The number of victims of the 2nd World War. How many people died in the second world war in the ussr and in the world

The United States was forced to enter the war on December 7, 1941, as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. And although the scale of the battles was not the same as on the Eastern Front, this does not negate their fierceness. Getting bogged down in battles with the Japanese, the United States was able to secure the rear of the USSR, and later opening a second front, brought the defeat of Germany closer and made its collapse inevitable. In total, the main losses in World War II are due to the following factors:

The Allied contribution to victory should not be underestimated. In fact, while fierce battles were raging in the east and the blitzkrieg was raging, Great Britain and the United States also did not sit idly by, stretching the forces of the Germans and their allies in several directions, thereby reducing the pressure on the USSR.

During the entire war, a huge number of recruits were mobilized in the United States - more than 16 million people. Such reserves were enough to wage long wars of attrition, in addition, the American soldiers did not have the worst level of training, which allowed them to withstand even superior enemy forces.

After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the destruction of one of the most powerful military bases, the United States entered the war. Just hours after the attack, the Americans declared war on Japan and began planning a response.

Starting in 1942, the Japanese army lost its advantage and ceased to gain significant victories, which led to defeat at the Battle of Midway, and dealt a crushing blow to the imperial troops.

After that, the Americans continued their systematic offensive, freeing all the islands that came across on the way. The Japanese refused to surrender even when they found themselves in a completely stalemate in 1945. Foreseeing heavy losses at the beginning of the assault on the main island of Japan, the US command decided to drop two atomic bombs, which finally broke the spirit of the Japanese and led to the subsequent complete surrender.

In total, during the war with the Japanese, the Americans lost about 300 thousand soldiers and sailors killed, taken prisoner and subsequently killed from their wounds. In addition, it is known about the injured civilians. So the Japanese managed to intern over 12 thousand civilians.

One of the main "meat grinders" - the place where the Allies suffered the greatest losses, were the beaches during Operation Overlord. The infantry had to storm enemy bunkers, advancing through open areas, under the furious fire of artillery and machine guns. However, due to the disagreements of the German commanders, who as a result were unable to provide assistance to each other in an organized manner, the defenses were broken. The battle for Normandy lasted for about two months. The main task of the allies was to capture, expand and strengthen coastal bridgeheads in order to create favorable conditions for subsequent attacks on the enemy. This operation went down in history as the largest amphibious assault, since it involved more than 3 million soldiers who crossed the English Channel.

Great losses to the allies were inflicted by powerful German armored vehicles - an outdated military doctrine affected. The main tank of the US Army at that time was the M4 "Sherman", equipped with a short-barreled 75-mm gun, which was not able to adequately deal with enemy tanks that destroyed the "Shermans" at distances of more than a kilometer. The use of specialized self-propelled guns did not give significant results, which is why the Americans lost heavily to the mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht. As a result, due to the large casualties, the Americans had to quickly develop new types of tanks, as well as figure out how to modernize the current ones that remained in service.

Even despite the complete American dominance of the air, German forces continued to offer serious resistance. Especially here the Hitler Youth managed to excel. The teenagers, led by experienced officers, managed to inflict huge damage on the American forces, turning the French vineyards into a real hell. However, they did not stand a chance, as the Americans were more prepared and already possessed combat skills by the time the operation began. Some units had real combat experience gained during battles with the Japanese. This played a cruel joke with the American Marines, since the Germans used completely different battle tactics, which also led to large losses at first.

In total, during the bloody battles in Europe, the United States lost almost 186 thousand soldiers killed, which, of course, is quite small when compared with the losses of the USSR.

Conclusion

The greatest contribution to the victory over the Third Reich, undoubtedly, made. The allies could only indirectly help the Soviet troops, diverting the attention of the Wehrmacht command and forcing them to scatter their forces. And also additionally supplied weapons for the Soviet army under the Lend-Lease program. In total, the losses of the United States in World War II amounted to 405 thousand killed and 671 thousand wounded.

Experts in the field of history assess the losses suffered during the Second World War in different ways. In this case, different methods of initial data and methods of calculation are used. Today, in Russia, the official data are recognized by a research group that worked in the framework of a project carried out by specialists from the Military Memorial.

As of 2001, when the research data were once again clarified, it is generally accepted that during the war against Hitler's fascism, the Soviet Union lost 6.9 million troops. Almost four and a half million Soviet soldiers and officers were captured or disappeared. The most impressive are the total human losses of the country: taking into account the dead civilians, they amounted to 26 million 600 thousand people.

The losses of fascist Germany turned out to be significantly lower and amounted to a little more than 4 million servicemen. The total losses of the German side as a result of the actions are estimated at 6.6 million people; this includes the civilian population. Allied Germany lost less than a million soldiers killed. The overwhelming number of those killed on both sides of the military confrontation was.

WWII losses: questions remain

Previously, Russia adopted completely different official data on its own losses. Almost until the end of the existence of the USSR, serious research on this issue was practically not carried out, since most of the data was closed. In the Soviet Union, after the end of the war, the estimates of losses named by I.V. Stalin, who set this figure equal to 7 million people. After N.S. Khrushchev, it turned out that the country had lost about 20 million people.

When a team of reformers headed by M.S. Gorbachev, it was decided to create a research study, at the disposal of which documents from archives and other reference materials were provided. The data on losses in the Second World War, which are used, were made public only in 1990.

Historians from other countries do not dispute the research findings of their Russian colleagues. The total human losses suffered by all countries that participated in one way or another in the Second World War, it is almost impossible to calculate exactly. The figures are from 45 to 60 million people. Some historians believe that as new information is found and the methods of calculation are refined, the upper total loss of all the warring countries may be up to 70 million people.

The Second World War was the most destructive war in the history of mankind. There are disputes about its consequences to this day. It was attended by 80% of the world's population.

Many questions arise about how many people died in the Second World War, since different sources of information give different information about the loss of life in the period from 1939 to 1945. The differences are due to where the original information was obtained and which method of counting was used.

Total death toll

It is worth noting that many historians and professors have studied this issue. The number of those killed by the Soviet Union was calculated by the staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. According to the new archival data, the information of which is given for 2001, the Great Patriotic War in total claimed the lives of 27 million people. Of these, more than seven million are military personnel who have been killed or died from their injuries.

Talk about how many people died from 1939 to 1945. as a result of hostilities, they continue to this day, since it is almost impossible to calculate the losses. Various researchers and historians cite their data: from 40 to 60 million people. After the war, the real data was hidden. During Stalin's rule, it was said that the losses of the USSR amounted to 8 million people. During the Brezhnev era, this figure increased to 20 million, and during the perestroika period - to 36 million.

The free encyclopedia Wikipedia gives the following data: more than 25.5 million military personnel and about 47 million civilians (including all participating countries), i.e. in total, the number of casualties exceeds 70 million.

Read about other events in our history in the section.

The Second World War refers to the hostilities that took place in various theaters of military operations from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945.

The beginning of World War II is considered the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, and its end - on September 2, 1945, the unconditional surrender of Japan on board the American battleship Missouri.

2. The Second World War, which lasted for six years and one day, has no analogues in world history in terms of scale. In one form or another, 61 states out of 73 that existed on the planet at that time took part in it. 80 percent of the world's population was involved in the war, and hostilities were fought on the territory of three continents and in the waters of four oceans.

3. Six states during the Second World War took part in it on the side of both the Nazi bloc and the anti-Hitler coalition - these are Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Iraq. Finland was the last to join the fight against Nazism on September 19, 1944. Finland entered the war on the side of Germany on June 26, 1941, attacking the USSR.

4. The participation of the Soviet Union in World War II is divided into two periods: the Great Patriotic War (June 22, 1941 - May 9, 1945) and the Soviet-Japanese War (August 9 - September 2, 1945).

In Soviet historiography, it was not customary to include in World War II such episodes as the Polish campaign of the Red Army in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 and the conflict at Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

5. Of the “big three” of the anti-Hitler coalition (USSR, USA, Great Britain), the last to enter World War II were the United States, which declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941.

6. World War II remains the only armed conflict in which atomic weapons were used.

On August 6, 1945, a bomb called "Kid" was dropped by American aircraft on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and on August 9, a charge called "Fat Man" was dropped by the US Air Force on Nagasaki. The total death toll ranged from 90 to 166 thousand people in Hiroshima and from 60 to 80 thousand people in Nagasaki.

7. Despite the fact that 68 years have passed since the end of World War II, a peace treaty has not been concluded between Russia and Japan. This happened due to a territorial dispute over the four islands of the South Kuril ridge - Kunashir, Iturup, Khibomai and Shikotan. Thus, formally, the state of war between Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, and Japan persists to this day.

During the Second World War, the participating countries mobilized a total of more than 110 million people, of which about 25 million people died.

The total number of civilians killed in World War II was more than 65 million. The exact data on the number of deaths has not been definitively established to this day.

In the Soviet Union alone, 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages were destroyed, 32 thousand plants and factories.

The total financial losses of states in the Second World War are estimated, according to various sources, in the amount of 1.5 to 4 trillion dollars. Material costs reached 60-70 percent of the national income of the warring states.

In the photo: the head of the USSR delegation at the conference in San Francisco A.A. Gromyko signs the UN Charter. June 26, 1945.

10. On the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition formed during the Second World War, the United Nations Organization was created, the main task of which was to prevent world wars in the future. The name United Nations was first used in the United Nations Declaration signed on January 1, 1942. The UN Charter was approved and signed at the San Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945 by representatives of 50 states.

Who fought in numbers, and who - by skill. The monstrous truth about the losses of the USSR in World War II Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The ratio of irrecoverable losses of the Soviet Union and Germany in World War II

The true size of the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces perished, including those who died in captivity, according to our estimate, may be 26.9 million people. This is approximately 10.3 times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on Hitler's side, lost about 160 thousand dead and killed, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of another ally of Germany, Finland, amounted to about 61 thousand killed and deceased, including 403 people died in Soviet captivity and about 1 thousand people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost in battles against the Red Army about 165 thousand killed and deceased, including 71 585 killed, 309 533 missing, 243 622 wounded and 54 612 dead in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldovans returned from captivity. Thus, of the number of missing persons, 37,536 people should be attributed to those killed. If we assume that about 10% of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in the battles with the Red Army will amount to about 188.1 thousand deaths. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the death rate among the wounded was 10%, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Thus, the total number of killed and deceased in captivity from among the missing Romanian military personnel can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the fight against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead. The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners. Finally, the army of Slovakia lost 1.9 thousand dead in battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity. On the side of the USSR, the Bulgarian army fought against Germany, losing about 10 thousand dead. Two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27.5 thousand dead and missing, and the Czechoslovak corps, which also fought on the side of the Red Army, lost 4 thousand dead. The total casualties on the Soviet side can be estimated at 27.1 million servicemen, and on the German side - at 2.9 million, which gives a ratio of 9.1-9.3: 1. In the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, the ratio of casualties to those killed was 7.0: 1, not in favor of the Red Army (we estimate Soviet casualties at 164.3 thousand. people, and Finnish - in 23.5 thousand people). It can be assumed that this ratio was approximately the same in 1941-1944. Then, in battles with Finnish troops, the Red Army could lose up to 417 thousand killed and died from wounds. It should also be taken into account that the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army in the war with Japan amounted to 12 thousand people. If we accept that in battles with the rest of the German allies, the losses of the Red Army were approximately equal to the losses of the enemy, then in these battles it could lose up to 284 thousand people. And in the battles against the Wehrmacht, the losses of the Red Army were supposed to be about 22.2 million killed and died from wounds against about 2.1 million killed and died on the German side. This gives a loss ratio of 10.6: 1.

According to Russian search engines, for one found corpse of a Wehrmacht soldier, on average, there are ten corpses of Red Army soldiers. This ratio is almost equal to our estimate of the ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

It is interesting to trace at least an approximate ratio of losses of the parties over the years of the war. Using the ratio established above between the number of Soviet servicemen killed and killed in battles and based on the data given in the book by E.I. Smirnov, the number of Soviet soldiers killed by years can be distributed as follows: 1941 - 2.2 million, 1942 - 8 million, 1943 - 6.4 million, 1944 - 6.4 million, 1945 - 2.5 million It should also be borne in mind that about 0.9 million Red Army soldiers who were listed in irrecoverable losses, but later discovered in the liberated territory and recruited again, accounted for mainly in 1941-1942. Due to this, we reduce the losses of those killed in 1941 by 0.6 million, and in 1942 - by 0.3 million people (in proportion to the number of prisoners) and with the addition of prisoners we get the total irrecoverable losses of the Red Army by years: 1941 - 5, 5 million, 1942 - 7.153 million, 1943 - 6.965 million, 1944 - 6.547 million, 1945 - 2.534 million. For comparison, let's take the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces by years, based on the data of B. Müller-Gillebrand. At the same time, we subtracted the losses incurred outside the Eastern Front from the total figures, roughly spreading them over the years. The following picture turned out for the Eastern Front (the figure of the total irrecoverable losses of ground forces for the year is given in brackets): 1941 (from June) - 301 thousand (307 thousand), 1942 - 519 thousand (538 thousand), 1943 - 668 thousand (793 thousand), 1944 (for this year, losses in December were taken equal to January) - 1129 thousand (1629 thousand), 1945 (before May 1) - 550 thousand (1250 thousand) ... The ratio in all cases is obtained in favor of the Wehrmacht: 1941 - 18.1: 1, 1942 - 13.7: 1, 1943 - 10.4: 1, 1944 - 5.8: 1, 1945 - 4, 6: 1. These ratios should be close to the true ratios of the irrecoverable losses of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front, since the losses of the ground army amounted to the lion's share of all Soviet military losses and much larger than that of the Wehrmacht, and the German aviation and navy had the main irrecoverable losses in during the war, they were carried outside the Eastern Front. As for the losses of the German allies in the East, the underestimation of which somewhat worsens the indicators of the Red Army, it should be borne in mind that in the fight against them the Red Army suffered relatively much smaller losses than in the fight against the Wehrmacht, that the German allies did not actively act in all periods war and suffered the greatest losses of prisoners in the framework of the general surrender (Romania and Hungary). In addition, on the Soviet side, the losses of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian units operating together with the Red Army were not taken into account. So, in general, the relationships we have identified should be fairly objective. They show that the improvement in the ratio of irrecoverable losses for the Red Army has been happening only since 1944, when the Allies landed in the West and Lend-Lease assistance had already given the maximum effect in terms of both direct supplies of weapons and equipment and the deployment of Soviet military production. The Wehrmacht was forced to throw reserves to the West and could not, as in 1943, unleash active operations in the East. In addition, the heavy losses of experienced soldiers and officers affected. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the ratio of losses remained unfavorable for the Red Army due to its inherent vices (stereotyped, contempt for human life, inept use of weapons and equipment, lack of continuity of experience due to huge losses and inept use of marching reinforcements, etc.). ).

A particularly unfavorable ratio of casualties for the Red Army was in the period from December 1941 to April 1942, when the Red Army carried out its first large-scale counteroffensive. For example, only the 323rd Infantry Division of the 10th Army of the Western Front lost 4138 people in three days of fighting, from 17 to 19 December 1941, including 1696 dead and missing. This gives an average daily level of casualties of 1346 people, including 565 irrecoverable people. The entire German Eastern Army, with more than 150 divisions, had an average daily casualty rate of only slightly higher for the period from December 11 to December 31, 1941 inclusive. On the day, the Germans lost 2,658 people, including only 686 - irrevocably.

This is simply amazing! One of our divisions lost as much as 150 German ones. Even if we assume that not all German formations in the last three weeks of December 1941 were in action every day, even if we assume that the losses of the 323rd Infantry Division in three-day battles were for some reason uniquely great, the difference is too striking and cannot be explained by statistical errors. Here we must talk about the errors of social, fundamental vices of the Soviet way of waging war.

By the way, according to the testimony of the former commander of the 10th Army, Marshal F.I. Golikov, and in the previous days the 323rd division suffered heavy losses, and, despite the fact that the Soviet troops were advancing, the losses were dominated by the missing, most of whom were most likely killed. So, in the battles on December 11, during its turn south towards the city of Epifan and the settlement of Lupishki, the 323rd division lost 78 people killed, 153 wounded and up to 200 missing. And on December 17-19, the 323rd Division, together with other divisions of the 10th Army, successfully, by Soviet standards, attacked the German defensive line on the Upa River. And by the next line, the Plava River, the 323rd division was not yet the most battered of the divisions of the 10th army, which were fully staffed before the start of the Moscow counteroffensive. In the 323rd division, 7613 people remained, while in the neighboring 326th - only 6238 people. Like many of the other divisions involved in the counteroffensive, the 323rd and 326th divisions had just been formed and entered the battle for the first time. Lack of experience and internal cohesion of the units led to large losses. Nevertheless, on the night of December 19-20, two divisions took Plavsk, breaking through the enemy line. At the same time, the Germans allegedly lost more than 200 people only in killed. In fact, given that at that moment most of the German divisions were operating in the Moscow direction, and Plavsk was defended by only one regiment, the losses of the latter could not exceed several dozen killed. The commander of the 323rd division, Colonel Ivan Alekseevich Hartsev, was considered a completely successful divisional commander and on November 17, 1942, he became a major general, in 1943 he commanded the 53rd rifle corps, successfully ended the war, having been awarded the 1st degree order of Kutuzov, and died peacefully in 1961.

Let us compare the above monthly data on the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army for 1942 with the monthly data on the losses of the German ground army, calculated from the diary of the chief of the General Staff of the German ground army, General F. Halder. It should be noted here that the Soviet data includes not only losses in the ground forces, but also losses of aviation and the fleet. In addition, the irrecoverable losses from the Soviet side include not only those killed and missing, but also those who died from their wounds. In the data given by Halder, only the losses of the killed and missing are included, relating only to the ground forces, without the Luftwaffe and the fleet. This circumstance makes the ratio of losses more favorable for the German side than it actually was. Indeed, taking into account the fact that in the Wehrmacht the ratio of the wounded and killed was closer to the classic - 3: 1, and in the Red Army - closer to the unconventional ratio - 1: 1, and also taking into account that the mortality rate in German hospitals was much higher, than in the Soviet, since in the latter there were much fewer seriously wounded, the category of those who died from wounds accounted for a much larger share in the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht than the Red Army. Also, the share of aviation and naval losses was relatively higher for the Wehrmacht than for the Red Army, due to the extremely large losses of the Soviet ground forces. In addition, we do not take into account the losses of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian armies allied with the Wehrmacht, which also makes the loss ratio more favorable for Germany. However, all these factors can overestimate this indicator by no more than 20–25% and are not able to distort the general trend.

According to the entries in F. Halder's diary, in the period from December 31, 1941 to January 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 87,082, including 18,074 killed and 7,175 missing. Irrecoverable losses of the Red Army (killed and missing) in January 1942 amounted to 628 thousand people, which gives a loss ratio of 24.9: 1. In the period from January 31 to February 28, 1942, German losses in the East amounted to 87,651 people, including 18,776 killed and 4,355 missing. Soviet losses in February reached 523 thousand people and turned out to be 22.6 times more than the German irrecoverable losses.

In the period from March 1 to March 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 102,194 people, including 12,808 killed and 5,217 missing. Soviet losses in March 1942 amounted to 625 thousand dead and missing. This gives us a record ratio of 34.7: 1. In April, when the offensive began to fade, but Soviet troops still suffered quite a few prisoner losses, German casualties amounted to 60,005 people, including 12,690 killed and 2,573 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 435 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 28.5: 1.

In May 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy prisoner losses as a result of its unsuccessful offensive near Kharkov and the successful German offensive on the Kerch Peninsula, its losses amounted to 433 thousand people. This figure is most likely significantly underestimated. After all, the Germans captured almost 400 thousand prisoners in May, and compared to April, when there were almost no prisoners, the losses even decreased by 13 thousand people - with a drop in the index of those killed in battles by only three points. The losses of the German ground forces can only be counted for the period from May 1 to June 10, 1942. They amounted to 100,599 people, including 21,157 killed and 4212 missing. To establish the ratio of irrecoverable losses, it is necessary to add a third of losses in June to the Soviet May losses. Soviet losses this month amounted to 519 thousand people. Most likely, they are overestimated due to the inclusion of underestimated May losses in the June parts. Therefore, the total number of casualties in May and the first ten days of June of 606 thousand dead and missing seems close to reality. The ratio of irrecoverable losses is 23.9: 1, not differing fundamentally from the indicators of several previous months.

During the period from 10 to 30 June, the losses of the German ground forces in the East amounted to 64,013 people, including 11,079 killed and 2,270 missing. The ratio of irrecoverable losses for the second and third decades of June is equal to 25.9: 1.

In July 1942, the German land army in the East lost 96,341 people, including 17,782 killed and 3,290 missing. Soviet losses in July 1942 amounted to only 330 thousand people, and, most likely, they are somewhat underestimated. But this underestimation is largely offset by the more significant losses of the German allies who participated in the general offensive in the south that began at the end of June. The ratio of irrecoverable losses turns out to be 15.7: 1. This already means a significant improvement in this indicator for the Red Army. The German offensive turned out to be less disastrous for the Red Army in terms of casualties than its own offensive in the winter and spring of 1942.

But the real turning point in the ratio of irrecoverable losses occurred in August 1942, when German troops attacked Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Soviet troops - in the Rzhev region. Soviet prisoner losses were significant, and undoubtedly there was an underestimation of Soviet irrecoverable losses, but, most likely, it was no more than in July. In August 1942, the German army in the East lost 160,294 people, including 31,713 killed and 7,443 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 385 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 9.8: 1, that is, an order of magnitude better for the Red Army than in the winter or spring of 1942. Even taking into account the likely underestimation of Soviet losses in August, the change in the ratio of losses looks significant. Moreover, the probable underestimation of Soviet losses was compensated for by a significant increase in the losses of the German allies - the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops, who actively participated in the summer-autumn offensive. The loss ratio is improving not so much due to the reduction in Soviet losses (although it, in all likelihood, took place), but because of the significant increase in German losses. It is no coincidence that it was in August 1942 that Hitler, according to W. Schellenberg, for the first time admitted the possibility that Germany would lose the war, and in September there followed the loud resignations of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Army F. Halder and the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A operating in the Caucasus, Field Marshal V. Leaf. Hitler was beginning to realize that there was no way out of the impasse into which the German offensive in the Caucasus and Stalingrad was increasingly entering, and that the growing losses would soon enough lead the Wehrmacht to exhaustion, but he could not do anything.

Halder's diary makes it possible to calculate the losses of ground forces only in the first ten days of September. They amounted to 48 198 people, including 9558 killed and 3637 missing. Soviet losses in September amounted to 473 thousand dead and missing. These losses not only do not seem to be underestimated, but, on the contrary, rather underestimate the true size of Soviet losses in September by including earlier unaccounted losses, since this month, compared to August, the number of casualties in battles fell from 130 to 109. One third from 473 thousand . is 157.7 thousand. The ratio of Soviet and German irrecoverable losses in the first decade of September 1942 is equal to 11.95: 1, which proves that the August trend of improving the ratio of losses continued in September, especially taking into account the overestimation of Soviet losses this month ...

In the further course of the war, the irrecoverable losses of the German ground army, with rare exceptions, only grew. The number of Soviet prisoners of war dropped sharply in 1943, while German troops this year for the first time suffered significant prisoner losses on the Eastern Front as a result of the Stalingrad catastrophe. Soviet casualties after 1942 also experienced an upward trend, but the absolute increase in the number of killed was significantly less than the amount by which the average monthly number of Soviet prisoners decreased. According to the dynamics of the number of those killed in battles, the maximum losses in those killed and those who died from wounds were noted in July, August and September 1943, during the Battle of Kursk and the crossing of the Dnieper (the index of those killed in battles in these months is 143, 172 and 139, respectively). The next peak of the Red Army's losses in killed and dead from wounds falls in July, August and September 1944 (132, 140 and 130). The only peak in casualties in 1941-1942 falls on August 1942 (130). There were some months when the ratio of irrecoverable losses was almost as unfavorable for the Soviet side as in the first half of 1942, for example, during the Battle of Kursk, but in most months of 1943-1945 this ratio was already significantly better for the Red Army than in 1941-1942.

A significant, by Soviet standards, improvement in the ratio of irrecoverable losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and its allies, which began in August 1942 and continued until the end of the war, was due to several factors. Firstly, the Soviet commanders of the middle and top echelon, starting with the regimental commanders, acquired a certain combat experience and began to fight a little more competently, adopting a number of tactical techniques from the Germans. At a lower command level, as well as among rank-and-file fighters, there was no significant improvement in the quality of combat operations, since there was a large turnover of personnel due to huge losses. The improvement in the relative quality of Soviet tanks and aircraft, as well as an increase in the level of training of pilots and tankers, also played a role, although in terms of training they were still inferior to the Germans even at the end of the war.

But an even greater role than the growth in the fighting efficiency of the Red Army in the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front was played by the decline in the fighting efficiency of the Wehrmacht. Due to the ever-growing irrecoverable losses, the share of experienced soldiers and officers was decreasing. Due to the need to replace the increasing losses by the end of the war, the level of training of pilots and tankers decreased, although it remained higher than that of their Soviet opponents. Even an increase in the quality of military equipment could not compensate for this drop in the level of training. But more importantly, starting in November 1942, after the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany had to send more and more aircraft and then ground forces to fight against the Western Allies. Germany had to make more use of its weaker allies. The defeat by the Red Army of significant Italian, Romanian and Hungarian troops in late 1942 - early 1943 and in the second half of 1944 - early 1945 significantly improved the ratio of irrecoverable losses in favor of the Soviet side and significantly increased the numerical advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. Another turning point here occurred after the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944. It was from July 1944 that there has been a sharp increase in the irrecoverable losses of the German army, primarily prisoners. In June, irrecoverable losses of ground forces amounted to 58 thousand people, and in July - 369 thousand and remained at such a high level until the end of the war. This is due to the fact that Germany was forced to withdraw significant forces of ground forces and the Luftwaffe from the Eastern Front, thanks to which the Soviet numerical superiority in manpower increased to seven or even eight times, which made any effective defense impossible.

Explaining the enormous Soviet human losses, German generals usually point to the disregard for the lives of soldiers on the part of the high command, the weak tactical training of the middle and lower command personnel, the stereotyped techniques used in the offensive, the inability of both commanders and soldiers to make independent decisions. Such statements could be considered a simple attempt to belittle the dignity of the enemy, who nevertheless won the war, if not for the numerous similar testimonies from the Soviet side. So, Zhores Medvedev recalls the battles near Novorossiysk in 1943: “The Germans had two defense lines near Novorossiysk, perfectly fortified to a depth of about 3 km. The artillery barrage was considered to be very effective, but it seems to me that the Germans quickly adapted to it. Noticing that the technique was concentrating and powerful shooting began, they went to the second line, leaving only a few machine gunners on the front line. They left and watched all this noise and smoke with the same interest as we did. Then we were ordered to go forward. We walked, were blown up by mines and occupied the trenches - already almost empty, only two or three corpses were lying there. Then the order was given - to attack the second line. It was then that up to 80% of the attackers perished - after all, the Germans were sitting in perfectly fortified structures and shot all of us almost at point-blank range. " American diplomat A. Harriman conveys Stalin's words that “in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to attack,” and comments on it this way: “This phrase of Stalin shows well that he was aware of the state of affairs in the army. We were shocked, but we understood that this makes the Red Army fight ... Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive of the Russian offensive was its massive nature. The Russians walked wave after wave. The Germans literally mowed them down, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through. "

And here is the testimony of the battles in December 1943 in Belarus by the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: "A line of people in civilian clothes with huge" sidors "behind their backs passed along the message." "Slavs, who are you, where are you from?" I asked. - "We are from the Oryol region, replenishment." - "What kind of replenishment, when in civilian and without rifles?" - "Yes, they said that you will get it in battle ..."

The artillery strike on the enemy lasted about five minutes. 36 guns of the artillery regiment "hollowed out" the leading edge of the Germans. From the shells, the visibility became even worse ...

And here is the attack. The chain rose, twisting like a black curved snake. The second is behind her. And these black wriggling and moving snakes were so absurd, so unnatural on the gray-white ground! Black in the snow is a great target. And the German "watered" these chains with dense lead. Many firing points came to life. Heavy machine guns fired from the second line of the trench. The chains are laid. The battalion commander shouted: “Go ahead, your mother! Forward! .. Into the battle! Forward! I'll shoot you! " But it was impossible to get up. Try to tear yourself off the ground under artillery, machine-gun and automatic fire ...

The commanders still managed to raise the "black" village infantry several times. But it’s all in vain. The enemy's fire was so dense that, after running a couple of steps, people fell as if knocked down. We, the artillerymen, could not reliably help either - there was no visibility, the Germans well camouflaged the firing points, and, most likely, the main machine-gun fire was fired from the bunkers, and therefore the firing of our guns did not give the desired results. "

The same memoirist very colorfully describes the reconnaissance in force carried out by a battalion of penalties, so much praised by many memoirists from among the marshals and generals: “Two divisions of our regiment took part in a ten-minute fire raid - and that was all. After the fire, there was silence for some seconds. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: “Guys! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Behind me! Hurray-ah-ah! " The penalties slowly climbed out of the trench and, as if having waited for the latter, threw up their rifles at the ready, ran. A groan or a cry with a drawn-out "ah-ah" poured from left to right and again to the left, then dying out, then intensifying. We also jumped out of the trench and ran forward. The Germans threw a series of red missiles towards the attackers and immediately opened powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, lay down and we - a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. It was impossible to raise my head. How to pinpoint and who will pinpoint the enemy's targets in this hell? His artillery hit from closed positions and far from the flanks. Heavy weapons were also beating. Several tanks fired direct fire, their shells-blanks with a howl swept overhead ...

Penalties lay in front of the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German “threshed” this field, plowing the land, bushes, and the bodies of people ... Only seven people left us with a battalion of penalties, and there were all together - 306. "

Incidentally, there was no attack in this area.

We have a story about such senseless and bloody attacks in the memoirs and letters of German soldiers and junior officers. One unnamed witness describes an attack by A.A. Vlasov to the height occupied by the Germans near Kiev in August 1941, and his description in detail coincides with the story of the Soviet officer cited above. Here and useless artillery preparation past the German positions, and the attack in thick waves, perishing under German machine guns, and an unknown commander, unsuccessfully trying to raise his people and dying from a German bullet. Such attacks on a not very important height continued for three days in a row. The German soldiers were most struck by the fact that when the whole wave was dying, single soldiers still continued to run forward (the Germans were incapable of such senseless actions). These failed attacks nevertheless drained the Germans physically. And, as the German serviceman recalls, he and his comrades were most shocked and depressed by the methodical nature and scale of these attacks: “If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate such insignificant results of our advancement, then how often and how many will they attack people if the object is really very important? " (The German author could not imagine that otherwise the Red Army simply could not and could not attack.)

And in the letter of the German soldier home during the retreat from Kursk in the second half of 1943, it is described, as in the cited letter of V. Dyatlov, an attack of almost unarmed and uniformed reinforcements from the newly liberated territories (the same Oryol region), in which the overwhelming majority died participants (according to an eyewitness, even women were among the summoned). The prisoners said that the authorities suspected the inhabitants of cooperation with the occupation authorities, and mobilization served as a kind of punishment for them. And the same letter describes the attack of Soviet penalties through a German minefield to blow up mines at the cost of his own life (D. Eisenhower cites the story of Marshal G.K. Zhukov about this practice of Soviet troops in his memoirs). And again, the German soldier was most struck by the obedience of the mobilized and the penalty box. The prisoners of the penalty box, "with rare exceptions, have never complained about such treatment." they said that life is difficult and that "mistakes have to be paid." Such obedience of Soviet soldiers clearly shows that the Soviet regime educated not only commanders capable of giving such inhuman orders, but also soldiers capable of carrying out such orders unquestioningly.

The inability of the Red Army to fight otherwise than at the cost of a lot of blood is also evidenced by high-ranking Soviet military leaders. So, Marshal A.I. Eremenko characterizes the features of the "art of war" of the famous (deservedly so?) "Marshal of victory" G.K. Zhukova: “It should be said that Zhukov's operational art is 5-6 times superiority in forces, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight in numbers and builds his career on blood.” By the way, in another case, the same A.I. Eremenko conveyed his impression of acquaintance with the memoirs of German generals: “The question naturally arises, why the Hitlerite“ heroes ”, who“ won ”our squad together, and five of them a whole platoon, could not complete the tasks in the first period of the war, when the undeniable numerical and was technical superiority on their side? " It turns out that the irony is ostentatious, because A.I. Eremenko actually knew well that the German commanders did not exaggerate the balance of forces in favor of the Red Army. After all, G.K. Zhukov headed the main operations in the main directions and had an overwhelming superiority of forces and equipment. Another thing is that other Soviet generals and marshals hardly knew how to fight differently than G.K. Zhukov, and A.I. Eremenko was no exception here.

We also note that the huge irrecoverable losses of the Red Army did not allow, to the same extent as in the Wehrmacht, and even more so in the armies of the Western Allies, to retain experienced soldiers and junior commanders, which reduced the cohesion and resilience of units and did not allow reinforcement soldiers to adopt combat experience from veterans , which further increased the loss. Such an unfavorable ratio of irrecoverable losses for the USSR was a consequence of the fundamental flaw of the communist totalitarian system, which deprived people of the ability to independently make decisions and act, taught everyone, including the military, to act according to a template, to avoid even a reasonable risk and, more than the enemy, to be afraid of responsibility before their higher authorities.

As the former intelligence officer E.I. Malashenko, who rose to the rank of lieutenant general after the war, even at the very end of the war, Soviet troops often acted very ineffectively: “A few hours before the offensive of our division on March 10, a reconnaissance group ... captured a prisoner. He showed that the main forces of his regiment had been withdrawn 8-10 km in depth ... By phone, I reported this information to the division commander, and that information to the commander. The division commander gave us his car to deliver the prisoner to the army headquarters. Approaching the command post, we heard the rumble of the artillery preparation that had begun. Unfortunately, it was carried out on unoccupied positions. Thousands of shells delivered with great difficulty through the Carpathians (the case took place on the 4th Ukrainian Front. - B.S.), were wasted. The surviving enemy stopped the advance of our troops by stubborn resistance. " The same author gives a comparative assessment of the fighting qualities of German and Soviet soldiers and officers - not in favor of the Red Army: “German soldiers and officers fought well. The rank and file were well trained, skillfully acted in the offensive and on the defensive. Well-trained non-commissioned officers played a more prominent role in battle than our sergeants, many of whom were almost indistinguishable from the rank and file. The enemy infantry constantly fired intensively, acted persistently and swiftly in the offensive, stubbornly defended itself and launched quick counterattacks, usually with the support of artillery fire, and sometimes air strikes. The tankers also aggressively attacked, fired on the move and from short stops, skillfully maneuvered and conducted reconnaissance. If they failed, they quickly concentrated their efforts in the other direction, often striking at the joints and flanks of our units. The artillery quickly opened fire and sometimes conducted it very accurately. She had a lot of ammunition at her disposal. German officers skillfully organized the battle and controlled the actions of their subunits and units, skillfully used the terrain, and made timely maneuvers to an advantageous direction. With the threat of encirclement or defeat, German units and subunits made an organized retreat into the depths, usually to occupy a new line. The soldiers and officers of the enemy were intimidated by rumors of reprisals against the prisoners, they surrendered without a fight extremely rarely ...

Our infantry was less trained than the German. However, she fought bravely. Of course, there have been cases of panic and premature withdrawal, especially at the beginning of the war. The infantry was greatly assisted by artillery, the most effective was the Katyusha fire when repelling enemy counterattacks and delivering strikes on areas of concentration and concentration of troops. However, artillery in the initial period of the war had few shells. It must be admitted that tank units did not always act skillfully in attacks. At the same time, in the operational depth during the development of the offensive, they showed themselves brilliantly. "

The exorbitant losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War were recognized even then by some Soviet generals, although this was by no means safe. For example, Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin, who had previously commanded the army, and then was engaged in the preparation of reserves, had the imprudence to write in his diary that the Supreme High Command "does not care about the preservation of manpower and allows large losses in certain operations." This, along with others, "anti-Soviet" statement cost the general a sentence of 25 years in the camps. And another commander - Major General of Aviation A.A. Tuzhansky - in 1942 he received only 12 years in the camps for a completely fair opinion about the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau, which "are intended only to calm the masses and do not correspond to reality, since they diminish our losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy."

It is interesting that about the same as in the Great Patriotic War, was the ratio of irrecoverable losses between the Russian and German troops in the First World War. This follows from the research carried out by S.G. Nelipovich. In the second half of 1916, the troops of the Russian Northern and Western Fronts lost 54 thousand killed and 42.35 thousand missing. The German troops operating on these fronts, and the few Austro-Hungarian divisions that fought on the Western Front, lost 7.7 thousand killed and 6.1 thousand missing. This gives a 7.0: 1 ratio for both killed and missing. On the Southwestern Front, Russian losses amounted to 202.8 thousand killed. The Austrian troops operating against him lost 55.1 thousand killed, and the German troops - 21.2 thousand killed. The ratio of losses turns out to be very indicative, especially taking into account the fact that in the second half of 1916, Germany had far from the best on the Eastern Front, mostly second-order divisions. If we assume that the ratio of Russian and German losses here was the same as on the other two fronts, then from the Russian South-Western Front, about 148.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed in battles against the Germans, and about 54.4 thousand - in battles against the Austro-Hungarian troops. Thus, with the Austrians, the ratio of casualties was even slightly in our favor - 1.01: 1, and the Austrians lost much more prisoners than the Russians - 377.8 thousand missing against 152.7 thousand from the Russians throughout the South -Western front, including in battles against German troops. If we extend these ratios to the entire war as a whole, the ratio between the total losses of Russia and its opponents killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and in captivity can be estimated as 1.9: 1. This calculation is done as follows. German losses on the Eastern Front of the First World War amounted to, including losses on the Romanian front, 173.8 thousand killed and 143.3 thousand missing. In total, according to official data, there were 177.1 thousand prisoners of war in Russia, of which more than 101 thousand people were repatriated by the end of 1918. Died in captivity until the spring of 1918, 15.5 thousand people. Perhaps some of the German prisoners were repatriated later or died. The official Russian number of German prisoners is probably overestimated at the expense of subjects of the German Empire interned in Russia. In any case, almost all of the missing German soldiers on the Eastern Front can be attributed to prisoners. If we assume that during the entire war there were on average seven Russian soldiers per one German soldier who died, the total losses of Russia in the fight against Germany can be estimated at 1217 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front in 1914-1918 amounted to 311.7 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian missing persons reached 1194.1 thousand people, which is less than the Russian data on the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners - 1750 thousand. As in the case of Germany, in the case of Austria-Hungary, you can be sure that almost all of the missing on the Russian front are prisoners. Then, extending the proportion between the Russian and Austrian killed, which we established for the second half of 1916, for the entire period of the First World War, the Russian casualties in the fight against the Austro-Hungarian troops can be estimated at 308.6 thousand people. Losses of Turkey in the First World War by those killed by B.Ts. Urlanis are estimated at 250 thousand people, of which, in his opinion, the Caucasian front accounts for probably up to 150 thousand people. However, this figure has to be questioned. The fact is that the same B.Ts. Urlanis cites data that 65 thousand Turks were in Russian captivity, and 110 thousand in British captivity. It can be assumed that the real combat activity in the Middle East (including the Thessaloniki front) and the Caucasian theaters of military operations differed in the same proportion, given that since the beginning of 1917 there were no active hostilities on the Caucasian front. Then the number of Turkish soldiers killed in hostilities against the Caucasian Front, as well as against Russian troops in Galicia and Romania can be estimated at 93 thousand people. The losses of the Russian army in the fight against Turkey are unknown. Considering that the Turkish troops were significantly inferior to the Russians in terms of combat capability, the losses of the Russian Caucasian Front can be estimated half as much as the Turkish losses - at 46.5 thousand killed. The losses of the Turks in the fight against the Anglo-French troops can be estimated at 157 thousand killed. Of these, about half died at the Dardanelles, where Turkish troops lost 74.6 thousand people, British troops, including New Zealanders, Australians, Indians and Canadians - 33.0 thousand killed, and French troops - about 10 thousand killed. This gives a 1.7: 1 ratio, close to what we assumed for the losses of the Turkish and Russian armies.

The total losses of the Russian army killed in the First World War can be estimated at 1601 thousand people, and the losses of its opponents - 607 thousand people, or 2.6 times less. For comparison, let us determine the ratio of casualties on the Western Front of the First World War, where German troops fought with British, French and Belgian troops. Here Germany lost 590.9 thousand people killed before August 1, 1918. Over the last 3 months and 11 days of the war, German casualties can be estimated at about one quarter of the preceding 12 months of the war, taking into account that in November there were almost no hostilities. The losses of Germany in the period from August 1, 1917 to July 31, 1918, according to the official sanitary report, amounted to 181.8 thousand killed. Taking this into account, the losses in the last months of the war can be estimated at 45.5 thousand people, and all the losses of Germany killed on the Western Front - at 636.4 thousand people. The losses of the French ground forces in killed and died from wounds in the First World War amounted to 1104.9 thousand people. If we subtract from this number 232 thousand deaths from wounds, the death toll can be estimated at 873 thousand people. Probably, about 850 thousand people were killed on the Western Front. British troops in France and Flanders lost 381 thousand killed. The total losses of the killed British dominions amounted to 119 thousand people. Of these, at least 90 thousand died on the Western Front. Belgium lost 13.7 thousand people killed. American troops lost 37 thousand people killed. The total losses of the Allies killed in the West are equal to approximately 1,372 thousand people, and in Germany - 636 thousand people. The loss ratio turns out to be 2.2: 1, which turns out to be three times more favorable for the Entente than the ratio between Russia and Germany.

The extremely unfavorable ratio of losses between Russia and Germany is leveled out at the expense of the losses of the German allies. To get the total irrecoverable losses of Russia in the First World War, it is necessary to add to the losses of those killed by those who died from wounds, died from diseases and died in captivity - respectively 240 thousand, 160 thousand (together with victims of suicides and accidents) and 190 thousand. human. Then the total irrecoverable losses of the Russian army can be estimated at 2.2 million people. The total number of Russian prisoners is estimated at 2.6 million people. In Russian captivity, about 15.5 thousand German and at least 50 thousand Austro-Hungarian soldiers, as well as about 10 thousand Turks, died. The total number of deaths from wounds in the German army is estimated at 320 thousand people. Considering that the Eastern Front accounts for about 21.5% of all killed German soldiers, the losses of Germany in the fight against Russia who died of wounds can be estimated at 69 thousand people. The number of deaths from illness and accidents in the German army is estimated at 166,000. Of these, up to 36 thousand people may fall on the Russian front. The Austrians lost 170 thousand people who died from wounds and 120 thousand people died from diseases. Since the Russian front accounts for 51.2% of all losses of Austria-Hungary (4273.9 thousand people out of 8349.2 thousand), the number of deaths from wounds and deaths from diseases related to the Russian front can be estimated at 87 thousand, respectively. . and 61 thousand people. The Turks lost 68 thousand deaths from wounds and 467 thousand deaths from diseases. Of these, the Russian front accounts for 25 thousand and 173 thousand people, respectively. The total irrecoverable losses of Russia's opponents in the First World War amounted to about 1133.5 thousand people. The ratio of total deadweight losses is 1.9: 1. It becomes even more favorable for the Russian side than the ratio of only those killed, due to the significant death rate from disease in the Turkish army.

The ratio of losses in the First World War was much more favorable for the Russian army than in the Second World War, only due to the fact that in 1914-1918, not German, but much less combat-ready Austro-Hungarian troops fought on the Russian front.

Such an unfavorable for Russia (USSR) ratio of losses in two world wars in relation to the losses of German troops is explained primarily by the general economic and cultural backwardness of Russia in comparison with Germany and with the Western allies. In the case of the Second World War, the situation was aggravated due to the peculiarities of Stalin's totalitarianism, which destroyed the army as an effective instrument of warfare. Stalin failed, as he urged, to overcome in ten years the lag behind the leading capitalist countries, which he defined as 50-100 years. But he completely remained in line with the late imperial tradition, preferred to win not with skill, but with great blood, since he saw a potential threat to the regime in the creation of a highly professional army.

Losses of the Japanese merchant fleet from American submarines in World War II

APPENDIX 3 Success of the French Navy in World War II Notes: * - Success achieved with the participation of ships or aircraft of allies P - Captured as a prize + - Sunk = - Seriously damaged 1 - The ship was killed by mines displayed in May