Former director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant Viktor Blyukhanov: "At night, driving past the fourth block, I saw that the upper structure over the reactor ... No! Incomprehensible atom. Interview with Viktor Blyukhanov (Profile magazine)

Former director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant Viktor Blyukhanov:
Former director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant Viktor Blyukhanov: "At night, driving past the fourth block, I saw that the upper structure over the reactor ... No! Incomprehensible atom. Interview with Viktor Blyukhanov (Profile magazine)

Viktor Bryukhanova can be considered one of the fathers of the Chernobyl NPP. He built a station from scratch and headed her until the 1986 catastrophe.
During the elimination of the consequences of the accident on Chernobyl, Viktor Bryukhanov received irradiation of 250 BEER (at the annual rate of 5 Ber). And a few months later, he was on the dock as one of the main accused of tragedy. Directors and four of his colleagues were sentenced to ten years in prison, of which he served five. Two of the convicts died, another ended in a psychiatric hospital. Now Viktor Petrovich and his wife lives in an ordinary apartment in Troyeschina. He is already 75. The honorable age and the received dose of radiation make themselves know: the veteran of energy does not see well, it is rarely coming out of the house, mainly to the hospital. He said, on the eve of the 25th anniversary of the tragedy, a lot of things remember, and these memories are very serious ... "I started building the Chernobyl NPP in 1970. When I scored pegs in her place, "recalls Blywood

If you return at that time, would you agree to head again?

V. B. If I knew what it means to be the director of the NPP under construction, would never go to this position. It is like being a whipping boy. Commissioning of the regional committee was held regularly, which was invited to me as a customer, as well as representatives of project and construction organizations. We reported on the progress of the plan. And no matter what happens, always wrong customer. The approved plan was not fulfilled. The first power unit we had to start in 1975, and let them go in 1977, because initially there was no huge amount of work. If in the 70th on the implementation of installation works, only 30 thousand rubles were allocated, then in 1978-1980 they were given 120-130 million rubles each year. Funds are considerable even for the Soviet Union.

The highest leadership of the country was often interested in construction?

V. B. And what about! It was the largest station in the world! Schcherbitsky (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. - Weekly.ua), secretary of the regional committee often visited ... But the main control was still from the USSR Ministry of Energy, which we obeyed. Vladimir Deputy Minister Weed by the construction site every month, brought the chiefs of masterpieces. Operational meetings were held: information on the course of construction was heard on them, the reasons were considered that it was inhibited.

You were customized, required to work shock?

V. B. All such construction sites were called shock. And without control over the party line, it simply could not do. Such was life ...

When did you sign acts about the commissioning of the first and subsequent blocks of the Chernobyl NPP, were there any fears regarding its reliability?

V. B. No, no! And there was no such thoughts! All equipment (in particular, the reactor) was held a military acceptance in Russia. And you understand what a military acceptance is ...

The station seemed harmless, we thought she would always work.

The launch of the Chernobyl station was a huge achievement. Suffice it to say that later for the year we produced so much electricity as all Czechoslovakia - 24 billion kWh. Each unit worked almost all the year at full capacity. No such station in the world was like ours.

Apartiation of pripyat, apparently, also legally on your shoulders?

V. B. In this matter, I was most hit by the Obto Party and personally the first secretary of the regional committee. His city construction interested in more than the station! For example, in recent years (before an accident. - Weekly.ua) He says: let's build a 50-meter pool so that international competitions can be held. Moreover, four pools have already worked. The cost of building an object was not worried, because the financing of nuclear power plants and the adjacent city was led by the Allied Ministry. But I had a financial plan in which the costs of the pool were not provided, and nothing could be changed in it! Or: let's build an ice rink so that international competitions can be carried out. How? In all of Ukraine there was no object of this class, and I had to build it in this small town!

How did you come out of the situation?

V. B. Well, somehow twisted, I had to change plans on the go ... there were a lot of problems. For example, on the project in Pripyat, one large store was provided. And where people will eat, buy products? It was necessary to solve such questions.

In general, more than 200 million rubles went on the construction of the city. The first turn cost 90 million (when the first two blocks were built at NPPs), the second - another 120 million.

Imagine: in the city number 50 thousand people were four schools, eight kindergartens, excellent improvement. Everyone wanted to get to us.

Probably, the salary at the station were good?

V. B. They were the same as in other stations of the Union. In addition to the salary, we paid our employees a prize - 40% monthly. Engineer earned 150 rubles, head of the shop - 200, and this is excluding the allowance. I like the director was 350 rubles., And when the number of operating power units reached four, I installed a salary of 450 rubles.

In the first years of NPP, there were freelance situations that foreshadowed trouble?

V. B. Everything worked clearly, reliable, steadily. There were no suspicions and bad expectations. In addition, we remembered the saying of Academician Alexandrov * that the station is safe, nothing can happen to it ...

After commissioning the four blocks, we began to build two more. In 1986, the installation of the reactor and the turbine of the fifth block began. They expected that he would be launched in 1987, and the next year - the sixth.

Already then the possibility of construction on the opposite side of Pripyat another nuclear power plant was considered. After all, a large team of builders gathered: Consider 25 thousand people. They had to have something to do after starting the sixth block. If everything was safely, it would certainly have started the construction of another nuclear power plant.

There are many rumors on the events at the Chernobyl station on the night of the tragedy. How was it really?

V. B. Blok was derived to overhaul. At the same time, project tests were carried out by one of the security systems. On the first and second blocks there was no such scheme, only in the third and fourth. Before that, we have already carried out such a check on the third block, everything went fine. On the fourth - failed. Station staff made the same actions, everything went fine, but an explosion happened at the stop ...

How did you find out about the accident?

V. B. In a half-night night I called alarmed head of the workshop: "Viktor Petrovich, at the station something happened, do you know?". I immediately began to call the station, but I could not find the head of the shift - no one took the phone. Then I quickly got dressed, I sat down on duty bus and drove to the station. And the approach, I saw that there is no upper part of the reactor structure. I immediately gave the team to collect all the leadership staff (up to the heads of children's gardens) in the premises of civil defense and ran to the block.

You immediately understood what happened?

V. B. We understood that things were bad, but did not think so much. After all, it could be a burst of hydrogen, and mounted panels over the reactor simply collapsed ... It was impossible to approach the reactor itself - there was a crazy radiation. We tried to swing water to cool the reactor, but everything was useless.

Only when the government commission began at the station, I rose with the military and representatives of the design organization over the power unit on the helicopter and saw that the upper plate of the reactor was an edge. The worst fears were confirmed ...

What actions were undertaken first?

V. B. At the station already worked the Government Commission, I was removed from the liquidation and consequences. Piled sand, boron ...

Together with other employees, I went to the pioneer camp 40 km from the station. There remained three more power units (in addition to the exploding. - Weekly.ua), they had to follow their condition. Therefore, as before, from the camp we were hiring to work. Eight hours worked at the station - change. Normally.

Are they all voluntarily driving, knowing about health hazards?

V. B. Podsov, no fugitives. All were patriots of the station, loved her, defended. In addition, people knew how to behave, where it was impossible to walk ...

Of course there were heroic cases. I remember how the Electrician deputy head Alexander Relchenko, realizing that it is dangerous to leave the generators with hydrogen, carried out the necessary work on its displacement, having spent a long time under high radiation conditions. As a result, he received a large share of irradiation and died in a hospital in Moscow.

It is often suited that the population of Pripyat was not evacuated on time ...

V. B. When I was judged, it was one of the charges ... I spoke at the trial, and I can repeat: in the city, as at the station, was the headquarters of civil defense, he is the boss. Also was the head of the headquarters of the city - Chairman of the City Executive Committee. And the head of the civil defense area is the chairman of the regional executive committee. Where were they, why did not people evacuated? Why am I guilty? I took my staff from the station on time.

And in the city executive committee and the regional executive committee were aware of the real state of affairs?

V. B. Of course! On the night of the accident, I immediately reported and demanded evacuation. I experienced everyone, ranging from the city government, the city executive committee, the regional executive committee, to the rector of the Ministry of Ukraine and the head at the USSR Ministry of Energy. Everyone knew what happened.

Do you think the power tried to grind an accident?

V. B. Regional authorities, and not only they were afraid of panic. On the afternoon of April 26, we were collected by the deputy chairman of the regional executive committee. He said: "Do not panic, a government commission will come, we will decide!".

What to say, if the Minister of Energy, having arrived in the Government Commission, gave the team to make a schedule of inclusion in the work of the destroyed fourth block to the November holidays! Then everyone was so brought up by the system, they simply lied ... until the government commission arrived and its chairman did not give the team to evacuate the population, no one was engaged in this question.

Now, in 25 years, can you call the reason for the tragedy?

V. B. In my opinion, these are flaws of the reactor. The protection system did not work as quickly as needed. This confirmation can be the fact that immediately after the accident at the reactors of this type throughout the USSR (on other blocks of the Chernobyl station, Kursk, Smolensk and Leningrad NPP), the speed of protection was increased and three more dozen more events were held. But after all, the necessary parameters can and it was necessary to provide in advance, even at the design stage. So, I missed something!

So you think the faults of the staff were not at all?

V. B. I think there is no. Take at least nuclear fuel: it was made at the Russian Plant "Elektrostal". Could and here to make something wrong, because the problems were not with the whole reactor, but only with his quarter. Today there may be weight assumptions, but no one will confirm them. And what was in fact, we will never know.

Have you tried to convey your position to the management of the ministry, the country?

V. B. In early June, I was summoned to Moscow to the Politburo meeting, where the issue of the Chernobyl NPP was considered. It took place in a large office, as I now remember: 40-50 meters in length and 20 - in width. At the head of the table, Mikhail Gorbachev, near the Politburo members. The first to report the Chairman of the Government Commission, the second - Deputy Minister of Energy, the Third Gorbachev called me for the tribune.

What was your report?

V. B. outlined his vision of what happened. 15 minutes reported. After that, Gorbachev asked me: "Did you hear about the accident at the American Station" Three Mile Island "?"

I said that I read, informed. There were no more questions.

Why Gorbachev was interested in the American station?

V. B. I need to ask him. Probably because it was the only NPP at the time where a serious accident occurred.

Some of the speakers supported your position?

V. B. Only our deputy minister. Other speakers hung all the blame for staff. And who was there? Minister of Engineering, Chairman of the State Summer ... All of them are interested persons. After all, the designers submitted to the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, naturally, nobody will say anything against themselves. At the end of the reports, Gorbachev announced: to exclude Brojanov from the party. Deputy Energy and Head of Gosatomnadzor to declare reprimand and remove from work. Minister put on appearance. And when I returned to Pionerolerge in Pripyat, another person already worked in my place. No one even warned. And soon the agenda came to the prosecutor's office of Ukraine. About two weeks I wrote in writing to questions. Sheets 50, probably copied. Then, one day, I was called again. The investigator traditionally asked questions, after which he charged. I did not recognize him. After lunch, he returned with two people. I was taken out, put in the car and were lucky in the SIZO KGB.

Be afraid that you run away?

V. B. I asked this question to the investigator. He replied: "It will be better for you." Why better - I do not know. Maybe because the term of the investigation is counted as a batch, and the consequence lasted a year ...

Then there was a court. At first I refused a lawyer, why is he me? But the wife insisted. It is noteworthy that experts performed representatives of scientific and design institutions. Of course, they pointed to staff. Defended the uniform that they still had?

What was the final sentence?

V. B. For not evacuated by the residents of Pripyat, I was given five years. For violation of the explosion safety station - ten. During the court hearings, I told them: What is the explosion safety? Show at least one page in the station project, ask designers: Where is it written that some object at the station is explosive? There's no such thing. There is no word like that!

I understood perfectly: I just needed to find some kind of article to condemn me. It was clear in advance what would punish me. At that moment, when I saw that the upper part of the structure of the reactor was absent. I immediately realized that I would judge me that I would sit. If there was a suitable article, I would have been shot. After all, it was necessary to show the Central Committee of the Party, the whole world: here we found the culprit. But can the science flicker in the Soviet Union? It is the most advanced in the world ...

Survived the conclusion?

V. B. During the investigation, I had to sit in a single SIZO camera, although there were usually sites or suicide, or currency. He came the boss, apologized that he could not hide anyone ... After the sentence, he sat down a month or two in the SIZO on Lukyanovka, then he fell into the colony in the Luhansk region. There worked as a mechanic with a boiler room.

Nevertheless, you just seen five years ...

V. B. For three years left in the colony. Then I was sent, as the people speak, to "chemistry". They were taken to Uman, they went to the hostel, where I could go to work on my own, just had to be celebrated every time ... And in five years, the court decided to state-early early release. I wanted to get to the Chernobyl NPP again. But I was offered a job in the state-owned company "Ukrintenergo" (now engaged in the export of electricity. - Weekly.ua), I agreed and worked there before retirement.

Was the decision to stop the Chernobyl NPP in 2000?

V. B. Understand, immediately after the accident, the station turned into a feeder. For example, the director's secretary was invited to work from Vladivostok himself. Why? Because a five-time salary was installed at the station after the accident. People who were able to negotiate came to the station for large money. Trust the station to some passing people, of course, it was impossible. In this context, I once said that it had to be closed immediately after the accident ... True, the power units at the Chernobyl NPP after the reconstruction could work today. Nevertheless, Ukraine went on western countries, believing promises that funds for the construction of compensating capacity will be highlighted. But nothing like this did not happen.

What lesson should the world from the tragedy at the Chernobyl NPP?

V. B. Greenpisovtsians today offer to use wind energy, the Sun ... But these are little things, the country's power supply issues do not solve that. Therefore, someone wants or not, but the nuclear power industry will develop, without it anywhere. Of course, it is worth approaching the operation of nuclear power plants. It is hoped that after the accident in Fukushima will be even more attentive.

Viktor Petrovich Blyukhanov

In 1959 he graduated from the Energy Faculty of Tashkent Polytech, after which he worked on the Angren GRES (Tashkent region).

From 1966 to 1970 she worked at the Slavic GRES (Donetsk region), went away from the senior master to the deputy chief engineer.

From April 1970 to July 1986 - Director of the Chernobyl NPP. V. I. Lenin. After the accident in 1986, he was removed from the office of the director.

In September 1991, he was exempted early.

From February 1992 he worked on Ukrintenergo state enterprise before retirement.

Married, has a daughter and son.

Specialcore "MK" met with those who were appointed by the arroders for the most terrible technogenic accident of the twentieth century

Masataki Shimizz and Victor Blyukhanov. These names have a long radioactive trace. One is the president of the operator of the Emergency NPP "Fukushima-1", the other - the former director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The national nuclear catastrophe and personal tragedy in their lives happened to the difference of 25 years. After Shimydz did not appear in the public for several weeks, rumors of his suicide crawled. Many already "buried" and Brojanova. After two strokes, Viktor Petrovich lives a rejection in a distant neighborhood on the outskirts of Kiev. In 1986, the deputy, the laureate and the order was declared a criminal, received 10 years of the camps. We guilty for the exploded reactor, the death of 30 people, caused damage of two billion rubles, shifted exclusively on operational staff and station management. Through what had to go through the former director of the Chernobyl, Viktor Bukukhanov and his five subordinates - in the material of the special correspondent of "MK".

Former director CHAES Viktor Blyukhanov.

"Life gave the crack - I'm going to Troyeschina" - so they say Kievans about the long-lasting residential array on the left bank of the Dnieper. In this bedroom microdistrict, Kiev, as well as in the Kharkov array, and the truth street settled after the accident workers of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

- Kiev residents looked at us Kosovo: We selected 3.5 thousand apartments from them, "says the former Chernigor Chernigor for the personnel of Ivan Tsarenko. - The idea of \u200b\u200bcalling the street of Pripyatskaya support from the local did not find ...

Parents forbade children to sit at one desk with "Chernobyl" kids. And from the priest schoolchildren formed separate classes. In the go was a joke: "Kolobok, Kolobok, I eat you!" "Do not eat me, a wolf, because I'm not a bun, but an hedgehog from Chernobyl." Only residents of the city of power engineers did not laugh.

- We were evacuated with the documents from the Goront last. Of course, they managed to take the hell knows what ... When in the evening before leaving I washed my head - the whole bath was littered with hair, "says Ivan Zarenko Valentina's wife.

In the clinics, the medical cards of the "Chernobyl residents" stood on separate shelves. From visitors shake like from lepers. They knocked in the diaspora, forming a separate Satytaya nation. And the truth about the catastrophe they had their own. Unlike the one that submitted to the public in 1987, the Supreme Court of the USSR.


Working weekdays of the power plant.

"This is the fate of us caught up"

- 25 years passed, and the night of April 26 still stands before his eyes, "says Ivan Tsarenko. - Chaps for the reporting year was recognized as the best in the USSR Ministry of Energy. A decree on the awarding station was already signed, the Order of Lenin had to hand to the May Day holiday. Deputy directors of all leading nuclear power plants of the country arrived to transfer to us. That's all the fate gathered ... And in the second hour, the night rushed.

The director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant Victor Blyukhanov, this terrible April day calmly remember. Immediately rolls pressure. After two stroke strokes, he almost sees anything, the words are given to him with difficulty. His eyes and mouth became his wife - Valentina Mikhailovna. About the recent examination of her husband, she says: "We put ten injections. We have passed acupuncture. " With Viktor Petrovich, they are one whole, together for more than half a century.

- On April 26, 1986, Viktor called the head of the chemical workshop at night: something happened at the station, "says slowly, with the alignment of Valentina Bryukhanov. "The husband tried to contact the head of shift, but no one took the phone on the fourth block. Reliable to all officials to gather in the bunker, at the headquarters of civil defense. Jumped into a duty bus. From the city of Pripyat to the station - two kilometers. Then I admitted me: "I saw the top part of the fourth block cut off the explosion and said out loud:" This is my prison. "

You know, this is the fate of us caught up. In 1966, we found themselves in the epicenter of the devastating earthquake in Tashkent. Miraculously saved. The whole city and surroundings lay in ruins. Then they decided: it is necessary to leave Uzbekistan. And exactly 20 years later after the Tashkent earthquake - a day a day, April 26, an accident was happened for Chernobyl. The trouble came the same night.

"Was my power, I would shoot you"

The fourth power unit was supposed to stroke on April 24th. When stopping the reactor, an experiment was scheduled. It should be found out whether the mechanical generator energy is enough until the reserve, the backup diesel generator will be released on the desired mode.

- These were the usual regulatory work provided for by the reactor project, says Ivan Tsarenko. - A year before this, such tests have already been carried out on the third block - before it is displayed in planned repairs.

Experiment's customer - Dontehenergo. Her representative of Gennady Methleko arrived in advance at the station. All documents were signed and agreed.

On April 25, at night, the staff began to reduce the power of the reactor. At 14.00, according to the approved program, the system of emergency cooling of the reactor was disabled. And at that moment the Kyivenergo dispatcher demanded to delay the trip of the fourth block. 12 o'clock reactor worked with a disconnected emergency cooling system. In 23.10, a reduction in power was continued. In 1.23, the experiment began - the operator pressed the emergency protection button. It was provided earlier on the briefing and was made to join the reactor along with the start of the test on the lowest turbine in the regular, and not an emergency mode. But the thermal power of the reactor suddenly the jump began to grow. With an interval of several seconds, two explosions rang out.

Many times the mining workers asked scientists: "How can emergency protection do not join, and blow up the reactor?" The answer could be only one: so the reactor was designed.

- Brujanov was accused of the fact that on the first day he handed over to Kiev a certificate of the undergraduated level of radiation ...

"It was necessary to find an extreme, and found him," says Ivan Tsarenko. - The first measurements made employees of the station, but all devices failed due to large doses of radiation. We had an external dosimetry department, which headed shipboards. He reported to Blyukhanov, what is the situation in Pripyat. Based on the data provided by him Viktor Petrovich and amounted to reports. They were signed by the engineer in physics, and the secretary of the station station was always sitting nearby and the head of the department of the Kiev Regional Committee of the CPSU.

Brukhanov first spoke about the need to evacuate the population. The Chairman of the Primary City Executive Committee and the Secretary of the Party State of the Party objected: "A government commission comes, let it decide."

"The first thing that the Chairman of the Government Commission, Boris Shhechbina, threw Victor in his face, it was:" Was my power, I would shoot you, "recalls Valentina Brojanova.


Victor Blyukhanov with his wife (left) and granddaughter.

"You are arrested. So it will be better for you "

Only years later, declassified the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of July 3, 1986 with the mark: "owls. Secret. Ex. only. (Work entry) ". The conversation was frank. It turned out that the RBMK-1000 reactor had a number of constructive flaws. Deputy. Minister of Energy Shasharin noted that "people did not know that the reactor could accelerate in such a situation. You can dial a dozen situations at which the same thing happens as in Chernobyl. This is especially true of the first blocks of the Leningrad, Kursk and Chernobyl NPP. " Academician Alexandrov admitted that "the property of overclocking the reactor is the mistake of the scientific supervisor and the main designer of RBMK," and asked him to release him from the duties of the President of the Academy of Sciences and to enable the reactor. It sounded that in the 11th five-year plan at stations 1042 emergency stops of power units were admitted, including 381 - at nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors. This information was intended for the highest leadership of the country, for domestic use. The people through the newspaper "True" announced: "The accident occurred due to a number of coarse violations of the rules of operation of reactor installations made by employees of the power plant. Soviet equipment was supposed to remain reliable in the world. "Arrower pests" were found. The judicial car has twisted. Brujanova called to Moscow, at an extended meeting, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was excluded from the party. When his old mother in Tashkent learned that the eldest son was removed from his office, her heart stopped. And on August 13, Viktor Petrovich took into custody. At first they called to the General Prosecutor's Office. After the conversation, the investigator announced: "You are arrested. So it will be better for you. "

- They were arrested and husband, and the account on the savings book, where he put his vacation money. And they evacuated us in some dresses, "said Valentina Brojanova. - Only at the end of August got into his apartment in Pripyat. The first door came the dosimetrist. I allowed to take something out of things and books. Each volume we wiped with a rag moistened with a weak solution of acetic acid. Believed, it can save from radiation.

"The year, while the investigation lasted, Victor sat in an investigative isolator KGB one," says Ivan Tsarenko. - Alone was usually planted before execution. When detention, it turned out that he received 250 x-rays, under a sanitary rate for an employee of a station 5 x-ray a year. In the first days after the accident, he did not leave the Chernobyl, worked in the basement and upstairs. Several times climbed the helicopter with members of the government commission over the exploded rector where there was a luminescence post, there were more than 3.5 thousand x-rays.

The deputy chief engineer of the Dyatlov exploitation station, which was at the time of the accident in the premium of the control panel of the 4th power unit, with open non-surging wounds lay half a year in the 6th Moscow Hospital. After discharge in sanatorium treatment, he was refused. The consequence required his arrest. And he lost 15 kilograms for the times of illness, he studied to walk again. But on December 4, he was moved to the caasemate. Did not make a discount on health and 50-year-old station engineer Nikolai Fomin. At the end of 1985, he crashed into a pine at his "Zhigulenka", broke the spine. After a long paralysis with a captured psyche went to work, a month before the Chernobyl explosion. In the Camera SIZO, he broke his glasses and glasses tried to open the veins.

"Open" court in the closed zone

The court took place in the House of Culture in Chernobyl. The building has risenly repaired, lattice hung on the windows.

"The" open court in the closed zone "- it was said in the press," recalls the President of the Union "Chernobyl Ukraine" Yury Andreev. - You could only get inside on special specialists. Journalists were admitted twice: to hear the indictment and the last sentence on the first day. In 18 days there were 40 witnesses, 9 victims and 2 affected. Details and circumstances of the accident were discussed at working sessions. On the bench of the defendants were: director of the Bukian station, chief engineer Fomin, his deputy Dyatlov, head of the Kovalenko reactor workshop, head of the change of the station Rogozhkin and Inspector of Gosatomenergonadzor Laushkin.

- They were tried under Article 220 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR - for the incorrect operation of explosive enterprises. But nuclear power plants did not belong to the explosive objects on any instructions, "says Ivan Tsarenko. - This was done by the judicial and technical expert commission in the back.

It was clear: the court will decide how they have already decided at the top. Brujanova, Fomin and Dyatlov sentenced to 10 years in prison. Rogozhkin was given 5 years of the camps, Kovalenko - 3, Laushkin - 2. The sentence was not subject to appeal. Case materials and information about the accident were classified.

- The head of the shift of the block Sasha Akimov, the reactor operator Lenya Toptunov and the head of the reactor workshop Valera Veloshenko would also be planted. But they died, "says Yuri Andreev. - Their wives and children did not fail to remind: Your husbands and fathers are criminals. Each paper came from the prosecutor's office: "Criminal prosecution was discontinued on the basis of Article 6 of paragraph 8 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Ukrainian SSSR on November 28, 1986." Death saved the guys from shame.

"For Brojanov, the sentence was shocked for 10 years," says Ivan Tsarenko. - He is very discreet. Everyone worried about himself.

Later it was recognized by his relatives: "If a smaller article was found for me, I would have shifted without thinking." On the night after the sentence of the former director, the Chernobyl Night did not leave one for a minute. Near a narrow shone, the guard put the chair and did not descend the eye from the arrestant. Even in the toilet, he walked under supervision. In the insulator feared that the bruitans would impose on their hands.

- Our older daughter, Lily, was a nursing mother. Four months after the catastrophe, she gave birth to Katya. The year that was the investigation, we were defeated, did not say that dad in the detention facility. She just knew that he could not call, "Valentina Brojanova was divided with us. - And here finally on July 31, in the form of an exception, we were given a date with Victor.

Only two adults and one minor could be present. Lily, who came from Kherson, said: "I will definitely go." And the Son, and I also really wanted to see Victor. And then suddenly our youngest, Oleg, shouted: "I only will turn 18 on August 2, I still have a child." How we jumped from the joy that he would also go! They came, sat down to the glass - partition. Vitya did not see children and everyone asked: "Oleg, stand up!" And the son was swept in the tenth, graduation class, changed strongly. Then he said: "Lily, stand, Valya, stand up ..." I looked at us all my eyes and brushed tears from the face. I could not waste a word at all, I was afraid to burst out. The next day, August 1, the Son went to take the exam in mathematics at the institute - and, of course, did not write anything. It was very hard. Thanks to the chief engineer Nikolai Steinberg, who helped return to work on the Chernobyl. After an accident worked for 15 days after the accident, then 15 days rested. I asked to allow me to work without weekends. Start jumping pressure, it was bad and physically, and morally. I remember came to doctors, then they were based on the heat. And here is one, Dr. Rubnik, shook me by the shoulder: "And well, take yourself in hand! You have a family".

We were different in different ways. There were those who were hostile to hiked after, but many sympathized. I am very grateful to one simple woman from Pripyat. Once, when I walked off the bus stop and roared, she went to me, hugged and said: "Currency, what are you crying? Victor is alive, and this is the main thing! Look at how many graves left after Chernobyl. "

On October 9, we got an apartment in Troyeschina. Kievans considered this area by racing, and I liked it, I don't really love the big city. I got up with a gourney, from early spring until the autumn went to the river, the water was given to me.

Measurement of radiation in the Chernobyl zone.

Every one is great

And Viktor Blyukhanov and another five employees of the Chernobyl, went on shipments. There were chambers for 30 places where 70 people were picked. Lukyanovskaya, Kharkov, Lugansk prison ... Shirt with a tag, headdress with the "romantic" name "Piderka". And before your misfortunes there is no business - everyone is great. But even behind bars were their joys. For the first time in the year they saw the green trees, Sparrow.

Information about the staging of the former Director of the Chernobyl NPP has reached Brojanov's forward. The whole zone dumped on the "main culprit of the catastrophe" on the feet.

- adapted to live in the zone, "says Valentina Mikhailovna. - Victor was a man unpretentious. He grew up in a large family. Study at the institute, 18 hours could stand at the drawing board. When someone "burned", fled to Viktor. He did many and the diplomas and courses. He could not come to mind to ask for money. So many helped in the colony.

In order not to be angry, Viktor Petrovich began to study English behind bars. Soon I read the classics in the script. From the "Blessed" and dangerous position of the chief dispatcher, which distributed the ses on the work, refused. He worked in the boiler room, engaged in the development of documentation for the reconstruction of the boiler room.

- lived in that the letters remembered the happiest years of life. After all, we became acquainted with Viktor in Angren, where both worked on GRES. I remember, in the journal I saw the name of the Bukukhanov - I thought, what a stupid surname. God forbid ... And herself soon became Blyukhanovoy. Mashin, who went from the mountains, brought the yekhai wild tulips. Victor forced all the window sills with flowers. Solovyov listened in Oshshniki. Then, already in Pripyat, somehow bathed on April 9 and suddenly we see: two moose float out of the water, go in the sand, devads.

Prison could not turn over the past. The investigator was completed even after the court: "You can now terminate the marriage at any time." Valentina Mikhailovna then barely restrained to not be lit in response. She was 48 years old, Viktor - 52. When Oleg's son was married, Brujanova was released home for a month. By that time, he had served a sentence not at the common zone, but in the colony-settlement in Uman.

- Victor walked silently in the Kiev apartment, everything was for him new. In the evening, friends and colleagues were granted. Where didn't come from where. Looking at the disgraced Wit, went into the kitchen, where we were cut by salads with my daughter, they began to cry. I hitched: "Well, remove all the tears so that he does not see. He needs support, not pity. "

- played a wedding. Our daughter married Bookanov's son, "says Ivan Tsarenko. - We have become watches. Then I Viktor Petrovich on his car had brought home every weekend. We brought to the police station, put a mark: arrived, then dropped out. All this was very unpleasant. But everywhere to Blyukhanov treated with respect. He "in chemistry" worked as a dispatcher on construction, was appreciated as a knowledgeable engineer. No one considered him a criminal.

"With things to exit!"

Final: "With things on the output!" - sounded for Viktor Brojanova in September 91st. Freed early. Alone was held half the deadline and the other five defendants in the "Chernobyl business". Boris Rogozhkin went to Nizhny Novgorod. Nikolai Fomina in 1988, after two years of detention, has developed jet psychosis. He was sent to the Rybinsky psychoneurological hospital for prisoners Yun 83/14. Then, at the insistence of relatives, transferred from the prison hospital to the civilian psychiatric clinic to the Tver region. At one time he worked at the Kalinin NPP. Doctors only for a while facilitate him suffering.

Brukhanov after liberation immediately went to Chernobyl. They met him very warmly, appointed the head of the technotel.

And when Viktor Petrovich knocked 60 years, the Minister of Energy of Ukraine Makuchin invited him to the post of Deputy Head of Internenergo Association. Brukhanov was engaged in contracts for the supply of electricity abroad, visited business trips in Hungary, Japan, Germany. He worked up to 72 years, and only when the vision fell, retired.

- On October 27, 1997, 20 years from the day of the Chernoby began in Slavutich. We were also invited, "says Valentina Mikhailovna. "When Viktor called himself to the podium, the room all rose, clapped so that my ears laid.

- And what are I with Blyukhanov? - Ivan Zerenko promises. - Certificate of liquidators of the first category, disability. Give 332 hryvnias on enhanced nutrition. By law, we must pay eight minimum pensions. But the law does not work. Must give free medicines. But do not give. The insults from Viktor Petrovich did not remain, he says: "Chernobyl is my cross for life."

Troy from the former selators is no longer alive. Dyatlov left the life of 64 from heart failure. Kovalenko died of cancer. The same incurable disease handled and Laushkin. On freedom, he did not live and years. "Yura did not have time to get a residence in Kiev - he did not want to bury him at the local cemetery," says Yuri Andreev. - Until the organization of veterans of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant intervened, his body lay in the apartment for more than a week. "

In 1991, the newly gathered Commission of the USSR State Administration came to the conclusion that the Chernobyl accident acquired a catastrophic scale due to the unsatisfactory design of the reactor. Did not find confirmation and many of the accusations that were previously nominated to the staff of the station.

- Do you believe that Viktor Brojanova and five stations workers rehabilitate?

- The court was allied. Who will do this now? - says Valentina Mikhailovna. - no strength no longer live. Victor had two stroke, the left side refuses. We were treated in the fall. Husbands made around the eyes, 10 ampoules - 1000 hryvnia. He is very suffering that he cannot read and solve favorite crosswords. TV only listens, but sees some contours. Need an operation to restore the retina. But it is done only in four countries of the world. Who are we needed now? ..

Kiev-Moscow

"We did not know how the equipment was running from the elegation, so in the first seconds I took ... some kind of bad such sound appeared<...> I myself do not remember the sound, but I remember how I was described in the first days of the accident: as if the "Volga" began to slow down to slow down and would be to slow down and would go. Such a sound: Du-Du-Du ... Running in the roar. There was a vibration of the building. Yes, I thought it was not good. But what it is probably the situation of the eleg.<...> Then he sounded a blow. Because I was closer to the turbine, I considered that the blade flew out.<...> I bounced, and at that time followed the second blow. That was a very strong blow. Plaster fell, the whole building came ... The light of the wonder, then the emergency food was restored.<...>

Everyone was shocked. All with elongated persons stood. I was very frightened. Full shock. Such a blow is the most natural earthquake.

<...> The roof of Mashal fell - probably, something collapsed on her ... I see the sky and the stars in these holes, I see that under my feet slices of the roof and black bitumen, such ... dust. I think - Wow ... where does this black one come from? Such a thought. Is that - in the sun so much bitumen, coating? Or isolation so dried, what turned into dust? Then I understood. It was graphite.

<...> Passed near the ripple ... I showed the shine ... I showed under my feet. He said Dyatlov: "This is Hiroshima." He was silent for a long time ... We went further ... Then he said: "I didn't even dream in a terrible dream." He apparently was ... Well, what to say there ... the accident of huge sizes. "

So about the events of the night on April 26, 1986, Yuri Tregub told in the Chernobyl NPP - the head of the change of the 4th station block. A year later, on July 11, 1987, he will rise to the testimonian tribune in the House of Chernobyl culture and will give testimony against his former leader - Deputy Chief Engineer Anatoly Dyatlov Station. Dyatlov will receive 10 years in prison and will be one of the six "Chernobyl arroders", as often called convicts in the case of the catastrophe of managers and engineers of the Chernobyl.

Arrests and accusations

Anatoly Dyatlov at the time of the catastrophe was 55 years old. An experienced physicist, a graduate of MEPI, for the Chernobyl, from the stage of its construction in 1973. In 1986, Dyatlov was Deputy Head of the Chief Engineer of the Operation Station. On the night of April 26, he participated in the test of the so-called "turbogenerator's eleg". The experiment was scheduled in advance. During the stop of the 4th power unit's reactor (it was discharged for planned repair), engineers and station operators should have been checked if the inertia of rotation of the turbogenerator can be used for short-term electricity generation for its own needs of the station - in case of de-energization.

The government commission, and after it, and investigators in the case of the catastrophe concluded that the staff and management of the Chernobyl Nuclear Service allowed many mistakes and flaws. Documents signed without looking, did not fulfill the rules of work, the reactor's emergency protection was carried out.

Dyatlov was arrested in December 1986. A month before that, he was discharged from GKB No. 6 in Moscow, where half a year he glanced with non-healing wounds on the legs - the consequence of irradiation during the accident. For the month of the house, Dyatlov learned a little again to walk, but found himself in the SIZO. He had the disability of the Group II and the prescription from the physicians not to interrogate it for longer than two hours. But investigative actions lasted at six o'clock, and on eight, he recalled later in his book "Chernobyl. How it was".

Dyatlov became the third in a row arrested in a criminal case: back in August 1986, the director of Chernobia Viktor Blyukhanov and Chief Engineer of Nikolai Fomin were found in the Sizo. "Invited on August 13 at 10 am to the General Prosecutor's Office. Talked with the investigator to the hour of the day. Then he left dining, returned and announced: "You are arrested." I asked why I need to arrest me, because I was not lost anywhere. I heard the answer: "It will be better for you." And I was sent to the SIZO KGB, "Belukhanov told reporters in the early 2000s.

The director was charged not only by experiment, but also irresponsible behavior after the accident: he sent employees of one after another to examine the infected areas at nuclear power plants and around, did not prevent the exit at 8 am a whole shift, although part of the station workers could be left at home and not expose irradiation, and most importantly - did not report reliable data on the radiation background at the station and in Pripyat. "I immediately told the Chairman of the Primary City Executive Committee and the Secretary of the Golitude Party: it is necessary to evacuate the population. They replied: "No, let's wait. Let the government commission arrive, it will decide on evacuation." What could I do?" - Whether after years after the accident of the Brukhanov.

Academician Valery Legasov, First Deputy Director of the Atomic Energy Institute. Kurchatov, who became part of that very government commission, recalled the director of the Chernobyl, as a person very frightened and not able to act at the moment of emergency: "The director of the Chernobia was shocked, from beginning to end<...> I saw him on the first day, as I arrived there.<...> And last time I saw him at the Politburo meeting on July 14, when the reason for the Chernobyl accident was considered. Right there it was asked. And he was all the time in shock. He could not utter any reasonable actions and words<...>He was there an incapable man. "

On the same day with Blyukhanov, August 13, they were arrested and the chief engineer of the Fomin station. By the beginning of the court they spent in the SIZO KGB for almost a year. The consideration of the case should have started back in March 1987, but before the first meeting, Fomin in the chamber broke his glasses and opened his veins.

The accused themselves only learned that their six. In addition to the arrested leaders of the station on the dock, the head of the reactor workshop No. 2 Alexander Kovalenko, the inspector of the Gosatomenergonadzor at the Chernobyl, Yury Laushkin and the head of the change of station Boris Rogozhkin.

Court in the 30-kilometer zone

"The city is the same abandoned by residents", but "Likely to the village" - so about Chernobyl in the summer of 1987, a journalist of the Swiss newspaper Tages Anzeiger Elfiya Siegl, who already visited Pripyati, who had previously evacuated all the 50,000 people. About 12 thousand people were taken from Chernobyl. A small town of 12 kilometers from the station was inside the so-called alienation zone or a 30-kilometer zone - an area infected with radionuclides, which is prohibited free entry.

The radiation background in Chernobyl in the summer of 1987 was decided to consider "normal", but radiation protection measures were used in the city: receiving the permission recommended as close to the outdoors as possible, do not smoke out on the street, do not walk along the roads. At the entrances to administrative buildings - including the building of the USSR of the USSR, where the exit meeting of the USSR Supreme Court was held, "the bodies were stood with water: people were wrapped in them shoes before entering the room.

Asphalt on the streets and markings were fresh - the previous coating was removed by bulldozers and burned, as it was infected. Every few hours of the streets of the city of washed irrigation cars, wrote the Polish journalist Waldemar Sivinsky. Orange orange dosimeters with fans stood around the city.

On the windows of the House of Culture, which turned into court, hung the lattices, hooked the fence part of the yard - for the entrance of the "Auto Plant" with the accused. In the meeting room, the ex-visiting room was turned - only the scene was detained a dense curtain and rearranged chairs.

For work, the journalist on the process it was necessary to obtain the already mentioned pass, and foreign correspondents were also supposed to have accreditation in the Foreign Ministry. As a result, 23 Soviet and 15 foreign journalists arrived in the meeting: Japanese, Yugoslav, Hungarian, Polish, Swedish, Finnish, German, American correspondents, reporters of the French AFP Agency and British BBC Radio Station. In a separate room, a press center was even created, where correspondents could ask questions on the peculiarities of the Ukrainian Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, asked to translate some details.

The then Deputy Director of Chernoby Anatoly Kovalenko in the book "Chernobyl - how did the world saw him" says that all foreign correspondents divided into groups of two or three people and each singled out from a specially created information and international relations, which he, Kovalenko, and headed .

There were no problems with an international telephone connection in Chernobyl DC: the BBC correspondent on July 7 was able to turn the news about the beginning of the process in an hour after the opening of the meeting. At the same time, for example, the TASS news agency about the sentence made on July 29 only three days later - August 1.

Over the settlement of the day, the court lasted 18 days, and came from 11:00 to 19:00. The journalists were allowed into the hall only during the announcement of the indictment and on the day of the sentence, there were no other days in Chernobyl. At the same time, the station employees could be present at the meetings - so, for example, the deputy head of the nuclear physical laboratory in the Nuclear Security Department of the Chernobia Nikolai Kartan in his free time came to court and described in detail what was happening in detail, and later published his records in the book "Chernobyl. Revenge of a peaceful atom. " At each meeting in the hall was gathered, according to the memoirs of the participants of the process and the audience, about 200 people.

The meaning of the exit meeting in the exclusion zone was explained to foreign journalists in the press center to comply with the principle of territorial jurisdiction - the process should be held at the place of the crime. The judges even visited the station itself, "to imagine a clearer situation," the head of the Covalenko information department said. The judge of the Supreme Court of the USSR Raymond Brize was chaired (a year later, he considered another resonant case - about Sumgath pogrom in Azerbaijan). People's assessors of Konstantin Amosov and Alexander Zaslavsky and the Spare Attendant Tatiana Galka participated.

The state concretion was represented by Advisor to Justice of the 2nd Class Yuri Sadrin - Senior Assistant of the Prosecutor General of the USSR and the Head of the Office for the Supervision of Criminal Procedures in the courts. Not embarrassed in expressions, Shadrin in the shaped dark blue uniform with the golden lapels called the defendants with "glowing experimenters."

Experimentors-shoottles

On July 7, Dyatlova, Fomin and Brujanov brought under the convoy in DK Chernobyl for half an hour before the meeting, and at 13.00 the secretary announced: "I ask to get up, the court goes!"

The accusatory conclusion also announced the secretary - he went for about two hours. The prosecutor's office accused six defendants under Article 220 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (violation of safety rules at explosive enterprises and in explosive shops), article 165 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (abuse of power or official position) and article 167 of the Ukrainian SSR (negligence).

Since the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe significantly aggravated the disguise and distortion of data on the real level of radiation pollution and its danger to residents, the criminal codes and other legislative acts of the former Federal Republics were amended, providing for responsibility for non-informing the population about the consequences of environmental disasters and man-made accidents.

In Russia, information on environmental disasters and emergency situations, as well as epidemics, cannot relate to information with limited access or to state secrets.

Article 237 of the Criminal Code provides responsibility for concealing information about the circumstances of the danger to the life or health of people.

The accused of this article threatens to two years of imprisonment (part 1), and if the secretary of information allowed the state official or because of it there was grave consequences - up to five years (part 2).

According to the fault of the defendants, the representative of the Supreme Court read, 30 employees of the station died (two on the first day, the rest - from the rapidly developed radiation sickness). Several hundred people also received different doses of irradiation and they had a radiation disease, and 116 thousand residents of Pripyat, Chernobyl and neighboring villages had to evacuate. The triggers of the criminal case should also be three operators of the station: the head of the change of the 4th block Alexander Akimov, the senior engineer of the reactor management Leonid Toptunov and the head of the change of the reactor workshop Valery transported. But they died in the days and weeks after the accident: Akimov - May 11, Toptunov - May 14, transported - June 13.

Article 220 of the Criminal Code unpleasantly surprised everyone without exception to the accused: "I am guilty of negligence as a leader. But according to these articles - I do not understand them, "said Blywanes. "On charges of violation of safety equipment on explosive equipment. Neither the technological regulations nor the SNIP nor the passport of the Nuclear Security Rules on the reactor installation do not include the reactor shop to explosive enterprises! " - the head of the Covalenko shop was outraged. The prosecutor Shadrin parried that it would be based on the regulations, but to the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

The explosiveness of the reactor and ignorance about this staff of the Chernobias was spoken in court and witnesses: the former head of the 4th power unit of the Chernobia Chernobia Igor Cossacks, the former secretary of the Party Committee Chaps Sergei Parashin, the former head of the reactor workshop №2 Gregory Reichtman. "This apparently misses the whole science. Today it has already been written that if in the active zone less than 30 rods, then the reactor goes into a nuclear hazardous state. The device has such negative qualities that sooner or later it would have happened, "Cuppen quotes in his notes from the court of testimony of Anatoly Tryat, the head of the Nuclear Physical Laboratory Chernobyl.

But not all the testimony of witnesses (in July 1987, about 40 people acted in Chernobyl DC) were in favor of the defendants, and even their own stories testified to numerous violations - both during the implementation of the program "Logging" and after the accident.

Why didn't you remove people from the defeat zone? - asked the prosecutor Shadrin director of Brujanova.

I gave the command to delete all extra, but the reactor cannot be left unattended.

Why in a letter party and Soviet authorities did not have information about 200 x-rays per hour? (which corresponds to 200 million microentergen; Normal radiation background is about 20-30 microentergen per hour - MW)

I inattentively looked the letter, it was necessary to add, of course.

But this is the most serious question, why didn't you do this?

Blukhanov answered with silence. In a memorandum "Up", he indicated that the indicator 3-6 x-ray per hour was recorded, and the situation at the NPP in general was controlled.

Viktor Petrovich, who had to take responsibility to declare on the radio: Close the windows and doors - and did not do it? - asked the former chief of the widow of the deputy chief engineer Anatoly Sitnikov.

City executive committee, in my opinion.

Did you tell them it?

I do not remember.

"Competent, but unorganized and non-executive. Hard. Akimov was afraid of Dyatlov, "the prosecutor of the defendant deputy chief engineer characterized the prosecutor. Dyatlov defended and recognized only a part of the violations imputed to him.

In what part of the charge do you recognize yourself guilty? Specify your position. Specifically, - requested the chairman of the judge.

First, in two-three HCNs (the main circular pumps - MZ) expenses exceeded 7 thousand cubic meters per hour; Secondly - late by pressing the AZ-5 button (emergency protection - MW). The third - did not speak to increase the power up to 700 megawatts after the failure. Fourth - in the reactivity reactivity less than 15 rods at the time of reset. I can explain all this.

So, under Article 220, recognize your guilt only partially?

Dyatlov said in court that at the time of the fall in the power it was not indoors called the BSO - a block shield of control (from there and conducted an experiment), he went for a while - and therefore did not know that she fell to zero, and not just to low values . Otherwise, I assured the engineer, he would shut off the reactor and stopped the execution of the experimental program.

Some witnesses argued that if the drop in power was random, then further tests at low power were carried out at the initiative of Dyatlov.

At about 5-15 minutes of the first hour, I heard a conversation between Akimov and Dyatlov. Its essence was that Dyatlov wanted the reactor to work on the power of 200 megawatts. Akimov, he kept the program in his hands, brought arguments, apparently objected. This is judging by the expression of his face, Mimic. This makes me think that the reduction in power was carried out at the direction of Dyatlov. Although I did not hear the direct order from his side, "Tregub reported.

Did you know about reducing power? He asked the assistant prosecutor of the witness Gennady Metlenko, a senior brigade engineer Dontehenergo. He participated in the running program, but as an invited energy specialist who is not related to nuclear physics.

Yes, something was at 00:28, - remembered Metlenko. - Dyatlov from the console went away, wiping his forehead.

Do you confirm the presence of Dyatlov at this time on the Syra Remote (Senior Reactor Management Engineer - MZ)?

Yes, in my opinion, he was.

As a large plane flying at low altitude, the RBMK reactor at low power is also dangerous, at this level it is poorly controlled and managed. The operation of the reactor at low facilities was not sufficiently studied. I think that the personnel of a clear idea of \u200b\u200bdanger was not. But if everyone had acted strictly according to the program, the explosion would not have happened, "the deputy head of the nuclear-physical laboratory was crushed in the court in the Nuclear Security Department of Chernobyl Police Cartpan.

The defendant was expressed against his former damage - chief engineer of the Fomin nuclear station. At the same time, the witnesses came out of his testimony and stories, that Fomin himself really did not know anything about the physics of the reactor.

Who, in your opinion, the main culprit of the accident? - asked 50-year-old Fomin Prosecutor.

Dyatlov, Akimov, who made deviations from the program, - listed the chief engineer.

As for Toptunova. You said that he prevailed ignorance. And in other participating experiences what prevailed - ignorance or dismissive attitude?

Rather, dismissive attitude from excess knowledge.

The ability to ask questions by the defendant was not only at the prosecutor and the judge, but, for example, the experts - and with the permission of the presiding breeze they did it right during the process.

Having absentee education, not physics, what did you hope, fulfilling the duties of the main engineer station? - one of the experts was surprised.

I did not ask for the position of Horsis. And when they were offered, it did not refuse. In addition, I recommended the director to select me deputies from physicists. Sitnikov, Dyatlov, Lutov - Physics, - explained Fomin.

Nervously squeezing fists, the former chores engineer repeated: perform a woodpecker, akims and other programs without any self-conceiving, there was no accident.

After listening to the defendants, I am indignant. They say: I did not see, I did not know, and at this time other people worked ... All the guys who died, behaved with adequate, "Tamara Kudryavtseva said, the widow of the senior engineer of Alexander Kudryavtseva's reactor workshop. Her husband died from radiation sickness on May 14, 1986.

"They, mostly, recognized their guilt and repent in the deed," said Kovalenko's deputy director of Kovalenko station in the press center to foreign journalists. A few days earlier, his namesake and defendant Alexander Kovalenko said that he could not even imagine that his colleagues would so seriously retreat from the regulations of the program, and it was not on these tests at all. Inspector Laushkin said that he could not prevent an accident. "It's hard to carry a punishment if you do not understand why it is taken out. It kills faith in justice, which means that he also kills a person, "the head of the change of Rogozhkin argued, recalling that he was already excluded from the party. They all asked for an exclusive sentence.

Dyatlov, Fomin and Brukhanov said that they recognize the guilt partly, but not in the volume and not in those wording, which presented to them the prosecutor's office.

Life and death after sentence

The judge was sentenced with exactly such deadlines as requested by the prosecutor: Brukhanov in part 2 of Article 220 and Part 2 of Article 165 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR received 10 years, to the same sentence - for 10 years of correctional colony - in part 2 of Article 220 sentenced Fomin and Dyatlov . Rogozhkin in part 2 of Article 220 and Article 167 received five years, Kovalenko - three years under Article 220, and Laushkin - two years under Article 167 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.

All the convicts were irradiated, the most painful to all the radius diseases of the Dyatlov. First, from the Lukyan prison, and then from the colony in the Poltava region, the former deputy chief engineer Chaps wrote complaints to Mikhail Gorbachev and the prosecutor's office. His wife went on the instances - and reached the chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Evgenia Smolentseva. Talking with Him Dyatlov leads in her book.

You, what do you want - others tried, and me to free your husband? So I was kind? - responded to a request to revise the case of Smolensev.

Well no. I do not count on kindness in any way. I count only for justice. After all, it is now known that the reactor was not suitable for operation. And my husband is innocent in this.

So you, what do you want me to plan Alexandrov? Such an old one? (Academician Anatoly Alexandrov, Head of the Institute. Kurchatov and Scientific Director of the RBK reactor, died in 1994 at the age of 91 - MW).

Dyatlov's died by the studio of Dyatlov, Academician Andrei Sakharov, and then his widow Elena Bonnere. As a result, he was released after 3 years 9 months after arrest. Dyatlov was treated from radiation sickness in the burn center in Munich, died in 1995, while in the last year of life to write a book with his version of the events for the Chernobyl.

The health of Nikolai Fomin was undermined before the catastrophe: in 1985 he fell into a car accident and received a spine fracture, then for the first time he turned to a psychiatrist, nerves were very loosened. In 1988, Fomin was sentenced to a colony transferred to the Rybinsk psychoneurological hospital for prisoners, and in 1990 they were recognized as inconvenient and released, translating into a civil psychiatric hospital.

After recovering, Fomin settled again at the NPP - this time Kalininskaya, in the city of Udomlya, the Tver region, where he worked until retirement.

Victor Blyukhanov - Personal II Groups and a Chernobyl accident on the Chernobyl) of the 1st category. Almost every anniversary of the accident gives interviews to journalists, but every year it is more difficult for him to communicate without any assistance: it is difficult to say after two strokes, almost nothing sees. Until 1991, Bukukhanov was serving a sentence in the colony of the Lugansk region, where he worked as a mechanic in the boiler room - "Almost in the specialty", the ex-director of the Chernobyl is joking. He managed to submit to conditionally early liberation through the administration of a colony that issued a positive characteristic to the former boss. Committing free, he got a job in Ukrinterenergo.

The apartment left by the Brujan family in Pripyat the organizers of semi-easiest excursions in the "Alienation Zone" show everyone. After liberation, the Ex-director of the Chernobia himself visited there: "It would be better not to go. My wife and I did not take one thing from there. Came - the house is a lap. Nothing left. Only a broken chair, and that is not from our house ... I heard that today it seems to be sitting on the "my" desktop. Rave".

For the fate of the former accomplices of Brukhanov, it refers to the movement of Fomin to Russia, reports that Rogozhkin, freed, returned to work at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Laushkin and Kovalenko died of cancer.

"Everyone defended the honor of their uniforms! Only no one defended me. I think this is: if the reactor protection system was normally constructed, then the accident did not happen, "the boryanov recalls the trial of almost 30 years ago.

Flaw in the reactor and death of academician

"Evaluating the operational reliability of the RBMK reactor, a group of specialists<...> It concluded that its characteristics of modern safety requirements are concerned. In their conclusion, it is said that when conducting an examination at the international level, the reactor will be subjected to "Ostracism". RBMK reactors are potentially dangerous. "

"The physics of the reactor determined the scale of the accident. People did not know that the reactor could accelerate in such a situation. There is no conviction that refinement will make it quite safe. You can dial a dozen situations in which the same thing happens as in Chernobyl ".

"We went to the accident. If the accident had not happened now, it could have happened at any time when it could happen. After all, this station tried to blow up twice, and they did only on the third year. How it became now known, there was not a single year at nuclear power plants without PE<...> The disadvantages of the RBMK reactor design were also known, but the corresponding conclusions are not made by the ministries or the USSR Academy of Sciences. "

RBMK, or Channel Large Power Reactor is a whole series of energy nuclear reactors developed in the Soviet Union. The main designer of RBMK was the research and development institute of energy engineers (Nikiet), headed by academician, and the scientific project manager - Institute of Atomic Energy (IEE). Kurchatova led by Academician Alexandrov.

The Chernobyl Academy in 1986 was not the first and not the only serious incident with RBMK: In 1975, the accident occurred at the Leningrad NPP (gap of one channel), in 1982 - on Chernobyl (gap of one channel), in 1991 - on Chernobyl (fire In the engine room of the 2nd block), in 1992 - again at the Leningrad NPP (breaking one channel due to valve defects).

The construction of two new power units with RBMK on the Chernobia was stopped in 1987. The second power unit of the Chernobyl is stopped in 1991, the first - in 1996, the third one in 2000.

In the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania, in 1988, the construction of the third and fourth power units was canceled, and in 2004 and 2009, the first and second power units of the station were stopped in accordance with Lithuanian obligations to the European Union.

It is now exploited by 11 power units with RBMK, all - in Russia: on Leningrad (four power units), Kursk (four power units) and Smolensk NPP (three power units). The bookmark of new or completion of the existing unfinished blocks of RBMK in Russia is currently not planned.

These are not the conclusions of an alternative investigation of the Chernobyl accident, conducted in many years after the trial over Dyatlov and others. These are the speeches of the members of the Government Commission for the Investigation, which sounded at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on July 3, 1986 - after two with a small month after the tragedy and a year before the trial. These speeches did not have any dissidents from nuclear physics: Deputy Chairman of the USSR Government Boris Shcherbina, headed by the Commission, Deputy Minister of Energy of the USSR Gennady Shasharin, Head of the Government of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov.

He recognized the potential danger of the RBC and created his academicians - Valery Legasov and Anatoly Alexandrov. The latter promised "over the year or two" to eliminate "this property" of the reactor - overclocking instead of stopping after pressing the emergency protection button at a certain position of the rods (absorbing elements).

However, recognizing the imperfection of the reactor and the inadequate response of systems on the actions of operators, the minutes of the meeting immediately classified, and in a month arrest began. The newspaper "True" a message was published about those conclusions of the government commission, which Politburo decided to disclose: "It was established that the accident occurred due to a number of gross violations of the rules of operation of reactor installations, which is" for internal use " And "for all" differed dramatically.

In court, experts (four of 11 were employees of the main designer of the reactor - the Institute Nikiet - and the Scientific Director of the Reactor - IEE. Kurchatov) came to the formulation "The reactor is not explosive with proper use", and adhered to it.

Do experts made earlier conclusions of the Government Commission on the lack of reactor? - asked Judge Raymond Brize.

Experts confirm some flaws of the reactor. First of all, the positive steam effect of reactivity. At the same time, it turned out not provided, as the operational personnel should behave with such a situation. It is confirmed by the unsatisfactory design of the management and protection system. But it could only lead to an accident only in errors in the work of the staff serving reactor.

Could the reactor flaws lead to an accident?

These shortcomings do not explain the wrong personnel actions. The reactor is not nuclear hazardous in the presence of 15 neutron rods in the active zone. And 30 rods protect the reactor from unauthorized personnel actions.

Is the reactor safe?

The presence in the active zone 26-30 rods compensate for positive reactivity. RBMK reactors can be viewed as safe.

Why in the documents of the chief designer, the RBMK designers did not have a physical and technical substantiation of the inability to operate at the heat power of the device less than 750 MW, having an operational less than 15 rods in the active zone?

These explanations are not necessary. Otherwise, the regulations will swallow. It is assumed that the staff is competent and all this knows. But now the Regulations are inscribed on the regime of nuclear danger.

The conclusions about the guilt of personnel and the leadership of the Chaps, who conducted the experiment "at any cost", in 1986 adopted as the main and IAEA - the report of the Instag group was prepared on the basis of the materials provided by the USSR and the oral speech of Academician Lemaces. However, in 1993, after an additional investigation conducted by the Gosatnadzor, the IAEA issued an updated version of the Instag-7 report. In it, without taking responsibility from the staff, the experts reported the dangerous design features of the reactor and the absence of the effective interaction of engineers of the station with designers and scientific leaders. Simply put, those who exploited RBMK did not know about its explosion hazard under certain conditions.

From the decryption of the voice recorder made by Academician Legasov (the scientist recorded his thoughts on the accident at the NPP): "So, say: one emergency protection system should control the operator: automatically, semi-automatically, manually, it depends on the mode; And the second emergency protection system must independently work (with any state of the operator) only to exceed parameters, say: neutron flows, power, temperature, etc. etc. and must automatically stop the reactor. Here the RBMK reactor was not supplied with such a second, independent of the operator's actions, not included in the control system, protection. This, in general, speaking, a major mistake and, let's say, if it were not, the Chernobyl accident would not be. And finally, the third design error, which is even difficult to explain, was that emergency protection systems that were quite large quantities, they were available to the station personnel. " If briefly, the scientist regretted that the designers and designers did not provide RBMK with reliable "protection against a fool", which the station staff could not intervene in any way.

On April 27, 1988, the day after the second anniversary of the Chernobia accident, the body of Academician Lemaces was found in his office. Official version - [Roskomnadzor] due to the oppressed state of the psyche. There were those who doubted that Legasov left his life independently: the knot on the rope was tied too professionally, as if the scientist was engaged in mountaineering. And in the box of the table, Lesshasov found his award gun, which he for some reason did not take advantage.

Academician Alexandrov at the Politburo meeting in 1986 asked him to release him from the post of President of the Academy of Sciences, but continued to work in IEE. In 1994, he died. Some media (in particular, the Zaporizhia Edition "MIG") later wrote that this could also be [Roskomnadzor]: the body of a 91-year-old scientist allegedly found in the Volga in the garage "with the motor included.

The chief designer of the RMBK Academician Nikolay Dollezhal shortly after the accident at the Chernobyl, retired. In the early 1990s, he was interrogated in a criminal case, and in 1999 he was awarded the Order "For Merit to Fatherland". Dollezhal died in 2000, buried in the Moscow region.

Cases that have not reached the court

The deputy director of Cherniga Kovalenko after the final meeting in DK Chernobyl spoke to journalists that three more criminal cases will be in courts soon: "One is connected with the designers who did the project. The second - with those who answered evacuation, health care, etc. The third - with those employees of the Ministry of Energy, who were responsible for security. "

"The case of designers and party leadership" was really investigated for some time, but in the same 1987 closed. Renewed the investigation into the circumstances of the accident after the XXVIII Parts, in August 1990 on the personal disposal of I.O. Prosecutor General of the USSR Alexey Vasilyeva. In December 1991, the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR was eliminated, the investigative group broke up, but the 41 volume was preserved and was transferred to the Prosecutor General of Russia.

According to the main case, Academician of Dollezhal, and the famous Soviet physics, the creator of the system of dosimetric control of Boris Dubovsky (he directly called as the culprit of the accident just detonated). In 1993, the case was closed by the investigator of the Prosecutor General's Office on particularly important cases Boris Uvarov - as he explained himself, due to the transfer of a significant part of the materials to Ukrainian colleagues.

Ukrainian investigators, presumably studied these documents within the framework of the case No. 49-441, which in their books about Chernobyl tells a member of the Commission for the Investigation of the case in relation to officials, the People's Deputy of the USSR Alla Yaroshinskaya. She was one of the first to publish the declassified protocol of the July meeting of the 1986 Politburo, she also told about the investigation in 1992. These are the criminal case materials initiated on February 11, 1992 with respect to the heads of Ukraine, the Chernobyl Chernobyl, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Vladimir Shcherbitsky (of the one that brought people to the May Day demonstration three days after the accident), chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexander Lyashko, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Valentina Shevchenko and Minister of Health of Ukraine Anatoly Romanenko.

"The main harm for the health of people, especially children, was caused due to the lack of immediate alerts of the population on the accident and carry out a complex of measures necessary to reduce the dose load. Over the age of one and a half April 25-27, 1986, even the population of the city of Pripyati did not know about an accident, the danger of radiation exposure, there was everyday life of an ordinary day off, which aggravated the increase in the scale of damage to health.<...> The process of shelter and disinformation of the public about the consequences of the accident was determined and sent by the managers by anyone unsociable, irrelevant and unobstructed structures of power - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Politburo of the CPU Central Committee, which were Schcherbitsky, Shevchenko and Lyashko, "said the materials of the investigation. The accusation should have been concluded by the same 165 article of the Ukrainian SSR authority - abuse of power or official powers.

On April 24, 1993, a criminal case against the party functionaries of the republic was closed over the expiration of the statute of limitations.

After graduating from the Energy Faculty of the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute in 1959, he worked on an Angren TPP (Tashkent region) in the posts of a duty dehering plant, a machinist of nutrient pumps, an assistant driver of the turbine, a turbine driver, a senior turbine shop driver, head of the shift, head of the turbine workshop.

In 1966, it was invited to work at the Slavic GRES (Donetsk region), where he worked until 1970 in the posts of the Senior Master, Deputy Chief of the Boiler-Turbine Workshop, the head of this workshop, Deputy Chief Engineer.

Member of the CPSU since 1966. Delegate XXVII Congress of the CPSU (1986). In the period from 1970 to 1986 Repeatedly elected by a member of the Bureau of the Kiev Regional, Chernobyl district and Syative City Committees of the Party, Deputy of the Chernobyl District and Syative City Councils of People's Deputies.

From April 1970 to July 1986 - Director of the Chernobyl NPP named after V. I. Lenin. After the accident in 1986, he was removed from the post of Director and from July 1986 to July 1987 - Deputy Head of the Chernobyl Academy of Technical Department.

On July 3, 1986, the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU "For large mistakes and shortcomings in the work, which led to the accident with severe consequences" is excluded from the Rows of the CPSU.

On July 29, 1987, the decision of the Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the USSR was sentenced to 10 years in prison with the serving of punishment in the correctional labor institution of a general type.

From August 1991 he lives in Vatuta (now - Desnyansky), the city of Kiev. From February 1992, the employee of the state enterprise Ukrinterenergo. Member of the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident (Category 1). Disabled group II.

Awards

Winner of the Republican Prize of the Ukrainian SSR (1978). Awarded: Order of the Labor Red Banner (1978), the Order of the October Revolution (1983), medals "For Valiant Labor. In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, "and" Veteran of Labor ", the honorary diploma of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR (1980).

A family

  • Wife - Valentina Mikhailovna, Energy Engineer, in 1975-1990 - Senior Engineer of the Chernobyl Exchange Department, now retired.
    • Son - Oleg (born in 1969), Senior Engineer CHP-5, Kiev.
    • Daughter - Lily (born in 1961), pediatrician, a resident of Kherson.

We have such a publication "however" in Russia - the magazine, as you, probably guessed, Mikhail Leontyev, the author of the program of the eponymous program on the first channel TV. In the room dated April 26, 2010 published interviews with the first director of Chernobia Viktrom Blyukhanov, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
There is no Internet version of the publication, so I post the scanned option.

Chernobyl nobody taught anything.

Authorities decided to eliminate the danger symbol, but not its causes

Anton Samarin

On the night of April 25-26, 1986, the largest technogenic catastrophe occurred in the history of the Chernobyl NPP. During the elimination of the accident, 31 people died, and 600 thousand people who took part in steaming fires and cleaners were obtained high doses of radiation. In just two decades, almost 18 thousand people died of the consequences of the catastrophe. On the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. However, publishes an interview with the first director of NPP Viktor Blyukhanov.

Viktor Petrovich appointed me a meeting at the House of Officers of the Moscow Military District. There, for an anniversary evening, the organizers of the Chernobyl movement of Russia and Ukraine were invited. When the 74-year-old disabled group II, irradiated 250 bears (safe norm - 5 Bar per year), carrying the stamp of one of the main perpetrators of the world's largest technogenic catastrophe, rose to the scene, the hall rose. The silence, migrant, broke the applause. Gray, dried up to the least, the old man was walking, hiding behind them, as from the machine-gun queue: "Do not".

- Viktor Petrovich, as you feel about the thesis that the official version of the court, supported by the IAEA, explaining the Chernobyl catastrophe errors and the negligence of the Chernobyl, is aimed at concealing the causes of the accident, and in fact their origin - in the constructive flaws of the reactor, as if initially Created not for peaceful energy, but for atomic weapons?

- I do not agree with any official point of view, nothing about what journalists are written. At the court they performed leading scientists, designers, representatives of technical expertise, prosecutors. And everyone defended the honor of the uniform. Everything! This is the journey of lies and led us from the true causes of the accident.

Let me remind you: at the time of creating the RBMK-1000 reactor, its level may have been the highest - Chernobyl reactor exceeded world analogs. That I know for sure. But I will not take the audacity to assert that it was used to produce atomic weapons. We had objects where even I, the director, was not enthusiastically. Only special services. After I met the indictment and signed it, I saw a letter of academician Volkova (an employee of the Atomic Energy Institute named after Kurchatov. - Approx. "However") in the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. He wrote that he had repeatedly applied to Academician Alexandrov (the author of the project exploded. - approx. "However") with the requirement of project refinement. Gorbachev in his manner was crowded. And when the report was preparing in the IAEA, it was even easier. The commission of 25 people included a group of state surveillance - organizations directly interested in the funeral version of the project's design flaws. Almost half of the commission amounted to "Children of Alexandrova" - employees of the Atomic Energy Institute named after Kurchatov. The circle closed. You need to search somewhere here.

- Do you think that the cause of the accident in the design miscasses?

- I do not want to collapse. There were violations of the staff, but they, if everything is provided for by the project, would lead to the failure of the block, and not to the catastrophe. Professor Boris Dubovsky claims that if emergency protection corresponded to the appointment, staff errors would lead only to the weekly 4th block. As for the protection system, I am confident: it must be designed for a fool. Not only to the physics of the nuclear center, and on me, the heads. That is, whatever mistakes do staff do, the technique should not react so sharply. As a Japanese household appliances: if we click the wrong button, the unit does not deteriorate, does not fail. When we finished the check, the "moan" button was pressed, the reactor, instead of stopping, exploded.

- How dangerous is the fact that Chernobyl-type reactors are still used in the CIS countries?

- They are gradually derived from operation. But as for Chernobyl, I can safely argue, - from 1989 and according to this, the Chaps remains the safest nuclear power plant. From the fright it was completed, as it should.

- Then why closed?

Burned on milk. I understand the frightened alone, which requires the closure of the NPP at all. Since it is unthinkable, the authorities decided to eliminate the symbol of danger, but not its causes. From the point of view of technical, everything is simple: I pressed the button - and that's it. And spent fuel? And 6 thousand specialists? And the return of $ 2 billion to the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development? But these are all the little things in comparison with the inevitability of the new turn of the development of atomic energy. Here it would be there to understand the true causes of the catastrophe to know in which direction to develop the industry. And the world can not understand that it is impossible to reject a peaceful atom. Probably, therefore, the Americans, the French, the British, the Japanese - all hide the true causes of accidents on their nuclear power plants. In this sense, Chernobyl nobody taught anyone.

- When did you realize what a catastrophe occurred, which is nothing to compare with what?

Like everything - much later. One example. When, after the explosion, the Prime Minister of the USSR Ryzhkov arrived, with him - the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU Ligachev and Shcherbitsky, they reported by the Minister of Energy Shcherbina: "The 4th block will be restored and surrender to November. And the 5th will build for the new year. " Nonsense? Her at the construction site listened to the elite of the Nuclear Science of the USSR, the Government Commission, General Colonel, Commander of the Chemical Troops of the USSR Stukalov. I think, then no one understood what happened.

- Viktor Petrovich, when you realized that the main guilt would be imposed on you?

- Immediately. When I was accused of the fact that in the night of the accident I was in the forest with my mistress. The court could not bring me to a focusing article, but gave me Alexander Dyatlov, the Deputy Chief Engineer, a maximum of ten years. The head of the change of Boris Rogozhkin received five years, the head of the reactor workshop Anatoly Kovalenko - three years, the inspector of the State Denadzor Yury Laushkin - two. Dyatlov, Laushkin and Kovalenko died after being released. Fomin went to Russia, nothing heard about him. Rogozhkin works in Chernobyl.

- Where were you at the time of the accident?

- At home. On the eve of Kiev came to the weekend daughter with her husband. Lily was on the fifth month of pregnancy. When, it seems, the 27th, the question arose about evacuation, I gave the keys from our "Zhigulenka" by the son-in-law Andrew, ordered the daughter, the son-nine-grader and leave. They did not travel and five kilometers as under the village of Kopach had to skip the multi-kilometer column of buses. They went to evacuate Pripyat. Then in Kiev, the daughter went to the radiologists. Her clothing rang. "

- What about the child? Is it true that pregnant women were advised to make abortions?

- I do not know about abortion. We had granddaughter born. I am true, for the first time I saw almost five years old when I was freed. Long grandfather did not recognize. Now finishes the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

- Why did you refuse protection on the court?

- I knew the result in advance.

- Where have you stayed?

- a year under investigation in the KGB insulator. During the trial - in the usual SIZO. After the trial - in the Lukyan prison near Kiev, then in the colony of the general regime in the Luhansk region. Already then I realized that the SIZO KGB is a resort in comparison with Lukyanovskaya, Kharkov and Lugansk prisons. At the GB cameras on two, three people. I had to often sit alone. Then he had already found out from the occasion, that alone was planting before execution.

- True, that you yourself asked for a 70-seater chamber to criminery?

- did not ask. Just on the shipment there was a chamber for 30 seats, and we had about 70 people there.

- What was this for a neighbor on the camera, who wanted to kill you?

- not a neighbor. Once during the interrogation, a person entered the room, I think someone from the special services, and the evil said so: "I would shoot you." I am to him: "Shoot". He reached the holster. But she knew and left. And neighbors ... differently treated, more often indifferent. But some still send congratulations on the day of liberation.

- Convicted knew who were you?

- I have not arrived in Lugansk, but I already knew about me there. Brought in Special Machine, I go to the courtyard. Dropped the whole prison. Look at the animal. Then they treated as a pop star - with admiration and envy.

- What was envied?

- What? Almost "political". Not for snungeing tobacco was taken and not behind a stealled wallet.

- Who did you work in the zone?

- Almost in the specialty - in the boiler room. At first they were offered to head the library or be a dispatcher - to distribute all the works. Position as far as thoroughly in the criminal world is so and life-threatening. I refused. I was afraid not for my skin, and molly. I understood: the event got historical, still under the microscope will be studied.

- After the release, you returned to Chernobyl ...

- I was given a decent position - the head of the technotel. Then he came somehow at NPP Minister of Energy of Ukraine. Says: "Go to me." And invited to the post of deputy director of the Association of Foreign and Economic Activities under the Ministry. By the age of 70, he lost his post to younger friend, he was engaged in public affairs.

- Reference with you?

- Not. The verdict endured the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. There is no such country. Who will cancel him? ..

- You do not have the desire to appeal the court decision? According to many experts, including academician RAS Boris Dubovsky, "... condemnation of five employees of the Chernobyl NPP - V.P. Brojanova, N.M. Fokina, AU. Dyatlova, A.P. Kovalenko and V.V. Rogozhkin ... illegally and unreasonable. "

- It does not make sense. "Arroges" or died of irradiation from horse doses, or, like me, are expressly punished. Throw no one's past. Those who quietly bend from radiation do not count. It is done. Point.

- Do you know that an international tourist route is laid in your apartment in Pripyati?

- I heard, I was there once, immediately after conclusion. It would be better not to go. Doors are knocked out. The furniture made marauders. The family, by the way, did not return for things. I was already sitting when they were allowed to pick up Skarb. I did not regret rags, but I have no photo from the "Davarian" life. But how did you live?! They believed that we live in the city of the future. I remember, threw the cry so that every resident of Pripyat was his pink bush. And we from Lithuania and Latvia brought roses. Fifty thousand bushes. All gothes ...

- Do you prevent the glory of the Bookanov himself?

- I do not. Daughter changed the surname when married. For the son and grandchildren, it happens, I'm afraid, because I do not believe in justice. There is no one on this light.

- What do you think will ever find out the truth about Chernobyl?

- We will not know the truth because they hide her. It cannot be understood. By hot trails, when everything was possible to find out if this was not wanted to do.