At the end of February 1709 CharlesXII Having learned about the departure of Peter I from the army to Voronezh, he redoubled his efforts to force the Russians into battle, but it was all in vain. As a last resort, he undertook the siege of Poltava, where at the end of 1708 Peter sent the 4th battalion of the garrison, under the command of Colonel Kellin, and where, according to the assurance of the Zaporozhye ataman Gordeenko and Mazepa, there were significant stores and huge sums of money. Having personally examined the Poltava fortifications, Charles XII at the end of April 1709 moved to this city from the village of Budishcha, where his main apartment was then located, Colonel Shparre with 9 infantry regiments, 1 artillery and the entire army convoy. On the Russian side, General Renne was sent against him with a 7,000 cavalry detachment, which stood directly opposite the city, on the left bank of the Vorskla. He built two bridges and covered them with retrenchments, but his actions to maintain contact with Poltava were unsuccessful, and Renne returned to the army.

The city of Poltava was located on the heights of the right bank of the Vorskla, almost a mile from the river itself, from which it was separated by a very swampy valley. It was surrounded on all sides by a chain earthen rampart, and inside it a retrenchment with palisades was made by the garrison. Gordeenko advised the Swedes to capture Poltava through an accidental attack; but they failed to take advantage of his offer, and on the night of April 30 to May 1, 1709, taking advantage of the cover of bushes and a rather deep ravine, they opened the first trenches, at a distance of 250 fathoms from the city. The conduct of the siege was entrusted to Quartermaster General Gyllenkrok. According to his plan, it was supposed to conduct an attack, first of all, on the suburb, from the side where there was a high wooden tower, and then attack the Russian suburb. This was based on news received that in the suburbs of Poltava there were many wells, while in the city itself there was only one. Gillenkrok decided to lay three parallels at the same time, connected to each other by aproshas. Zaporozhye Cossacks were assigned for the work, and a detachment of Swedish infantry provided cover for them. Due to the inexperience of the Cossacks, the work proceeded slowly and unsuccessfully, so that by morning the troops could only occupy the first two parallels, while the third, barely begun, was not yet completed. The next night the Swedes managed to complete the broken routes leading to the third parallel. Gillenkrok suggested that the king attack Poltava at dawn, but Charles XII did not agree to his proposal, but ordered him to go through the ditch with grapnels and lay a mine under the rampart. This enterprise failed because the Russians, having fired a countermine, discovered the enemy's intentions.

Having no siege weapons, with only a small number of small-caliber field weapons, the Swedes could not hope for success, but, despite this, their actions became more decisive from hour to hour, and Poltava was in imminent danger. Colonel Kellin, who was in Poltava with 4 thousand regular troops and 2.5 thousand townspeople, sought all means for defense. He ordered a fence of barrels to be made on the rampart and in the suburbs and repeatedly sent word with empty bombs to the Russian troops stationed near Poltava that the Swedes were getting closer and closer to the city and that the garrison was in a dangerous situation, suffering a shortage of combat and partly life supplies. As a result, the Russians launched demonstrations against the enemy. Menshikov crossed to the left side of the Vorskla, and General Beling, following its right bank, attacked Colonel Shparre. The Swedes were repulsed, but Charles XII, who arrived in time with cavalry regiments, stopped the Russians and forced them to retreat. Despite this, Menshikov continued his movement along the left bank of the Vorskla and positioned himself opposite Poltava at the villages of Krutoy Bereg, Savka and Iskrevka, in two fortified camps separated from each other by the Kolomak stream, which flows in a swampy and wooded valley. Through it, 4 fascine roads with posts were made, which served as communications for both camps. Wanting to reinforce the city garrison, Menshikov took advantage of the Swedes’ oversight and on May 15 brought 2 battalions into Poltava, under the command of brigadier Alexei Golovin. Encouraged by this, Kellin began to act more decisively, and the Swedes had a lot of difficulty repelling his attacks.

On May 10, the main Swedish forces arrived at Poltava: the infantry occupied the surrounding villages; The cavalry stood at some distance from the city, supporting themselves by foraging. Charles XII, wanting to stop relations between the Poltava garrison and Menshikov, ordered the construction of a redoubt at the height of the right bank of the river, opposite the bridge, near the Steep Bank, and began to actively prepare all measures for the capture of the city. Then Sheremetev, who commanded the Russian army in Peter’s absence, decided to unite with Menshikov. At the end of May 1709, he crossed Psyol and Vorskla and occupied a camp at Kruty Bereg, adjoining this village with his left flank. The main forces of his army stood in two lines with a front to the north, while the vanguard was located to the left of Iskrevka and Savka, parallel to the Kharkov road, and a front to the south. Thus, both parts of the Russian army were facing each other with their rears. The main apartment of the Russians was in the village of Krutoy Beregu. From the vanguard, a detachment was sent all the way to Vorskla, which began laying various fortifications: several redoubts were built near the river bank, and a closed trench was located at a height near the bridge. But all attempts by Sheremetev to provide assistance to Poltava were in vain. The Swedes laid a series of closed fortifications along the right bank of the river, near the bridge, and thus completely interrupted the communication of the Russians with the city, the situation of which was becoming more dangerous from day to day. On June 1, the Swedes began to bombard Poltava and, having managed to set fire to the wooden tower of the suburb, launched an attack, but were repulsed with damage.

Preparations for the Battle of Poltava

On June 4, Peter himself arrived at the Russian army. His presence inspired the troops. Having entered into communication with the garrison of Poltava, he assembled a military council, at which it was decided, in order to liberate the city, to cross directly against him through Vorskla and attack the Swedes together with the Cossacks Skoropadsky, going there on the right side of this river. The marshy banks of the Vorskla impeded the work, but, despite the unsuccessful execution of the tasks, Peter was still faithful to the plan he had adopted. To entertain the attention of the enemy, he ordered General Renna, with 3 regiments of infantry and several regiments of dragoons, to move up the river to Semenov Ford and Petrovka and, having crossed the Vorskla, fortify himself on its right bank; General Allard received orders to cross the river slightly below Poltava. On the 15th, Renne, having transported two infantry battalions along the Lykoshinsky Ford, occupied the old fortification on opposite heights; The Cossacks stretched out to guard the crossings along the entire right bank from Tishenkov Ford to Petrovka. On June 16, Renne built on the hills between the last village and Semenov Ford a line of separate fortifications, behind which his detachment was located. On the same date, Peter completed the fortifications on the marshy island of Vorskla against the left flank of the Swedish coastlines.

Karl paid particular attention to the movements of Allard and Renne. He himself went against the first, sending a general Renschilda to Semyonovka. Carrying out a personal reconnaissance, the Swedish king was shot in the leg, which forced him to postpone the attack on Allard. Renschild's actions were no more successful.

But Peter also saw the futility of his enterprises; At the newly assembled military council, he proposed to cross the Vorskla somewhat higher than Poltava and give a general battle, the success of which could already be relied upon with greater certainty. On June 10, 1709, the Russian army moved from the camp at Krutoy Bereg to Chernyakhov and settled down near the last village in the camp, which was partly surrounded by trenches. Then Peter learned from the prisoners about Karl’s illness, and therefore, on the 20th, he hastened to cross the bridge at Petrovka and the three fords mentioned above. The Russian army occupied the fortified camp prepared by General Renne.

Charles XII, wishing to take advantage of the removal of the Russian army, ordered, on the 21st, an assault on Poltava, but it was repulsed, as was another undertaken by the Swedes the next day with desperate courage. On June 25, Peter moved more forward, stopped before reaching Yakovets, three miles below Semenovka, and strengthened his position. The Swedes immediately stepped forward, as if challenging the Russians to battle, but seeing that they were not leaving their trenches, they decided to attack them themselves and give battle, setting the 27th for this.

On the night of June 26, the Russians finally dug in their camp and built 10 more redoubts ahead at the exit from the adjacent valley. These redoubts were located at a distance of a rifle shot from each other. The Russian position was turned with its rear to Vorskla, and with its front to a vast plain extending to the village of Budishchi; it was surrounded by forest and had exits only from the north and southwest. The disposition of the troops was as follows: 56 battalions occupied a fortified camp; 2 battalions of the Belgorod regiment, under the command of Brigadier Aigustov, were assigned to defend redoubts armed with cannons; behind them were 17 cavalry regiments, under the command of Renne and Baur; the remaining 6 cavalry regiments were sent to the right to maintain communication with Skoropadsky. The artillery, including 72 guns, was commanded by Bruce. The number of Russian troops ranged from 50 to 55 thousand.

On the morning of the 26th, Peter, accompanied by some of his generals, under the cover of a small detachment, surveyed the surrounding area. He saw that in order to liberate Poltava he had to take the fight, and therefore he only wanted to wait for the arrival of the expected reinforcements, joining with which he intended to attack the Swedes himself on the 29th. Having experienced his happiness at Lesnaya, the tsar decided to personally take over the main command of the army. In the order given to the troops, with a strong speech he convinced them of the importance of the upcoming battle.

For his part, the Swedish king did not want to allow the Russians to warn him of the attack. For this purpose, he sent back in advance, beyond Poltava, under the cover of 2 cavalry regiments, his convoy and artillery, which, due to a lack of shells, could not take part in the battle. Only 4 guns remained with the troops. Charles XII, in consultation with Field Marshal Renschild, personally drew up a plan for the battle of Poltava, which, however, was not communicated either to the troops or even to the closest persons who made up the main headquarters. In all likelihood, the king believed that the Russians would defend themselves in their fortified camp, and therefore had the intention, dividing his army into columns, to break through between the advanced redoubts, push back the Russian cavalry and then, in accordance with the circumstances, or rush quickly against the trenches, or, if the Russians leave the camp, rush against them. Around noon, on the 26th, Quartermaster General Gillenkrok was ordered to form four columns of infantry, while the cavalry was divided by Renschild into 6 columns. There were 6 battalions in each infantry column, 6 in 4 medium cavalry columns, and 7 squadrons in both flanks. 2 battalions and part of the cavalry were left near Poltava; separate detachments covered the convoy and maintained posts down the Vorskla: in New Senzhary, Beliki and Sokolkovo. The last measure taken to ensure a retreat, in case of failure, was useless, because the Swedes did not build a bridge across the Dnieper in advance; In addition, this measure weakened the already weak army, which could only field 30 battalions and 14 cavalry regiments (in total up to 24 thousand) for battle. Mazepa and the Cossacks were left to guard the siege work.

Battle of Poltava 1709. Plan

Progress of the Battle of Poltava

By the evening of the 26th, Swedish troops lined up parallel to the position occupied by the Russian cavalry behind 6 redoubts. The infantry stood in the middle, and the cavalry on the flanks. Charles XII, carried on a stretcher along the front of his soldiers, in brief words convinced them to show the same courage at Poltava with which they fought at Narva and Golovchin.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, on the 27th, at dawn, the Swedes, starting the Battle of Poltava, moved against the Russian position, into the gap between the forests that bordered the plain. In front were infantry columns, under the command of Posse, Stackelberg, Ross and Shparre. Behind them, somewhat behind, followed the cavalry, led on the right wing by Kreutz and Schlippenbach, on the left by Cruz and Hamilton. Approaching the line of redoubts, the Swedish infantry stopped and waited for the arrival of its cavalry, which immediately rushed at several Russian cavalry regiments that had ridden out to meet it. Behind her the center and right wing of the infantry moved forward. Having taken 2 unfinished redoubts, she passed through the gaps between them and the rest of the trenches, because the Russians, for fear of damaging their own cavalry, stopped shooting at the enemy. The Swedish cavalry, supported by this rapid onslaught, pushed back the Russians. Noticing this, Peter, at 4 o'clock in the morning, ordered General Baur (Bour), who took command instead of the wounded Renne, to retreat with the Russian cavalry to the camp and join his left flank to it. During this movement, the left wing of the Swedes, without waiting for Ross to join, who was busy attacking the Russian flank redoubts, moved forward. This circumstance had an extraordinary influence on the fate of the entire battle of Poltava.

Battle of Poltava. Painting by P. D. Martin, 1726

Having come under heavy fire from the Russian fortified camp, the left wing of the Swedes, instead of persistently continuing the movement they had started, stopped for a while and moved further to the left. Charles XII, who was with him on a stretcher, wishing to more accurately ensure the accession of Ross, sent part of the cavalry to his aid, after which several other cavalry regiments followed, without any command from their generals. Crowded in disorder and coming under heavy fire from the Russian batteries, this cavalry also stretched to the left, to the place where the Swedish infantry stood, which in turn retreated to the edge of the Budishchensky forest, where, hiding from the shots of the Russian batteries, it began to put its upset rows. Thus, the Swedes were unable to take advantage of their initial success and were now placed in a dangerous position. Between their right and left wings a considerable gap was formed, which divided their army into two separate parts.

This mistake did not escape the attention of Peter, who personally controlled the actions of his troops in the battle of Poltava. In the midst of the strongest fire, even before that, seeing the onslaught of the left wing of the Swedes and believing that they would attack the Russian camp, he withdrew part of his infantry from it and built it in several lines, on both sides of the trenches, in order to hit the Swedes in the flank . When their regiments were badly damaged by our shots and began to settle down near the forest, he ordered, at 6 o'clock in the morning, the rest of the infantry to also leave the camp and line up in two lines in front of him. To take advantage of Ross's distance, the Tsar ordered Prince Menshikov and General Renzel, with 5 battalions and 5 dragoon regiments, to attack the Swedes' right wing. The Swedish cavalry regiments that rode out to meet them were overthrown, and the general himself Schlippenbach, who led the cavalry of the right wing, was captured. Then Renzel’s infantry rushed against Ross’s troops, who had meanwhile occupied the Yalowitsky forest, on the left flank of our position, and the Russian dragoons moved to the right , threatening the Swedish line of retreat. This forced Ross to retreat to Poltava itself, where he occupied the siege trenches and, attacked from all sides by Renzel’s 5 battalions pursuing him, was forced, after a half-hour period given to him to think, to put down his weapon.

Having left Renzel to pursue Ross to Poltava, Prince Menshikov, commanding the left Russian wing, joined the rest of the cavalry to the main forces of the army, located in two lines in front of the camp. In the center of the first line there were 24 infantry battalions, on the left flank - 12, and on the right - 23 cavalry squadrons. The second line consisted of 18 battalions in the center, 12 on the left flank, and 23 squadrons on the right. The right wing was commanded by Baur, the center by Repnin, Golitsyn and Allard, and the left wing by Menshikov and Belling. General Ginter was left in the trenches with 6 infantry battalions and several thousand Cossacks to reinforce the battle lines, if necessary. Moreover, 3 battalions, under the command of Colonel Golovin, were sent to the Vozdvizhensky Monastery to open communications with Poltava. 29 field guns, under the command of Artillery General Bruce, and all the regimental guns were in the 1st line.

The Swedes, after the separation of Ross, were left with only 18 infantry battalions and 14 cavalry regiments, and therefore they were forced to build their infantry in one line, and their cavalry on the flanks in two lines. There was almost no artillery, as we saw.

In this order, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the Swedish regiments with desperate courage rushed towards the Russians, who had already managed to line up in battle formation and were personally led by Peter. Both troops participating in the battle of Poltava, inspired by their leaders, understood their great purpose. Courageous Peter was ahead of everyone and, saving the honor and glory of Russia, did not think about the danger that threatened him. His hat, saddle and dress were shot through. The wounded Charles, on a stretcher, was also among his troops; the cannonball killed two of his servants and they were forced to carry him on spears. The clash between both troops was terrible. The Swedes were repulsed and retreated back in disorder. Then Peter moved forward the regiments of his first line and, taking advantage of the superiority of his forces, surrounded the Swedes on both flanks, who were forced to flee and seek salvation in the forest. The Russians rushed after them, and only a small part of the Swedes, after a two-hour battle in the forest, escaped the sword and captivity.

Peter I. Portrait by P. Delaroche, 1838

Charles XII, under the cover of a small detachment, mounted a horse, barely reached the place beyond Poltava where his convoy and artillery stood, under the cover of part of the Swedish cavalry and Mazepa’s Cossacks. There he waited for the concentration of the scattered remnants of his army. First of all, the convoy and park moved along the right bank of the Vorskla to New Senzhary, Beliki and Sokolkovo, where the cavalry posts left by Karl were located. The king himself followed them and arrived on the 30th in Perevolochna.

Results and results of the Battle of Poltava

The first result of the Battle of Poltava was the liberation of Poltava, which in some way constituted the very goal of the battle. On June 28, 1709, Peter solemnly entered this city.

The losses of the Swedes in the battle of Poltava were significant: 9 thousand of them fell in the battle, 3 thousand were taken prisoner; 4 cannons, 137 banners and standards were the prey of the Russians. Field Marshal Renschild, generals Stackelberg, Hamilton, Schlpppenbach and Ross, colonels Prince Maximilian of Württemberg, Horn, Appelgren and Engstätt were captured. A similar fate befell Minister Pieper and two state secretaries. Among the dead were Colonels Thorstenson, Springen, Sigrot, Ulfenarre, Weidenhain, Rank and Buchwald.

The Russians lost 1,300 killed and 3,200 wounded. Among those killed were: Brigadier Tellenheim, 2 colonels, 4 headquarters and 59 chief officers. Among the wounded were Lieutenant General Renne, Brigadier Polyansky, 5 colonels, 11 headquarters and 94 chief officers.

After the battle of Poltava, Peter dined with his generals and staff officers; the captured generals were also invited to the table and received favorably. Field Marshal Renschild and the Prince of Württemberg were given swords. At the table, Peter praised the loyalty and courage of the Swedish troops and drank to the health of his teachers in military affairs. Some Swedish officers, by their consent, were transferred by the same ranks to the Russian service.

Peter did not limit himself to just winning the battle: on the same day he sent Prince Golitsyn with the guards and Baur with the dragoons to pursue the enemy. The next day, Menshikov was sent for the same purpose.

The further fate of the Swedish army under Perevolochne had a close connection with the result of the battle of Poltava and constituted, so to speak, its end.

No matter how great the material consequences of the Battle of Poltava were, even more immense was its moral influence on the very course of events: Peter’s conquests were secured, and his extensive plans - to improve the well-being of his people by developing trade, navigation and education - could be freely carried out.

Great was the joy of Peter and the entire Russian people. In memory of this victory, the Tsar decreed an annual celebration in all places in Russia. In honor of the Battle of Poltava, medals were struck for all officers and soldiers who participated in it. For this battle, Sheremetev received huge estates; Menshikov was made field marshal; Bruce, Allard and Renzel received the Order of St. Andrew; Renne and other generals were awarded ranks, orders and money. Medals and other awards were distributed to all officers and soldiers.

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Battle of Poltava

P.D. Martin. Battle of Poltava. 1720
State Museum-Reserve "Tsarskoye Selo"

The historical attempt of the Russian state to regain the original Russian lands on the shores of the Gulf of Finland and at the mouth of the Neva (Novgorod Pyatina) and thereby gain access to the Baltic Sea resulted in the long Northern War of 1700 - 1721. The turning point of this war was the general battle between the Russian and Swedish armies on June 27 (July 8, new style) 1709 near Poltava.

In the summer of 1708, the Swedish army of King Charles XII set out on a campaign against Russia, moving in the Moscow direction. When the Swedes approached its state border, they saw what kind of river it was. The Russian army is standing in Vikhri and Gorodny. Charles XII abandoned the idea of ​​​​giving her a general battle and turned south, to Ukraine, where he was invited by the traitor hetman Ivan Mazepa.

After the defeat of the Swedish corps of General Levengaupt near the village of Lesnaya (Peter I called this battle “the mother of the Poltava battle”), the king found himself in a difficult situation: the Russian army was pursuing the enemy, and Mazepa, who promised to bring all the Ukrainian Cossacks to Charles XII, brought only about 2 thousand . a man of the Cossack foreman and the personal regiment of “Serdyuks”. They fled at night from the hetman (about 700 people remained), to whom the king gave 20 Swedes for personal protection. In addition, General Alexander Menshikov, by royal decree, defeated the Mazepa headquarters of Baturin, in which significant reserves, primarily food, were collected for the Swedes.

Charles XII brought the Swedish army to Ukraine, which was distinguished by its high professional training, discipline and won many convincing victories in the lands of Denmark, Saxony and Poland. She was responsible for the victory over the young regular army of Peter the Great in 1700 near the Narva fortress.

The Swedes had a hard time in Ukraine. The partisans met them back in Belarus. “Flying” detachments of Russian dragoon cavalry and irregular cavalry, primarily Cossack cavalry, haunted the royal army. The earth burned under the interventionists' feet. The attempt of the king and hetman to use the separatist sentiments of a small part of the Zaporozhye Cossacks, led by Ataman Gordienko, did not change the course of events. The Ukrainian Cossacks turned their backs on the hetman, the “Polyakh,” who was awarded in absentia by Tsar Peter I the cast-iron “Order of Judas.” World history knows nothing like this.

During the winter of 1708 - 1709. Russian troops, avoiding a general battle, continued to exhaust the forces of the Swedish army in local battles. In the spring of 1709, Charles XII decided to resume the attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. To protect his rear, he decided to take the fortified city of Poltava. The Swedish army approached it with a force of 35 thousand people with 32 guns, not counting the Mazepa and Cossacks.

Poltava stood on the high bank of the Vorskli River. Its fortifications consisted of a rampart with a palisade on top with loopholes for firing guns. The garrison, commanded by Colonel Alexey Kelin, consisted of 4 thousand 187 soldiers, 2.5 thousand Poltava Cossacks and armed townspeople and 91 gunners. The fortress had 28 guns.

From the first days of the siege, the Swedes began to storm Poltava over and over again. Its defenders repelled 12 enemy attacks in April alone, often making daring and successful forays themselves. The siege work did not stop. On June 21 and 22, the most furious assaults were repulsed: the attackers, who even managed to hoist a banner on the ramparts, were thrown off it by a counterattack. In 2 days, the Poltava garrison lost 1 thousand 258 people killed and wounded, the Swedes - 2 thousand 300 people.

Tsar Peter I was able to provide assistance to the besieged garrison with men and gunpowder, the reserves of which in Poltava were running out. Gunpowder was “sent” to the city in hollow bombs that did not explode when they hit the ground.

Meanwhile, the army of Peter I was converging on Poltava. It consisted of 42 thousand people with 72 guns. It consisted of 58 infantry battalions (infantry) and 72 cavalry squadrons (dragoons). The Ukrainian Cossack regiments were commanded by the new elected hetman Skoropadsky, who guarded the Poltava field from the side of Malye Budishchi, blocking the possible route of retreat of the Swedes to Poland.

The heroic defense of Poltava gave the Russians a gain in time. On June 16, a military council, at which the tsar and his associates decided to give the enemy a general battle: “cross the Vorskla near the village of Petrovka and, with the help of God, seek happiness over the enemy.”

V. P. Psarev. Peter the Great and his companions

The fact that the enemy was planning to cross Vorskla became known in the Swedish camp. Charles XII decided to conduct reconnaissance, but near the river they were fired upon by Russian patrol posts. Then the monarch's retinue ran into a Cossack picket, and the king was wounded by a bullet in the leg. He had to watch the Battle of Poltava from a stretcher.

The Battle of Poltava became a test of the maturity of the young regular army of Russia. And she passed this test with honor. Russian military art surpassed Swedish art, which was admired throughout Europe. The enemy army was completely defeated, ceasing to exist as such.

The Russian command prepared thoroughly for the battle. Peter I ordered the army camp to be moved closer to the fortress, about 5 km in a straight line from the Swedish camp. It was fortified with retrenchments (trenches) with bastions at the corners. A kilometer from the camp, on the battlefield, a system of field fortifications was created, which military practice had not yet seen. The Tsar ordered the construction of a line of 6 frontal redoubts in front of the camp, and 4 more (the two front ones did not have time to be completed) - perpendicular to them.

Plan of the Poltava Victoria from the book “The Life and Glorious Deeds of Peter the Great...” St. Petersburg. 1774 RGADA

The earthen redoubts had a quadrangular shape and were located at a distance of a direct rifle shot from each other. This ensured tactical interaction between the garrisons of the redoubts. They housed two battalions of infantry and grenadiers, regimental guns (1 - 2 per redoubt). The system of redoubts became the forward position of the Russian army, against which the first enemy attack was supposed to crash. This was a new word in the art of war of European armies of the early 18th century.

Another tactical innovation was the placement of 17 dragoon regiments immediately behind the redoubts. The regiments were commanded by the famous cavalry commander of the Northern War, the future Generalissimo A.D. Menshikov. The dragoon cavalry was supposed to attack the Swedes on the line of redoubts and between them in the initial phase of the general battle.

Peter I planned to wear down the enemy in the forward position (the line of redoubts) and then defeat him in an open field battle. He perfectly understood the strength and weakness of the linear battle formation. The redoubts were intended to break the linear battle formation of the Swedish army, break its cohesion and bring the troops of Charles XII under flanking fire from a fortified camp. After this, the scattered royal army had to be defeated piece by piece.

At the military council on June 25, the Swedes decided to be the first to attack the enemy. Charles XII never received help from Poland or the Crimean Khan. He decided at night to suddenly attack the camp of the Tsar’s army from all sides before the Russians left it and lined up for battle. The plan was to throw them off a cliff into the river. For the speed of movement, it was decided not to take artillery, but to take only 4 cannons with us. For the blockade of the Poltava fortress, 2 infantry battalions (1 thousand 300 soldiers) and about 8 thousand Cossacks and Mazepas were left. The king did not trust his allies. In total, approximately 22 thousand people were allocated for the night attack: 24 infantry battalions and 22 cavalry regiments.

On June 27 at two o'clock in the morning, the Swedish army under the command of Field Marshal K.G. Renschild (the king, with his sword drawn, was carried by his bodyguards - drabants) on a stretcher) with four columns of infantry and six columns of cavalry secretly moved towards the enemy position. Charles XII called on the soldiers to bravely fight the Russians and invited them after the victory to a feast in the tents of the Moscow Tsar.

The Swedish army moved towards the redoubts and stopped in the night 600 m from the front fortifications. From there the sound of axes could be heard: two advanced redoubts were being hastily completed. The Swedes deployed in advance into 2 battle lines: the 1st consisted of infantry, the 2nd - of cavalry. Suddenly a pistol shot rang out - a Russian cavalry patrol discovered the approach of the enemy. Warning fire was opened from the redoubts.

Field Marshal Renschild ordered an attack on the redoubts at five o'clock in the morning. But the Swedes were able to take two of them, which they did not have time to complete. The garrisons of the other two - perpendicular ones - fought back with the help of soldiers who had left the fortifications captured by the Swedes. They received an unpleasant surprise: they only knew about a line of six transverse redoubts. There was no need to storm them: Russian dragoon regiments of generals Menshikov and K.-E rushed to the battle line. Renne. The Swedish cavalry moved ahead of the infantry and a battle ensued.

The dragoons threw back the royal squadrons and, by order of Peter I, retreated beyond the line of longitudinal redoubts. When the Swedes resumed their attack, they were met with strong rifle and cannon fire from the field fortifications. The right flank of the royal army, caught in the crossfire and suffering heavy losses, retreated in disarray to the forest near the village of Malye Budishchi.

Peter I's calculation to dismember the enemy army at the beginning of the battle fully justified itself. The right-flank columns of generals K.G., separated from the main forces during the battle for the redoubts. Ross and V.A. Schlippenbach was destroyed by the dragoons of General Menshikov.

The main forces of the parties collided at dawn. At about 6 o'clock Peter I formed the Russian army in front of the camp in 2 battle lines. The peculiarity of the formation was that each regiment had its own battalion in the second line, and not someone else’s. This created a depth of battle formation and reliably provided support for the first battle line. The second line of infantry received a tactical assignment, which was a major step forward in the development of linear tactics. The center was commanded by General Prince. The Tsar entrusted general command of the troops to Field Marshal B.P., who had been tested in the war. Sheremetev.

The Swedish army, having broken through the line of redoubts to lengthen its battle formation, formed into one battle line with a weak reserve behind. The cavalry formed two lines on the flanks. The Swedes were very determined.
At 9 o'clock in the morning the first line of Russians moved forward. The Swedish army also moved towards rapprochement. After a short mutual salvo of rifle fire (from a distance of just over 50 meters), the Swedes, not paying attention to the cannon fire, rushed into a bayonet attack. They sought to quickly get closer to the enemy and avoid destructive artillery fire.

The right wing of the royal troops, with Charles XII under his command, pushed back the battalion of the Novgorod infantry regiment, which was attacked by 2 Swedish ones. There was a threat of a breakthrough of the Russian position almost at its very center. Peter I, who arrived here, personally led the second battalion of Novgorodians, stationed in the second line, into a counterattack, which with a swift blow overthrew the Swedes who had broken through, and closed the gap that had formed in the first line.

The Swedish frontal attack failed, and the Russians began to push back the enemy. A fierce battle took place along the entire line of contact between the parties. The Russian infantry line began to cover the flanks of the royal infantry battalions. The Swedes panicked, many soldiers began to hastily leave the battlefield, fearing encirclement. The Swedish cavalry rushed into the Budishchi forest without resistance; The infantrymen rushed there after her. And only in the center did General Levengaupt, next to whom the king was (his stretcher was broken by a cannonball), tried to cover the retreat to the convoys.

The Russian infantry pursued the retreating Swedes to the Budishchensky forest and at 11 o'clock formed in front of the last forest area that hid the fleeing enemy. The royal army was defeated and, in disarray, fled, led by the king and hetman Mazepa, from Poltava to the crossings of the Dnieper.

In the battle of Poltava, the winners lost 1 thousand 345 people killed and 3 thousand 290 wounded. Swedes' losses on the battlefield were estimated at 9,333 killed and 2,874 captured. Among the prisoners were Field Marshal Renschild, Chancellor K. Pieper and part of the generals. Russian trophies included 4 cannons and 137 banners, the enemy's convoy and his siege camp.

The remnants of the fleeing Swedish army covered about 100 km in two days and reached Perevolochna on June 29. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the exhausted Swedes began to search in vain for means of crossing the deep river. Then they dismantled the wooden church and built a raft, but it was carried away by the river current. Towards nightfall, several ferry boats were found, to which wheels from carriages and carts were added: they turned out to be improvised rafts.

But only King Charles XII and the deposed Hetman Mazepa with about a thousand close associates and personal guards managed to cross to the western bank of the Dnieper. The pursuers approached Perevolochna: a guards brigade led by General Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, 6 dragoon regiments of General R.Kh. Boura and, finally, 3 horse and 3 foot regiments led by Menshikov. At 2 p.m. on June 30, he accepted the surrender of the Swedish army, abandoned by the king, and not even thinking about resistance. 142 banners and standards lay at the feet of the winners. In total, 18,746 Swedes were captured, almost all the generals, all their artillery, and the entire army convoy. King Charles XII and the traitor hetman Ivan Mazepa fled to the Turkish borders, managing to deceive the pursuit sent after them in the steppe.

Kivshenko A.D. Poltava battle
The Swedes bow their banners before Peter I. 1709

The triumphal entry of Russian troops into Moscow
December 21, 1709 after the victories at Lesnaya and Poltava.
Engraving by etching and chisel by A. Zubov. 1711

Prominent commanders of Europe highly appreciated the art of the Russian army in the battle of Poltava. The largest Austrian commander, Moritz of Saxony, wrote: “In this way, thanks to skillful measures, you can make happiness tilt in your direction.” The French military theorist of the first half of the 18th century, Roconcourt, advised studying the military leadership of Peter I. He wrote the following about the Battle of Poltava: “Such a decisive victory over the best disciplined European troops was not a well-known omen of what the Russians would do over time... It should really be noted with this battle a new tactical and fortification combination that would be a real advance for both. It was in this method, which had not been used until then, although equally convenient for attack and defense, that the entire army of the adventurer Charles XII was to be destroyed.”
High assessments of the actions of the Russian army in the general battle of the Northern War were also given by domestic researchers. Thus, A. Puzyrevsky noted: “Poltava is the only example in military history of an offensive fortified position.”

Monument to Glory in Poltava. 1805-1811 Erected in honor of the victory of the Russian army over Swedish troops in the Battle of Poltava.
Architect J. Thomas de Thomon, sculptor F.F. Shchedrin

The Poltava victory meant a radical change in the ongoing war. Now the strategic initiative is completely in the hands of Russia. Victoria near Poltava significantly raised the authority of the Russian state and placed Tsar Peter I among the most skillful commanders not only of his era. Russian military art was recognized as advanced and innovative.

Alexey Shishov,
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher
Research Institute of Military History
Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The Battle of Poltava took place on June 27, 1709 and, in short, became one of the most important battles of the Northern War, which we will briefly discuss in this article. Separately, we will dwell on the reasons for the battle, as well as its course. To do this, based on historical documents and maps, we will draw up a detailed battle plan and understand how significant the results of the victory were.

Reasons for the Battle of Poltava

The Northern War developed in such a way that Sweden, led by the young king-commander Charles 12, won one victory after another. As a result, by mid-1708, all of Russia’s allies were actually withdrawn from the war: both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony. As a result, it became obvious that the outcome of the war would be determined in a head-to-head battle between Sweden and Russia. Charles 12, on a wave of success, was in a hurry to end the war and in the summer of 1708 crossed the border with Russia. Initially, the Swedes moved to Smolensk. Peter understood perfectly well that such a campaign was aimed at advancing deeper into the country and defeating the Russian army. When considering the causes of the Battle of Poltava, it is necessary to pay attention to two very important facts:

On September 28, 1708, a battle took place near the village of Lesnoy, during which the Swedes were defeated. It would seem that this is an ordinary event for war. In fact, as a result of this victory, the Swedish army was left virtually without provisions and supplies, because the convoy was destroyed and the roads for sending a new one were blocked.

In October 1708, Hetman Mazepa approached the Swedish king. He and the Zaporozhye Cossacks swore allegiance to the Swedish crown. This was beneficial for the Swedes, since the Cossacks could help them resolve issues with the interrupted supply of food and ammunition.

As a result, the main reasons for the Battle of Poltava must be sought in the reasons for the start of the Northern War, which at that time had already dragged on quite long and required decisive action.

Balance of forces and means before the start of the battle

The Swedes approached Poltava and began its siege at the end of March 1709. The garrison successfully held back the enemy's attacks, realizing that the king and his army would soon arrive at the battle site. At this time, Peter himself tried to strengthen his army with allied troops. To do this, he turned to the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan. His arguments were not heard, and having gathered a single Russian army, which was joined by part of the Zaporozhye Cossacks led by Skoropadsky, he went to the besieged fortress.

It should be noted that the Poltava garrison was small, only 2,200 people. However, he resisted the constant assaults of the Swedes for almost 3 months. Historians note that during this time approximately 20 attacks were repulsed and 6,000 Swedes were killed.

The Battle of Poltava in 1709, by the time it began, after the arrival of the main Russian forces, brought together the following forces of the parties.

Swedish army before the battle:

Number - 37,000 people (30,000 Swedes, 6,000 Cossacks, 1,000 Vlachs).

Guns - 4 pieces

Generals - Karl 12, Rehnschild Karl Gustav, Levenhaupt Adam Ludwig, Roos Karl Gustav,

Mazepa Ivan Stepanovich.

Russian army before the battle:

Number - 60,000 people (52,000 Russians, 8,000 Cossacks) - according to some sources - 80,000 people.

Guns - 111 pieces

Generals - Peter 1, Sheremetev Boris Petrovich, Repin Anikita Ivanovich, Allart Ludvig Nikolaevich, Menshikov Alexander Danilovich, Renne Karl Edward, Baur Radion Khristianovich, Skoropadsky Ivan Ilyich.

Progress of the Battle of Poltava (briefly)

At 23:00 on June 26 (the eve of the battle), Charles 12 gave the order to wake up the army and form it into battle formation for the march. However, the disunity of the Swedes played into the hands of the Russians. They were able to bring the army into battle formation only at 2 a.m. on June 27th. Karl's plans were thwarted; the wasted 3 hours completely deprived his attack of the element of surprise. This is how the Battle of Poltava began for the Swedes, the course of which will be briefly discussed below.

The Swedes left their camp and headed to the battle site. The first obstacle on their way was the Russian redoubts, which were built both horizontally and vertically relative to the position of the Russian army. The assault on the redoubts began in the early morning of June 27, and with it the Battle of Poltava! The first 2 redoubts were taken immediately. In fairness, it should be noted that they were unfinished. The Swedes did not succeed in the rest of the redoubts. The attacks were not successful. This is largely due to the fact that after the loss of the first two redoubts, Russian cavalry under the command of Menshikov advanced to the position. Together with the defenders in the redoubts, they managed to hold back the enemy’s onslaught, preventing him from capturing all the fortifications. Below is a diagram of the Battle of Poltava for a more detailed visual representation of the course of the battle.

Despite the short-term successes of the Russian army, Tsar Peter at 4 o'clock in the morning gives the order for the retreat of all regiments to their main positions. The redoubts fulfilled their mission - they exhausted the Swedes even before the battle began, while the main forces of the Russian army remained fresh. In addition, the Swedes lost about 3,000 people on the approaches to the main battlefield. Such losses are associated with tactical blunders of the generals. Charles 12 and his generals did not expect to storm the redoubts, expecting to pass them through the “dead” zones. In reality, this turned out to be impossible, and the army had to storm the redoubts without any equipment for this.

With great difficulty the Swedes overcame the redoubts. After this, they took a wait-and-see attitude, expecting the imminent arrival of their cavalry. However, General Roos by that time was already surrounded by Russian units and surrendered. Without waiting for cavalry reinforcements, the Swedish infantry lined up and prepared for battle. Forming in a line was Karl's favorite tactic. It was believed that if the Swedes were allowed to build such a battle formation, it would be impossible to defeat them. In reality it turned out differently...

The Swedish offensive began at 9 am. As a result of artillery shelling, as well as volleys of small arms fire, the Swedes suffered huge losses from the first minutes. The offensive formation was completely destroyed. At the same time, the Swedes still failed to create an attack line that would be longer than the Russian line. If the maximum values ​​of the formation of the Swedish army reached 1.5 kilometers, then the Russian detachments stretched up to 2 kilometers. Having a numerical superiority and smaller gaps between units. The advantage of the Russian army was simply enormous. As a result, after the shelling, which created gaps of more than 100 meters among the Swedes, panic and flight began. It happened at 11 o'clock. In 2 hours, Peter's army won a complete victory.

Losses of the parties in the battle

The total losses of the Russian army were 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. The losses of the Swedish army turned out to be simply nightmare:

All generals were killed or captured

• 9,000 people killed
• 3000 people taken prisoner
• 16,000 people were captured 3 days after the battle, when they managed to overtake the main forces of the retreating Swedes near the village of Perevolochny.

Pursuit of the enemy

The course of the Battle of Poltava after the retreat of the Swedes took on the character of persecution. On the evening of June 27, an order was given to pursue and capture the enemy army. The detachments of Baur, Galitsina and Menshikov took part in this. The advancement of the Russian army was not carried out at the fastest pace. The Swedes themselves were to blame for this, who nominated General Meyerfeld with the “authority” to negotiate.

As a result of all these actions, it was possible to reach the Swedes near the village of Perevolochny only after 3 days. Here they surrendered: 16,000 infantry, 3 generals, 51 command officers, 12,575 non-commissioned officers.

The significance of the Battle of Poltava

From school we are told about the great significance of the Battle of Poltava, and also that this is eternal glory for Russian weapons. Undoubtedly, the battle of Poltava gave the advantage in the war to Russia, but is it possible to speak of historical significance as of ingenious and outstanding significance? This is much more difficult... It is no coincidence that we chose the words of the famous historian Klyuchevsky as the epigraph. You can blame him for anything, but he always describes the era of Peter exclusively positively. And as a result, even Klyuchevsky admits that even a brief study of the Battle of Poltava indicates that losing in it would be a shame!

The meaning of the Battle of Poltava

The Russians were confronted by an exhausted, tired and half-starved army. Charles 12 entered Russian territory in the spring of 1708, and the Battle of Poltava took place only on June 27, 1709. For more than a year, the Swedes were in the enemy’s country, without the necessary provisions, uniforms and ammunition. Remember the battle at Lesnaya. It was there that the Swedes lost all this, and Peter himself later said that the causes and course of the Battle of Poltava are important, but the key to this success lies precisely with Lesnaya.

In the Battle of Poltava, the Swedes had only 4 guns! This fact is recognized by all historians. Many even say that these guns never fired a single shot during the battle because there was no gunpowder. As a result, the Swedes were deprived of artillery, while the Russians literally destroyed the enemy with their 111 guns.

The forces were unequal. Despite the seemingly insignificant superiority of the Russian army, the previous two points should be taken into account in the analysis. After all, the battle lasted only 2 hours! Can you imagine that the general battle of the war ended in just 2 hours if the forces of the opponents were equal? Of course not, this is impossible to even imagine. Remember, for example, the Battle of Borodino - the battle lasted for 24 hours, but here it lasted 2 hours...

This allows us to say that the victory in the Battle of Poltava was very significant, but its results should not be greatly extolled. It is imperative to make a reference to the enemy’s condition.

Results of the battle and its consequences

We briefly reviewed the Battle of Poltava. Its results are clear - an unconditional victory for the Russian army. Moreover, the Swedish infantry ceased to exist (of the 30,000 army, 28,000 people were captured or killed), the artillery also disappeared (Charles had 28 guns, 12 initially, 4 reached Poltava, 0 remained after the battle). The victory is unconditional and magnificent, even if you make allowances for the state of the enemy (ultimately this is their problem).

Along with these rosy results, it should be noted that, despite such a glorious victory, the outcome of the war did not come. There are several reasons for this; most historians agree that this is due to Peter’s reaction to the flight of the Swedish army. We said that the Battle of Poltava ended at 11 o’clock in the afternoon, however, the order to pursue came only at night, after celebrating the victory... As a result, the enemy managed to retreat significantly, and Charles 12 himself abandoned his army and went to Turkey to persuade the Sultan to war with Russia.

The results of the Poltava victory are ambiguous. Despite the excellent result, Russia did not receive any dividends from this. The delay in ordering the pursuit led to the possibility of the escape of Charles 12 and to the subsequent 12 years of war.

Hard winter of 1707-1708 The winter of 1708-1709 turned out to be incredibly difficult for the Swedes. in left-bank Ukraine. The Swedish army was dispersed across several small towns (Gadyach, Romny, Priluki, etc.) among the hostile population. The Russian army stood nearby in the northeast, along the line of Suma, Lebedin, Akhtyrka and constantly “bothered” the enemy with its sabotage (sometimes it came to battles involving several regiments). The Swedes had to take almost every city and every fortress in battle. The Swedes stormed the small Veprik fortress for 10 days and lost 3 (according to other sources - 1.5) thousand soldiers. They failed to advance towards Sloboda Ukraine. Contact with Stanislaw Leszczynski and the Swedish troops stationed in Poland was also lost. The Swedish army was melting before our eyes. The winter turned out to be unusually harsh. Both Russians and Swedes suffered from severe frosts.

But at home, as they say, even the walls help. The Swedes, thousands of kilometers away from their homes, lacked everything. This is how a Swedish historian describes the situation in the Swedish camp: “Soldiers died in snowdrifts on the streets of the city. Every morning they collected the corpses of hundreds of soldiers, orderlies, soldiers’ wives and children, and all day long sleighs loaded with numb bodies carried them to some hole or ravine.”

Siege of Poltava by the Swedes. But the stubborn Swedish king did not think about retreat. In the new year he planned an attack on Moscow. And in order to feel more confident in Ukraine and not have a strong enemy garrison in the rear, in April 1709 he besieged the Poltava fortress. The fortress garrison (4 thousand soldiers and 2500 armed residents) led by Colonel A.S. Kelin refused to surrender on honorable terms and withstood twenty enemy attacks. The Russian army, with its sabotage, sought to divert the forces of the besiegers. It was possible to transport reinforcements to the city. Poltava held out for two months.

The Russians are preparing for battle. Already since the winter, Peter had been thinking about the need for a “general battle.” In June, the final decision was made to give battle near Poltava. The Russian army crossed the Vorskla River and began building a fortified camp (“retrashement”) five miles north of the city. On the way of the Swedish army, ten additional redoubts were built, equipped with artillery. The Russians, therefore, chose and prepared the battlefield themselves. Taking into account the experience of the Battle of Lesnaya, they chose a small rugged space surrounded by forest in order to complicate the enemy’s maneuvers. The position of the Russian army was designed for an offensive - there was nowhere to retreat.

Forces of the Russian and Swedish armies. The king tried to act thoroughly and surely. 42 thousand regular and 5 thousand irregular troops were concentrated in the fortified camp. The tsar had a reserve of 40 thousand. The Russian army was well armed and provided with everything necessary. The artillery fleet consisted of 102 guns. The Russian cavalry was commanded by A.D. Menshikov, infantry - B.P. Sheremetev, artillery - Ya.V. Bruce.

The Swedes had about 30 thousand troops near Poltava, of which, as Swedish authors insist, only a little over 19 thousand were Swedes themselves. In the battle they had only 4 cannons (the remaining 35 were left in the baggage train). The army experienced an acute shortage of bullets and gunpowder.

War Council of Charles XII. The king himself had been wounded in the leg the day before in a skirmish with a Cossack patrol. He entrusted command to Field Marshal Renschild. At the military council, it was decided to suddenly attack the Russian redoubts, and then storm the Russian fortified camp on the move.

According to some reports, before the battle, the king addressed his generals with the words: “Tomorrow we will dine in the tents of the Moscow Tsar. There is no need to worry about food - the Moscow convoy has a lot in store for us.” However, one cannot vouch for the accuracy of these words: they are very reminiscent of a literary cliche; similar words, for example, were attributed in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamai” to Mamai on the eve of the invasion of Rus'.

Peter I intended to give battle on June 29, the day of his namesake. By this time, the arrival of irregular Kalmyk cavalry was expected. However, it became known from the “tongues” that Charles XII intended to enter the battle earlier - on June 27.

From a painting by I. Tannauer

Battle for the redoubts.“Out of his usual impatience,” the Swedish king took the initiative to attack, and before dawn on June 27, his troops approached the Russian redoubts, which met them with artillery fire. Menshikov’s cavalry (23 regiment) was also waiting for the Swedes here. Having captured two unfinished redoubts, the Swedes began shouting “Victory!” - so great was their faith in the happiness of their own king.

The battle for the redoubts turned out to be very fierce. It came to hand-to-hand combat, but the king did not intend to bring his main forces into battle here. The Swedish army pushed back the Russian cavalry, “which, although it held on with dignity, was however forced to yield, only at a great loss to the enemy.” But when the Swedes bypassed the untaken redoubts, part of the Swedish troops found themselves cut off from the main forces. Schliepenbach's cavalry and General Ross's infantry were forced to retreat to the Yakovets Forest, where they were again attacked by A.D.'s cavalry. Menshikov, who pursued them all the way to the Swedish camp near Poltava. General Schlippenbach was captured by Menshikov. Then the cavalry of His Serene Highness returned to the left flank of the Russian camp.

Decisive battle. After a short lull, both armies lined up in battle formation for the decisive battle. The king withdrew the bulk of his troops from the fortifications. In the center there was infantry, on the flanks there were dragoon regiments. The rebuilt Swedes went on the attack and were met with powerful artillery and then rifle fire. But the Swedes did not stop and tried to break through the line of Russian soldiers in the center of the position. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Russian cavalry began to encircle the Swedish troops from the flanks. The offensive of the Russian troops began, which the Swedes could no longer stop.

The heroic behavior of Charles XII. Throughout the battle, Charles XII was in the midst of his troops, in the most dangerous places of the battle. He was carried on a stretcher. However, they were defeated by the Russian core. The king mounted a horse and, overcoming terrible pain, continued to encourage his soldiers. Several horses were killed under the king. As always, he demonstrated personal courage and contempt for death. Seeing the beginning of the flight of his troops, Karl shouted in despair: “Swedes! Swedes! But the Swedes fled and did not hear the voice of their king, notes S.M. Soloviev.

Address of Peter I to the troops. Peter I was also at the center of the battle, although the overall leadership of the battle was entrusted to B.P. Sheremetev. Before the start of the decisive battle, the king addressed the troops with a speech. Its content is conveyed differently by sources. According to one version, he uttered only a few words: “To accept death for the Fatherland is very commendable, and the fear of death in battle is a thing worthy of any blasphemy.” There is another version of the king’s speech, which allegedly said that soldiers should follow the example of their monarch, and “after victory, peace will follow after labor.”

Victory at Poltava

However, the most famous is the third version, conveyed by the author of one of the first histories of the Northern War, Feofan Prokopovich. Most likely, Peter I did not pronounce this speech verbatim, but it quite accurately conveys his thoughts, his mood before the battle. Historians even call it “an order before the start of the Battle of Poltava”: “The Russian army knew that the hour had come, which would put the entire Fatherland’s fortune in their hands: either the abyss would be great, or Russia would be born in a better way. And they would not have thought of being armed and positioned themselves for Peter, but for the state entrusted to Peter, for their family, for the All-Russian people... They would have been embarrassed by the glory of the enemy as invincible, which they themselves had already shown to be false more than once. If only they had this before their eyes in this action, that God himself is truly at war with us... And about Peter they would know that his life was not cheap for him, if only Russia and Russian piety, glory and prosperity lived.”

Tsar Peter is on the attack. At the most crucial moment of the battle, when the Swedes tried to break through the front of the Russian troops, the tsar himself led the battalion of the second line of the Novgorod regiment into the attack. A horse was killed under the king. His hat was shot through by an enemy bullet. Later, when compiling the history of the war, Peter rather modestly defined his role in the Battle of Poltava: “For the people and the Fatherland, without sparing his person, he acted as a good leader should.”

Read also other topics Part III ""European Concert": the struggle for political balance" section “West, Russia, East in the battles of the 17th – early 18th centuries”:

• 9. "Swedish flood": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
  • Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
• 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (2 July 1644, 14 June 1645)
  • Marston Moor. Victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
• 11. “Dynastic wars” in Europe: the struggle “for the Spanish inheritance” at the beginning of the 18th century.
  • "Dynastic Wars". The fight for the Spanish inheritance
• 12. European conflicts are becoming global

History of mankind. Russia Khoroshevsky Andrey Yurievich

Battle of Poltava (1709)

Battle of Poltava (1709)

Russian troops under the command of Peter I and A.D. Menshikov defeated the famous Swedish army led by Charles XII. Thus, the Swedes’ plans to capture Moscow were thwarted; the battle became a turning point in the course of the Northern War between Russia and Sweden.

At the beginning of the 17th century, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia, Sweden captured the Russian cities of Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye and Oreshek. So Russia refused to be cut off from the sea coast and stopped foreign trade through the Baltic ports. At the turn of the XVII–XVIII centuries. Peter I decided to “open a window to Europe” and return access to the Baltic Sea to the Russians. In this struggle, he encountered a talented commander, the grandson of Gustavus Adolphus, King Charles XII. In 1700, at the start of the so-called Northern War with Russia, the king was only 18 years old, Peter was 28.

The 140,000-strong Swedish army was considered one of the best in Europe at that time; the Swedish fleet, numbering 42 battleships and 12 frigates, also had great power. In Russia, the first steps to reorganize the army were just being taken. The beginning of the war was unsuccessful for Russia; its troops were defeated near Narva in the fall of 1700.

But the development of the military industry and active efforts to strengthen the army continued. The production of rifles with a bayonet began, and great attention was paid to artillery. Only for 1700–1708. 1006 guns, mortars and howitzers were cast in Russia. From 1703, regular recruitment of peasants and townspeople (mainly artisans) began to take place; the officer corps was formed from nobles who necessarily served as soldiers in the guard. In 1708–1709 All branches of the military received a uniform military uniform.

After the victory at Narva, Charles XII directed the main blow against Poland, which in 1704 became an ally of Russia. Taking advantage of the absence of Sweden's main forces in the Baltic states, Russian regiments under the command of B.P. Sheremetev in 1701–1702. defeated the Swedes at Erestfer and at Gummelsgof. As a result of the siege and assault, the Russians took the Noteburg (Oreshek) fortress. This victory opened the way to capturing the mouth of the Neva. On May 16, 1703, the Peter and Paul Fortress was founded, marking the beginning of St. Petersburg.

In 1704, Russian troops captured Narva and Dorpat (Tartu). Russia regained the coast of the Neva and firmly established itself in the Eastern Baltic.

The theater of military operations was shifting to the south. Charles XII chose a different strategic direction. In Poland, the Swedes managed to take Warsaw and Krakow, and obtained from the Sejm the deprivation of Augustus II of the Polish crown. A supporter of the Swedish king, Stanislav Leszczynski, was placed on the throne. In connection with these events, Peter I convened a military council in Zholkva (Galicia), at which the possibility of a general battle with the Swedes was discussed not in Poland, but on Russian territory. To do this it was necessary to exhaust the enemy forces. Already at the beginning of 1707, the Russian command became aware that the attack of the main enemy forces would be directed through Belarus and Smolensk to Moscow. Charles XII wanted to dismember the Russian state. Its northern territories were to go to Sweden; the king was going to plant his protege in Moscow. He promised Ukraine, Smolensk region and other western territories to Poland.

Peter I considered an untimely general battle as an “extremely dangerous matter” and was ready to give it only after careful preparation. Gaining time, Russian troops launched separate attacks on the enemy, delaying him on the water lines.

Having entered Mogilev on July 8, 1708, Charles XII was awaiting the approach of Leven-Haupt's sixteen-thousand-strong corps, which was traveling from Riga with a large convoy to join the main forces. Without waiting for reinforcements and experiencing an urgent need for food and fodder, the Swedes crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and moved to Smolensk. In a battle near the village of Dobroye, their vanguard numbering over five thousand people was defeated. Charles XII abandoned the campaign through Smolensk and turned to Ukraine, taking advantage of the invitation of Hetman Mazepa.

68-year-old Mazepa was an experienced and deft diplomat and politician. He carried out special assignments under the Polish king, hetmans Doroshenko and Samoilovich, gained confidence in the temporary worker Vasily Golitsyn and in 1687 received the hetman's mace. Peter I, who brutally dealt with Golitsyn’s henchmen, did not touch the Ukrainian hetman. Moreover, Mazepa managed to win over the formidable king. During the Northern War, Peter continued to trust the hetman completely and allowed him to occupy Right Bank Ukraine when the Swedes invaded Poland. Thus, both banks of the Dnieper came under the rule of Mazepa.

Even in the first years of the Northern War, Ivan Stepanovich conducted secret negotiations with Karl, and then with Stanislav Leshchinsky. He promised to provide them with winter quarters, food and a Cossack army of fifty thousand during the Swedish invasion. Most likely, Mazepa wanted to strengthen his own power, unite significant territories under his mace and have a certain independence in governance from the Swedes and Poles. However, the negotiations were conducted extremely carefully: Mazepa was waiting to see which side would have the advantage. But when the Swedish king turned south, he had to openly go over to the side of Russia’s opponents. On October 24, 1708, with a total of five thousand (according to other sources - two thousand) detachment and part of the faithful foreman, Mazepa crossed the Desna and went to join Karl, hoping for the support of the entire Cossacks and motivating his transition by an uprising against Moscow oppression.

When Charles invaded Ukraine in September, the main forces of the Russian army under the command of B.P. Sheremetev also turned south, and Peter I and A.D. Menshikov, having formed a light mobile detachment of twelve thousand, moved towards Levenhaupt’s corps. On September 28, Russian troops forced Levengaupt to take battle in a difficult wooded and swampy area near the village of Lesnoy. The Swedes lost 8,700 people killed, 45 officers and more than 700 soldiers were captured. The entire convoy with a large amount of ammunition and food, 17 guns, 44 banners went to the Russians. Peter I called the victory at Lesnaya “the mother of the Poltava battle.”

Menshikov, who was located near the Ukrainian border, quickly responded to Mazepa’s transition to the enemy’s side. He blocked the crossing of the Desna and issued a manifesto to the Ukrainian people on October 28, in which he branded the hetman as a traitor to his homeland and faith, who wanted to give the Orthodox faith to the Uniates. On November 2, Menshikov entered Baturin and organized a pogrom there, destroying a significant part of the population, and four days later in Glukhov, I. Skoropadsky was elected hetman in the place of the deposed Mazepa. However, even without the repressive measures of the Russian command, the Ukrainian population was in no hurry to go over to the Swedish side.

In the spring, Peter I sent Yakovlev’s detachment to suppress a possible uprising by the Sich. The tsarist troops broke into the Sich and after a short battle forced the Cossacks to capitulate. 300 people surrendered. Yakovlev ordered the noble prisoners to be sent to the tsar, and executed the rest on the spot as traitors. By royal order, the Zaporozhye Sich was destroyed and burned.

The capture of Baturin by the Russians was the second serious blow for the Swedes after Lesnaya. Charles XII hoped to replenish supplies of food, gunpowder, and cannonballs at the hetman’s residence, and to take the artillery located there.

The advance of the Swedish army across Ukraine was not without problems. Romny, Gadyach, Chernukhi, Piryatin, Zenkov and other cities offered stubborn resistance to Karl. The Swedes were also alarmed by numerous small detachments of Cossacks and local residents operating in the rear of the advancing army.

Swedish troops launched an invasion of Slobozhanshchina. And here they were not welcomed with open arms. Kotelva, Krasnokutsk, and Kolomak defended stubbornly. Small Russian detachments and the Cossack regiment of Galagan successfully acted against the Swedes. Swedish troops were forced to retreat to the area between the Vorskla and Psla rivers. At this time, Russian troops and Cossacks carried out a strategic encirclement of the enemy in Left Bank Ukraine. Cossack regiments controlled crossings across the Dnieper. Peter I repeatedly offered Charles XII to make peace, but he declared that he would end the war by entering Moscow.

To improve the supply of his troops, the Swedish monarch decided to occupy Poltava. This would also help him obtain convenient routes for communication with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, and use the crossing of the Dnieper at Perevolochnaya to replenish the army with a detachment of General Krassou and the Polish gentry. Poltava was located on the right, high bank of the Vorskla. Its fortifications, as it seemed to the Swedish generals, could not be a serious obstacle. The army of Charles XII had experience of sieging more powerful fortresses in the Baltic states, Poland, and Saxony.

Given the important strategic position of the city, the Russian command sent six infantry battalions to Poltava under the command of Colonel A.S. Kelin. The Poltava garrison consisted of 4,181 soldiers and officers, 91 gunners and 2,600 armed local residents; there were 28 cannons in the city.

On April 3, 1709, a 1,500-strong Swedish detachment appeared in front of the fortifications and began to storm them. The attack was repulsed. In the following days there were forays from both sides. On April 5, the Swedes lost 427 people killed, the Poltava garrison - 62. The forays of the city’s defenders did not give the Swedes the opportunity to build trenches near the ramparts. In response to the tunnels where mines were laid, Kelin ordered trenches to be dug from the city. Poltava residents were given the opportunity to seize the gunpowder they were putting in. The assaults on April 29 and 30 failed.

On May 14, Menshikov brought his troops to the left bank of the Vorskla opposite the city. At dawn on May 15, about 1,200 soldiers dressed in Swedish uniforms under the command of Alexei Golovin crossed Vorskla. At the fortress itself, they burst into enemy trenches and killed 200 soldiers, then the detachment managed to break into the city.

Charles XII understood that large Russian forces were concentrating near Poltava, but he categorically refused to leave, expecting support from Leshchinsky and Krassou. Capturing Poltava became a matter of prestige for him. On May 23, laying mines under the ramparts, three thousand Swedes rushed to attack. The besieged managed to defuse the mines, and the attack of Charles’s detachment was repulsed.

On the evening of June 1, Poltava was shelled with incendiary bombs. While the fire was being put out in the city, the Swedes burst onto the ramparts, but were again overpowered and driven back.

On June 2, Field Marshal Renschild presented Commandant Kelin with an ultimatum to surrender on honorable terms. Otherwise, he threatened the complete extermination of the garrison and residents of the city. Kelin, without hesitation, rejected the demands, stating that he already had seven such letters.

On June 4, near Poltava, in the village of Krutoy Bereg, Peter I arrived. This was reported to the defenders of the city in a letter enclosed in a discharged cannonball. On June 16, the Russian military council came to the conclusion that the only way to prevent the fall of Poltava was a general battle. Preparations for it included the transfer of the main forces of the Russian army to the right bank of the Vorskla. At the same time, the Cossacks were ordered to occupy all the withdrawal routes of the Swedish troops through Psel and further to Poland.

The Swedish army found itself in a dead end. There was not enough strength for the offensive, but retreat was also associated with great risk. During a reconnaissance on June 17, Charles XII was wounded in the leg, and rumors spread throughout his army that the king was deliberately seeking death. “Northern Alexander the Great” understood that the Russian army was preparing for a general battle and saw the capture of Poltava as the only way to protect itself from the rear. The assaults followed one after another. The city experienced difficult days on June 21 and 22, when the Swedes were especially persistent and lost over two thousand people. During the defense, the defenders of Poltava lost 1,186 soldiers killed, 1,200 people were wounded, while Karl was left without more than six thousand soldiers - i.e., a fifth of the army that came to Ukraine. His hopes of receiving support were not justified: the corps of Lieutenant General Goltz provided the appearance in Ukraine of troops of the Polish gentry and the Swedish corps of Krassow.

On June 19, the main forces of the Russian army crossed Vorskla with three fords (the remaining units crossed on the night of June 20) and settled on a wide open plain near the village of Semenovka. A camp was built here. However, such terrain was convenient for linear formation and would give great advantages to the strong Swedish cavalry. On June 25, after inspecting the camp, Peter ordered the army to be transferred closer to Poltava and stationed near the village of Yakovtsy. Hollows, ravines and small forests excluded the possibility of wide cavalry maneuver. Here infantry was needed, which constituted the main strength of the Russian army.

In one night, a camp was built, protected on one side by the steep bank of the Vorskla, on the other by the Yakovets forest, and on the third by a small ravine. The fortifications consisted of earthen ramparts and redans in the form of a protruding corner. There were significant gaps between the ramparts and redans so that the army could not only defend itself, but also quickly go on the offensive. In front of the camp stretched a small flat field, about one and a half kilometers wide and up to three kilometers long. From the east it adjoined the Yakovetsky forest, from the west - to the Malobudyshchansky forest. The only possible path of advance of the Swedish army lay from Poltava. On this part of the field, by order of Peter I, a forward position was created: six transverse (relative to the direction of the Swedish offensive) and four longitudinal redoubts were built. (By the way, similar fortifications did not appear on the battlefields of Europe any time soon.) Rifle and artillery fire from the redoubts was supposed to dismember the linear order of enemy regiments.

The Russian command took into account that Charles XII usually sought to strike the first blow with maximum forces. Infantry and artillery, concentrated in redoubts, repelled the first onslaught and forced the Swedes to split up their forces.

On June 26, all Russian regiments occupied the positions provided for in the battle plan. The infantry of the Belgorod regiment with artillery were stationed in the redoubts. Behind the redoubts the cavalry was located under the command of Menshikov and Bour, consisting of 17 dragoon regiments.

Poltava victory. Hood. A. Kotzebue

On the night of June 26-27, a non-commissioned officer of the Semenovsky regiment ran over from the Russian camp to the Swedes, who reported on the Russian preparations for battle and the location of the troops. He apparently also said that the Swedes could be successful in attacking Apraksin’s regiment, which consisted of recruits dressed in gray uniforms. Peter, having learned about the defector, ordered changes in the disposition of the regiments, and Apraksin’s soldiers exchanged uniforms with the proven Novgorod infantry regiment. The main forces of the Cossack cavalry concentrated near the village of Zhuki in order to close the direct path for the enemy’s retreat. On the eve of the battle, Peter I toured the troops and delivered short patriotic addresses, in which he called on them to fight not for Peter, but “for Russia and Russian piety.” Charles XII was also carried on a stretcher in front of the Swedish regiments, who promised that tomorrow his soldiers would dine in the Russian convoy.

The number of Russian troops near Poltava was 42 thousand, Swedish - about 30 thousand. Charles left part of his forces to guard the trenches and the siege camp under the city, the convoy and the road along the Vorskla to the Dnieper.

On June 27, before dawn, Swedish infantry and cavalry moved towards the location of the Russian troops. Menshikov led the cavalry to the forward redoubts and started a counter battle.

Unexpectedly, the Swedish command encountered a Russian advanced position at the redoubts. The artillery opened fire at maximum range, which already deprived the enemy of an important advantage - the surprise of the attack. The Swedes initially managed to somewhat push back the Russian cavalry and occupy the two nearest unfinished redoubts. However, they were unable to cross the transverse redoubts. The crossfire of Russian infantry and artillery from the redoubts and cavalry attacks repelled the enemy onslaught. The Russian cavalry pressed the Swedish cavalry towards the Yakovets forest.

Having received a report that part of the troops of Schlippenbach and Ross, who were leaving for the Yakovetsky Forest, had been cut off, Peter sent Menshikov five infantry battalions and five dragoon regiments. At the same time, the Russian cavalry, led by Bour, was ordered to withdraw from the redoubts. Bour's withdrawal was perceived by the Swedes as forced. Carried away by the pursuit, the Swedish cavalry and infantry found themselves in a clearing a hundred paces from the Russian camp. The Russian artillery, commanded by J. Bruce, opened fire. Hit by buckshot and cannonballs, the enemy rushed to the left, to the edge of the Malobudyshchansky forest. The generals and officers of Charles XII began to put the thinned regiments in order. Only now has it become known about the absence of the columns of Ross and Schlippenbach, which made up a fourth of the Swedish army. They were completely defeated by the Russians at the Yakovets forest. The first stage of the battle ended at six o'clock in the morning. Three hours of inactivity ensued for the Swedish troops. The respite meant that the Swedes lost the initiative.

After some time, Russian intelligence reported that the Swedes were forming a battle formation near the Malobudyshchansky forest. Now the main role was to be played by the Russian infantry. Peter I ordered the withdrawal of the regiments. Six infantry regiments remained in the camp so that the Swedes would not see the numerical superiority of the Russians and retreat without a fight. Russian regiments lined up in front of the camp. The infantry lined up in two lines: in front were the first battalions of each regiment, followed by the second. This ensured mutual support, the necessary depth of battle formation, as well as a certain independence of the regiments’ actions. There were 10 thousand people in the first line. The artillery was dispersed along the entire infantry front. On the left flank there were six selected dragoon regiments under the command of Menshikov, on the right - eleven led by Bour. Three infantry battalions were sent to communicate with the Poltava garrison, and six dragoon regiments were sent to the village of Zhuki to help the Cossacks pursue the enemy.

Sheremetev was appointed commander of all troops, Peter himself took over leadership of the center division. Before the start of the battle, the king addressed the soldiers with the famous call: “Warriors! The hour has come that will decide the fate of the fatherland. So, you should not think that you are fighting for Peter, but for the state entrusted to Peter, for your family, for your fatherland ... "

The battle formation of the Swedish troops corresponded in form to the formation of the Russian regiments. But the infantry was placed in one line in order to stretch the front and hide the heavy losses suffered in the first stage of the battle. The second line contained only three infantry battalions. The cavalry was placed in two lines and evenly distributed on the flanks, four guns were placed along the front. In this order of battle, the Swedes began to approach the Russians.

When approaching a rifle shot, both sides fired a strong volley from all types of weapons. Russian artillery fire disrupted the enemy ranks, and then came the moment of brutal hand-to-hand combat. Two Swedish battalions, closing the front, rushed at the first battalion of the Novgorod regiment, which stood out with its homespuns. To their surprise, the “recruits” were not at a loss. But with a bayonet attack, the Swedes still managed to crush and push back the first battalion. Peter himself led the second battalion into the attack. The Novgorodians rushed in with fixed bayonets and restored the line. The powerful figure of Peter attracted enemy shooters: one bullet pierced his hat, the second - his saddle.

Excellent Russian artillery played a huge role. The second stage of the battle lasted from 9 to 11 o'clock. In the first half hour, cannon and rifle fire caused enormous damage to the Swedes. Charles's elite regiments lost more than half of their strength and almost all their officers. During the battle, a cannonball hit the royal stretcher, and a rumor spread among the soldiers that Charles had died. Field Marshal Renschild intensified the panic by shouting: “Your Majesty, our infantry is dead!”

The Swedish onslaught weakened. Having attacked the enemy’s right flank, Menshikov pushed back the enemy cavalry, exposed the infantry and put it in danger of destruction. The Swedes' right flank wavered and began to retreat. Menshikov's local success soon grew into a Russian offensive along the entire front. The Swedes fled. The remnants of the once invincible army poured through the Malobudyshchansky forest. Subsequently, they encountered the Skoropadsky Cossacks and turned towards Kobelyaki to reach the Dnieper at Perevolochnaya.

In the battle of Poltava, Charles XII lost 9324 soldiers; 2874 soldiers and officers led by Renschild surrendered. The Russian army had 1345 killed and 3290 wounded. On June 28, the ceremonial entry of the winners into Poltava took place. Ten dragoon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments under the overall command of Menshikov pursued the Swedish army. The Cossacks of Colonel Paliya took part in the pursuit of the enemy. The pursuit continued to the Dnieper. At Perevolochnaya, the Swedes did not find means of crossing - they were destroyed in advance by Yakovlev’s detachment. Only Karl with a guard detachment of a thousand people and Mazepa with several hundred Cossacks managed to cross the Dnieper. Menshikov’s detachment that arrived in time was inferior in number to the Swedish army left in Perevolochnaya. Menshikov ordered the dragoons to dismount and join the infantry, and the horse handlers positioned the horses so that the enemy would mistake them for combat cavalry. A demonstrative offensive was launched from several sides. Seeing no other way out, 11 infantry and 11 dragoon regiments (16,264 people) under the command of Levengaupt capitulated on June 30. 174 banners, 28 guns, many small arms, a convoy, and the treasury of the Swedes fell into the hands of the Russians.

The Battle of Poltava became a turning point in the Northern War and, in the words of Peter I, “laid the foundation stone of St. Petersburg,” that is, the foundation of the powerful Russian Empire.