German submarines of the Second World War. German submarines of World War II: the “wolf packs” of the Wehrmacht

German submarines of the XXI series, without exaggeration, are the best ships of this class in the world of that era.

German submarines of the XXI series, without exaggeration, are the best ships of this class in the world of that era. They became role models in all leading naval powers. What was revolutionary about them? The creation of the XXI series submarines began in 1943. Then the “wolf pack” tactics, based on group night attacks by submarines operating from the surface, ceased to bring results. Boats pursuing convoys on the surface were detected by radar and subjected to preemptive counterattacks. Submarines forced to operate from the surface, since underwater they were inferior to convoys in speed and had a limited supply of energy resources, were doomed to lose.

Structure of the XXI series submarine:
a - longitudinal section; b - location of propulsion motors; c - deck plan.

1 - vertical steering wheel; 2 - fairing of the hydroacoustic station (HAS) “Sp-Anlage”; 3 - life raft containers; 4 - creeping electric motor; 5 - a device for operating a diesel engine under water (“snorkel”); 6 - diesel; 7 - living quarters; 8 - air supply shaft for diesel engines; 9 - fenders of the first shots; 10 - 20 mm artillery mount; 11 - gas exhaust shaft; 12 - retractable radio antenna mast; 13 - radar antenna; 14.15 - commander and navigation periscopes; 16 - sonar fairing “S-Basis”; 17 - torpedo loading hatch; 18 - spare torpedo; 19 - torpedo tube; 20 - sonar fairing “GHG-Anlage”; 21 - battery pits; 22 - propeller shaft gearbox; 23 - propulsion motor; 24 - hydroacoustics cabin; 25 - radio room; 26 - central post; 27 - stabilizer; 28 - aft horizontal rudders

The solution to the problem lay in radically improving the quality of the submarine, and specifically the quality of the submarine. And this could only be achieved by creating a powerful power plant and large-capacity energy sources that do not require atmospheric air. However, work on new gas turbine engines proceeded slowly, and then a compromise decision was made - to create a diesel-electric submarine, but focusing all efforts primarily on achieving the best performance of the elements of underwater navigation.
A feature of the new boat was the use of powerful electric motors (5 times more than the previous large submarines of the IX series, which had the same displacement) and batteries with a tripled number of cell groups. It was assumed that the combination of these proven solutions and perfect hydrodynamics would provide the submarine with the necessary underwater qualities.

The submarine was initially equipped with an improved device for operating a diesel engine under water, the snorkel. This allowed the boat, while under the periscope and sharply reducing its radar signature, to charge the battery while making transitions under diesel engines. The approach of the anti-submarine ships conducting the search was detected by the submarine using the signal receiver antenna of operating radar stations installed on the snorkel. The combination of these two devices on one retractable mast made it possible to promptly warn submariners about the appearance of the enemy and evade them by diving to depth.
The total mass of the battery installation was 225 tons, and its share in the displacement reached 14%. In addition, the capacity of cells previously created for Series IX submarines was increased through the use of thinner plates by 24% in a two-hour discharge mode or by 18% in a twenty-hour discharge. However, at the same time, the service life of the batteries was halved - from 2-2.5 to 1-1.5 years, which approximately corresponded to the average “life expectancy” of submarines participating in combat operations. In this regard, the XXI series boats were considered by the designers as wartime ships, as a kind of “expendable weapon” with a relatively short life cycle, the same as a tank or an airplane. They did not have the excess resources typical of peacetime ships that have been in service for 25-30 years.
Placing such a powerful battery became possible only thanks to the original shape of the durable case with cross sections in the form of a “figure of eight”. On boats of the XXI series, the battery pits occupied about a third of the length of the durable hull and were located in two tiers - in the lower segment of the “eight” and above it, with a central passage between the batteries.
The durable hull of the XXI series submarine was divided into 7 compartments. But, unlike the previous boats of the VII and IX series, it refused to highlight shelter compartments with spherical bulkheads of increased strength, which, as a rule, were the end compartments and the central post compartment. War experience has shown that in combat conditions the concept of rescuing submariners from shelter compartments is practically impossible to implement, especially for boats in the ocean zone. The abandonment of shelter compartments made it possible to avoid the technological and layout costs associated with spherical bulkheads.
The contours of the stern end adopted to achieve high speed qualities did not allow the placement of feed devices. But this did not in any way affect the methods of using the new submarines. It was assumed that, having discovered the convoy, it should take a position in front of it, and then, approaching underwater at the maximum possible speed, break through the guards and take a place under the ships inside the order (the relative position of the ships during the sea crossing and during the battle). Then, moving along with the convoy ships at a depth of 30-45m and hiding behind them from anti-submarine ships, the boat, without surfacing, carried out attacks with homing torpedoes. Having fired the ammunition, she went to greater depths and, with low noise, evaded the stern of the convoy.
Artillery weapons were intended only for air defense. Two twin 20-mm artillery mounts were located in turrets, organically integrated into the contours of the wheelhouse fence. Unlike previous ships, the XXI series submarines were for the first time equipped with a fast loading device, which made it possible to reload all torpedo tubes in 4-5 minutes. Thus, it became technically possible to fire with a full load of ammunition (4 salvos) in less than half an hour. This became especially valuable when attacking convoys that required a large expenditure of ammunition. The depth of torpedo firing was increased to 30-45 m, which was dictated by the requirements for ensuring safety from ramming attacks and collisions when the boat is in the center of the order, and also corresponded to the optimal operating conditions for surveillance and target designation equipment when performing periscope-less attacks.

The basis of the hydroacoustic armament was a noise direction-finding station, the antenna of which consisted of 144 hydrophones and was located under a drop-shaped fairing in the keel of the bow, and a sonar station with an antenna installed in the bow of the wheelhouse enclosure (view sector up to 100° on each side). Primary detection of targets at distances of up to 10 miles was carried out at a noise direction-finding station, and accurate target designation for firing torpedo weapons was provided by sonar. This allowed the XXI series boats, unlike their predecessors, to carry out attacks from underwater based on hydroacoustic data, without surfacing under the periscope for visual contact.
To detect the most dangerous opponents - anti-submarine aircraft - the boat was armed with a radar station, which was used only on the surface. Subsequently, on the boats scheduled for delivery to the fleet in the summer of 1945, it was planned to install a new radar with an antenna on a retractable mast, raised in a periscope position.
Much attention was paid to hydrodynamic properties. The shape of the hull ensured low resistance underwater, but at the same time made it possible to maintain good surface seaworthiness. The protruding parts were kept to a minimum and given a streamlined shape. As a result, compared to the previous large submarines of the IXD/42 series, the Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the hydrodynamic qualities of the ship, for submerged boats of the XXI series increased by more than 3 times (156 versus 49).

The increase in underwater speed required an increase in the stability of the submarine in the vertical plane. For this purpose, horizontal stabilizers were introduced into the stern tail. The applied stern empennage scheme turned out to be very successful. In the post-war period, it became widespread and was used on a number of diesel and then first-generation nuclear submarines.
Hydrodynamic perfection had a beneficial effect on the ship's underwater noise. As shown by post-war tests conducted by the US Navy, the noise of the XXI series boats when moving under the main electric motors at a speed of 15 knots was equivalent to the noise of American submarines traveling at a speed of 8 knots. When moving at a speed of 5.5 knots under the electric creeping motors, the noise of the German submarine was comparable to the noise of American boats at the slowest speed (about 2 knots). In low-noise mode, the XXI series boats were several times superior in the range of mutual hydroacoustic detection to the destroyers guarding the convoys.
Special measures were envisaged to significantly improve the habitability of new submarines. Realizing that during long-term cruising, the combat effectiveness of a submarine largely depends on the physical condition and well-being of the crew, the designers used such new items as air conditioning and a water desalination plant. The system of “warm” beds was eliminated, and each submariner received his own individual sleeping place. Favorable conditions were created for the crew's service and rest.
Traditionally, German designers paid great attention to ergonomic factors - the convenience of the crew, the most effective combat use of technical equipment. The degree of thoughtfulness of these “details” characterizes this example. The flywheels on the valves of ship systems, depending on the purpose, had their own shape, different from others (for example, the flywheels of the valves on the lines going overboard had handles with a ball fitting). Such a seemingly trifle allowed submariners in an emergency situation, even in complete darkness, to act unerringly, by touch controlling the valves and shutting off or activating the necessary systems.
Before the end of World War II, German industry in 1944-1945. transferred 121 submarines of the XXI series to the fleet. However, only one of them, on April 30, 1945, went out on its first combat campaign. This is explained by the fact that after the submarine left the factory, 3 months of testing were envisaged, and then another 6-month course of combat training. Even the agony of the last months of the war could not break this rule.

This text should perhaps begin with a short introduction. Well, for starters, I didn't intend to write it.

However, my article about the Anglo-German war at sea in 1939-1945 gave rise to a completely unexpected discussion. There is one phrase in it - about the Soviet submarine fleet, in which large amounts of money were apparently invested before the war, and “... whose contribution to the victory turned out to be insignificant...”.

The emotional discussion that this phrase generated is beside the point.

I received several e-mails accusing me of “...ignorance of the subject...”, of “... Russophobia...”, of “... keeping silent about the successes of Russian weapons...”, and of “. .. waging an information war against Russia...".

Long story short - I ended up becoming interested in the subject and did some digging. The results amazed me - everything was much worse than what I had imagined.

The text offered to readers cannot be called an analysis - it is too short and shallow - but as a kind of reference it may be useful.

Here are the submarine forces with which the great powers entered the war:

1. England - 58 submarines.
2. Germany - 57 submarines.
3. USA - 21 submarines (operational, Pacific Fleet).
4. Italy - 68 submarines (calculated from the flotillas stationed in Taranto, La Spezia, Tripoli, etc.).
5. Japan - 63 submarines.
6. USSR - 267 submarines.

Statistics are a rather insidious thing.

Firstly, the number of combat units indicated is to a certain extent arbitrary. It includes both combat boats and training boats, obsolete ones, those being repaired, and so on. The only criterion for including a boat on the list is that it exists.

Secondly, the very concept of a submarine is not defined. For example, a German submarine with a displacement of 250 tons, intended for operations in coastal areas, and a Japanese ocean-going submarine with a displacement of 5,000 tons are still not the same thing.

Thirdly, a warship is not assessed by displacement, but by a combination of many parameters - for example, speed, armament, autonomy, and so on. In the case of a submarine, these parameters include diving speed, diving depth, underwater speed, time during which the boat can remain under water - and other things that would take a long time to list. They include, for example, such an important indicator as crew training.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the table above.

For example, it is obvious that the great naval powers - England and the USA - were not particularly actively preparing for submarine warfare. And they had few boats, and even this number was “spread out” across the oceans. American Pacific Fleet - two dozen submarines. The English fleet - with possible military operations on three oceans - the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian - is only fifty.

It is also clear that Germany was not ready for a naval war - in total there were 57 submarines in service by September 1939.

Here is a table of German submarines - by type (data taken from the book “War At Sea”, by S Roskill, vol.1, page 527):

1. “IA” - ocean, 850 tons - 2 units.
2. “IIA” – coastal, 250 tons - 6 units.
3. “IIB” - coastal, 250 tons - 20 units.
4. “IIC” - coastal, 250 tons - 9 units.
5. “IID” - coastal, 250 tons - 15 units.
6. “VII” - ocean, 750 tons - 5 units.

Thus, at the very beginning of hostilities, Germany had no more than 8-9 submarines for operations in the Atlantic.

It also follows from the table that the absolute champion in the number of submarines in the pre-war period was the Soviet Union.

Now let's look at the number of submarines that took part in hostilities by country:

1. England - 209 submarines.
2. Germany - 965 submarines.
3. USA - 182 submarines.
4. Italy - 106 submarines
5. Japan - 160 submarines.
6. CCCP - 170 submarines.

It can be seen that almost all countries during the war came to the conclusion that submarines are a very important type of weapon, began to sharply increase their submarine forces, and used them very widely in military operations.

The only exception is the Soviet Union. In the USSR, no new boats were built during the war - there was no time for that, and no more than 60% of those built were put into use - but this can be explained by many very good reasons. For example, the fact that the Pacific Fleet practically did not participate in the war - unlike the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern.

The absolute champion in building up the forces of the submarine fleet and in its combat use is Germany. This is especially obvious if you look at the roster of the German submarine fleet: by the end of the war - 1155 units. The large difference between the number of submarines built and the number of those that participated in hostilities is explained by the fact that in the second half of 1944 and 1945 it was increasingly difficult to bring a boat to a combat-ready state - boat bases were mercilessly bombed, shipyards were the priority target of air raids, training flotillas in the Baltic Sea did not have time to train crews, and so on.

The contribution of the German submarine fleet to the war effort was enormous. The figures for the casualties they inflicted on the enemy and the casualties they suffered vary. According to German sources, during the war, Doenitz's submarines sank 2,882 enemy merchant ships, with a total tonnage of 14.4 million tons, plus 175 warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers. 779 boats were lost.

The Soviet reference book gives a different figure - 644 German submarines sunk, 2840 merchant ships sunk by them.

The British (“Total War”, by Peter Calviocoressi and Guy Wint) indicate the following figures: 1162 German submarines built, and 941 sunk or surrendered.

I did not find an explanation for the difference in the statistics provided. The authoritative work of Captain Roskill, “War At Sea”, unfortunately, does not provide summary tables. Perhaps the matter is in different ways of recording sunken and captured boats - for example, in what column was a damaged boat, grounded and abandoned by the crew, taken into account?

In any case, it can be argued that German submariners not only inflicted huge losses on the British and American merchant fleets, but also had a profound strategic impact on the entire course of the war.

Hundreds of escort ships and literally thousands of aircraft were sent to fight them - and even this would not have been enough if not for the successes of the American shipbuilding industry, which made it possible to more than compensate for all the tonnage sunk by the Germans.

How did things go for other participants in the war?

The Italian submarine fleet performed very poorly, completely disproportionate to its nominally high numbers. The Italian boats were poorly built, poorly equipped, and poorly managed. They accounted for 138 sunk targets, while 84 boats were lost.

According to the Italians themselves, their boats sank 132 enemy merchant ships, with a total displacement of 665,000 tons, and 18 warships, for a total of 29,000 tons. Which gives an average of 5,000 tons per transport (corresponding to the average English transport ship of the period), and 1,200 tons on average per warship - equivalent to a destroyer, or English escort sloop.

The most important thing is that they did not have any serious impact on the course of hostilities. The Atlantic campaign was a complete failure. If we talk about the submarine fleet, the greatest contribution to the Italian war effort was made by Italian saboteurs who successfully attacked British battleships in the Alexandria roadstead.

The British sank 493 merchant ships with a total displacement of 1.5 million tons, 134 warships, plus 34 enemy submarines - while losing 73 boats.

Their successes could have been greater, but they did not have many goals. Their main contribution to the victory was the interception of Italian merchant ships going to North Africa, and German coastal ships in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway.

The actions of American and Japanese submarines deserve a separate discussion.

The Japanese submarine fleet looked very impressive in its pre-war phase of development. The submarines that were part of it ranged from tiny dwarf boats designed for sabotage operations to huge submarine cruisers.

During World War II, 56 submarines larger than 3,000 tons of displacement were put into service - and 52 of them were Japanese.

The Japanese fleet had 41 submarines capable of carrying seaplanes (up to 3 at once) - something no other boat in any other fleet in the world could do. Neither in German, nor in English, nor in American.

Japanese submarines had no equal in underwater speed. Their small boats could make up to 18 knots under water, and their experimental medium-sized boats showed even 19, which exceeded the remarkable results of the German XXI series boats, and was almost three times faster than the speed of the standard German “workhorse” - the VII series boats .

Japanese torpedo weapons were the best in the world, surpassing the American ones three times in range, twice as much in the destructive power of the warhead, and, until the second half of 1943, had a huge advantage in reliability.

And yet, they did very little. In total, Japanese submarines sank 184 ships, with a total displacement of 907,000 tons.

It was a matter of military doctrine - according to the concept of the Japanese fleet, the boats were intended to hunt warships, not merchant ships. And since military ships sailed three times faster than “merchants”, and, as a rule, had strong anti-submarine protection, the successes were modest. Japanese submariners sank two American aircraft carriers and a cruiser, damaged two battleships - and had virtually no effect on the overall course of military operations.

Starting from a certain time, they were even used as supply ships for besieged island garrisons.

It is interesting that the Americans started the war with exactly the same military doctrine - the boat was supposed to track down warships, not “traders”. Moreover, American torpedoes, in theory the most technologically advanced (they were supposed to explode under the ship under the influence of its magnetic field, breaking the enemy ship in half) turned out to be terribly unreliable.

The defect was corrected only in the second half of 1943. By this time, pragmatic American naval commanders switched their submarines to attacks on the Japanese merchant fleet, and then added another improvement to this - now Japanese tankers became a priority target.

The effect was devastating.

Of the 10 million tons of displacement total lost by the Japanese military and merchant fleet, 54% was attributed to the submariners.

The American fleet lost 39 submarines during the war.

According to the Russian reference book, American submarines sank 180 targets.

If American reports are correct, then 5,400,000 tons divided by 180 "targets" hit gives an incongruously high figure for each ship sunk - an average of 30,000 tons. An English merchant ship from the Second World War had a displacement of about 5-6 thousand tons, only later the American Liberty transports became twice as large.

It is possible that the directory only took into account military vessels, because it does not provide the total tonnage of targets sunk by the Americans.

According to the Americans, about 1,300 Japanese merchant ships were sunk by their boats during the war - from large tankers, and almost to sampans. This gives an estimated 3,000 tons for each Maru sunk, which is roughly what is expected.

An online reference taken from the usually reliable site: http://www.2worldwar2.com/ also gives a figure of 1,300 Japanese merchant ships sunk by submarines, but estimates the losses of American boats higher: 52 boats lost, out of a total of 288 units ( including training and those who did not participate in hostilities).

It is possible that boats lost as a result of accidents are taken into account - I don’t know. The standard American submarine during the Pacific War was the Gato class, 2,400 tons, equipped with superior optics, superior acoustics, and even radar.

American submarines made a huge contribution to the victory. Analysis of their actions after the war revealed them as the most important factor that strangled the military and civilian industries of Japan.

The actions of Soviet submarines must be considered separately, because the conditions of their use were unique.

The Soviet pre-war submarine fleet was not just the largest in the world. In terms of the number of submarines - 267 units - it was two and a half times larger than the British and German fleets combined. Here it is necessary to make a reservation - British and German submarines were counted for September 1939, and Soviet ones - for June 1941. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strategic plan for the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet - if we take the priorities of its development - was better than the German one. The forecast for the start of hostilities was much more realistic than that determined by the German “Plan Z” - 1944-1946.

The Soviet plan was made on the assumption that the war could start simply today, or tomorrow. Accordingly, funds were not invested in battleships that required long construction. Preference was given to small military vessels - in the pre-war period only 4 cruisers were built, but more than 200 submarines.

The geographical conditions for the deployment of the Soviet fleet were very specific - it was, of necessity, divided into 4 parts - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific - which, in general, could not help each other. Some ships, apparently, managed to pass from the Pacific Ocean to Murmansk, small ships like small submarines could be transported disassembled by rail - but in general, the interaction of the fleets was very difficult.

Here we come across the first problem - the summary table indicates the total number of Soviet submarines, but does not say how many of them operated in the Baltic - or in the Black Sea, for example.

The Pacific Fleet did not participate in the war until August 1945.

The Black Sea Fleet joined the war almost immediately. In general, he had no enemy at sea - except perhaps the Romanian fleet. Accordingly, there is no information about successes - due to the absence of the enemy. There is also no information about losses - at least detailed ones.

According to A.B. Shirokorad, the following episode took place: on June 26, 1941, the leaders “Moscow” and “Kharkov” were sent to raid Constanta. While retreating, the leaders came under attack from their own submarine, Shch-206. She was sent on patrol but was not warned about the raid. As a result, the leader "Moscow" was sunk, and the submarine was sunk by its escorts - in particular, the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".

This version is disputed, and it is argued that both ships - the leader and the submarine - were lost at a Romanian minefield. There is no exact information.

But here’s what is absolutely indisputable: in the period April-May 1944, German and Romanian troops were evacuated from Crimea by sea to Romania. During April and twenty days of May, the enemy conducted 251 convoys - many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine protection.

In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 combat campaigns damaged one (!) transport. According to commanders' reports, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this.

The result is astounding inefficiency.

There is no summary information on the Black Sea Fleet - the number of boats, the number of combat exits, the number of targets hit, their type and tonnage. At least I didn't find them anywhere.
The war in the Baltic can be reduced to three phases: the defeat in 1941, the blockade of the fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt in 1942, 1943, 1944 - and the counter-offensive in 1945.
According to information found on forums, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in 1941 conducted 58 trips to German sea communications in the Baltic.

Results:
1. One German submarine, U-144, was sunk. Confirmed by the German reference book.
2. Two transports were sunk (5769 GRT).
3. Presumably, the Swedish mobilized patrol boat HJVB-285 (56 GRT) was also sunk by a torpedo from the S-6 submarine on 08/22/1941.

This last point is even difficult to comment on - the Swedes were neutral, the boat was - most likely - a bot armed with a machine gun, and was hardly worth the torpedo that was fired at it. In the process of achieving these successes, 27 submarines were lost. And according to other sources - even 36.

Information for 1942 is vague. It is stated that 24 targets were hit.
Summary information - the number of boats involved, the number of combat exits, the type and tonnage of targets hit - is not available.

Regarding the period from the end of 1942 to July 1944 (the time of Finland’s exit from the war), there is complete consensus: not a single combat entry of submarines into enemy communications. The reason is very valid - the Gulf of Finland was blocked not only by minefields, but also by an anti-submarine network barrier.

As a result, throughout this period the Baltic was a quiet German lake - Doenitz's training flotillas trained there, Swedish ships with important military cargo for Germany - ball bearings, iron ore, etc. - sailed without interference - German troops were transferred - from the Baltics to Finland and back, and so on Further.

But even at the end of the war, when the nets were removed and Soviet submarines went to the Baltic to intercept German ships, the picture looks rather strange. During the mass evacuation from the Courland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area, in the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-capacity ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine protection in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 military campaigns sank only one transport, a mother ship and a floating battery .

It was at this time that high-profile victories happened - the sinking of the Gustlov, for example - but nevertheless, the German fleet managed to evacuate about 2 and a half million people by sea, the largest rescue operation in history - and it was neither disrupted nor even slowed down by the actions of the Soviets submarines

There is no summary information about the activities of the Baltic Submarine Fleet. Again - they may exist, but I haven't found them.

The situation is the same with statistics on the actions of the Northern Fleet. The summary data is nowhere to be found, or at least not in public circulation.

There is something on the forums. An example is given below:

“...On August 4, 1941, the British submarine Tygris and then Trident arrived in Polyarnoye. At the beginning of November they were replaced by two other submarines, Seawolf and Silaien. In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, this is not important, the main thing is that during the same period, 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets...”

The biggest mystery comes from the information from the pivot table:
http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.

According to it, 170 Soviet submarines took part in the hostilities. Of these, 81 were killed. 126 targets were hit.

What is their total tonnage? Where were they sunk? How many of them are warships and how many are merchant ships?

The table simply does not provide any answers on this matter.

If the Gustlov was a large ship, and is named in the reports, why are other ships not named? Or at least not listed? In the end, both a tugboat and a four-oared boat can be counted as hit.

The idea of ​​falsification simply suggests itself.

The table, by the way, contains another falsification, this time completely obvious.

The victories of the submarines of all the fleets listed in it - English, German, Soviet, Italian, Japanese - contain the sum of the enemy ships they sunk - commercial and military.

The only exception is the Americans. For some reason, they only counted the warships they sunk, thereby artificially reducing their indicators - from 1480 to 180.

And this small modification of the rules is not even specified. You can find it only by doing a detailed check of all the data given in the table.

The final result of the check is that all data is more or less reliable. Except Russian and American. The American ones are worsened by 7-something times through obvious manipulation, and the Russian ones are hidden in a thick “fog” - by using numbers without explanation, detail and confirmation.

In general, from the above material it is obvious that the results of the actions of Soviet submarines during the war were negligible, the losses were great, and the achievements did not correspond at all to the enormous level of expenditure that was invested in the creation of the Soviet submarine fleet in the pre-war period.

The reasons for this are clear in general terms. In a purely technical sense, the boats lacked the means to detect the enemy - their commanders could only rely on not very reliable radio communications and their own periscopes. This was generally a common problem, not just for Soviet submariners.

In the first period of the war, German captains created an improvised mast for themselves - the boat, in the surface position, extended the periscope up to the limit, and a watchman with binoculars climbed onto it, like a pole at a fair. This exotic method helped them little, so they relied more on a tip - either from colleagues in the “wolf pack”, or from reconnaissance aircraft, or from the coastal headquarters, which had data from radio intelligence and decoding services. Radio direction finders and acoustic stations were in wide use.

What exactly the Soviet submariners had in this sense is unknown, but if we use the analogy with tanks - where orders in 1941 were transmitted by flags - then we can guess that the situation with communications and electronics in the submarine fleet at that time was not the best.

The same factor reduced the possibility of interaction with aviation, and probably with headquarters on land too.

An important factor was the level of crew training. For example, German submariners - after crew members graduated from the relevant technical schools - sent boats to training flotillas in the Baltic, where for 5 months they practiced tactical techniques, conducted firing exercises, and so on.

Particular attention was paid to the training of commanders.

Herbert Werner, for example, a German submariner whose memoirs provide a lot of useful information, became a captain only after several campaigns, having managed to be both a junior officer and a first mate, and receive a couple of orders in this capacity.

The Soviet fleet was deployed so quickly that there was simply nowhere to find qualified captains, and they were appointed from people who had experience sailing in the merchant fleet. In addition, the guiding idea at that time was: “... if he doesn’t know the matter, it doesn’t matter. He will learn in battle...”

When handling such a complex weapon as a submarine, this is not the best approach.

In conclusion, a few words about learning from mistakes made.

A summary table comparing the actions of boats from different countries is taken from the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie “Commanders of Soviet Submarines 1941-1945.”

It was published in 800 copies - clearly only for official use, and clearly only for commanders of a sufficiently high level - because its circulation was too small to be used as a teaching aid for trainee officers at naval academies.

It would seem that in such an audience you can call a spade a spade?

However, the table of indicators is compiled very slyly.

Let's take, say, such an indicator (by the way, chosen by the authors of the book) as the ratio of the number of sunk targets to the number of lost submarines.

The German fleet in this sense is estimated in round numbers as follows - 4 targets for 1 boat. If we convert this factor into another - say, tonnage sunk per boat lost - we get approximately 20,000 tons (14 million tons of tonnage divided by 700 boats lost). Since the average oceangoing English merchant ship of that time had a displacement of 5,000 tons, everything fits.

With the Germans - yes, it agrees.

But with the Russians - no, it doesn’t fit. Because the coefficient for them - 126 targets sunk against 81 lost boats - gives a figure of 1.56. Of course, worse than 4, but still nothing.

However, this coefficient, unlike the German one, is unverifiable - the total tonnage of targets sunk by Soviet submarines is not indicated anywhere. And the proud reference to a sunken Swedish tug weighing as much as fifty tons makes one think that this is far from accidental.

However, that's not all.

The German coefficient of 4 goals per 1 boat is the overall result. At the beginning of the war - in fact, until mid-1943 - it was much higher. It turned out to be 20, 30, and sometimes even 50 ships for each boat.

The indicator was reduced after the victory of the convoys and their escorts - in mid-1943 and until the end of the war.

That is why it is listed in the table - honestly and correctly.

The Americans sank approximately 1,500 targets, losing approximately 40 boats. They would be entitled to a coefficient of 35-40 - much higher than the German one.

If you think about it, this relationship is quite logical - the Germans fought in the Atlantic against the Anglo-American-Canadian escorts, equipped with hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft, and the Americans fought a war against weakly protected Japanese shipping.

But this simple fact cannot be recognized, and therefore an amendment is introduced.

The Americans - somehow imperceptibly - are changing the rules of the game, and only “military” goals are counted, reducing their coefficient (180 / 39) to a figure of 4.5 - obviously more acceptable for Russian patriotism?

Even now - and even in the narrowly professional military environment for which the book by Platonov and Lurie was published - even then it turned out to be undesirable to face the facts.

Perhaps this is the most unpleasant result of our small investigation.

P.S. The text of the article (better font and photos) can be found here:

Sources, short list of websites used:

1. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - American boats.
2. http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm - submarine warfare.
3. http://www.paralumun.com/wartwosubmarinesbritain.htm - English boats.
4. http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/britsubs.html - English boats.
5. http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm - Japanese boats.
6. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/2270/ww2e.htm - Italian boats.
7. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
8. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/84/84929.htm - Soviet boats.
9. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/255/255106.htm - Soviet boats.
10. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - submarine warfare.
11. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Soviet boats.
12. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/46/46644.htm - Soviet boats.
13. - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
15. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
16. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/ - forum, military equipment. Hosted by Sergei Kharlamov, a very smart person.

Sources, short list of books used:

1. "Steel Coffins: German U-boats, 1941-1945", Herbert Werner, translation from German, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2001
2. “War At Sea”, by S. Roskill, in Russian translation, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
3. “Total War”, by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Penguin Books, USA, 1985.
4. “The Longest Battle, The War at Sea, 1939-1945,” by Richard Hough, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.
5. “Secret Raiders”, David Woodward, translation from English, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
6. “The Fleet that Khrushchev Destroyed”, A.B.Shirokograd, Moscow, VZOI, 2004.

Reviews

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"COMbat OPERATIONS OF GERMAN SUBMARINES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR."

Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 plunged the world into the deadliest war ever to rage on Earth. Despite the fact that, starting in 1933, Germany intensively prepared for war, its submarine fleet was only seventh in size and had almost no bases for operations against Germany's main enemy at sea in a possible major war - Great Britain. For comparison, the number of submarines in the navies of different countries: Germany-56, France-77, USA-99, Italy-115, USSR-218. All German submarines were built after 1934, since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 deprived the Weimar Republic of the right to have submarines, large surface ships, tanks and aircraft. Despite this ban, new aircraft and tanks produced at “joint ventures” were tested at testing grounds in Soviet Russia, 3 “pocket battleships” were built in Germany, and in the Netherlands the concern “Dutch Submarine Development Bureau” produced submarines for export, designed by German designers based on the experience of the First World War, thus developing new technologies in the construction of submarines.

As a result, when Hitler announced a naval agreement with England in June 1935, giving the Kriegsmarine the right to have a surface fleet of 35% of the British and a submarine fleet of 45% of the British, the first German submarine U-1 was launched on water for 10 days.
In total, about 2,000 submarines were laid down in Germany during the war, and 1,155 entered service (of which 725 submarines were sunk).

The submarine war in the Atlantic began on September 3, 1939, when U-30 sank the passenger liner Athenia, which was carrying 1,103 passengers, including 300 Americans. 128 people died. This caused a storm of indignation among Hitler, who was afraid of ruining relations with the United States and repeating the mistake of the Kaiser’s Germany, which, by sinking the passenger ship Lusitania in the spring of 1915, gave rise to supporters of the United States entering the war on the side of the Entente to increase pressure on the country’s government.

Doenitz also had other reasons for concern: when U-39 attacked the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal on September 14, 1939, its torpedoes exploded too early, did not harm the aircraft carrier and attracted the attention of British destroyers, which sank the submarine (problems with new torpedoes with magnetic detonators were pursued by the German Navy for several years - often torpedoes that hit their targets did not explode or exploded too early); another problem was that the German industry could not cope with replenishing losses in submarines, and given the fact that 2/3 of the submarines had to be in bases for repairs or on transitions to patrol areas and that half of all Kriegsmarine boats were type II and had a short range, then no more than 10 submarines could be on patrol in the Atlantic.

Germany received its first reason to be proud of its submariners on September 17, 1939, when U-29 sank the aircraft carrier Coreygeus. Immediately after this, Doenitz, during Hitler's visit to Wilhelmshaven (the main base of the German Navy), gave an impassioned sermon on the importance of the submarine fleet and that a submarine fleet of 300 submarines using "wolf pack" tactics (a method of attacking convoys with a group of submarines when the boat that discovered the convoy goes alongside and calls the rest of the “flock” submarines by radio, and then they attack together at night) will be “a means that will cause decisive damage to England in its most vulnerable place.” On September 30, Doenitz became a rear admiral, and on October 13, 1939, the submarine U-47 under Lieutenant Commander Gunther Prien slipped into the main base of the British Navy at night and in two attacks (during the first, only one torpedo out of five detonated) sank the battleship Royal Oak. .
The result of this brilliant attack was not only that Hitler awarded Gunther Prien the Knight's Cross and each crew member the Iron Cross, but also the removal of many restrictions on the methods of warfare by submarines. It was Prien's attack that can be considered the beginning of a large-scale submarine war against the British Navy.

The Wehrmacht's capture of France, Belgium and the Netherlands, in turn, also gave Germany excellent bases on the Atlantic coast of France (such as Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, Bordeaux and others), the proximity of which to the main hunting areas of German submarines increased their time patrol for 1 week. Even before the armistice with France, on May 15, 1940, Victor Jorn departed from Wilhelshaven on U-37. He was the first submariner who sailed in “happy times” - having sunk 11 ships with a total tonnage of 43,000 tons, Jorn dispelled the despondency among German submariners that reigned after the failures of the winter-spring of 1940. Soon other underwater aces appeared - Otto Kretschmer, who sank seven enemy ships in one patrol, Joachim Schepke, Prien, who sank ships with a total tonnage of 66,000 tons. In June, the High Command announced a complete blockade of the British Isles, which meant that submarines could sink everything that floated on the water (of course there were restrictions - for example, for a long time, until Germany declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, German submarines could not attack American ships escorting convoys with cargo for Great Britain).

Doenitz used a special method of measuring the effectiveness of his submarines - the "efficiency factor", measured in the daily average tonnage of enemy ships sunk per submarine.
This “coefficient” rose from 514 tons in June to 594 tons in July, then to 664 tons in August and 758 tons in September, reaching the highest point for the entire war in October - 920 tons. But starting in the autumn of 1940, the British situation began to change . The RAF, having not lost the Battle of Britain, had averted the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles and the British fleet, reinforced by 50 old American destroyers, was able to provide more ships to escort convoys that had previously sailed across the Atlantic with no more than one light cruiser as cover. .
The “wolf pack” tactics that Doenitz had been working on since the end of World War I fully justified themselves. Doenitz had only one problem - he did not have enough boats. Having 27 submarines suitable for operations in the Atlantic on September 1, 1940, he could not widely use the "flock" method, and due to the fact that at the end of 1940 6 boats were put into operation per month, Doenitz could not say with certainty whether it will ever be able to deploy the much-needed 300 submarines in the Atlantic. Hitler promised him the construction of 25 submarines every month, but it was not until 1943 that German industry approached this indicator, not having managed to reach it when England was on the verge of defeat.
Despite the fact that he had enough submarines to try again to cut off Britain from her colonies in the new year, 1942, Doenitz wrote: "1941 ended in an atmosphere of unrest and anxiety." The USA entered the war...

Trying from the very beginning of hostilities by the American fleet to seize the initiative off the east coast of the United States, Doenitz launched Operation Drumbeat. On January 13, 1942, 5 Type IX submarines arrived in their area of ​​operations. A month after Pearl Harbor, American oil tankers and transports continued to sail as they sailed before the war - unescorted, brightly lit, with captains conducting unencrypted radio communications, they became excellent targets for the "wolves" of the Kriegsmarine. The “second happy time” or “American hunting season” has come - 13 ships were sunk before February 1, and in February the massacre began in the Caribbean Sea - on February 16 alone, the United States lost 8 tankers. Churchill was forced to send several corvettes to help the US fleet, which could not begin escort operations off its coast.

Doenitz lost his first boat on April 13, 1942, when U-85 was sunk by the USS Roper. The British huff-duff direction-finding system installed on escort ships and new radars on patrol aircraft led to increased losses among German submarines. Germany responded to these Allied innovations with the “metox” system, which warned the boat about the approach of an aircraft or ship with a radar and increased the construction of submarines to 20 units per month.

Doenitz had 331 submarines on July 1, 1942, of which only 101 were suitable for operations in the Atlantic. "Wolf packs" gathered in the middle of the ocean, beyond the range of the latest bombers. But a streak of bad weather in September delayed the deployment of the 4 “flocks” Doenitz required, and he diverted some of his submarines for operations in the South Atlantic.

On September 12, 1942, near Freetown, U-156 sank the armed transport Laconia, carrying 1,800 Italian prisoners of war and many women and children. Despite Doenitz's order not to expose himself to danger by rescuing people from sunken ships, the commander of U-156, Werner Hartenstein, gave the order to rescue people from the Laconia, loaded 263 people onto the submarine and began to tow 4 boats full of rescued people. Doenitz sent 3 more boats to this area to rescue people from the Laconia, including U-506 and U-507. Werner announced that he would not attack Allied ships if they helped him save people. On September 16, a B-24 bomber attacked a submarine with a deck full of British civilians and Italians, damaging it. Finally, on September 17, French ships arrived and took 1,111 people on board. The result of all this was the withdrawal of German submarines from the South Atlantic and Doenitz's order, which imposed a ban on any attempts to rescue passengers and crew from sunken ships.

The storms of the winter of 1943 delayed the development of German submarine operations in the Atlantic, and in Berlin, Hitler, after the failed attack of the heavy cruiser Hipper and the battleship Lützow on an allied convoy off the coast of Norway, dismissed Grand Admiral Raeder and appointed commander-in-chief of the German fleet Doenitz, who was 51 years old. Now Doenitz could concentrate most of Germany's resources, which were devoted to the construction of the fleet, on the production of submarines. Minister of Armaments and Military Industry Albert Speer launched the mass construction of submarines, bringing it to 30 units per month, that is, the level that Doenitz determined back in 1939 as necessary to effectively counter Allied shipping.

In February 1943, out of more than 400 German submarines, 164 participated in operations in the Atlantic. The destruction of 63 Allied ships with a total displacement of 359,328 tons instilled optimism in the submariners.

But April and May ended with the defeat of German submarine forces in the Atlantic. Using new radars operating in the centimeter range, which were not detected by the Metox system, as a result, 41 Doenitz submarines were destroyed in May. Forced to withdraw his boats from the North Atlantic on May 24, 1943, he allowed the Allies to use more aircraft to patrol the Bay of Biscay, resulting in a sharp increase in the number of submarines sunk there. On August 2, Dönitz suspended all voyages of his submarines in the Gulf.

Trying to somehow resist the actions of the Allies, Hitler gave the order to increase the pace of submarine construction and increase their monthly production to 40 units. At the same time, work began on an “electric boat”, which was supposed to have more batteries, which would increase the time of swimming under water. Another measure was the installation of a “snorkel” (a device that removed exhaust gases from a submerged boat and supplied fresh air, as a result of which the boat could run on diesel underwater for days) on existing submarines. At the same time, new acoustic torpedoes "Sauköning" and radar radiation detectors "Naxos" were developed, created by Hagenuk and Telefunken, which finally detected radiation in the 10-centimeter range. But the Allies responded with their own “fido” acoustic torpedo, used from aircraft, and buoys towed behind the convoy ships and creating noise, distracting the “zauköning” torpedoes towards themselves. The technology race continued - the Germans invented the FAT torpedo, which, after leaving the torpedo tube, walked in a straight line for some time, and then began to move in a zigzag, having many chances to hit one of the ships in dense convoy columns. The best Kriegsmarine torpedo was the Lerche, which had a television guidance system and could be adjusted via a cable about 6 km long. At the final section of the trajectory, an acoustic guidance system was turned on, more advanced than for “zaukoning” and not distracted by jammers. Unfortunately for Doenitz, this torpedo only appeared at the very end of the war.
An antenna for a “methox” radar radiation detector also appeared, which English 10-cm range radars could not detect.

Doenitz's attempt to regain the initiative in the Atlantic in the fall of 1943, despite success in the first battle on September 20 (a flock of 19 submarines sank 3 escort ships and about 9 transports), failed. He lost many boats with good crews. The Germans had lost four-fifths of their Type XIV submarine tankers, and the construction of new Type XXI and XXIII submarines was lagging behind, forcing Doenitz to virtually curtail his operations in the South and West Atlantic. 1943 is considered a turning point in the struggle on Allied communications, ending with the defeat of the “wolves” of Germany.

In 1944, all military operations in the Atlantic boiled down to an attempt by German submarines to stop the Allied invasion of France (Operation Overlord). If the fighting on the Allied communications did not stop, then in any case the German fleet lost all hope of “cutting off” England from the colonies and allies. The fighting in the English Channel from June to early August 1944 took place under complete Allied supremacy in the air and at sea. Of the 60 submarines that Doenitz allocated to counter the Allied landing fleet, only those equipped with snorkels were able to operate, which, being constantly under water, sank 12 transports, 4 landing craft and 5 escort ships with the loss of 20 of their boats. The liberation of France deprived Doenitz of bases in the Bay of Biscay (even if the base remained in the hands of the besieged Germans, it was impossible to use it for repairs and supplies of submarines), and the submarine war in the fall of 1944 returned to where it began 5 years ago - in coastal waters British Isles.

Doenitz's hopes of using new submarines to seize the initiative at sea did not come true - only 8 experimental boats designed for operations in coastal waters managed to take part in the hostilities. Having sunk several Allied ships, they were unable to reverse the course of history. The first and last Type XXI submarine that managed to go to sea before the end of the war was U-2511 under the command of veteran Adalbert Schnee. Leaving Bergen on April 30, 1945, she found a target for herself only on May 4, after the order of Doenitz, now the leader of Germany, to cease hostilities at sea. Grand Admiral Dönitz's final message to his submariners on May 5, 1945 read: "You have fought like lions. Unrivaled and flawless, you lay down your weapons after a heroic battle unparalleled."

The fighting in the Northern Theater of Operations (Norway, Barents and Norwegian Seas) began with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940. Despite the fact that all the available forces of the German fleet (31 submarines) were thrown to intercept the English fleet, which immediately began to cover the transfer of British troops to Norway, out of 38 attacks on British ships, only one was successfully completed, during which it was sunk one transport. The failures of the Doenitz submarine were caused by poor torpedoes, untested tactics of the boats and the British knowledge of the submarine locations from a map found on a German ship.

Actions in the Arctic began with renewed vigor starting on June 22, 1941, when, after Germany’s attack on the USSR, convoys from Great Britain and later from the USA arrived in the northern ports of the USSR. Germany's main striking force in the fight against allied convoys and inland water communications of the USSR in 1941-1942 was aviation. The submarines had little work to do and they did it poorly - often transports damaged by torpedoes reached their destinations, as in the case of transport from convoy PQ-8 in January 1942 or with the Northern Fleet Air Force floating base Maria Ulyanova torpedoed on August 26. In 1941, the Germans failed to sink a single Allied ship in convoys from England to the USSR and back.

The fighting expanded in 1942 - with the combined actions of aviation, submarines and surface ships, the Germans managed to sink 69 transport ships and 5 escort ships in northern convoys (hereinafter “northern convoys” will be called convoys from Great Britain to the northern ports of the USSR - Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and others, and vice versa). The submarine's actions grew - on January 17, a submarine sank the English destroyer Matabele and damaged the transport Harmetres, and on April 30, the cruiser Edinburgh, loaded with gold for Lend-Lease deliveries, was damaged by the submarine U-456 and then sunk by an attack by the Germans. destroyers. Convoys PQ-16, 17 and 18 suffered the greatest losses - PQ-16 lost 6 transports from air attacks, and one from submarine attacks, the destruction of 24 transports out of 36 in convoy PQ-17 caused a shock in the leadership of the English fleet, which suspended months, all convoys to the Soviet Union in the Arctic seas. PQ-18 lost 12 out of 40 transports, despite this setting a record for a single cargo delivery to the USSR during the war.

All of these German anti-convoy achievements were achieved with air superiority, and when the number of aircraft decreased, the German Navy's successes diminished.

Germany continuously increased the number of submarines in the North - by the beginning of 1943 they had 31 submarines there, losing only 3 boats out of 12 that were part of the “flock” in the attack on PQ-18. Submarine operations in 1943 in the Arctic ended in the same way as in the Atlantic - failure. Submarines and aircraft sunk 4 transports from northern convoys and 6 transports on internal routes of the USSR. In 1943, the number of attacks by British and Soviet destroyers on submarines increased, but it is not always possible to confirm the destruction of submarines.

In 1944 and 1945, the Germans managed to maintain a threat to Allied communications, sinking 6 transports and 3 escort ships in northern convoys in 1944 and 4 transports and 5 escort ships in 1945. But maintaining such “pressure” cost great sacrifices - only two submarines were sunk by Soviet destroyers in 1944 - U-344 on August 22 and U-387 on December 9, and one in 1945 - U-286 on April 22. In total, the Germans lost 27 submarines in the fight against the Allied convoys.

After the “Blitz War” against the USSR was defeated, the headquarters of the German fleet decided to implement a plan to transfer several submarines to the naval bases of Romania and Bulgaria allied with Germany, proposed back in March 1941 during the development of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans could not transfer their or Italian submarines from the Mediterranean through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits because Turkey was firmly neutral during World War II. Therefore, Germany was forced to transfer its submarines 1800 km across Europe.

The uniqueness of this operation was that between Dresden-Ubigau (the last point on the Elbe to which the smallest German Type IIB submarines could be brought on pontoons) and Ingoldstadt on the Danube, from where the boats were to be towed to the cities of Linz and Galati, they had to be transported along a 450 km long highway. The possibility of transportation by rail was no longer possible due to its narrow gauge in Europe. The transfer by land was carried out on special multi-axle platforms with a carrying capacity of 60 tons. To reduce the overall height, the boats were turned on board, and to lighten their weight, diesel engines, other large equipment, torpedoes, solid ballast, etc. were removed from them. Transfer of 6 boats of the 30th The flotilla began in the spring of 1942, and the last one entered service at Galati U-20 in July 1943. The entire operation from the dismantling of the submarines in the Baltic Sea to their entry into service took 10 months. By the same waterway or by rail, Germany was able to transfer 30 torpedo boats, 50 self-propelled ferries, 23 minesweepers and other vessels with a total displacement of about 40,000 tons to the Black Sea.

The ships of the 30th flotilla managed to complete only 57 military campaigns and sink 5 Soviet ships (including 2 schooners) before the Red Army invaded Romania in the summer of 1944 and it became clear that the USSR had won the war on the Black Sea. After an air raid on the main Axis naval base of Constanta on August 20 (during this raid the submarine U-9 was sunk), all submarines were sunk by their crews.

The operations of German submarines in all theaters of war ended in defeat. The Germans did not have much success in the Baltic due to the fact that there were no goals - the Soviet Navy did not withdraw its large ships from the harbors since the fall of 1941, operating with submarines and the “mosquito” fleet. Despite this, the Kriegsmarine lost several submarines in the Gulf of Finland in 1944 in attempts to stop the Soviet breakthrough into the Baltic.

Germany's submarine war did not bring it victory, just like during World War I. There is an opinion that a type of weapon cannot bring victory if the enemy is stronger than you in other types. And so it happened - German surface raiders stopped active operations by the beginning of 1943, the Luftwaffe, starting from 1942, had difficulty defending Germany itself from raids by allied bombers and could not effectively assist the submarine operations.

The coordinated actions of the surface fleet, submarines and aviation lasted the longest in the Northern theater of operations - until 1943, leading to the fact that the phrase “northern convoys” became synonymous with quick death for sailors of the allied fleets. German submariners alone achieved success only in ideal conditions - in the “happy times” of the summer-autumn 1940, when they acted against British convoys poorly guarded by a small escort, and in the “American hunting season” in the winter-spring of 1942, when they acted in general unprotected communications off the east coast of the United States. The colossal success of March 1943 was also achieved with a huge concentration of forces and good reconnaissance.
The Germans lost the "Battle of the Atlantic" because:
a) Neglect of new technologies (in the initial period of the war);
b)Lack of air protection (especially in the Bay of Biscay);
c) Lack of trained crews;
d) The correct tactics of the allies;
e) General superiority of the allies.
f) The defeat of German troops in Russia, which resulted in a decrease in allocations for the construction of submarines and R&D.
g) The presence of such an ally as Italy, which the Germans were always forced to help by sending their boats to the Mediterranean Sea, distracting them from the main task - the fight against convoys and the British fleet in the waters of the Metropolis;
h) The British knew the codes of the German command, which led to the failure of well-planned operations.

All this led to a natural ending, despite all the resilience and skill of the German “wolves”. The war is won not by aces and heroes, but by designers, workers and “cannon fodder” - even if the Germans had several Type XXI submarines at the beginning of the allied invasion of France in 1944, the allies would have simply exchanged five or six of their destroyers for each of them and would continue the invasion...

In the wars of the 20th and 21st centuries, the most important thing was, is and will be not the valor and quantity of military equipment at the beginning of a military conflict, but the economy, the information and transport network and science. Moreover, the more developed they are, the more vulnerable - again, an example with the “Battle of the Atlantic” - if Germany had cut off the communications of the US and Great Britain, these countries would have collapsed, unable to create the fleet and aviation necessary to restore supply routes.

The rusty skeletons of submarines of the Third Reich are still found at sea. The German submarines of World War II are no longer the ones on which the fate of Europe once depended. However, these huge piles of metal are still shrouded in mystery today and haunt historians, divers and adventure lovers.

Forbidden construction

The fleet of Nazi Germany was called the Kriegsmarine. A significant part of the Nazi arsenal consisted of submarines. By the beginning of the war, the army was equipped with 57 submarines. Then, gradually, another 1,113 underwater vehicles were used, 10 of which were captured. During the war, 753 submarines were destroyed, but they managed to sink enough ships and have an impressive impact on the whole world.

After World War I, Germany was unable to build submarines under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. But when Hitler came to power, he lifted all prohibitions, declaring that he considered himself free from the shackles of Versailles. He signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which gave Germany the right to a submarine force equal to Britain's. Hitler later announced the denunciation of the agreement, which completely freed his hands.

Germany developed 21 types of submarines, but they mainly came down to three types:

1. The small Type II boat was designed for training and patrol duties in the Baltic and North Seas.
2. The Type IX submarine was used for long voyages in the Atlantic.
3. The Type VII medium submarine was intended for long-distance voyages. These models had optimal seaworthiness, and minimal funds were spent for its production. That's why most of these submarines were built.

The German submarine fleet had the following parameters:

• displacement: from 275 to 2710 tons;
• surface speed: from 9.7 to 19.2 knots;
• underwater speed: from 6.9 to 17.2 knots;
• diving depth: from 150 to 280 meters.

Such characteristics indicate that Hitler’s submarines were the most powerful among all Germany’s enemy countries.

"Wolf Packs"

Karl Doenitz was appointed commander of the submarines. He developed an underwater hunting strategy for the German fleet, which was called “wolf packs.” According to this tactic, submarines attacked ships in large groups, depriving them of any chance of survival. German submarines hunted mainly for transport ships that supplied enemy troops. The point of this was to sink more boats than the enemy could build.

This tactic quickly bore fruit. “Wolf packs” operated over a vast territory, sinking hundreds of enemy ships. U-48 alone was able to kill 52 ships. Moreover, Hitler was not going to limit himself to the results achieved. He planned to develop the Kringsmarine and build hundreds more cruisers, battleships and submarines.

The submarines of the Third Reich almost brought Great Britain to its knees, driving it into the blockade ring. This forced the Allies to urgently develop countermeasures against the German “wolves”, including the massive construction of their own submarines.

Fighting the German "wolves"

In addition to Allied submarines, radar-equipped aircraft began to hunt for the “wolf packs.” Also, in the fight against German underwater vehicles, sonar buoys, radio interception equipment, homing torpedoes and much more were used.

The turning point occurred in 1943. Then each sunk Allied ship cost the German fleet one submarine. In June 1944 they went on the offensive. Their goal was to protect their own ships and attack German submarines. By the end of 1944, Germany had finally lost the Battle of the Atlantic. In 1945, the Kringsmarine faced a crushing defeat.

The army of German submariners resisted until the last torpedo. Karl Dönitz's last operation was the evacuation of some of the naval admirals of the Third Reich to Latin America. Before his suicide, Hitler appointed Dennitz as head of the Third Reich. However, there are legends that the Fuhrer did not kill himself at all, but was transported by submarines from Germany to Argentina.

According to another legend, the valuables of the Third Reich, including the Holy Grail, were transported by the submarine U-530 to Antarctica to a secret military base. These stories have never been officially confirmed, but they indicate that German submarines from World War II will haunt archaeologists and military enthusiasts for a long time.

The outcome of any war depends on many factors, among which, of course, weapons are of considerable importance. Despite the fact that absolutely all German weapons were very powerful, since Adolf Hitler personally considered them the most important weapon and paid considerable attention to the development of this industry, they failed to inflict damage on their opponents that would significantly influence the course of the war. Why did it happen? Who is at the origins of the creation of a submarine army? Were the German submarines of World War II really that invincible? Why were such prudent Nazis unable to defeat the Red Army? You will find the answer to these and other questions in the review.

general information

Collectively, all equipment in service with the Third Reich during World War II was called the Kriegsmarine, and submarines made up a significant part of the arsenal. Underwater equipment became a separate industry on November 1, 1934, and the fleet was disbanded after the war ended, i.e., having existed for less than a dozen years. In such a short period of time, German submarines of World War II brought a lot of fear into the souls of their opponents, leaving their huge mark on the bloody pages of the history of the Third Reich. Thousands of dead, hundreds of sunk ships, all this remained on the conscience of the surviving Nazis and their subordinates.

Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine

During World War II, one of the most famous Nazis, Karl Doenitz, was at the helm of the Kriegsmarine. German submarines certainly played an important role in World War II, but without this man this would not have happened. He was personally involved in creating plans to attack opponents, participated in attacks on many ships and achieved success in this path, for which he was awarded one of the most significant awards of Nazi Germany. Doenitz was an admirer of Hitler and was his successor, which did a lot of harm to him during the Nuremberg trials, because after the death of the Fuhrer he was considered the commander-in-chief of the Third Reich.

Specifications

It is easy to guess that Karl Doenitz was responsible for the condition of the submarine army. German submarines in World War II, photos of which prove their power, had impressive parameters.

In general, the Kriegsmarine was armed with 21 types of submarines. They had the following characteristics:

• displacement: from 275 to 2710 tons;
• surface speed: from 9.7 to 19.2 knots;
• underwater speed: from 6.9 to 17.2;
• diving depth: from 150 to 280 meters.

This proves that the German submarines of World War II were not just powerful, they were the most powerful among the weapons of the countries that fought with Germany.

Composition of the Kriegsmarine

The warships of the German fleet included 1,154 submarines. It is noteworthy that until September 1939 there were only 57 submarines, the rest were built specifically to participate in the war. Some of them were trophies. Thus, there were 5 Dutch, 4 Italian, 2 Norwegian and one English and French submarines. All of them were also in service with the Third Reich.

Achievements of the Navy

The Kriegsmarine inflicted considerable damage on its opponents throughout the war. For example, the most effective captain Otto Kretschmer sank almost fifty enemy ships. There are also record holders among ships. For example, the German submarine U-48 sank 52 ships.

Throughout World War II, 63 destroyers, 9 cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers and even 2 battleships were destroyed. The largest and most notable victory for the German army among them can be considered the sinking of the battleship Royal Oak, whose crew consisted of a thousand people and its displacement was 31,200 tons.

Plan Z

Since Hitler considered his fleet extremely important for Germany’s triumph over other countries and had extremely positive feelings towards it, he paid considerable attention to it and did not limit funding. In 1939, a plan was developed for the development of the Kriegsmarine for the next 10 years, which, fortunately, never came to fruition. According to this plan, several hundred more of the most powerful battleships, cruisers and submarines were to be built.

Powerful German submarines of World War II

Photos of some surviving German submarine technology give an idea of ​​the power of the Third Reich, but only weakly reflect how strong this army was. The majority of the German fleet consisted of Type VII submarines; they had optimal seaworthiness, were of medium size, and most importantly, their construction was relatively inexpensive, which is important in

They could dive to a depth of 320 meters with a displacement of up to 769 tons, the crew ranged from 42 to 52 employees. Despite the fact that the “sevens” were quite high-quality boats, over time, Germany’s enemy countries improved their weapons, so the Germans also had to work on modernizing their brainchild. As a result of this, the boat has several more modifications. The most popular of these was the VIIC model, which not only became the personification of Germany's military power during the attack on the Atlantic, but was also much more convenient than previous versions. The impressive dimensions made it possible to install more powerful diesel engines, and subsequent modifications also featured durable hulls, which made it possible to dive deeper.

German submarines of the Second World War were subject to constant, as they would say now, upgrades. One of the most innovative models is considered to be type XXI. An air conditioning system and additional equipment were created in this submarine, which was intended for a longer stay of the crew under water. A total of 118 boats of this type were built.

Kriegsmarine performance results

Germany of the Second World War, photos of which can often be found in books about military equipment, played a very important role in the offensive of the Third Reich. Their power cannot be underestimated, but it is worth considering that even with such patronage from the bloodiest Fuhrer in world history, the German fleet did not manage to bring its power closer to victory. Probably, good equipment and a strong army were not enough; for Germany’s victory, the ingenuity and courage that the brave soldiers of the Soviet Union possessed was not enough. Everyone knows that the Nazis were incredibly bloodthirsty and did not disdain much on their way, but neither an incredibly equipped army nor a lack of principles helped them. Armored vehicles, a huge amount of ammunition and the latest developments did not bring the expected results to the Third Reich.