating such powerful forces, the enemy was confident in the success of the offensive. However, the enemy and this time overestimated the offensive opportunities of his army and underestimated the immeasurably increased battle power of the Red Army ..." [A.M. Vasilevsky]. Such very concise comments to the German leadership expresses K.K. Rokossovsky "German command, apparently, expedited to repeat the attack, similar to the one that it took in the summer of 1942 from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh. However, the enemy was cruel ..." [K.K. Rokossovsky].

Virtually not paying attention to the mistakes of the German side, the Soviet military units in their memories are talking about the "right" decision-making by the rate, under which, naturally, is meant. I.V. Stalin. I am replete with positive reviews about the rate and party "Memories" G.K. Zhukova, and in a variety of variations: "Preparing the Red Army to the summer campaign, the Central Committee of the Party, the State Committee of Defense, the Bet and General Staff in the spring of 1943 launched a colossal work. The party mobilized the country for the decisive defeat of the enemy" [Zhukov GK] "The Communist Party, as always, paid a lot of attention to raising the level of party-political work in the army." [Zhukov G.K.] "Politorganians, party and Komsomol organizations sent all their efforts to increase the moral qualities and political consciousness of the personnel of the troops." [Zhukov G.K.] Against this background, his subsequent fate is especially surprising - the repressed marshal.

More restrained in the "praise" of the Supreme Commander K.K. Rokossovsky and N.A. Antipenko: "Soviet command managed to solve an opponent's ideas in a timely manner, the supposed directions of its main blows and even the timing of the transition to the offensive." [Rokossovsky kk.] "The idea of \u200b\u200bthe enemy was timely understood by our bet" [Antipenko N.A.]

It should also be noted that the memoirs of the Soviet commander practically deprived of criticism in the address rate. The only one who mentions errors at the initial stage of preparation is KK Rokossovsky "The bet made a rude miscalculation, overestimate their capabilities and underestimating the possibility of the enemy." [K.K. Rokossovsky]. But he later seeks to smooth this criticism with positive reviews.

But only thanks to the competent leadership, the Soviet troops managed to create deeply echelonized defense at the Kursk direction. According to Rokossovsky kk.: "The front command already at the end of March in its orders and directives gave troops specific instructions on the equipment of defensive frontiers." - Further - "For three months, the front troops equipped six main defensive bands." Such statements allow us to conclude about the high professionalism of the command and, apparently, the fruitful work of Soviet intelligence, since, as is known from German memoirs, the German command was originally planned for the onset of May.

A.M. Vasilevsky claims the following: "No matter how neither the enemy keep the plans of his offensive, no matter how he tried to distract the attention of Soviet intelligence from the areas of concentration of his shock groups, our intelligence was determined not only by the overall idea of \u200b\u200bthe enemy for the summer period of 1943, the direction of strikes, the composition of the drums Groupings and reserves, but also to establish the time of the start of the fascist offensive. "[A.M. Vasilevsky].

No army of the world will be able to fight without weapons, ammunition, technology and food. The task of our bet at this stage consisted not only in the leadership of the troops, but also in the organization of providing the army to all necessary for the successful conduct of hostilities.

The Soviet rear during the Great Patriotic War in the General and Kursk battle in particular played a huge role. In his memoirs, the domestic commanders never mention the quality of his work. Evaluating the work of the rear of his front on a Kursk arc, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky writes: "We need to pay tribute to the front of the front ... I have been able to organize cargo in a short time, using all means for this: automotive, gentle and even water transport" [Rokossovsky kk]

In their "memories" G.K. Zhukov says the following: "Truly, the titanic work was done by the rear of fronts, armies and compounds ... who were helped by their work, with their creative initiative, the troops and the command of all degrees to fight the enemy, hover it and complete the war on the world-historical victory." [Zhukov G. TO.]

Thus, a numerical advantage and proper guide - the main reasons for the victory of the Soviet troops on the fiery arc, passing the red line in all memoirs of the Soviet Commostat.

But not only competent leadership brought the victory of the USSR, in the memoirs of German commanders there are mentions of the highest combat and moral qualities of the Russian soldier. Domestic military workers speak about the heroism of Soviet soldiers. In particular, A.M. Vasilevsky writes: "The Soviet Armed Forces strengthened the organizational time. Their combat skill increased. The moral spirit of warriors increased. - And further - the entire period of defensive fighting, as well as the offensive operations after him, abounded by examples of mass heroism and combat mastery of our glorious warriors." [A.M. Vasilevsky]

The Soviet people fought for their homeland not only in the regular army, made a victory by working in the machine, the partisan detachments in this struggle are in this struggle, according to K.K. Rokossovsky "... With the partisan headquarters, we supported a permanent connection. From there, we received information about the movements of the enemy's troops. Observations of our air intelligence were rechecked and complemented by partisans." [K.K. Rokossovsky]. On the contribution of the partisan in the victory in the Kursk direction mentions Zhukov G.K.: "... The power of our blows on the enemy was significantly increased by the actions of the partisan ... The interaction of the partisans and the regular army was strengthened, which they assisted in obtaining data on the adversary, pushing it Reserves, cutting communications, tearing the transfer of troops and weapons ... The impact of partisans on the moral state of the enemy's troops was of great importance. " [Zhukov GK]

As a result, from the memoirs of the domestic commander, we received a number of reasons that influenced the outcome of the battle under Kursk and appeared as a result of the indigenous fracture of the entire Great Patriotic War. First, the numerical superiority of the Soviet "combat vehicle", which, secondly, it became possible to achieve only due to the competent leadership of the rear from the rate. In addition, the Soviet leadership due to the exploration managed to create a wide network of defensive fortifications, which was another cause of victory at this stage. Fourth, the highest combat qualities of the Russian soldier and successful actions of partisan detachments.

Bibliography:

Westphal Z., Crape V., Blumenitrite G., Baerlein F., Zeitzler K., Zimmerman B., Mandifel X. Fatal solutions. - NY., 1956. // http://lib.ru/memuary/germ/fatal_ds.txt

Guderian G. Memories of the soldier. - Smolensk.: Rusich, 1999.// http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html

Ditmar K. Protiant blitzkrieg. Why Germany lost war. - M.: Yauza Press, 2008. // http://www.e-reading-lib.org/bookReader.php/1002613/zatyanuvshiysya_blickrig_pochemu_germaniya_proigrala_voynu.html

Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. IN 2 t. . - M. .: Olma ‐ Press , 2002.// http://www.modernlib.ru/books/zhukov_georgiy/ vospominaniya_i_razmishleniya_tom_1 / Read /

Lidel Garth B.G. The Second World War. - M.: AST, SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/liddel-hart/index.html

Manstein E. Lost Victory. - M.: ACT; SPB Terra Fantastica, 1999. - S.540 - (Military Historical Library). // Publicist .n 1.By / Conspects / Conspect _manstein .html; Lidel Garth B.G. The Second World War. - M.: AST, SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999.// Militera .lib .ru / h / liddel -hart /28.html

Tippelskirm K. History of World War II. - St. Petersburg: Polygon; M.: AST, 1999.// http://statehistory.ru/books/istoriya-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-/3

Yesterday sapojnik I published an interview with one German historian of war about the battle on the Kursk arc. It turns out that the Soviet heroic and victorious version of this historical event is not true. The myth designed in Soviet times specifically for concealing unpleasant facts, lesions and losses, traditional ways, lies and defaults.
The historical truth looks much easier and worse. That is, more interesting and more important.
Naturally, I was wondering, and I climbed into historical literature. Here are the results of my searches.
For the seed - the interview itself: http://www.istpravda.ru/digest/4517/ More precisely, the most interesting quotes:
"Colonel Karl-Heinz Fritzer: In this" great tank battle "the German army lost only three tanks!
German historians about the battle near Prokhorovka.
Military historian, Colonel in retired Karl-Heinz Fritzer, worked for many years in the Military Historical Office of the Bundeswehr, the best specialist in the Eastern Front, studied in detail both German and Russian documents.

Die Welt: - The most famous part of the "Citadel" operation was a tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Did there be two "steel avalanches" then?
Karl-Heinz Fenser"Some claims that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks participated in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 Wehrmacht tanks allegedly destroyed, considered the "Cemetery of German Tank Forces". However, in fact, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. The Red Army lost 235 tanks at the same time, and the German troops are only three!
DW - How could this be?
Fritzer - Soviet generals made incorrectly all that could be done because Stalin, mistaken in his calculations, was very picked by the terms of the operation. Thus, the "attack Kamikadze" performed by the 29th Tank Corps ended in an unnoticed trap, arranged earlier by the Soviet troops, followed by German tanks. Russians lost 172 of 219 tanks. 118 of them were completely destroyed. On the evening of that day, German soldiers took their damaged tanks into repair, and all the damaged Russian tanks blew up.

DW - Battle near Prokhorovka ended the victory of Soviet or German forces?
Freezer - it all depends on what part of the situation to see. From a tactical point of view, German troops defeated, and for the Soviet, this fight turned underwheld. From an operational point of view, it was the success of the Russians, because the German offensive was stopped for a while. But in fact, the Red Army initially planned the destruction of two tank corps of the enemy. Therefore, strategically, this was also the failure of the Russians, since under Prokhorovka planned to deploy the fifth Guards tank army, which was subsequently played to play a major role in the summer offensive.

DW - Battle near Kursk really became the turning point of World War II?
Fritzer - no.
DW - why not?
Fenser - Nor Kursk nor Stalingrad became turning points. Everything was decided in the winter of 1941 in the battle near Moscow, who ended with the collapse of Blitzkrieg. In the protracted war, the Third Reich, who experienced, in particular, the lack of fuel, there was no chance of the Soviet Union, which also received support from the United States and Great Britain. Even if Germany won the Kursk battle, she would not have been able to prevent their own defeat in the whole war.

DW - you have already dispelled several myths about the Kursk battle, who dominated the former Soviet Union. Why was it a lot of legends about this battle?
The freezer - in the Soviet historiography of the Kursk battle, "the greatest battle of all time," initially allocated to surprise a minor role. Because the mistakes made by the Soviet command during it were simply shameful, and the loss of terrifying. For this reason, the truth subsequently replaced myths.
DW - How do your Russian colleagues rate the Kursk battle today? Does the legends dominate in Russia? And did anything changed in the perception of this issue in Putin's era compared with the times of Yeltsin?
Fritzer - in recent years there have been several critical publications. The author of one of them, Valery Zamulin, confirmed the huge losses of Soviet forces under Prokhorovka. Another author, Boris Sokolov, pointed out that the official loss data were strongly understated. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded, however, that Russian historians create a positive image of the Red Army. Since then, these colleagues, as sources in Moscow told me, are forced to "split" between "True and Honor". Sven Felix Kellerhoff for Die Welt.

I was very surprised by Fryser Information. But very quickly found them confirmation.
First, here is the book of Zamulina, who mentioned the German military historian.
Zamulin V. Classified Kursk battle. - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2007.http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/index.html
I, naturally, will not post the whole book. But here is the concept of the author, from the preface:
"Relying on the analysis of documents of open funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (2) and trophy materials of the 4th Tha, the book discusses the four main issues related to this topic. First, the overall intention of the counterdard and the calculations N.F. Vatutin on The moment of his occurrence (July 9-10) and after the situation changed dramatically (on the night of July 12). Secondly, how the commander's troops were preparing, what problems and inconsistencies had them. For the first time, the situation with the transfer of several Divisions from the 40th and in the 6th GW. And on July 11, 1943, and armed during this friction between K.S. Moskalenko and I.M. Pistolyakov, who were not allowed to switch to the counter of the entire auxiliary group of the front. In -Ronoch, in detail the course of hostilities in a strip of the 69th and a day before the start of the counter and the process of localizing the breakthrough of its turn of the 3rd TC of the enemy, and also examines the influence of these events for the failure of the main grouping of the front (5th GW. A and 5th GW. TA). And, NAO NEZ, fourth, by the clock describes the course of the famous combat of four tank buildings 5th GW. Ta and divisions of the 2nd TC COP on July 12, 1943 at the "Tank Field" under Prokhorovka and opened the reasons that did not allow several hundreds of Soviet combat vehicles to minimize the MD SS "Leibstandart Adolf Hitler".
An essential problem in the preparation of input in the battle of the two Guards armies was the choice of the area of \u200b\u200bdeploying their fixed forces. In connection with the promotion of the enemy, the front command was forced twice to change the initial frontiers for their shock groups. The book for the first time shows the role of German tactical intelligence in the breakthrough on July 10, 1943, the front edge of the third Army Strip under Prokhorovka, in detail the construction of the station defense system on the night of July 11, 1943, and reveals a number of major problems in the management of the 5th GW . A who contributed to the exit of the 2nd SS TC to its outskirts and seizure of a plot scheduled for the initial positions of two shock tank compounds of the 5th GW. TA - 18th and 29th TC.
One of the important components of the adversary success at this moment was the human factor. Opports and flaws were admitted to the Soviet command almost at all levels: both front-line, and army, and divisional. Leaving the chain of objective problems and difficulties in the troops, defended the station and came up with the march, they almost led to the seizure of the SC-SCRs, and possibly more tragic consequences. In an effort to convey to the reader, the motives of solutions that took key figures of the historical drama, more fully reveal the essence of the circumstances in which they were, I used not only the database of unique documentary sources collected in domestic and foreign archives, but also previously not known to the general reader of eyewitnesses And direct participants of the battle on both sides.
July 12, 1943 became the most dramatic day of the whole Kursk battle. Constridar, to whom the Soviet command tried to finally stop promoting the troops of the HA "South" and defeat its strongest connection, did not bring the desired result. General G. Goth beat the leadership of the Voronezh Front. The battle-planned in May 1943 in May 1943 in order to bleed the moving reserves accumulated by the Soviet side for the period of spring operational pause, brought the expected results to the enemy. And although the powerful blows of Soviet tank compounds made a significant contribution to the breakdown of the "Citadel" operation, it is impossible not to recognize that under the progestorate the enemy still managed to achieve a very important result - the loss of our troops in people and armored vehicles were an order of magnitude higher than in the 2nd TK SS and 3rd TC. For incomplete days N.F. Vatutin lost a significant part of the prepared and fully equipped reserves - the most important lever of influence on the operational situation. The consequences of spraying forces of the Gvardia Army General PA Rothmistrova In the failed and to the end, not prepared by the front counter, they began to be felt the day after it started, and another day they made in the most difficult conditions to bring troops 69th and from the interfold of the Donets. "

Secondly, there was an excellent article about this battle, discusing and criticizing Soviet mythology. "Battle for Kursk, Eagle and Kharkov. Strategic intentions and results. Critical review of Soviet historiography" ((Published: Gezeitenwechsel Im Zweiten Weltkrieg? HRSG. Von Roland G. Foerster. Hamburg- Berlin-Bonn; Verlag Mittler Sohn-Militargeschichtliches Forschungsachichtliches Forschungsamt, 1996 . Translation from the English author). Http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/03.html
"In 1943, the advantage received by the Germans from the suddenness of the attack in 1941, practically sued no, and the Soviet industry reached its maximum performance after the decline in the first year of the war. These facts were very useful for creating a new myth - about the triumph of Soviet political Systems and Soviet people in the Kursk battle, the third great battle of the war after Moscow and Stalingrad, in which people, tanks and aircraft participated more than in any other battle on the Eastern Front. But for such a myth it is very important not to clarify the question of strategic intentions. and results.

And thirdly, the work of the historian Boris Sokolova was discovered. Quotes of them are too extensive, so I will leave only the most suitable, about the frieze, Kursk arc and Prokhorovka. Somehow, then to prostrate individual excerpts, I really liked his criticism of the traditional, mythological Soviet history. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/index.html
Sokolov B.V. True on the Great Patriotic War (collection of articles). - SPb.: Aletia, 1989.
In 1993, the Military Historical Research Institute of the FRG Ministry of Defense invited the author to the conference in Ingoldstadt, who considered this battle. However, in chance you can see the pattern. It was the Kursk battle that became the largest battle of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. Since the German attack on the USSR, by that time, the whole two years have passed, and all the advantages that Wehrmacht received due to the suddenness of the invasion, has long lost their meaning. The Soviet Union completely unfolded his military potential, was able to use significant supplies on Land Lesu and had an army equipped with people and technician with two-year experiences of fighting, in numbers and armament seriously superior to the enemy. Nevertheless, as shown in our report, from the point of view of military art, the Red Army Kursk battle lost, because, with the huge superiority, which she had, achieved relatively modest results, do not justify the monstrous losses in humans and technique reported by it. By the way, to the degree of inconsistency of the real course of events, the Soviet mythology of this battle will give odds to the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad. The reports of the German participants of the conference mentioned do not leave the stone on this stone on this myth. Especially I especially want to allocate the work of Karl-Gainz Fryser, dedicated, in particular, the analysis of the famous tank battle under Prokhorovka. (2) On her writing of the German historian inspired the view of the Soviet film "Fire Arc" from the Skyopopoeia "Liberation". Drawn in the film The picture of the greatest tank battle, he found entirely fake. On the material of the German archives, the Fritzer proved that Soviet statements seem to be under Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. The Germans lost 300 or 400 tanks - no more than a poetic exaggeration contained in the reports of Soviet tank commanders. In fact, the 2nd German Tank Corpus COP, opposed by the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army under Prokhorovka, irretrievably lost only 5 tanks, and another 43 tank and 12 assault tools were damaged, whereas the irrevocable losses of only 3 buildings 5- The Guards Tank Army amounted to, according to the Soviet reports that coincide in this case with German, at least 334 tanks and self-propelled guns. And this is despite the fact that almost four-time superiority was at the Soviet side - together with two convulsions called in the Army P. Rothmistrova, corps, tank and mechanized - up to 1000 units of armored vehicles against no more than 273 in Germans. There is an oral tradition from words of eyewitnesses, as if Stalin in Moscow after Prokhorovsky battle caused Rothmistrova "on the carpet" and said approximately the following: "What are you, asshole, in one day the whole army ruined, and did nothing?" However, from the intention to betray the unlucky commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the supreme will refused the court: after all, the Kursk battle Soviet troops still won. As a result, a legend was born about Soviet success under Prokhorovka. For this purpose, the number of tanks in the Germans was overestimated in two and a half times - up to 700, and their losses were 5-7 times, up to 300-400 cars to make them comparable to Soviet. I happened to talk with one of the participants of Prokhorovsky battle L. V. Chechkov. Then he was the elder, commander T-34 tank. Although the tank was burned, Leonid Vasilyevich was fortunate enough to survive. But from 50 of his friends on the tank corpus formed in Transbaikal, we went away from the battlefield under Prokhorovka only five. Most of the Soviet tankers did not have the necessary combat experience and in the Kursk arc adopted a fighting baptism. This undoubtedly affected the results of a tank battle under Prokhorovka. The true reasons for the end of the Army Group "South", contrary to the opinion common in Soviet historiography, as if the refusal of the Germans from continuing the "Citadel" operation was caused by the failure under Prokhorovka (which was not really), the Soviet attack against Orlovsky had already begun. A bridgehead, and therefore there was no chance of the grinding of the group of the Red Army under Kurk. The continuation of the onset of Kursk from the south was an unjustified risk and in the future could lead to the surrounding and death of German tank joints. Victory under Prokhorovka still could not change the overall strategic situation unfavorable for the German side.
In general, the Soviet command clearly underestimated the ability of the Wehrmacht to restore and even increase their forces after the catastrophe near Stalingrad and did not pay due attention to the combat training of troops and headquarters. Meanwhile, generals were in the Red Army, who were more realistic to evaluate the situation and fully paid for their realism. So, the head of the Smolensk Artillery School, Major Major General of Artillery E. S. Petrov had negligence at one meeting to express the opinion that after Stalingrad the Germans "fill their losses, after which they would still be strong, and need to be considered with them." He was immediately arrested and sentenced to 25 years camp. (2a)
The reasons for large losses of the Red Army in a Kursk battle, as in the following battles of the final period of war, it is also thought to be explained by the next reason. Due to the high level of losses in the early years of war, officers with military experience remained mainly at the level of the regiment and higher. In the Rota-Rota link and even the battalion of the commanders starting war, as well as sergeants and foreman, was preserved very little. Therefore, it was very difficult to transmit experience with a new replenishment. Hundreds of thousands and millions of poorly trained fighters continued to die, did not have time to inflict serious damage to the enemy. "

Sokolova has another book, did not have time to read, but surely interesting. About Zhukova: Sokolov B.V. Unknown zhukov: portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era. - MN: Rhodiola-Plus, 2000.