Immortal feats of Soviet tankers. The exploits of heroes-tankers during the great patriotic war

The history of the Great Patriotic War contains hundreds of names of heroes-tankers, whose exploits today amaze and even shock. Their courage made it possible to withstand the hardest battles, and their ingenuity helped out, even when the enemy was several times outnumbered. Last Sunday, the country honored everyone involved in the Day of the Tankman, and we decided to remember the defenders who fought in the "combat vehicle".

Zinovy ​​Kolobanov and the road to Leningrad

Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov commanded a company of heavy KV tanks during the Great Patriotic War 1st tank division of the Northern Front. on the outskirts of Leningrad at the state farm Voiskovitsa, a famous tank battle took place, in which KV-1 Kolobanov destroyed an enemy convoy of 22 combat vehicles. This battle made it possible to delay the advance of the Germans and save Leningrad from a lightning-fast capture.

The crew of the KV-1 Z.G. Kolobanova (center), August 1941.Photo: P.V. Maisky

Vladimir Khazov and three T-34s

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Khazov was instructed to stop a convoy of German tanks near the village of Olkhovatka. Having reached the indicated area, they decided to act from cover. The young officer believed that the main weapon was surprise, and he was right. Three Soviet T-34 managed to defeat 27 German combat vehicles. Numerical superiority did not allow the enemy to emerge victorious from this battle, and Khazov's platoon in full force returned to the battalion's location.

Alexey Roman and the capture of an impregnable bridgehead

The last water obstacle on the way to Berlin was the Oder River; the enemy tried to hold these lines at any cost. The tank company of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Roman was the first in line to cross the river. For several days, in the hardest battles, the tankers not only managed to force the Oder northwest of Breslau, but also captured the adjacent, previously unapproachable German bridgehead. For the heroic crossing, the young officer was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Dmitry Zakrevsky and a hijacked German tank

The scouts under the command of Captain Dmitry Zakrevsky hijacked a German tank from the enemy rear. During the operation, near the village of Buzuluk, the defenders found a Nazi T-IV, and in it portable maps of enemy commanders and other secret documents. Courage and ingenuity allowed the scouts not only to overcome the German and Soviet lines of defense, but also to return to the location of the battalion in full force.

“Courage exceeds quantity” - these words belong to the ancient Greek named Vegetius. But they have not lost their relevance even during tank battles.

Very often, stories about the exploits of Soviet heroes-tankers during the Great Patriotic War are associated with the KV machine. Especially when it comes to the first year of the war: the KV-1 tank, even without additional modifications, surpassed German military equipment both in firepower and in armor. For example, the famous feat of a senior lieutenant, commander of a tank company Kolobanov, under whose command the KV-1 tank from an ambush during more than an hour's "duel" with the enemy destroyed a German tank column (22 tanks), fired more than 98 shots from a stationary position, he himself received more 100 direct hits on armor, but what is typical - not a single penetration at the same time. All damage to Kolobanov's KV-1 was limited to a "broken" triplex and a jammed turret rotation mechanism. And there are a lot of similar stories, when tankers in KV-shkakh simply crushed the enemy with power ...

But the story will focus on another legendary Soviet tank crew, on whose side there was neither a record reservation guaranteeing protection, nor firepower superior to the enemy, as in the KV crews ...

Only reckless courage, resourcefulness and healthy military impudence.

On October 17, 1941, a separate 21st tank brigade was tasked with making a deep raid along the Bolshoye Selishche-Lebedevo route, crushing the enemy in Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino, capturing the city of Kalinin (Tver), freeing it from the Germans. In short - to conduct reconnaissance in force, break through the city and connect with the defense on the Moscow highway.

The tank battalion of Major Agibalov goes to the Volokolamskoe highway. In the vanguard of the column are T-34s: tanks of senior sergeant Gorobets and platoon commander Kireev with the task of identifying and suppressing enemy firing points. On the highway, tanks are catching up with a German column of armored vehicles and vehicles with infantry. The Germans notice the pursuit, deploy anti-tank guns and the battle begins. Kireev's tank is hit and slides into a ditch. Gorobets's tank rushes forward, ironing out the German anti-tank battery, and then, without slowing down, breaks into the village of Efremovo, where it engages in battle with the rest of the forces of the German column. Having fired at German tanks at speed, crushed three trucks and thinned out the infantry of 34 senior sergeant Stepan Gorobets with hull number "03" with machine-gun fire, rushes through the village and jumps back onto the highway: The path to Kalinin (Tver) is open ...

At the same time, the tank battalion of Major Agibalov, following the vanguard of two T-34s, falls under the air raid of the Junkers, several vehicles are knocked out and the commander stops the convoy. But after the attack on the Germans entrenched in the village, the radio communication of the Gorobets tank was damaged. The crew of the T-34, separated from the main convoy by more than 500 meters, does not know that the convoy has stopped! Gorobets, not yet knowing that he was left alone, continues to fulfill the task of the vanguard: without slowing down to conduct reconnaissance in force, and moves to the city of Kalinin (Tver). Right on the highway, a convoy of German motorcyclists overtakes and destroys it ...

Now imagine the situation: October 1941, the early snow is already breaking down, the Germans are advancing on Moscow. The main defensive battles for Kalinin (Tver) have already died down, the Germans have occupied the city and fortified in it, pushing back the Soviet troops and occupying defensive positions on the outskirts of the city. The task assigned to the tank brigade - reconnaissance in force - is actually a tank raid along the rear from Volokolamskoe highway to Moscow highway: break through, make noise, try to recapture the city and connect with the front in another sector. But instead of a tank column, one tank breaks through to the city - the "troika" st. Sergeant Gorobets.

When leaving the village of Lebedevo to the right of the highway, the tankers find a German airfield with planes and petrol tankers. 34 enters the battle, shells the airfield, destroys two Junkers Ju-87 and blows up the fuel tank. And when the German anti-aircraft guns are deployed to fire direct fire at an impudent Soviet tank ... At this moment, Sergeant Gorobets understands that his attack is not supported by the battalion's tanks, which, in theory, should have already caught up with the vanguard that got involved in the battle, supporting them with fire and maneuver, and roll out this whole German airfield, anti-aircraft guns and other protection like a tortoise god. The radio is silent, there is no connection. Nothing is known about the fate of the column, just as the distance separating Gorobets' troika from the tank battalion is unknown ...

And since the anti-aircraft guns are already beginning to hit the tank with direct fire, Gorobets makes a bold and somewhat impudent decision: leaving from under the shelling, break through to Kalinin alone. From such military impudence of the Russians, German soldiers and officers always tore the template into small pieces, and so that even after many years they lamented in their memoirs that they could not understand how, for example, an infantry battalion could be attacked on the march from an ambush by the forces of five riflemen? ...

How can you attack a defensive enemy in a city with one tank?

And here's how: leaving under anti-aircraft gunfire in the direction of Kalinin, Gorobets's car again meets a German convoy, rams three cars and shoots the infantry. Without slowing down, the tank rushes into the city, turns left on Lermontov Street and rushes with a whistling and whooping roar and firing along Traktornaya Street, then along 1st Zalineinaya Street ... In the area of ​​Tekstilshchikov Park, Gorobets's tank turns to the right under the viaduct and flies into the Proletarka courtyard ": The workshops of the cotton mill and factory # 510 are on fire, the workers were on the defensive here ... The crew notices that a German anti-tank gun is aiming at the tank. Gorobets aims at the enemy, but the German cannon fires first, a fire starts in the tank from a shell hit ...

Fedor Litovchenko, mechanic of 34 Gorobets leads the tank to ram and crushes the enemy with tracks, while the remaining three crew members are fighting the fire using fire extinguishers, rugs, quilted jackets, duffel bags ... The fire is extinguished, the enemy's firing position is destroyed, but from a direct hit the turret is jammed by the gun: shooting is impossible. Only machine guns are now active from weapons.

Gorobets's car moves further along Bolshevikov Street, then along the right bank of the Tmaka River past the nunnery, then immediately crosses the river across a dilapidated bridge, risking collapsing a ferry that was not designed for a 30-ton weight of the tank, and flies to the left bank of the Tmaka. The tank enters the target of the Golovinsky shaft, but when trying to go out onto Sofia Perovskaya Street, it meets an unexpected obstacle: the installed rails, which are deeply dug into the ground - another hello from the factory workers who held the defenses here. At the risk of being discovered, the tankers use the tank as a tractor and loosen the rails dug into the ground, pushing them aside and thereby clearing the passage. Gorobets's car enters the tram lines laid along the wide street ...

A black tank, soaked from a fire, is walking along a wide street in the city occupied by the Germans, kicking up fresh snow with its tracks. Not a star or a number on the side of the tank is simply not visible. The Germans do not react to him - I take it for my own. Suddenly the crew notices a column of captured ZISs and GAZ trucks with infantry moving towards them on the left side of the street: the cars are repainted, German soldiers are sitting in the bodies. Remembering the inactive gun of the tank, Gorobets gives the order to the mechanic: "Fedya, let's go straight to them." A sharp turn and the tank crashes into the convoy at full speed: roar, crackling, the Germans jump out of their cars in panic, radio operator Ivan Pastushin starts pouring fire on them from a machine gun ... The tank ironed the entire convoy without leaving a single whole car. The Germans began to hastily radio that "Russian tanks are in the city", not knowing that this is the only vehicle.

Flying out onto Sovetskaya Street, 34 stumbles upon a German tank. Using the surprise effect, Gorobets's tank bypasses the German and rams the enemy tank into the side, throwing it off the street onto the sidewalk and stalling. The atmosphere is nowhere better: the Germans leaning out of the hatches yell "Rus, surrendering", the 34's crew is trying to start the engine ... This is not successful on the first try, and suddenly - good news: the loader Grigory Kolomiets was able to revive the gun! ..

Gavriil Antonovich Polovchenya by the time the Great Patriotic War began was already an experienced soldier. In the army, he, a native of the village of Yazil, Bobruisk district of the Minsk province of the Russian Empire, was drafted in 1927.

He began as a private in a cavalry regiment. After completing his military service, he attended courses for driver mechanics, then - courses for middle command personnel. He took part in the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet-Finnish war. On June 22, 1941, he met with the rank of senior lieutenant. By the beginning of November 1941, GA Polovchenya was promoted to captain and was appointed deputy commander of the 141st separate heavy tank battalion.

In January 1942, the battalion took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmsk operation as part of the North-Western Front. The battalion was tasked with breaking through the enemy's defenses and developing an offensive in the direction of Luga, Andreapol and further to Velizh.

On January 9, the 141st separate tank battalion broke through the front line of the enemy's defenses and rushed into the breakthrough. The tankers crossed the lake across the ice, took the village of Okhvat and went towards Luga. Captain Polovchenya fought in a T-34 tank. In excitement, he broke away from his battalion, since the heavy KV tanks could not keep up with him. On January 11, the Polovchenya tank broke into the village of Luga alone. A German regiment was stationed there.

The crew of the tank of Captain Polovchenya, using a cannon, machine gun and tracks, destroyed 2 anti-tank guns, 6 mortars, as well as machine guns, ammunition wagons. Two battalions of infantry were put to flight. The losses of the Germans were numbered in the hundreds of those killed.

In addition to the brilliant performance of the combat mission, the Polovchenya raid saved 85 villagers from certain death. The Nazis accused them of being connected with partisans, drove them into one of the houses and were going to publicly burn them the next day.

But that is not all. On January 12, the Polovchenya tank burst into the neighboring village of Aleksino. Here the Germans fired at the tank and damaged it, forcing it to stop. The Nazis tried to take the crew prisoner, and when this did not work, they threw a tarpaulin over the tank, doused it with gasoline and set it on fire. However, the crew managed to start the tank and bring down the flames. The tank returned safely to Luga.

The next day, January 13, the 141st separate tank battalion approached the city of Andreapol. Captain Polovchenya received an order with two tanks to go to the railway station, where a German echelon with Soviet citizens who were going to be hijacked to Germany was ready to send. Polovchenya's tanks were supposed to block the train.

However, the tank in which Gavrila Antonovich was located fell through the ice of the river, and no matter how hard the tankers tried, they could not get out of the ice trap. A tractor was needed. Polovchenya decided to wait for the approach of the Red Army units. He ordered the crew of the second tank to go to the railway station and complete a combat mission.

The tank stuck in the river was soon noticed by the Germans. The trophy was notable, and it was impossible to miss it. The Germans cautiously approached the tank. The crew sat quietly inside, showing no signs of life. Polovchenya's plan was simple and daring: let the Germans pull the tank out of the river themselves, and once free, the crew would find an opportunity to use the first convenient moment.

Bypassing the tank, knocking with rifle butts, trying to open the turret hatch and failing to do so, the Germans decided that the tank had been abandoned.

I must say, the frost was at 35 degrees, and the Germans could not even imagine that in such a cold someone would be able to stay inside a tank stuck in the ice for so long.

Finally, the Germans drove a tractor, hooked on the tank and pulled it ashore. It was January 15th. By this time, the tankers were already suffering from the cold, but still did not give themselves away.

The thirty-four was dragged to Adreapol, to the territory of the industrial complex. There were guards here, so the soldiers had to continue to secretly sit inside the tank. In the meantime, their radio was working properly, and Captain Polovchenya was able to contact the command and receive the necessary instructions.

On January 16, at five o'clock in the morning, the crew of the captured tank set off for a breakthrough. Thirty-cheverka broke into the streets of the city, opened fire on the enemy, sowing panic among the Germans. During the battle, the crew of Polovcheni destroyed 12 guns, 30 vehicles with ammunition, and more than 20 enemy soldiers and officers. The disorganized Germans were unable to provide adequate resistance to the approaching units of the Red Army, and the city of Adreapol was liberated on the same day.

For these feats during the Toropetsko-Kholmsk operation, Gavriil Antonovich was promoted to major, and he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Half a battle just as skillfully and bravely fought until the end of the Great Patriotic War, and when the war ended, he continued to serve in the armored and mechanized troops of the USSR. Having retired, GA Polovchenya lived in Ukraine, worked as chief engineer and director of the machine and tractor section, at the Black Sea shipyard. He died in 1988.

Against the T-34, the German cars were shit.
Captain A.V. Maryevsky

“I could. I held out. Destroyed five buried tanks. They could not do anything, because they were T-III, T-IV tanks, and I was in a thirty-four, frontal armor, which their shells did not penetrate. "

Few tankers of the countries participating in the Second World War could repeat these words of the commander of the T-34 tank, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar, regarding their combat vehicles. The Soviet T-34 tank became a legend primarily because those people who sat at the levers and the sighting devices of its cannon and machine guns believed in it. In the memoirs of tankers, one can trace the thought expressed by the famous Russian military theorist A.A. Svechin: "If the importance of material resources in a war is very relative, then faith in them is of great importance." Svechin went through the Great War of 1914-18 as an infantry officer, saw the debut on the battlefield of heavy artillery, airplanes and armored vehicles, and he knew what he was talking about. If the soldiers and officers have faith in the equipment entrusted to them, then they will act bolder and more decisively, paving their way to victory. On the contrary, distrust, the willingness to give up mentally or a really weak sample of weapons will lead to defeat. Of course, we are not talking about blind faith based on propaganda or speculation. Confidence in people was inspired by the design features, which strikingly distinguished the T-34 from a number of combat vehicles of that time: the inclined arrangement of armor plates and the V-2 diesel engine.

The principle of increasing the effectiveness of the tank's protection due to the inclined arrangement of the armor sheets was understandable to anyone who studied geometry at school. “The T-34 had thinner armor than the panthers and tigers. Total thickness approx. 45 mm. But since it was located at an angle, the leg was about 90 mm, which made it difficult to break through, ”? recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Alexander Sergeevich Burtsev. The use of geometric constructions in the defense system instead of the brute force of a simple increase in the thickness of the armor plates gave in the eyes of the T-34 crews an undeniable advantage to their tank over the enemy. “The arrangement of the armor plates for the Germans was worse, mostly vertically. This is, of course, a big minus. Our tanks had them at an angle, ”recalls the battalion commander, Captain Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov.

Of course, all these theses had not only theoretical but also practical substantiation. German anti-tank and tank guns with a caliber of up to 50 mm in most cases did not penetrate the upper frontal part of the T-34 tank. Moreover, even the subcaliber shells of the 50-mm PAK-38 anti-tank gun and the 50-mm T-III tank gun with a barrel length of 60 calibers, which were supposed to pierce the T-34's forehead according to trigonometric calculations, in reality ricocheted from the sloped armor of high hardness. without causing any damage to the tank. Conducted in September - October 1942, NII-48 (Central Research Institute No. 48 of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry), a statistical study of combat damage to T-34 tanks that were being repaired at repair bases No. 1 and 2 in Moscow, showed that out of 109 hits the upper frontal part of the tank was 89% safe, and dangerous injuries occurred on guns with a caliber of 75 mm and above. Of course, with the advent of the Germans a large number of 75-mm anti-tank and tank guns, the situation became more complicated. The 75-mm shells were normalized (deployed at right angles to the armor upon impact), piercing the sloped frontal armor of the T-34 hull already at a distance of 1200 m.The 88-mm anti-aircraft cannon shells and cumulative ammunition were just as insensitive to the slope of the armor. However, the share of 50-mm guns in the Wehrmacht until the battle on the Kursk Bulge was significant and the belief in the sloped armor of the "thirty-four" was largely justified.

Any noticeable advantages over the T-34 armor were noted by tankers only in the armor protection of British tanks. “... if a blank penetrated the turret, then the commander of the British tank and the gunner could remain alive, since practically no fragments were formed, and in the thirty-four the armor was crumbling and those in the turret had little chance of surviving,” recalls V. P. Bryukhov ...

This was due to the exceptionally high nickel content in the armor of the British Matilda and Valentine tanks. If the Soviet 45-mm armor of high hardness contained 1.0 - 1.5% nickel, then the medium-hard armor of British tanks contained 3.0 - 3.5% nickel, which provided a slightly higher viscosity of the latter. At the same time, no modifications were made to the protection of T-34 tanks by the crews in the units. Only before the Berlin operation, according to Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Petrovich Schwebig, the former deputy brigade commander of the 12th Guards Tank Corps for the technical part, screens from metal bed nets were welded onto the tanks to protect them from faust cartridges. The well-known cases of shielding "thirty-fours" are the fruit of the creativity of repair shops and manufacturing plants. The same can be said about the painting of tanks. The tanks came from the factory painted green inside and out. When preparing the tank for winter, the task of the deputy commanders of tank units for the technical part included painting the tanks with whitewash. The exception was the winter of 1944-45, when the war was raging across Europe. None of the veterans remembers wearing camouflage on tanks.

An even more obvious and inspiring design detail for the T-34 was the diesel engine. Most of those who were trained as a driver, radio operator or even a commander of a T-34 tank in civilian life in one way or another faced with fuel, at least with gasoline. They knew very well from personal experience that gasoline is volatile, flammable and burns with a bright flame. The quite obvious experiments with gasoline were used by the engineers who created the T-34. “In the midst of the dispute, the designer Nikolai Kucherenko used not the most scientific, but a clear example of the advantages of the new fuel at the factory yard. He took a lighted torch and brought it to a bucket of gasoline - the bucket instantly engulfed the flame. Then the same torch was lowered into a bucket of diesel fuel - the flame extinguished, as in water ... "(Ibragimov DS Confrontation. M .: DOSAAF, 1989. P.49 - 50). This experiment was projected on the effect of hitting a tank with a projectile capable of setting fire to fuel or even its vapors inside the car. Accordingly, the crew members of the T-34 treated enemy tanks to some extent with condescension. “They were with a gasoline engine. This is also a big drawback, ”recalls the gunner-radio operator Senior Sergeant Pyotr Ilyich Kirichenko. The same attitude was towards tanks supplied under Lend-Lease (“Many died because a bullet hit him, and there was a petrol engine and nonsense armor there,” recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Yuri Maksovich Polyanovsky) and Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns equipped with a carburetor engine ("Once the SU-76 came to our battalion. They were with gasoline engines - a real lighter. ... They all burned out in the very first battles ..." - VP Bryukhov recalls). The presence of a diesel engine in the engine compartment of the tank instilled in the crews the confidence that they had much less chances of accepting a terrible death from fire than the enemy, whose tanks were fueled with hundreds of liters of volatile and flammable gasoline. The neighborhood with large volumes of fuel (the number of buckets of which the tankers had to estimate every time the tank was refueled) was concealed by the thought that it would be more difficult for anti-tank cannon shells to set it on fire, and in the event of a fire, the tankers would have enough time to jump out of the tank.

However, in this case, the direct projection of the experiments with the bucket onto the tanks was not entirely justified. Moreover, statistically, tanks with diesel engines did not have advantages in fire safety in relation to cars with carburetor engines. According to statistics from October 1942, diesel T-34s burned even slightly more often than T-70 tanks fueled with aviation gasoline (23% versus 19%). The engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that was directly opposite to the everyday assessment of the possibilities of ignition of various types of fuel. “The use by the Germans on the new tank, released in 1942, of a carburetor engine, rather than a diesel engine, can be explained: [...] engines, especially with the competent design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers "(Design features of the Maybach HL 210 P45 engine and the power plant of the German heavy tank T-VI (Tiger). GBTU KA, 1943, p. 94). Bringing the torch to a bucket of gasoline, the designer Kucherenko set fire to a vapor of volatile fuel. There were no vapors in the bucket over the diesel oil layer that were favorable for ignition by the torch. But this fact did not mean that diesel fuel would not ignite from a much more powerful means of ignition - a projectile hit. Therefore, the placement of fuel tanks in the fighting compartment of the T-34 tank did not at all increase the fire safety of the thirty-four in comparison with their peers, whose tanks were located in the rear of the hull and were hit much less frequently. V.P. Bryukhov confirms what was said: “When does the tank catch fire? When the projectile hits the fuel tank. And it burns when there is a lot of fuel. And by the end of the fighting, there is no fuel, and the tank hardly burns. "

The tankers believed that the only advantage of the engines of German tanks over the T-34 engine was less noise. “The petrol engine is flammable on the one hand and quiet on the other. The T-34 not only roars, but also clicks its tracks, ”recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Arsentiy Konstantinovich Rodkin. The power plant of the T-34 tank did not initially provide for the installation of mufflers on the exhaust pipes. They were brought out to the stern of the tank without any sound-absorbing devices, roaring with the exhaust of a 12-cylinder engine. In addition to the noise, the powerful engine of the tank raised dust with its exhaust, devoid of a muffler. “The T-34 kicks up a terrible dust because the exhaust pipes are directed downward,” recalls A.K. Rodkin.

The designers of the T-34 tank gave their brainchild two features that set it apart from the combat vehicles of allies and opponents. These features of the tank added confidence to the crew in their weapons. People went into battle with pride for the equipment entrusted to them. This was much more important than the actual effect of the slope of the armor or the real fire hazard of a diesel tank.

Tanks appeared as a means of protecting crews of machine guns and guns from enemy fire. The balance between the protection of the tank and the capabilities of anti-tank artillery is rather shaky, the artillery is constantly being improved and the newest tank cannot feel safe on the battlefield. The powerful anti-aircraft and hull guns make this balance even more precarious. Therefore, sooner or later a situation arises when a shell hitting a tank penetrates the armor and turns the steel box into hell.

Good tanks solved this problem even after death, having received one or several hits, opening the way to salvation for people inside themselves. Unusual for tanks in other countries, the driver's hatch in the upper frontal part of the T-34 hull turned out to be quite convenient in practice for leaving the vehicle in critical situations. The driver-mechanic Sergeant Semyon Lvovich Aria recalls: “The hatch was smooth, with rounded edges, and it was not difficult to get in and out of it. Moreover, when you got up from the driver's seat, you were already leaning out almost waist-deep. " Another advantage of the driver's hatch of the T-34 tank was the ability to fix it in several intermediate relatively "open" and "closed" positions. The hatch mechanism was quite simple. To facilitate opening, the heavy cast hatch (60 mm thick) was supported by a spring, the rod of which was a toothed rack. By moving the stopper from a tooth to a rack tooth, it was possible to rigidly fix the hatch without fear of its breakdown on bumps in the road or battlefield. Driver mechanics willingly used this mechanism and preferred to keep the hatch ajar: "when possible, it is always better with an open hatch" - recalls V.P. Bryukhov. His words are confirmed by the company commander, senior lieutenant Arkady Vasilyevich Maryevsky: "The mechanic's hatch is always open to the palm, firstly everything is visible, secondly, the air flow with the upper hatch open ventilates the fighting compartment" Thus, a good overview and the ability to quickly leave car when a shell hits it. On the whole, the mechanic was in the most advantageous position, according to the tankers: “The mechanic had the greatest chance of surviving. He sat low, there was sloping armor in front of him, ”recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar; according to P.I. Kirichenko: “the lower part of the hull, as a rule, is hidden behind the folds of the terrain, it is difficult to get into it. And this one rises above the ground. Mostly they got into it. And more people died who were sitting in the tower than those who were below. " It should be noted here that we are talking about hits that are dangerous for the tank. Statistically, in the initial period of the war, most of the hits fell on the hull of the tank. According to the NII-48 report mentioned above, the hull accounted for 81% of the hits, and the turret 19%. However, more than half of the total number of hits were safe (blind): 89% of hits on the upper frontal part, 66% of hits on the lower frontal part and about 40% of hits on the side did not lead to through holes. Moreover, of the hits on the side, 42% of their total number fell on the engine and transmission compartments, the defeat of which was safe for the crew. The tower, on the other hand, was relatively easy to break through. The less durable cast armor of the turret weakly resisted even 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft cannon shells. The situation was worsened by the fact that the T-34's turret was hit by heavy guns with a high line of fire, for example, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as hits from long-barreled 75-mm and 50-mm guns of German tanks. The terrain screen, which the tankman was talking about, in the European theater of operations was about one meter. Half of this meter falls on the ground clearance, the rest covers about a third of the hull height of the T-34 tank. Most of the upper frontal part of the case is no longer covered by the terrain screen.

If the driver's hatch is unanimously assessed by veterans as convenient, then tankers are equally unanimous in their negative assessment of the turret hatch of early T-34 tanks with an oval turret, nicknamed the "pie" for its characteristic shape. V.P. Bryukhov says about him: “The big hatch is bad. It is very heavy and difficult to open. If it gets stuck, is that all? nobody will jump out. " The tank commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Evdokimovich Glukhov, echoes him: “The large hatch is very inconvenient. Very heavy". Combining hatches for two side by side crew members, a gunner and a loader, was uncharacteristic for world tank building. Its appearance on the T-34 was caused not by tactical, but by technological considerations associated with the installation of a powerful gun in the tank. The tower of the predecessor of the T-34 on the conveyor of the Kharkov plant - the BT-7 tank - was equipped with two hatches, one for each of the crew members located in the tower. For its characteristic appearance with open hatches, the BT-7 was nicknamed "MickeyMaus" by the Germans. "Thirty-fours" inherited a lot from BT, but instead of a 45-mm cannon, the tank received a 76-mm gun, and the design of the tanks in the fighting compartment of the hull was changed. The need to dismantle the tanks and the massive cradle of the 76-mm gun during repairs forced the designers to combine the two turret hatches into one. The body of the F-34 gun with recoil devices was removed through a bolt-on lid in the turret aft niche, and the cradle with a toothed vertical guidance sector was retrieved through the turret hatch. Through the same hatch, the fuel tanks were also taken out, fixed in the fenders of the T-34 tank hull. All these difficulties were caused by the side walls of the turret sloped to the cannon mask. The cradle of the F-34 gun was wider and higher than the embrasure in the frontal part of the turret and could only be pulled back. The Germans removed the guns of their tanks along with his mask (in width almost equal to the width of the tower) forward. It must be said here that the designers of the T-34 paid much attention to the possibility of repairing the tank by the crew. Even ... ports for firing personal weapons on the sides and stern of the tower were adapted for this task. The port plugs were removed, and a small assembly crane was installed in the holes in the 45-mm armor to dismantle the engine or transmission. The Germans had devices on the tower for mounting such a "pocket" crane - "Pilze" - appeared only in the final period of the war.

One should not think that when installing the large hatch, the designers of the T-34 did not take into account the needs of the crew at all. In the USSR, before the war, it was believed that a large hatch would facilitate the evacuation of wounded crew members from a tank. However, combat experience, complaints from tankers about the heavy turret hatch forced A.A. Morozov's team to switch to two turret hatches during the next modernization of the tank. The hexagonal tower, nicknamed the "nut", again received "Mickey Mouse ears" - two round hatches. Such towers were installed on T-34 tanks produced in the Urals (ChTZ in Chelyabinsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and UVZ in Nizhny Tagil) from the fall of 1942. The Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky continued to produce tanks with a “pie” until the spring of 1943 ... The task of extracting tanks on tanks with a "nut" was solved using a removable armored bulkhead between the hatches of the commander and gunner. The gun began to be removed according to the method proposed in order to simplify the production of the cast tower back in 1942 at the plant number 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" - the rear part of the tower was lifted with hoists from the shoulder strap, and the gun was pushed into the gap formed between the hull and the tower.

The tankers, in order not to get into the situation "I was looking for the latch with my hands without skin," preferred not to lock the hatch, securing it ... with a trouser belt. AV Bodnar recalls: “when I went into the attack, the hatch was closed, but not on the latch. I hooked one end of the trouser belt to the hatch latch, and wrapped the other a couple of times around the hook that held the ammunition on the turret, so that if you hit your head, the belt will come off and you will jump out. " The same techniques were used by the commanders of T-34 tanks with a commander's cupola: “On the commander's cupola there was a double-leaf hatch, which was locked with two latches on springs. Even a healthy person could hardly open them, but a wounded one would definitely not be able to. We removed these springs, leaving the latches. In general, we tried to keep the hatch open - it’s easier to jump out, ”recalls A. S. Burtsev. Note that not a single design bureau, either before or after the war, used the achievements of the soldier's ingenuity in one form or another. Tanks were still equipped with hatch latches in the turret and hull, which crews preferred to keep open in battle.

The day-to-day service of the thirty-four crew abounded in situations when the crew members were under the same load, and each of them performed simple but monotonous operations, not much different from the actions of a neighbor, such as digging a trench or refueling a tank with fuel and shells. However, the battle and the march were immediately distinguished from those under construction in front of the tank on the command "To the car!" people in overalls of two crew members, who had the main responsibility for the tank. The first was the vehicle commander, who, in addition to controlling the battle on the early T-34s, acted as the gunner: “If you are the commander of a T-34-76 tank. You yourself shoot, you command the radio yourself, you do everything yourself ”(V.P. Bryukhov).

The second person in the crew, on whom a significant share of the responsibility for the tank, and therefore for the lives of his comrades in battle, fell, was the driver. The commanders of tanks and tank subunits rated the driver very highly in battle. “... An experienced driver-mechanic is half the success,” recalls N.Ye. Glukhov.

There were no exceptions to this rule. “The driver-mechanic, Grigory Ivanovich Kryukov, was 10 years older than me. Before the war he worked as a driver and had already managed to fight near Leningrad. Was injured. He felt the tank perfectly. I believe that only thanks to him we survived in the first battles, ”recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Georgy Nikolaevich Krivov. The special position of the driver-mechanic in the "thirty-four" was due to the relatively complex control, requiring experience and physical strength. To the greatest extent, this applied to the T-34 tanks of the first half of the war, on which there was a four-speed gearbox, which required the gears to move relative to each other, with the engagement of the required pair of gears of the drive and driven shafts. Changing speeds in such a box was very difficult and required great physical strength. Remembers A.V. Maryevsky: "You can't turn on the gearshift lever with one hand, you had to help yourself with your knee." To facilitate gear shifting, gearboxes have been developed that are constantly in mesh. The change in the gear ratio was no longer carried out by moving the gears, but by moving the small cam couplings sitting on the shafts. They moved along the shaft on splines and coupled with it the required pair of gears already in engagement from the moment the gearbox was assembled. A gearbox of this type had, for example, the pre-war Soviet motorcycles L-300 and AM-600, as well as the M-72 motorcycle produced since 1941, a licensed copy of the German BMW R71. The next step in the direction of improving the transmission was the introduction of synchronizers into the gearbox. These are devices that equalize the speeds of the cam clutches and gears with which they meshed when a particular gear was engaged. Shortly before engaging a low or high gear, the clutch entered into a friction clutch with a gear. So it gradually began to rotate at the same speed with the selected gear, and when the gear was switched on, the clutch between them was carried out silently and without blows. An example of a gearbox with synchronizers is the Maybach-type gearbox of the German T-III and T-IV tanks. Even more advanced were the so-called planetary gearboxes of Czech-made tanks and Matilda tanks. It is not surprising that the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, on November 6, 1940, based on the results of tests of the first T-34s, sent a letter to the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, which, in particular, said: “In the first half of 1941, the factories must develop and prepare for serial production a planetary transmission for the T-34 and KV. This will increase the average speed of the tanks and facilitate control. " They did not manage to do anything of this before the war, and in the first years of the war, the T-34 fought with the least perfect gearbox that existed at that time. "Thirty-fours" with a four-speed gearbox required very good training of driver mechanics. “If the driver is not trained, then instead of the first gear he can stick the fourth, because it is also back, or instead of the second third, which will lead to a breakdown of the gearbox. It is necessary to bring the switching skill to automatism so that he can switch with his eyes closed, ”recalls A.V. Bodnar. In addition to the difficulties in shifting gears, the four-speed gearbox was characterized as weak and unreliable, often failing. The teeth of the gears that collided when shifting broke, and even breaks in the crankcase were noted. Engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka, in a lengthy 1942 report on joint tests of domestic, captured and lend-leased equipment, gave the T-34 gearbox of the early series simply a pejorative assessment: “Gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially T-34 and KV, do not fully meet the requirements for modern combat vehicles, yielding to gearboxes of both allied tanks and enemy tanks and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology. As a result of these and other reports on the shortcomings of the "thirty-four", the State Defense Committee issued a decree of June 5, 1942 "On improving the quality of T-34 tanks." As part of the implementation of this decree, by the beginning of 1943, the design department of plant No. 183 (the Kharkov plant evacuated to the Urals) developed a five-speed gearbox with constant gear engagement, which tankers who fought on the T-34 say with such respect. The constant engagement of the gears and the introduction of another gear greatly facilitated the control of the tank, and the radio operator no longer had to pick up and pull the lever together with the driver to change gear.

Another element of the T-34 transmission that made the combat vehicle dependent on the training of the driver was the main clutch, which connected the gearbox to the engine. This is how A.V. describes the situation. Bodnar, who trained driver mechanics on the T-34 after being wounded: “A lot depended on how well the main clutch was adjusted for free travel and off and how well the driver could use it when starting off. The last third of the pedal must be released slowly so as not to tear, because if it tears, the car will slip and the friction clutch will warp. " The main part of the main dry friction clutch of the T-34 tank was a package of 8 driving and 10 driven discs (later, as part of improving the tank's transmission, it received 11 driving and 11 driven discs), pressed against each other by springs. Incorrect shutdown of the clutch, with the friction of the discs against each other, their heating and warping could lead to the failure of the tank. Such a breakdown was called "burn the clutch" although formally there were no flammable objects in it. Being ahead of other countries in the implementation in practice of such solutions as a 76-mm long-barreled gun and an inclined arrangement of armor, the T-34 tank still lagged noticeably behind Germany in other countries in the design of the transmission and turning mechanisms. On German tanks, which were the same age as the T-34, the main clutch was equipped with discs running in oil. This made it possible to more efficiently remove heat from the rubbing discs and greatly facilitated turning on and off the clutch. The situation was somewhat improved by a servomechanism, which was equipped with the main clutch off pedal based on the experience of the combat use of the T-34 in the initial period of the war. The design of the mechanism, despite the "servo" prefix that inspires some degree of reverence, was quite simple. The clutch pedal was held by a spring, which, in the process of pressing the pedal, passed the dead center and changed the direction of the force. When the tanker just pressed the pedal, the spring resisted pressing. At a certain moment, on the contrary, she began to help and pulled the pedal towards herself, ensuring the required speed of the wings. Before the introduction of these simple, but necessary elements, the work of the second in the hierarchy of the crew of the tanker was very difficult. “During the long march, the driver-mechanic lost two or three kilograms in weight. He was all exhausted. It was, of course, very difficult, ”recalls P.I. Kirichenko. If on the march the driver's mistakes could lead to a delay on the way due to repairs of one duration or another, in extreme cases, to the abandonment of the tank by the crew, then in battle the failure of the T-34 transmission due to driver errors could lead to fatal consequences. On the contrary, the skill of the driver and vigorous maneuvering could ensure the survival of the crew under heavy fire.

The development of the design of the T-34 tank during the war went, first of all, in the direction of improving the transmission. In the above-cited report of the engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1942, there were the following words: “Recently, in connection with the strengthening of anti-tank equipment, maneuverability is at least no less a guarantee of the invulnerability of the machine than powerful armor. The combination of good armor on the vehicle and the speed of its maneuver is the main means of protecting a modern combat vehicle from anti-tank artillery fire. " The advantage in armor protection, lost by the final period of the war, was compensated by the improvement of the thirty-four's driving performance. The tank began to move faster both on the march and on the battlefield, it was better to maneuver. To the two features that the tankers believed in (the slope of the armor and the diesel engine), a third was added - speed. A.K. Rodkin, who fought on a T-34-85 tank at the end of the war, put it this way: “The tankers had this saying: 'Armor is bullshit, but our tanks are fast.' We had an advantage in speed. The Germans had petrol tanks, but their speed was not very high. "

The first task of the 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun was "Destruction of tanks and other motorized means of the enemy" (76-mm modernized tank gun mod. 1940 (F-34) and 76-mm tank gun mod. 1941 Service management. (ZIS-5). M .: Voenizdat, 1943, p. 3). Veteran tankers unanimously refer to German tanks as the main and most serious enemy. In the initial period of the war, the T-34 crews confidently went to a duel with any German tanks, rightly believing that a powerful cannon and reliable armor protection would ensure success in battle. The appearance on the battlefield of "tigers" and "panthers" changed the situation to the opposite. Now German tanks received a "long arm" that allows them to fight without worrying about camouflage. “Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can take their armor in the forehead only from 500 meters, they stood in an open place,” recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznov. Even sub-caliber shells for the 76-mm cannon did not give advantages in a duel of this kind, since they pierced only 90 mm of homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, while the frontal armor of the T-VIH "Tiger" had a thickness of 102 mm. The transition to the 85-mm cannon immediately changed the situation, allowing Soviet tankers to fight new German tanks at distances of over a kilometer. “Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one here,” recalls N.Ya. Zheleznov. The powerful 85-mm gun allowed the T-34 crews to fight their old acquaintances T-IV at a distance of 1200 - 1300 m. An example of such a battle on the Sandomierz bridgehead in the summer of 1944 can be found in the memoirs of N.Ya. Zheleznova. The first T-34 tanks with the 85-mm D-5T cannon left the assembly line at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant number 112 in January 1944. The beginning of the mass production of the T-34-85, already with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon, was put in March 1944, when tanks of a new type were built on the flagship of the Soviet tank building during the war, plant number 183 in Nizhny Tagil. Despite a certain haste in re-equipping the tank with an 85-mm gun, the 85-mm gun that went into mass production was considered reliable by the crews and did not cause any complaints.

Vertical guidance of the T-34 gun was carried out manually, and an electric drive was introduced to rotate the turret from the very beginning of the tank's production. However, tankers in battle preferred to rotate the turret manually. “Hands lie with a cross on the mechanisms for turning the turret and aiming the gun. The tower could be turned by an electric motor, but in battle you forget about it. You twist it with the handle, ”recalls G. N. Krivov. This is easy to explain. On the T-34-85, which G.N. Krivov, the handle for turning the tower manually simultaneously served as a lever for the electric drive. To switch from manual to electric drive, it was necessary to turn the turret rotation handle vertically and move it forward and backward, forcing the engine to rotate the turret in the desired direction. In the heat of battle, this was forgotten, and the handle was used only for manual rotation. In addition, as V.P. Bryukhov: "You have to be able to use the electric turn, otherwise you will tear, and then you have to turn it over."

The only inconvenience that caused the introduction of the 85-mm cannon was the need to carefully monitor so that the long barrel did not touch the ground on bumps in the road or battlefield. “The T-34-85 has a barrel length of four meters or more. In the slightest ditch, the tank can peck and grab the ground with its barrel. If you shoot after that, the trunk opens with petals in different directions, like a flower ”,? recalls A.K. Rodkin. Full barrel length 85 mm tank gun mod. 1944 was more than four meters, 4645 mm. The appearance of the 85-mm gun and new shots to it also led to the tank's no longer exploding with the turret blowing off: “they [shells] do not detonate, but explode in turn. On the T-34-76, if one shell exploded, then the entire ammunition rack detonates. " - A.K. Rodkin. This to some extent increased the chances of survival of the T-34's crew members, and the picture, sometimes flickering on the frames of 1941-43, disappeared from the photographic and newsreels of the war. - T-34 with a turret lying next to the tank or inverted after falling back onto the tank.

If German tanks were the most dangerous enemy of the T-34s, then the T-34s themselves were an effective means of defeating not only armored vehicles, but also the enemy's guns and manpower, interfering with the advance of their infantry. Most of the tankers, whose memories are given in the book, have in their account at best several units of enemy armored vehicles, but at the same time, the number of enemy infantrymen shot from a cannon and machine gun is estimated at tens and hundreds of people. The ammunition load of the T-34 tanks consisted mainly of high-explosive fragmentation shells. The standard ammunition load of the "thirty-four" with a "nut" turret in 1942-44. consisted of 100 shots, including 75 high-explosive fragmentation and 25 armor-piercing (of which 4 subcaliber ones since 1943). The standard ammunition load of the T-34-85 tank included 36 high-explosive fragmentation rounds, 14 armor-piercing and 5 subcaliber rounds. The balance between armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation projectiles largely reflects the conditions in which the T-34 fought during the attack. Under heavy artillery fire, tankers in most cases had little time for aimed fire and fired on the move and short stops, counting on suppressing the enemy with a mass of shots or hitting the target with several shells. Remembers G.N. Krivov “Experienced guys who have already been in battles tell us: 'Never stop. Hit right away. Heaven and earth, where the projectile is flying - hit, press. " You asked how many shells I fired in the first battle? Half of the ammunition. He beat, beat ... ".

As is often the case, practice suggested techniques that were not provided for by any statutes and methodological manuals. A typical example is the use of the clanking of a closing bolt as an internal alarm in a tank. V.P. Bryukhov says: "When the crew is well-coordinated, the mechanic is strong, he himself hears which projectile is driven off, the click of the bolt wedge, it is also heavy, more than two poods ...". The guns mounted on the T-34 tank were equipped with a semiautomatic bolt opening. This system worked as follows. When fired, the gun rolled back, after absorbing the recoil energy, the recoil pad returned the body of the gun to its original position. Just before the return, the shutter mechanism lever ran onto the copier on the gun carriage, and the wedge went down, the ejector legs associated with it knocked out an empty shell case from the breech. The loader sent the next projectile, knocking down with its mass, the bolt wedge held on the legs of the ejector. A heavy part, under the influence of powerful springs, abruptly returning to its original position, produced a rather harsh sound that overlapped the roar of the engine, the clanking of the chassis and the sounds of battle. Hearing the clang of the closing bolt, the driver, without waiting for the command "Short!" chose a fairly flat area of ​​terrain for a short stop and an aimed shot. The location of the ammunition in the tank did not cause any inconvenience to the loaders. The shells could be taken both from the stowage in the turret and from the "suitcases" on the floor of the fighting compartment.

The target that did not always appear in the crosshair of the sight was worthy of a shot from a gun. The commander of the T-34-76 or the gunner of the T-34-85 fired at the German infantrymen who were running or found themselves in the open space from a machine gun paired with a cannon. The course machine gun installed in the hull could only be effectively used in close combat, when a tank immobilized for one reason or another was surrounded by enemy infantry with grenades and Molotov cocktails. “This is a melee weapon when the tank was hit and it stopped. The Germans come up, and you can mow them, be healthy like that, ”recalls V.P. Bryukhov. On the move, it was almost impossible to shoot from a course machine gun, since the telescopic sight of the machine gun gave negligible opportunities for observation and aiming. “And I actually had no sight. I have such a hole there, you can't see a damn thing in it, ”recalls P.I. Kirichenko. Perhaps the most effective course machine gun was used when removed from a ball mount and used for firing from a bipod outside the tank. “And it began. They pulled out a frontal machine gun - they came at us from the rear. The tower was deployed. The submachine gunner is with me. We put a machine gun on the parapet, we are firing, ”recalls Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuzmichev. In fact, the tank received a machine gun, which could be used by the crew as the most effective personal weapon.

The installation of the radio on the T-34-85 tank in the tower next to the tank commander was supposed to finally turn the radio operator into the most useless member of the tank's crew, the "passenger". The ammunition load of the machine guns of the T-34-85 tank has more than halved compared to the earlier production tanks, to 31 discs. However, the realities of the final period of the war, when the German infantry had faust cartridges, on the contrary, increased the usefulness of the gunner of the course machine gun. “By the end of the war, he became needed, protecting from the Fausticians, clearing the way. So what, what is hard to see, sometimes the mechanic would tell him. If you want to see, you will see ”,? recalls A.K. Rodkin.

In such a situation, the space freed up after moving the radio into the tower was used to accommodate the ammunition. Most (27 out of 31) disks for the DT machine gun in the T-34-85 were placed in the control compartment, next to the shooter, who became the main consumer of machine gun cartridges.

In general, the appearance of the faust cartridges increased the role of the thirty-four small arms. Even shooting at the "faustniki" from a pistol with an open hatch began to be practiced. The regular personal weapons of the crews were TT pistols, revolvers, captured pistols and one PPSh submachine gun, for which a place was provided for stowing equipment in the tank. The submachine gun was used by crews when leaving the tank and in battle in the city, when the angle of elevation of the cannon and machine guns was not enough.

As the German anti-tank artillery strengthened, visibility became an increasingly important component of a tank's survivability. The difficulties that the commander and driver of the T-34 tank experienced in their combat work were largely associated with the meager capabilities of monitoring the battlefield. The first "thirty-fours" had mirrored periscopes at the driver and in the turret of the tank. Such a device was a box with mirrors installed at an angle at the top and bottom, and the mirrors were not glass (they could crack from the impact of shells), but made of polished steel. The image quality in such a periscope is not hard to imagine. The same mirrors were in the periscopes on the sides of the tower, which were one of the main means of observing the battlefield for the tank commander. In the above-quoted letter from SK Timoshenko of November 6, 1940, there are the following words: "The observation devices of the driver and radio operator should be replaced with more modern ones." The first year of the war, the tankers fought with mirrors, later instead of mirrors they installed prismatic observation devices, i.e. the entire height of the periscope was a solid glass prism. At the same time, the limited visibility, despite the improvement in the characteristics of the periscopes themselves, often forced the T-34 drivers to drive with open hatches. “The triplexes on the driver's hatch were completely ugly. They were made of hideous yellow or green plexiglass, which gave a completely distorted, wavy picture. It was impossible to disassemble anything through such a triplex, especially in a jumping tank. Therefore, the war was fought with hatches ajar on the palm, ”recalls S. L. Aria. AV Marievsky also agrees with him, pointing out that the driver's triplexes were easily splashed with mud.

Specialists of NII-48 in the fall of 1942, based on the results of the analysis of damage to armor protection, made the following conclusion: “A significant percentage of dangerous damage to the tank -34 on the side parts, and not on the frontal [of 432 hits in the hull of the examined tanks, 270 were on its sides - A. I.] can be explained either by the poor acquaintance of the tank teams with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot detect the firing point in time and make the tank turn to the position least dangerous for penetrating its armor. It is necessary to improve the acquaintance of tank crews with the tactical characteristics of the armoring of their vehicles and provide a better overview of them (emphasis added). "

The task of providing a better view was solved in several stages. Polished steel mirrors were also removed from the commander's and loader's observation devices. The periscopes on the cheekbones of the T-34 turret were replaced by slits with glass blocks to protect against shrapnel. This happened during the transition to the “nut” tower in the fall of 1942. New instruments allowed the crew to organize all-round observation of the situation: “The driver-mechanic is watching forward and to the left. You, commander, try to observe around. And the radio operator and the loader are more on the right ”(VP Bryukhov). On the T-34-85, MK-4 observation devices were installed at the gunner and loader. Simultaneous observation of several directions made it possible to timely notice the danger and adequately respond to it with fire or maneuver.

The problem of providing a good view for the tank commander was solved the longest. The clause on the introduction of the commander's cupola on the T-34, which was present in the letter to S.K. Tymoshenko 1940, was executed almost two years after the start of the war. After long experiments with attempts to squeeze the freed tank commander into the "nut" turret, turrets on the T-34 began to be installed only in the summer of 1943. The commander retained the gunner's function, but now he could raise his head from the sight eyepiece and look around. The main advantage of the turret was the possibility of a circular view. “The commander's cupola revolved around, the commander saw everything and without firing could control the fire of his tank and maintain communication with others,” recalls AV Bodnar. To be precise, it was not the turret itself that rotated, but its roof with a periscope observation device. Prior to that, in 1941 - 42. the tank commander, in addition to a "mirror" on the side of the turret, had a periscope, formally called a periscope sight. By rotating his vernier, the commander could provide himself with a view of the battlefield, but very limited: “In the spring of 1942, there was a commander's panorama on the KV and on the T-34s. I could rotate it and see everything around, but still it is a very small sector, ”recalls A.V. Bodnar. The commander of the T-34-85 tank with the ZIS-S-53 cannon, freed from the duties of the gunner, received, in addition to the commander's cupola with slots around the perimeter, his own prismatic periscope rotating in the hatch - MK-4 - which made it possible to look even backwards. But among tankers there is also such an opinion: “I did not use the commander's cupola. I always kept the hatch open. Because those who closed them burned down. We didn’t have time to jump out, ”recalls N.Ya. Zheleznov.

Without exception, all interviewed tankers admire the sights of German tank guns. As an example, we will cite the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhova: “We have always noted the high-quality Zeiss scope optics. And until the end of the war, it was of high quality. We didn't have such optics. The sights themselves were more convenient than ours. We have a reticle in the form of a triangle, and there are risks from it to the right and left. They had these divisions, corrections for the wind, for range, something else. " Here it must be said that according to the information in the gunner's field of view, there was no fundamental difference between the Soviet and German telescopic sight of the gun. The gunner could see the aiming mark and on either side of it "fences" of corrections for the angular velocity. In the Soviet and German sights there was a correction for the range, only it was introduced in various ways. In the German sight, the gunner rotated the pointer, placing it opposite the radially located distance scale. Each type of projectile had its own sector. Soviet tank builders went through this stage in the 1930s; the sight of the three-turret T-28 tank had a similar design. In "thirty-four" the distance was set by the sight thread moving along the vertically arranged range scales. So functionally the Soviet and German sights did not differ. The difference was in the quality of the optics itself, especially deteriorated in 1942 in connection with the evacuation of the Izyum optical glass plant. The real disadvantages of telescopic sights of the early "thirty-fours" can be attributed to their alignment with the bore of the gun. Aiming the gun vertically, the tanker was forced to rise or fall in his place, keeping his eyes at the eyepiece of the sight moving with the gun. Later, on the T-34-85, a "breaking" sight, characteristic of German tanks, was introduced, the eyepiece of which was fixed, and the lens followed the gun barrel due to a hinge on the same axis with the cannon trunnions.

Deficiencies in the design of observation devices adversely affected the habitability of the tank. The need to keep the driver's hatch open forced the latter to sit at the levers, “taking, moreover, on his chest a stream of chilling wind sucked in by the fan turbine roaring behind him” (S.L. Aria). "Turbine" in this case is a fan on the engine shaft, sucking air from the fighting compartment through a flimsy engine partition.

A typical complaint to Soviet-made military equipment from both foreign and domestic specialists was the Spartan situation inside the vehicle. “As a disadvantage, one can single out the complete lack of comfort for the crew. I climbed into American and British tanks. There the crew was in more comfortable conditions: the inside of the tanks were painted with light paint, the seats were semi-soft with armrests. None of this was on the T-34, ”recalls S.L. Aria.

There were really no armrests on the crew seats in the T-34-76 and T-34-85 turrets. They were only in the seats of the driver and the gunner-radio operator. However, the armrests themselves on the crew seats were a detail characteristic mainly of American technology. Neither British nor German tanks (with the exception of the "tiger") had no armrests in the turret.

But there were also real design flaws. One of the problems faced by the tank builders of the 1940s was the penetration of gunpowder gases from guns of ever increasing power into the tank. After the shot, the bolt opened, threw out the sleeve, and gases from the barrel of the gun and the discarded sleeve went into the fighting compartment of the machine. “... You shout, armor-piercing, fragmentation. You look, and he [the loader] is lying on the ammunition rack. I was burned with powder gases and lost consciousness. When the fight is tough, it is rare that anyone withstood it. All the same, you get burned out, ”recalls V.P. Bryukhov.

Electric exhaust fans were used to remove powder gases and ventilate the fighting compartment. The first T-34s inherited one fan in the front of the turret from the BT tank. In a turret with a 45-mm gun, it looked appropriate because it was located almost above the breech of the gun. In the T-34 turret, the fan was not above the breech, smoking after the shot, but above the gun barrel. Its effectiveness in this regard was questionable. But in 1942, at the peak of the shortage of components, the tank lost even that - the T-34s left the factories with empty turrets, there were simply no fans. During the modernization of the tank with the installation of the "nut" tower, the fan moved to the rear of the tower, closer to the area where the powder gases accumulated. The T-34-85 tank had already received two fans in the rear of the turret; the larger caliber of the gun required intensive ventilation of the fighting compartment. But during the tense battle, the fans did not help. Partially, the problem of protecting the crew from propellant gases was solved by blowing the barrel with compressed air (Panther), but it was impossible to blow through the sleeve that spreads suffocating smoke, according to G.N. Krivov, experienced tankers advised to immediately throw the cartridge case through the loader's hatch. The problem was radically solved only after the war, when an ejector was introduced into the design of the guns, which "pumped out" gases from the barrel of the gun after the shot, even before the shutter was opened by automatic controls.

The T-34 was in many ways a revolutionary design and, like any transitional sample, combined novelties and forced, soon outdated solutions. One of these solutions was the introduction of a radio operator into the crew. The main function of the tanker sitting at the ineffective course machine gun was to service the tank radio station. On the early "thirty-fours" the radio station was installed on the right side of the control compartment, next to the radio operator gunner. The need to keep a person in the crew engaged in setting up and maintaining the radio's performance was a consequence of the imperfection of communication technology in the first half of the war. The point was not that it was necessary to work with a key: the Soviet tank radio stations on the T-34 did not have a telegraph operating mode, they could not transmit dashes and dots in Morse code. The radio operator was introduced, since the main consumer of information from neighboring vehicles and from higher levels of control, the tank commander, was simply not able to carry out maintenance of the radio. “The station was unreliable. The radio operator is a specialist, and the commander is not such a great specialist. In addition, when hitting the armor, a wave was lost, the lamps were out of order, ”recalls V.P. Bryukhov. It should be added that the commander of the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon combined the functions of a tank commander and a gunner, and was too heavily loaded to deal with even a simple and convenient radio station. The allocation of a separate person to work with the radio was typical for other countries participating in the Second World War. For example, on the French Somua S-35 tank, the commander combined the functions of a gunner, loader and tank commander, but there was a radio operator, even freed from machine gun maintenance.

In the initial period of the war, "thirty-fours" were equipped with 71-TK-3 radio stations, and even then not all machines. The last fact should not be embarrassing, such a situation was common in the Wehrmacht, the radio frequency of which is usually greatly exaggerated. In reality, the commanders of the subunits from the platoon and above had transceivers. According to the state of February 1941, in a light tank company, Fu.5 transceivers were installed on three T-II and five T-IIIs, and only Fu.2 receivers were installed on two T-IIs and twelve T-IIIs. In a company of medium tanks, transceivers had five T-IV and three T-II, and two T-II and nine T-IV - only receivers. On the T-I, Fu.5 transceivers were not installed at all, with the exception of the special commander's klT-Bef.Wg.I. In the Red Army, there was essentially a similar concept of "radium" and "linear" tanks. The crews of "line" tanks had to act, observing the commander's maneuvers or receive orders from flags. The space for the radio station on the "linear" tanks was filled with disks for the DT machine gun shops, 77 disks with a capacity of 63 rounds each instead of 46 on the "radio" one. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 671 "line" T-34 tanks and 221 "radium" tanks.

But the main problem of the communication facilities of the T-34 tanks in 1941-42. it was not so much their quantity as the quality of the 71-TK-3 stations themselves. Tankers assessed its capabilities as very moderate. “On the way, she took about 6 kilometers” (PI Kirichenko). The same opinion is expressed by other tankers: “The radio station 71-TK-3, as I remember now, is a complex, unstable radio station. She very often went out of order, and it was very difficult to put her in order, ”recalls A.V. Bodnar. At the same time, the radio station to some extent compensated for the information vacuum, since it made it possible to listen to reports broadcast from Moscow, the famous "From the Soviet Information Bureau ..." in the voice of Levitan. A serious deterioration in the situation was observed during the evacuation of radio equipment factories, when from August 1941. the production of tank radio stations was practically discontinued until mid-1942.

As the evacuated enterprises returned to service, by the middle of the war, there was a tendency towards 100% radioification of tank forces. The crews of the T-34 tanks received a new radio station, developed on the basis of the aircraft RSI-4 - 9R, and later its modernized versions, 9RS and 9RM. It was much more stable in operation due to the use of quartz frequency generators in it. The radio station was of English origin, and for a long time it was produced using components supplied under Lend-Lease. On the T-34-85, the radio station migrated from the control compartment to the fighting compartment, to the left wall of the tower, where the commander, freed from the gunner's duties, now began to maintain it. Nevertheless, the concept of "linear" and "radio" tank remained.

In addition to communicating with the outside world, each tank had intercom equipment. The reliability of the intercom of the early T-34s was low, the main means of signaling between the commander and the driver were boots mounted on the shoulders. “The intercom worked disgustingly. Therefore, the connection was carried out with the feet, i.e. I had on my shoulders the boots of the tank commander, he pressed on my left or right shoulder, respectively, I turned the tank left or right, ”recalls S.L. Aria. The commander and the loader could talk, although more often the communication took place with gestures: "He stuck his fist under the loader's nose and he already knows that it is necessary to load with armor-piercing, and the splayed palm - with fragmentation." The intercom TPU-3bis installed on the later T-34 series worked much better. “The internal tank intercom was mediocre on the T-34-76. There I had to command my boots and hands, but on the T-34-85 it was already excellent, ”recalls N.Ya. Zheleznov. Therefore, the commander began to give the driver-mechanic orders by voice over the intercom - the T-34-85 commander no longer had the technical ability to put his boots on his shoulders - the gunner separated him from the control compartment.

Speaking about the communication facilities of the T-34 tank, the following should also be noted. From films to books and back travels the story of the call by the commander of a German tank of our tanker to a duel in broken Russian. This is completely untrue. Since 1937, all Wehrmacht tanks used the 27 - 32 MHz range, which did not intersect with the radio range of Soviet tank radio stations - 3.75 - 6.0 MHz. Only the command tanks, the so-called Befenspanzer, were equipped with a second shortwave radio station. It had a range of 1 - 3 MHz, again incompatible with the range of our tank radio stations. The commander of a German tank battalion, as a rule, had something to do other than challenges to a duel. In addition, tanks of obsolete types were often commanders, and in the initial period of the war - without weapons at all, with mock-ups of guns in a fixed turret.

The engine and its systems practically did not cause any complaints from the crews, in contrast to the transmission. “I'll tell you frankly, the T-34 is the most reliable tank. Sometimes, he stopped, something like that is not in order. The oil struck. Hose is loose. For this, a thorough inspection of the tanks was always carried out before the march, ”recalls A.S. Burtsev. A massive fan mounted in one block with the main clutch required caution in engine control. The driver's mistakes could lead to the destruction of the fan and the failure of the tank. Also, some difficulties were caused by the initial period of operation of the resulting tank, getting used to the characteristics of a particular instance of the T-34 tank: “Each vehicle, each tank, each tank gun, each engine had its own unique characteristics. They cannot be recognized in advance, they can only be identified in the course of everyday use. At the front, we ended up in unfamiliar cars. The commander does not know what kind of battle his cannon has. The mechanic does not know what his diesel can and cannot. Of course, at the factories, the guns of the tanks were shot at and a 50-kilometer run was carried out, but this was completely insufficient. Of course, we tried to get to know our machines better before the battle, and for this we used every opportunity "- recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.

Tankers faced significant technical difficulties when doing the engine and gearbox docking with the power plant during the repair of the tank in the field. It was. In addition to replacing or repairing the gearbox itself and the engine, the gearbox had to be removed from the tank when dismantling the side clutches. After returning to the site or replacing the engine and gearbox, it was required to install in the tank relative to each other with high accuracy. According to the repair manual for the T-34 tank, the accuracy of the installation was supposed to be 0.8 mm. For the installation of units moved with 0.75-ton hoists, this precision required an investment of time and effort.

Of the entire complex of components and assemblies of the power plant, only the engine air filter had design flaws that required serious revision. The old type filter, installed on T-34 tanks in 1941-42. poorly purified the air and interfered with the normal operation of the engine, which led to rapid wear of the V-2: “The old air filters were ineffective, took up a lot of space in the engine compartment, and had a large turbine. They often had to be cleaned, even when not walking on a dusty road. And “Cyclone” was very good, ”recalls A.V. Bodnar. Filters "Cyclone" showed themselves excellently in 1944-45, when Soviet tankers fought hundreds of kilometers: “If the air cleaner was cleaned according to the standards, the engine worked well. But during battles it is not always possible to do everything right. If the air cleaner does not clean enough, the oil changes at the wrong time, the gimp is not washed out and allows dust to pass through, then the engine wears out quickly, ”recalls A.K. Rodkin. "Cyclones" made it possible, even in the absence of time for maintenance, to undergo a whole operation until the engine failed.

Tankers are invariably positive about the duplicated engine starting system. In addition to the traditional electric starter, the tank had two 10-liter compressed air cylinders. The air start system made it possible to start the engine even if the electric starter failed, which often occurred in battle from the impact of shells.

Track chains were the most frequently repaired element of the T-34 tank. The trucks were a spare part with which the tank even went into battle. Caterpillars were sometimes torn on the march, broken by shell hits. “The caterpillars were torn, even without bullets, without shells. When soil gets between the rollers, the caterpillar, especially when turning, is stretched to such an extent that the fingers and the tracks themselves cannot withstand, ”recalls A.V. Maryevsky. Repair and tensioning of the tracks were inevitable companions of the combat work of the machine. In this case, the caterpillars were a serious unmasking factor. “Thirty-four, she not only roars a diesel engine, she also clicks caterpillars. If the T-34 is approaching, then you will hear the clatter of the tracks, and then the engine. The fact is that the teeth of the working tracks must exactly fall between the rollers on the drive wheel, which, while rotating, captures them. And when the caterpillar stretched, developed, became longer, the distance between the teeth increased and the teeth hit the roller, causing a characteristic sound, ”recalls A.K. Rodkin. The forced technical solutions of wartime, primarily rollers without rubber tires around the perimeter, contributed to the increase in the noise level of the tank. “... Unfortunately, the Stalingrad T-34s came, which had road wheels without bandages. They rumbled terribly, ”recalls A.V. Bodnar. These were the so-called rollers with internal shock absorption. The first rollers of this type, sometimes called "locomotive", began to produce the Stalingrad plant (STZ), and even before the really serious interruptions in the supply of rubber began. Earlier, the onset of cold weather in the fall of 1941 led to downtime on ice-bound rivers of barges with rollers, which were sent along the Volga from Stalingrad to the Yaroslavl Tire Plant. The technology provided for the manufacture of a bandage on special equipment already at the finished skating rink. Large batches of finished rollers from Yaroslavl got stuck on the way, which forced STZ engineers to look for a replacement for them, which was a solid cast roller with a small shock-absorbing ring inside it, closer to the hub. When the interruptions in the supply of rubber began, other factories took advantage of this experience and from the winter of 1941-42. Until the fall of 1943, T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines, the undercarriage of which consisted entirely or mostly of rollers with internal depreciation. Since the fall of 1943, the problem of the lack of rubber has finally become a thing of the past and the T-34-76 tanks have completely returned to rollers with rubber tires. All T-34-85 tanks were produced with rollers with rubber tires. This significantly reduced the noise of the tank, providing relative comfort for the crew and making it difficult for the enemy to detect the T-34s.

It is especially worth mentioning that during the war years, the role of the T34 tank in the Red Army has changed. At the beginning of the war, "thirty-fours" with an imperfect transmission, could not withstand long marches, but well-armored were good tanks for direct support of the infantry. During the war, the tank lost its armor advantage at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. By the fall of 1943 - early 1944, the T-34 tank was a relatively easy target for 75-mm tank and anti-tank guns, it was unambiguously fatal for it to be hit by shells from 88-mm Tiger guns, anti-aircraft guns and PAK-43 anti-tank guns.

But the elements that were not given due importance before the war or simply did not have time to bring to an acceptable level were steadily improved and even completely replaced. First of all, this is the power plant and transmission of the tank, from which they have achieved stable and trouble-free operation. At the same time, all these elements of the tank retained good maintainability and ease of use. All this allowed the T-34 to do things that were unrealistic for the T-34s of the first year of the war. “For example, moving from under Jelgava through East Prussia. We covered more than 500 km in three days. The T-34 could withstand such marches normally, ”recalls A.K. Rodkin. For T-34 tanks in 1941, a 500-kilometer march would have been almost fatal. In June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of DI Ryabyshev, after such a march from the places of permanent deployment to the Dubno region, lost almost half of its equipment on the way due to breakdowns. Fought in 1941-42. A.V. Bodnar assesses the T-34 in comparison with German tanks: “From the point of view of operation, German armored vehicles were more perfect, they were out of order less often. For the Germans, it cost nothing to walk 200 km; in the thirty-four, you will definitely lose something, something will break. The technological equipment of their machines was stronger, and the combat equipment was worse. "

By the fall of 1943, "Thirty-fours" became an ideal tank for independent mechanized formations designed for deep penetrations and detours. They became the main combat vehicle of tank armies - the main tools for offensive operations of colossal proportions. In these operations, the main type of action of the T-34 was marches with open hatches of driver mechanics, and often with headlights on. The tanks traveled hundreds of kilometers, intercepting the escape routes of the encircled German divisions and corps.

Essentially in 1944 - 45. The situation of the "blitzkrieg" of 1941 was mirrored, when the Wehrmacht reached Moscow and Leningrad on tanks with not the best at that time characteristics of armor and weapons, but mechanically very reliable. In the same way, in the final period of the war, the T-34-85 covered hundreds of kilometers with deep sweeps and detours, and the "tigers" and "panthers" trying to stop them were massively out of order due to breakdowns and were thrown by their crews due to lack of fuel. The symmetry of the picture was broken, perhaps, only by the weapons. In contrast to the German tankmen of the "blitzkrieg" period, the crews of the "thirty-fours" had an adequate means of dealing with enemy tanks superior in armor protection - an 85-mm cannon. Moreover, each commander of the T-34-85 tank received a reliable radio station that was quite perfect for that time, which made it possible to play against German "cats" as a team.

The T-34, which entered the battle in the early days of the war near the border, and the T34, which burst into the streets of Berlin in April 1945, although they had the same name, were significantly different both externally and internally. But both in the initial period of the war, and at its final stage, the tankers saw in the "thirty-four" a machine in which they could believe. At first, these were the slope of armor that reflected enemy shells, a diesel engine that was resistant to fire, and an all-crushing weapon. During the period of victories, it was high speed, reliability, stable communication and a cannon that allowed itself to stand up for itself.

The exploits of heroes-tankers during the Great Patriotic War are striking and even shocking today.
Their courage made it possible to withstand the hardest battles, and their ingenuity helped out, even when the enemy was several times outnumbered. Last Sunday, the country honored everyone involved in the Day of the Tankman, and we decided to remember the defenders who fought in the "combat vehicle".

Zinovy ​​Kolobanov and the road to Leningrad

Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov commanded a company of heavy KV tanks of the 1st Panzer Division of the Northern Front during the Great Patriotic War. In August 1941, on the outskirts of Leningrad, the famous tank battle took place near the Voyskovitsy state farm, in which Kolobanov's KV-1 destroyed an enemy convoy of 22 combat vehicles. This battle made it possible to delay the advance of the Germans and save Leningrad from a lightning-fast capture.


The KV-1 crew of Z.G. Kolobanov (center), August 1941 Photo: P.V. Maisky

Vladimir Khazov and three T-34s

In June 1942, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Khazov was ordered to stop a convoy of German tanks near the village of Olkhovatka. Having reached the indicated area, they decided to act from cover. The young officer believed that the main weapon was surprise, and he was right. Three Soviet T-34s managed to destroy 27 German combat vehicles. Numerical superiority did not allow the enemy to emerge victorious from this battle, and the Khazov platoon in full force returned to the location of the battalion


Vladimir Khazov

Alexey Roman and the capture of an impregnable bridgehead

February 1945. The last water obstacle on the way to Berlin was the Oder River; the enemy tried to hold these lines at any cost. The tank company of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Roman was the first in line to cross the river. For several days, in the hardest battles, the tankers not only managed to force the Oder northwest of Breslau, but also captured the adjacent, previously unapproachable German bridgehead. For the heroic crossing, the young officer was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

A.P. Roman's award list

Dmitry Zakrevsky and a hijacked German tank

In July 1943, scouts under the command of Captain Dmitry Zakrevsky hijacked a German tank from the enemy rear. During the operation, near the village of Buzuluk, the defenders found a Nazi T-IV, and in it portable maps of enemy commanders and other secret documents. Courage and ingenuity allowed the scouts not only to overcome the German and Soviet lines of defense, but also to return to the location of the battalion in full force


Tankmen D. Zakrevsky and P. Ivannikov

Tank ace Dmitry Lavrinenko

Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Lavrinenko is considered the most productive Soviet tank ace, he has 52 enemy combat vehicles. In November 1941, a young officer fought a unique battle with an enemy tank group that broke through the Soviet rear. Lavrinenko put his T-34 towards the enemy column near the highway leading to Shishkino. The tank was in ambush right in the middle of the field. Painted with whitewash, it was invisible to the enemy in the snowy area. In this battle, Lavrinenko destroyed six of 18 tanks.


The crew of Dmitry Lavrinenko (left)