Winter War 1940. Triumphant defeat

After the Civil War of 1918-1922, the USSR received rather unsuccessful and poorly adapted borders. Thus, it was completely ignored that the Ukrainians and Belarusians were divided by the line of the state border between the Soviet Union and Poland. Another of these "inconveniences" was the close location of the border with Finland to the northern capital of the country - Leningrad.

In the course of the events preceding the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union received a number of territories, which made it possible to significantly push the border to the west. In the north, this attempt to move the border met with some resistance, called the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, war.

Historical background and origins of the conflict

Finland as a state appeared relatively recently - on December 6, 1917 against the backdrop of the crumbling Russian state. At the same time, the state received all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Finland together with Petsamo (Pechenga), Sortavala and territories on the Karelian Isthmus. Relations with the southern neighbor also went wrong from the very beginning: the civil war in Finland died down, in which anti-communist forces won, so there was clearly no sympathy for the USSR, which supported the Reds.

However, in the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, relations between the Soviet Union and Finland stabilized, being neither friendly nor hostile. Defense spending in Finland declined steadily in the 1920s, peaking in 1930. However, the coming to the post of Minister of War Karl Gustav Mannerheim changed the situation somewhat. Mannerheim immediately set out to re-equip the Finnish army and prepare it for possible battles with the Soviet Union. Initially, the fortification line was inspected, which at that time was called the Enkel Line. The condition of its fortifications was unsatisfactory, so the line was re-equipped, as well as the construction of new defensive lines.

At the same time, the Finnish government took vigorous steps to avoid conflict with the USSR. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed, the term of which was to end in 1945.

Events 1938-1939 and the reasons for the conflict

By the second half of the 30s of the XX century, the situation in Europe was gradually heating up. Hitler's anti-Soviet statements made the Soviet leadership take a closer look at neighboring countries that could become Germany's allies in a possible war with the USSR. The position of Finland, of course, did not make it a strategically important foothold, since the local nature of the terrain inevitably turned hostilities into a series of small battles, not to mention the impossibility of supplying huge masses of troops. However, Finland's close position to Leningrad could still turn it into an important ally.

It was these factors that forced the Soviet government in April-August 1938 to begin negotiations with Finland regarding guarantees of its non-alignment with the anti-Soviet bloc. However, in addition, the Soviet leadership also demanded the provision of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland for Soviet military bases, which was unacceptable for the then government of Finland. As a result, the negotiations ended in vain.

In March-April 1939, new Soviet-Finnish negotiations took place, at which the Soviet leadership demanded the lease of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish government was forced to reject these demands as well, as it feared "Sovietization" of the country.

The situation began to escalate rapidly when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939, in a secret addition to which it was indicated that Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, although the Finnish government did not have information regarding the secret protocol, this agreement made it seriously think about the future prospects of the country and relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.

Already in October 1939, the Soviet government put forward new proposals for Finland. They provided for the movement of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 90 km to the north. In return, Finland was to receive approximately twice the territory in Karelia, in order to significantly secure Leningrad. A number of historians also express the opinion that the Soviet leadership was interested in, if not Sovietizing Finland in 1939, then at least depriving it of its protection in the form of a line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, already then called the Mannerheim Line. This version is very consistent, since further events, as well as the development by the Soviet General Staff in 1940 of a plan for a new war against Finland, indirectly indicate precisely this. Thus, the defense of Leningrad, most likely, was only a pretext for turning Finland into a convenient Soviet bridgehead, like, for example, the Baltic countries.

However, the Finnish leadership rejected the Soviet demands and began to prepare for war. The Soviet Union was also preparing for war. In total, by mid-November 1939, 4 armies were deployed against Finland, which had 24 divisions with a total strength of 425 thousand people, 2300 tanks and 2500 aircraft. Finland had only 14 divisions with a total strength of about 270 thousand people, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

In order to avoid provocations, the Finnish army in the second half of November received an order to withdraw from the state border on the Karelian Isthmus. However, on November 26, 1939, an incident occurred, for which both sides blame each other. Soviet territory was shelled, as a result of which several soldiers were killed and wounded. This incident took place in the area of ​​the village of Mainila, from which it got its name. Clouds thickened between the USSR and Finland. Two days later, on November 28, the Soviet Union denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and two days later Soviet troops were ordered to cross the border.

The beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)

On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops launched an offensive in several directions. At the same time, the hostilities immediately took on a fierce character.

On the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th Army was advancing, Soviet troops managed to capture the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) at the cost of heavy losses on December 1. It was here that the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Finland was announced, headed by Otto Kuusinen, a prominent figure in the Comintern. It was with this, the new "government" of Finland that the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. At the same time, in the first decade of December, the 7th Army was able to quickly seize the foreground and rested on the first echelon of the Mannerheim Line. Here the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and their advance practically stopped for a long time.

North of Lake Ladoga, in the direction of Sortavala, the 8th Soviet Army was advancing. As a result of the first days of fighting, she managed to advance 80 kilometers in a fairly short time. However, the Finnish troops opposing her managed to carry out a lightning-fast operation, the purpose of which was to encircle part of the Soviet forces. The fact that the Red Army was very strongly tied to the roads also played into the hands of the Finns, which allowed the Finnish troops to quickly cut off its communications. As a result, the 8th Army, having suffered serious losses, was forced to retreat, but until the end of the war it held part of the Finnish territory.

The least successful were the actions of the Red Army in central Karelia, where the 9th Army was advancing. The task of the army was to lead an offensive in the direction of the city of Oulu, in order to "cut" Finland in half and thereby disorganize the Finnish troops in the north of the country. On December 7, the forces of the 163rd Infantry Division occupied the small Finnish village of Suomussalmi. However, the Finnish troops, having superiority in mobility and knowledge of the terrain, immediately surrounded the division. As a result, Soviet troops were forced to take up a perimeter defense and repulse surprise attacks by Finnish ski detachments, as well as suffer significant losses from sniper fire. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to the aid of the encircled, which soon also found itself surrounded.

Assessing the situation, the command of the 163rd Infantry Division decided to fight its way back. At the same time, the division suffered losses of about 30% of its personnel, and also abandoned almost all of its equipment. After its breakthrough, the Finns managed to destroy the 44th Infantry Division and practically restore the state border in this direction, paralyzing the actions of the Red Army here. This battle, called the Battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in rich trophies taken by the Finnish army, as well as an increase in the overall morale of the Finnish army. At the same time, the leadership of the two divisions of the Red Army was subjected to repression.

And if the actions of the 9th Army were unsuccessful, then the troops of the 14th Soviet Army, advancing on the Rybachy Peninsula, acted most successfully. They managed to seize the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and large nickel deposits in the area, as well as reach the Norwegian border. Thus, Finland lost access to the Barents Sea during the war.

In January 1940, the drama also played out south of Suomussalmi, where the scenario of that recent battle was repeated in general terms. The 54th Rifle Division of the Red Army was surrounded here. At the same time, the Finns did not have enough forces to destroy it, so the division was surrounded by the end of the war. A similar fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which was surrounded in the Sortavala region. Another division and a tank brigade were surrounded in the Lemetti-South area and, having suffered huge losses and having lost almost all their materiel, nevertheless made their way out of the encirclement.

On the Karelian Isthmus, by the end of December, the fighting to break through the Finnish fortified line died down. This was explained by the fact that the command of the Red Army was well aware of the futility of continuing further attempts to strike at the Finnish troops, which brought only serious losses with a minimal result. The Finnish command, understanding the essence of the lull at the front, launched a series of attacks in order to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, these attempts failed with heavy losses for the Finnish troops.

However, on the whole, the situation remained not very favorable for the Red Army. Her troops were drawn into battles in foreign and poorly studied territory, in addition, in adverse weather conditions. The Finns did not have superiority in numbers and technology, but they had a well-oiled and well-developed tactics of partisan warfare, which allowed them, acting with relatively small forces, to inflict significant losses on the advancing Soviet troops.

The February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)

On February 1, 1940, a powerful Soviet artillery preparation began on the Karelian Isthmus, which lasted 10 days. The task of this training was to inflict maximum damage on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops and wear them out. On February 11, the troops of the 7th and 13th armies moved forward.

Fierce battles unfolded along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus. The main blow was struck by the Soviet troops on the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. However, here, like two months ago, the Red Army again began to get bogged down in battles, so soon the direction of the main attack was changed, on Lyakhda. Here, the Finnish troops could not contain the Red Army, and their defenses were broken, and a few days later - and the first strip of the Mannerheim line. The Finnish command was forced to begin to withdraw troops.

On February 21, Soviet troops approached the second line of the Finnish defense. Here fierce battles unfolded again, which, however, by the end of the month ended with the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in several places. Thus, the Finnish defense collapsed.

In early March 1940, the Finnish army was in a critical situation. The Mannerheim Line was broken, the reserves were practically depleted, while the Red Army was developing a successful offensive and had practically inexhaustible reserves. The morale of the Soviet troops was also high. At the beginning of the month, the troops of the 7th Army rushed to Vyborg, the fighting for which continued until the ceasefire on March 13, 1940. This city was one of the largest in Finland, and its loss could be very painful for the country. In addition, in this way, the way to Helsinki was opened for Soviet troops, which threatened Finland with the loss of independence.

Considering all these factors, the Finnish government set a course for the beginning of peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 7, 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to cease fire from 12 noon on March 13, 1940. The territories on the Karelian Isthmus and Lapland (the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala and Salla) withdrew to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was also leased.

Results of the Winter War

Estimates of the losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war differ significantly and, according to the data of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, there are approximately 87.5 thousand people killed and died from wounds and frostbite, as well as about 40 thousand missing. 160 thousand people were injured. Finland's losses were significantly lower - about 26 thousand killed and 40 thousand wounded.

As a result of the war with Finland, the Soviet Union was able to ensure the security of Leningrad, as well as strengthen its position in the Baltic. First of all, this concerns the city of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, on which Soviet troops began to be based. At the same time, the Red Army gained combat experience in breaking through a fortified enemy line in difficult weather conditions (the air temperature in February 1940 reached -40 degrees), which no other army in the world had at that time.

However, at the same time, the USSR received in the north-west, albeit not a powerful, but enemy, who already in 1941 let German troops into its territory and contributed to the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of Finland's performance in June 1941 on the side of the Axis countries, the Soviet Union received an additional front with a fairly large length, which diverted from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions in the period from 1941 to 1944.

Great Britain and France also closely followed the conflict and even had plans to attack the USSR and its Caucasian fields. At present, there is no complete data on the seriousness of these intentions, but it is likely that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union could simply "quarrel" with its future allies and even get involved in a military conflict with them.

There are also a number of versions that the war in Finland indirectly influenced the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line and practically left Finland defenseless in March 1940. Any new invasion by the Red Army into the country could well become fatal for it. After the defeat of Finland, the Soviet Union would have approached a dangerously short distance to the Swedish mines at Kiruna, one of Germany's few sources of metal. Such a scenario would put the Third Reich on the brink of disaster.

Finally, the not very successful offensive of the Red Army in December-January strengthened the belief in Germany that Soviet troops were essentially non-combatant and did not have a good command staff. This misconception continued to grow and peaked in June 1941 when the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR.

As a conclusion, it can be indicated that as a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union nevertheless acquired more problems than victories, which was confirmed in the next few years.

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The official reasons for the outbreak of the war are the so-called "Mainil incident". On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government about the shelling that was fired from Finnish territory. Finland was fully responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war took place at 8 o'clock in the morning, on November 30, 1939. On the part of the Soviet Union, the goal was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was only 30 km away. from the border. Earlier, the Soviet government appealed to Finland with a request to push back its borders in the Leningrad region, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But Finland refused categorically.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 caused a real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (minority of votes).

By the time hostilities began, the Finnish army numbered 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, and 250,000 soldiers. However, the Western powers have pledged their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the border line. At the beginning of the war, the Red Army numbered 3,900 aircraft, 6,500 tanks and one million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish war of 1939 is divided by historians into 2 stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation, which was to last about 3 weeks. But the situation turned out differently. The first period of the war lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the break of the Mannerheim line). The fortifications of the Mannerheim line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. Better equipment of Finnish soldiers and more severe winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role. The Finnish command was able to make excellent use of the terrain features. Pine forests, lakes, swamps seriously slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The ammunition supply was difficult. Finnish snipers also caused serious problems.

The second period of the war dates from February 11 - March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff had developed a new plan of action. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim line was broken on February 11. A serious superiority in manpower, aviation, and tanks allows the Soviet troops to move forward, suffering heavy losses. The Finnish army is experiencing a severe shortage of ammunition, as well as people. The Finnish government, which never received aid from the West, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border is being established.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Finland will enter the war on the side of the Nazis.

On the eve of the 1941 warriors

At the end of July 1940, Germany began preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. The ultimate goals were the seizure of territory, the destruction of manpower, political entities and the exaltation of Germany.

It was planned to strike at the formations of the Red Army, concentrated in the western regions, to rapidly advance into the interior of the country and occupy all economic and political centers.

By the beginning of the aggression against the USSR, Germany was a state with a highly developed industry and the strongest army in the world.

Having set himself the goal of becoming a hegemonic power, Hitler made the German economy, the entire potential of the occupied countries and his allies work for his war machine.

In a short time, the production of military equipment was sharply increased. German divisions were equipped with modern weapons and gained combat experience in Europe. The officer corps was distinguished by excellent training, tactical literacy and was brought up on the centuries-old traditions of the German army. The rank and file were disciplined, and the highest spirit was maintained by propaganda about the exclusiveness of the German race and the invincibility of the Wehrmacht.

Realizing the inevitability of a military clash, the leadership of the USSR began preparations to repel the aggression. In a country rich in useful digging and energy resources, heavy industry was created thanks to the heroic labor of the population. Its rapid formation was facilitated by the conditions of a totalitarian system and the highest centralization of leadership, which made it possible to mobilize the population to perform any tasks.

The pre-war economy was directive, and this made it easier to reorient on a war footing. There was a high patriotic enthusiasm in society and the army. Party agitators pursued a policy of "shaking off" - in the event of aggression, a war was planned on foreign territory and with little blood.

The outbreak of World War II showed the need to strengthen the country's armed forces. Civilian enterprises were reoriented to the production of military equipment.

For the period from 1938 to 1940. the increase in military production was more than 40%. 600-700 new enterprises were put into operation annually, and a significant part of them were built in the interior of the country. By 1937, in terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR came second in the world after the United States.

In numerous semi-prison design bureaus, the latest weapons were created. On the eve of the war, high-speed fighters and bombers (MIG-3, Yak-1, LAGG-3, PO-2, IL-2), a KB heavy tank, and a T-34 medium tank appeared. New models of small arms were developed and adopted.

Domestic shipbuilding is reoriented to the production of surface ships and submarines. The construction of the first rocket launchers was completed. However, the pace of rearmament of the army was insufficient.

In 1939, the law "On General Military Duty" was adopted, and the transition to a unified personnel system for manning troops was completed. This made it possible to increase the size of the Red Army to 5 million.

A significant weakness of the Red Army was the low training of command personnel (only 7% of officers had a higher military education).

The repressions of the 1930s caused irreparable damage to the army, when many of the best commanders of all levels were killed. Negatively influenced the combat effectiveness of the army and the strengthening of the role of the NKVD workers, who interfered in the leadership of the troops.

Reports from military intelligence, intelligence reports, warnings from sympathizers - everything spoke of the approach of war. Stalin did not believe that Hitler would start a war against the USSR without completing the final defeat of his opponents in the west. He in every possible way delayed the start of the aggression, giving no reason for this.

German attack on the USSR

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. Army Hitler and the Allied armies struck a swift and carefully prepared blow at several points at once, catching the Russian army by surprise. This day marked the beginning of a new period in the life of the USSR - Great Patriotic War .

Prerequisites for the German attack on the USSR

After defeat in World War I During the war, the situation in Germany remained extremely unstable - the economy and industry collapsed, there was a major crisis that the authorities could not solve. It was at this time that Hitler came to power, the main idea of ​​which was to create a single nation-oriented state that would not only take revenge for losing the war, but also subject the entire main world to its order.

Following his own ideas, Hitler created a fascist state in Germany and in 1939 unleashed World War II, invading the Czech Republic and Poland and annexing them to Germany. During the war, Hitler's army rapidly advanced across Europe, seizing territories, but did not attack the USSR - a preliminary non-aggression pact was concluded.

Unfortunately, the USSR was still a tidbit for Hitler. The opportunity to take possession of territories and resources opened up the opportunity for Germany to enter into open confrontation with the United States and declare its dominance over most of the world's landmass.

For the attack on the USSR was developed plan "Barbarossa" - a plan for a swift treacherous military assault, which was to be carried out within two months. The implementation of the plan began on June 22 with the German invasion of the USSR.

Germany's goals

Ideological and military. Germany strove to destroy the USSR as a state, as well as to destroy the communist ideology, which it considered to be wrong. Hitler sought to establish the hegemony of nationalist ideas throughout the world (the superiority of one race, one people over others).

Imperialist. As in many wars, Hitler's goal was to seize power in the world and create a powerful Empire, which would obey all other states.

Economic. The capture of the USSR gave the German army unprecedented economic opportunities for further waging the war.

Racist. Hitler sought to destroy all "wrong" races (in particular, the Jews).

The first period of the war and the implementation of the Barbarossa plan

Despite the fact that Hitler's plans were a surprise attack, the command of the USSR army had a preliminary suspicion of what might happen, so on June 18, 1941, some armies were put on alert, and the armed forces were pulled to the border in the places of the alleged attack. Unfortunately, the Soviet command had only vague information about the date of the attack, so by the time the Nazi troops invaded, many military units simply did not have time to prepare properly in order to correctly repel the attack.

At 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop handed the Soviet ambassador in Berlin a note declaring war, at the same time German troops launched an offensive against the Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. Early in the morning, the German ambassador arrived in the USSR for a meeting with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and made a statement stating that the Union was subversive in Germany in order to establish Bolshevik power there, therefore Germany breaks the non-aggression agreement and begins military operations ... A little later on the same day, Italy, Romania and later Slovakia declared an official war on the USSR. At 12 noon, Molotov spoke on the radio with an official address to the citizens of the USSR, announcing the German attack on the USSR and announcing the beginning of the Patriotic War. A general mobilization began.

The war has begun.

The reasons and consequences of the German attack on the USSR

Despite the fact that the Barbarossa plan was not implemented - the Soviet army put up good resistance, was better equipped than expected and, on the whole, fought competently, taking into account the territorial conditions - the first period of the war turned out to be a losing one for the USSR. Germany in the shortest possible time managed to conquer a significant part of the territories, including Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia and Lithuania. German troops advanced inland, encircled Leningrad and began bombing Moscow.

Despite the fact that Hitler underestimated the Russian army, the surprise of the attack still played a role. The Soviet army was not ready for such a rapid onslaught, the level of training of soldiers was much lower, military equipment was much worse, and the leadership in the early stages made a number of very serious mistakes.

Germany's attack on the USSR ended in a protracted war, which claimed many lives and actually brought down the country's economy, which was not ready for large-scale military operations. Nevertheless, in the middle of the war, the Soviet troops managed to gain an advantage and launch a counteroffensive.

World War II 1939-1945 (briefly)

The Second World War became the bloodiest and most brutal military conflict in the history of mankind and the only one in which nuclear weapons were used. It was attended by 61 states. The dates of the beginning and the end of this war, September 1, 1939 - 1945, September 2, are among the most significant for the entire civilized world.

The reasons for the Second World War were the imbalance of power in the world and the problems provoked by the results of the First World War, in particular, territorial disputes. The victors in the First World War, the USA, England, France concluded the Versailles Peace Treaty on the most unfavorable and humiliating conditions for the losing countries, Turkey and Germany, which provoked an increase in tension in the world. At the same time, the policy of appeasing the aggressor, adopted in the late 1930s by Britain and France, enabled Germany to dramatically increase its military potential, which accelerated the transition of the Nazis to active hostilities.

The members of the anti-Hitler bloc were the USSR, USA, France, England, China (Chiang Kai-shek), Greece, Yugoslavia, Mexico, etc. On the German side, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, China (Wang Jingwei), Thailand, Finland, Iraq, etc. participated in World War II. Many states - participants of the Second World War, did not conduct actions on the fronts, but helped by supplying food, medicine and other necessary resources.

Researchers identify the following main stages of the Second World War.

The first stage from September 1, 1939 to June 21, 1941. The period of the European blitzkrieg of Germany and the Allies.

The second stage June 22, 1941 - approximately mid-November 1942 The attack on the USSR and the subsequent failure of the Barbarossa plan.

The third stage is the second half of November 1942 - the end of 1943. A radical turning point in the war and the loss of the strategic initiative by Germany. At the end of 1943, at the Tehran Conference, in which Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill took part, it was decided to open a second front.

The fourth stage lasted from the end of 1943 to May 9, 1945. It was marked by the capture of Berlin and the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Fifth stage May 10, 1945 - September 2, 1945 At this time, battles are being conducted only in Southeast Asia and the Far East. The United States has used nuclear weapons for the first time.

The outbreak of World War II fell on September 1, 1939. On this day, the Wehrmacht suddenly launched an aggression against Poland. Despite the reciprocal declaration of war by France, Great Britain and some other countries, real assistance to Poland was not provided. Already on September 28, Poland was captured. The peace treaty between Germany and the USSR was concluded on the same day. Having thus obtained a reliable rear, Germany begins active preparations for war with France, which surrendered already in 1940, on June 22. Fascist Germany begins large-scale preparations for a war on the eastern front with the USSR. The Barbarossa plan was approved already in 1940, on December 18. The Soviet top leadership received reports of an impending attack, however, fearing to provoke Germany, and believing that the attack would be carried out at a later date, deliberately did not put the border units on alert.

In the chronology of World War II, the period June 22, 1941-1945, May 9, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War, is of paramount importance. On the eve of World War II, the USSR was an actively developing state. Since the threat of a conflict with Germany increased over time, defense and heavy industry and science developed in the first place in the country. Closed design bureaus were created, whose activities were aimed at developing the latest weapons. At all enterprises and collective farms, discipline was tightened as much as possible. In the 30s, more than 80% of the officers of the Red Army were repressed. In order to make up for the losses, a network of military schools and academies has been created. But there was not enough time for full-fledged training of personnel.

The main battles of the Second World War, which were of great importance for the history of the USSR, are:

Battle of Moscow September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942, which became the first victory of the Red Army;

Battle of Stalingrad July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943, which marked a radical turning point in the war;

Battle of Kursk 5 July - 23 August 1943, during which the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place - near the village of Prokhorovka;

Battle of Berlin - leading to the surrender of Germany.

But events important for the course of World War II took place not only on the fronts of the USSR. Among the operations carried out by the allies, it is worth noting: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which served as the reason for the US entry into World War II; the opening of the second front and the landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944; the use of nuclear weapons on August 6 and 9, 1945 to strike at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The end of the Second World War was September 2, 1945. Japan signed the act of surrender only after the defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops. The battles of the Second World War, according to the most rough estimates, carried away 65 million people on both sides. The Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses in World War II - 27 million citizens of the country were killed. It was he who took the brunt of the blow. This figure is also approximate and, according to some researchers, underestimated. It was the stubborn resistance of the Red Army that became the main cause of the defeat of the Reich.

The results of the Second World War horrified everyone. Military actions have brought the very existence of civilization to the brink. During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, fascist ideology was condemned, and many war criminals were punished. In order to prevent such a possibility of a new world war in the future, at the Yalta conference in 1945 it was decided to create the United Nations Organization (UN), which still exists today. The results of the nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the signing of pacts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a ban on their production and use. It must be said that the consequences of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are being felt today.

The economic consequences of the Second World War were also serious. For Western European countries, it turned into a real economic disaster. The influence of Western European countries has diminished significantly. At the same time, the United States managed to maintain and strengthen its position.

The significance of World War II for the Soviet Union is enormous. The defeat of the fascists determined the future history of the country. As a result of the conclusion of the peace treaties that followed the defeat of Germany, the USSR significantly expanded its borders. At the same time, the totalitarian system was strengthened in the Union. In some European countries, communist regimes were established. The victory in the war did not save the USSR from the massive repressions that followed in the 50s.

Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, Fin. Talvisota - Winter War, Swedish vinterkriget) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government about the shelling, which, according to the Soviet side, was carried out from Finnish territory. Finland was fully responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland (with the second largest city of Vyborg). 430 thousand Finnish residents were forcibly resettled by Finland from the front-line areas inland and lost their property.

According to a number of historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland belongs to the Second World War. In Soviet historiography, this war was viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict that was not part of World War II, just like the battles on Khalkhin Gol. The outbreak of hostilities led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR as the aggressor was expelled from the League of Nations.

Background

Events 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR appealed to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war broke out in Finland, in which the “red” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “white”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the "whites". After the victory in Finland, the troops of the Finnish "whites" supported the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The outbreak of the first Soviet-Finnish war during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryevsky) peace treaty was concluded. Some Finnish politicians, such as Juho Paasikivi, viewed the treaty as "too good a peace", believing that great powers only compromise when urgently needed. K. Mannerheim, former activists and leaders of separatists in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a shame and betrayal of compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Fin. H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Mannerheim in his "oath of the sword" publicly spoke in favor of the conquest of Eastern Karelia, which had not previously been part of the Finnish principality.

Nevertheless, relations between Finland and the USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula, were transferred to Finland in the Arctic, were not friendly, however openly hostile too.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, which was embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles in Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their armaments. In Finland, the government and most of the members of parliament have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, to save money, no military exercises were carried out at all. The allocated money was barely enough to support the army. The parliament did not consider expenditures for the provision of armaments. There were no tanks or military aircraft.

However, a Defense Council was created, which was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim on July 10, 1931. He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in the USSR, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: "The plague coming from the east can be contagious." In a conversation held in the same year with Risto Ryti, then the Governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure of the Progressive Party of Finland, Mannerheim outlined his views on the need for an early creation of a military program and its financing. However, Ryti, after listening to the reasoning, asked the question: "But what is the use of providing the military department with such large sums if war is not foreseen?"

In August 1931, after inspecting the fortifications of the Enckel line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for the conditions of modern warfare, both due to its poor location and destruction over time.

In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the Finnish budget of 1934, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was deleted.

V. Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of parliament "... still believes that a prerequisite for maintaining the independence of the country is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that it is worth all the costs of defense."

Mannerheim described his efforts as "a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow and resin-filled pipe." It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future meet a blank wall of incomprehension and indifference. And he filed a petition to be removed from his post.

Negotiations 1938-1939

Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939

The negotiations were initiated by the USSR, initially they were conducted in secret mode, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain "free hands" in an unclear perspective in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials, the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view in terms of domestic policy, since the population of Finland generally had a negative attitude towards the USSR.

On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived in Helsinki, at the USSR Embassy in Finland. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the USSR's position: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side blow through Finland. Therefore, Finland's attitude to the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait at the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland puts up resistance to the Germans, the USSR will provide her with military and economic assistance, since Finland is not capable of repelling the German landing itself. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Finance Minister Väinö Tanner. The guarantees of the Finnish side that Finland would not allow violating its territorial inviolability and invading Soviet Russia through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, which, in the event of a German attack, would oblige its participation in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands and the deployment of Soviet military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Finn. Suursaari). No territorial claims were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.

In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since it was almost impossible to either defend them or use them to protect the Karelian Isthmus. However, the negotiations were inconclusive and ended on April 6, 1939.

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact. Under a secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-intervention in the event of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later, on September 1, 1939. Soviet troops entered the territory of Poland on September 17.

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded agreements on mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.

On October 5, the USSR suggested that Finland consider the possibility of concluding a similar pact of mutual assistance with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany has already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finland.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow to negotiate "on specific political issues." The negotiations were held in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9.

For the first time Finland was represented by the envoy, state adviser J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.

During these negotiations, for the first time, they spoke about the proximity of the border to Leningrad. Joseph Stalin remarked: "We cannot do anything about geography, just like you ... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border away from it."

The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:

Finland moves the border 90 km from Leningrad.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years to build a naval base and station a four thousandth military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Fin.) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groupings and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states are disarming their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the arming of the Aland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive more extensive territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi.

The USSR announced its demands before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted and there should be no hope for Germany's help.

The State Council did not agree to fulfill all the requirements of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. Instead, a compromise option was proposed - the Soviet Union was offered the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Maly), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main navigable fairway in The Gulf of Finland, and the territories closest to Leningrad in Terioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deepened into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.

Earlier, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland, on the other hand, chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden made it clear about its position of neutrality, and there were no serious assurances of help from other states.

In the middle of 1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, at the USSR Main Military Council, an operational plan for an attack on Finland was discussed, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the "Mannerheim line" was being completed. On August 7-12, large military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, during which they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attachés were invited, except for the Soviet one.

The Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the question of ensuring the security of Leningrad - at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the USSR's consent to arming the Aland Islands, the demilitarized status of which was regulated Aland Convention 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the Mannerheim Line.

The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the number of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. "Do you want to provoke a conflict?" /V. Molotov /. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist before his parliament on the need to find a compromise, saying that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, first learning about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.

The negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side issued a statement: “We, civilians, have not made any progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers. "

However, Stalin made concessions the next day, suggesting instead of leasing the Hanko Peninsula to buy it or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, who was then finance minister and was part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that the proposals opened the way for an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.

On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, without looking at anything, breaking all and all kinds of obstacles on the way to the goal ". On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet received instructions to prepare for military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin, at least outwardly, showed a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases. But the Finns refused to discuss it, and on November 13 they left for Helsinki.

There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered as confirmation of the correctness of its position.

On November 26, Pravda published an article entitled "The Fool Pea as Prime Minister", which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign. On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the settlement of Mainila. The leadership of the USSR blamed Finland for this incident. In the Soviet media, a new term was added to the terms “White Guard”, “White Pole”, “White Emigrant”, widely used to name hostile elements - “White Finn”.

On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were ordered to go over to the offensive.

Causes of the war

According to the statements of the Soviet side, the goal of the USSR was to achieve by military means what it could not do peacefully: to ensure the safety of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of a war (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the early days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was at the same time the border between the USSR and Finland.

“Did the Government and the Party do the right thing to declare war on Finland? This question concerns the Red Army especially.

Couldn't war have been dispensed with? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since the peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, for its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

I. V. Stalin's speech at a meeting of the commanding staff on 04/17/1940 "

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require the transfer of the border. Requirements for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. Constant in the requirements was only the following: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, there were two concepts that are still being debated: one that the USSR pursued the declared goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second - that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland.

However, today there is a different division of concepts, namely: according to the principle of classifying a military conflict as a separate war or part of the Second World War, which, in turn, represent the USSR as a peace-loving country or as an aggressor and ally of Germany. At the same time, according to these concepts, the Sovietization of Finland was only a cover for the preparation of the USSR for a lightning invasion and the liberation of Europe from the German occupation, followed by the Sovietization of all of Europe and the part of African countries occupied by Germany.

MI Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war, both countries had claims to each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 1930s, the closure of Finnish schools, and so on. In the USSR, in turn, they knew about the activities of the ultranationalist Finnish organizations, which aimed to "return" Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland's unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, to which Finland went, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. The President of Finland P.E. Svinhufvud declared in Berlin in 1937 that "the enemy of Russia must always be Finland's friend." In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat will constantly exist for us. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong. " In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) began a partial mobilization in the Leningrad military district, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solution.

According to A. Shubin, prior to the signing of the Soviet-German pact, the USSR undoubtedly strove only to ensure the security of Leningrad. Helsinki's assurances of its neutrality did not satisfy Stalin, since, firstly, he considered the Finnish government hostile and ready to join any external aggression against the USSR, and secondly (and this was confirmed by subsequent events), the neutrality of small countries itself did not guarantee that they could not be used as a staging ground for an attack (as a result of the occupation). After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the requirements of the USSR became tougher, and here the question already arises of what Stalin was really striving for at this stage. Theoretically, presenting his demands in the fall of 1939, Stalin could plan to spend the next year in Finland: a) Sovietization and incorporation into the USSR (as happened with other Baltic countries in 1940), or b) a radical social reorganization with the preservation of formal signs of independence and political pluralism (as was done after the war in the so-called Eastern European countries of people's democracies, or c) Stalin could only plan for the time being to strengthen his positions on the northern flank of the potential theater of military operations, without risking so far interfering in the internal affairs of Finland and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. M. Semiryaga believes that in order to determine the nature of the war against Finland “it is not necessary to analyze the negotiations in the autumn of 1939. To do this, you just need to know the general concept of the world communist movement of the Comintern and the Stalinist concept - great-power claims to the regions that used to be part of the Russian Empire ... And the goals were to annex the whole of Finland as a whole. And there is no need to talk about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad ... ". The Finnish historian O. Manninen believes that Stalin tried to deal with Finland according to the same scenario that was ultimately implemented with the Baltic countries. “Stalin's desire to 'resolve issues in a peaceful way' was the desire to peacefully create a socialist regime in Finland. And at the end of November, starting the war, he wanted to achieve the same with the help of the occupation. The workers themselves had to decide whether to join the USSR or found their own socialist state. " However, O. Manninen notes, since these plans of Stalin were not formally fixed, this view will always remain in the status of an assumption, and not a provable fact. There is also a version that, putting forward claims to border lands and a military base, Stalin, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, sought to first disarm his neighbor, taking away his fortified territory, and then seize it.

An important argument in favor of the theory of Sovietization of Finland as a goal of the war is the fact that on the second day of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and, according to Ryti, refused any contact with the legitimate government of Finland, headed by Risto Ryti.

It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty: if things at the front were going in accordance with the operational plan, then this "government" would arrive in Helsinki with a certain political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called [...] to overthrow the "government of the executioners". Kuusinen's address to the soldiers of the "Finnish People's Army" directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" on the building of the president's palace in Helsinki.

However, in reality this "government" was used only as a means, albeit not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov's statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow Assarsson on March 4, 1940 that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortaval to the Soviet Union, then the subsequent Soviet conditions of peace will be even more harsh and the USSR will then go to a final agreement with the "government" of Kuusinen

M.I.Semiryaga. “Secrets of Stalinist Diplomacy. 1941-1945 "

A number of other measures were taken, in particular, among the Soviet documents on the eve of the war there are detailed instructions on the organization of the "Popular Front" in the occupied territories. M. Meltyukhov, on this basis, sees in Soviet actions a desire to Sovietize Finland through an intermediate stage of the left "people's government". S. Belyaev believes that the decision to Sovietize Finland is not evidence of the original plan to seize Finland, but was made only on the eve of the war due to the failure of attempts to agree on changing the border.

According to A. Shubin, Stalin's position in the fall of 1939 was situational, and he maneuvered between the minimum program - ensuring the security of Leningrad, and the maximum program - establishing control over Finland. Stalin did not aspire directly to Sovietization of Finland, like the Baltic countries, at that moment, since he did not know how the war in the West would end (indeed, in the Baltic states decisive steps towards Sovietization were made only in June 1940, that is, immediately after the defeat of France). Finland's resistance to Soviet demands forced him to go for a tough power option at a time that was unfavorable for him (in winter). In the end, he ensured for himself at least the execution of the minimum program.

According to the testimony of Yu. A. Zhdanov, Stalin in the mid-1930s in a private conversation announced a plan (of the “distant future”) to move the capital to Leningrad, while noting its proximity to the border.

Strategic plans of the parties

USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in three directions. The first of them was on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to lead a direct breakthrough of the Finnish defense line (which during the war was called the "Mannerheim line") in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga.

The second direction was central Karelia, adjacent to that part of Finland, where its latitudinal extent was the smallest. It was supposed here, in the Suomussalmi - Raate region, to cut the country's territory in two and enter the city of Oulu on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. For the parade in the city, the selected and well-equipped 44th Division was intended.

Finally, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of landings of Finland's western allies from the Barents Sea, it was planned to conduct hostilities in Lapland.

The main direction was considered the direction to Vyborg - between Vuoksa and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here, after a successful breakthrough of the defense line (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on a territory convenient for the operation of tanks, which did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the fullest possible way. It was supposed, after breaking through the fortifications, to carry out an offensive on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. In parallel, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and an exit to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned. This would make it possible to ensure in the future a quick seizure of Norway and to cut off the supply of iron ore to Germany.

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to long-term resistance. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops was also incorrect: "it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions." In addition, the Soviet command did not have information about the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, by the beginning of the war they had only "fragmentary intelligence information" about them. So, even at the height of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, Meretskov doubted that the Finns had permanent structures, although he was told about the existence of the Poppius (Sj4) and Millionaire (Sj5) bunkers.

Finland plan

On the direction of the main attack, correctly determined by Mannerheim, it was supposed to delay the enemy for as long as possible.

The Finnish defense plan north of Lake Ladoga was to stop the enemy on the Kitela (Pitkäranta area) - Lemetti (near Lake Syuskyujärvi) line. If necessary, the Russians were to be stopped north of Lake Suojärvi at echeloned positions. Before the war, a branch line from the Leningrad-Murmansk railway was built here, and large stocks of ammunition and fuel were created. Therefore, a surprise for the Finns was the introduction of seven divisions into battles on the northern shore of Ladoga, the number of which was brought to 10.

The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee a quick stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then conduct a counteroffensive in Karelia.

The armed forces of the opponents

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the stocks available in the warehouses were enough:

• cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns - for 2.5 months;
• shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - for 1 month;
• fuels and lubricants - for 2 months;
• aviation gasoline - for 1 month.

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state cartridge plant, one gunpowder plant and one artillery plant. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

The Finnish division consisted of: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one sapper company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division consisted of three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one anti-tank gun battery, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, and one engineer battalion.

The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in number (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

The Soviet division in terms of the aggregate firepower of machine guns and mortars was two times superior to the Finnish one, and in terms of the firepower of artillery — three times. The Red Army was not armed with submachine guns, but this was partially offset by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; they had numerous tank brigades at their disposal, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.

On the Karelian Isthmus, Finland's line of defense was the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of several fortified defensive zones with concrete and wood-based weapon emplacements, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes of frontal fire, 48 new and modernized pillboxes with from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery pillboxes and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 permanent fire installations were located along a line about 140 km long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In 1939, the most modern fortifications were built. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the financial capabilities of the state, and the people called them "millionaires" because of their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was reinforced with numerous artillery batteries on the coast and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to serve as the coordination of the fire of the Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work: by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for the military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The border section north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, in advance, preparations were made for partisan actions, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain, where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads and ice-covered lakes, on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to receive aircraft from the Western Allies.

Finland began building its navy by laying down coastal defense battleships (sometimes incorrectly called "battleships"), adapted for maneuvering and fighting in the skerries. Their main measurements: displacement - 4000 tons, travel speed - 15.5 knots, armament - 4 × 254 mm, 8x105 mm. The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Reason for war and breakdown of relations

The official reason for the war was the "Mainil incident": on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which stated that “On November 26, at 15:45, our troops stationed on the Karelian Isthmus near the Finnish border, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly shelled from Finnish territory by artillery fire. In total, seven cannon shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two from the command staff were wounded. Soviet troops, having a strict order not to succumb to provocation, refrained from reciprocal shelling "... The note was drawn up in moderate terms and required the withdrawal of Finnish troops 20-25 km from the border in order to avoid a repetition of incidents. Meanwhile, the Finnish border guards hastily investigated the incident, especially since the border posts witnessed the shelling. In return, the Finns said that the shelling was recorded by Finnish posts, the shots were fired from the Soviet side, according to the observations and estimates of the Finns from a distance of about 1.5-2 km southeast of the place where the shells fell, that on the border the Finns have only border troops and no guns, especially long-range ones, but that Helsinki is ready to start negotiations on a mutual withdrawal of troops and start a joint investigation of the incident. The USSR's reply note read: “The Finnish government’s denial of the fact of the outrageous shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, resulting in casualties, cannot be explained otherwise than by the desire to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling.<…>The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw the troops that had committed the villainous shelling of Soviet troops, and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, formally proceeding from the principle of equality of the sides, expose the hostile desire of the Finnish government to keep Leningrad under threat. "... The USSR announced its withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland, arguing that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad poses a threat to the city and is a violation of the pact.

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy to Moscow, Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Fin. Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where the Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that, in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which lies with the government of Finland, the government of the USSR recognized it necessary to immediately withdraw its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant the severance of diplomatic relations. On the same day, the Finns noted an attack on their border guards near Petsamo.

On the morning of November 30, the last step was also taken. As the official post said, "By order of the Red Army High Command, in view of new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 am on November 30 crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other regions."... On the same day, Soviet aviation bombed and fired at Helsinki with machine guns; at the same time, as a result of the error of the pilots, it was mainly the residential working quarters that suffered. In response to the protests of European diplomats, Molotov said that Soviet planes were dropping bread on Helsinki for the starving population (after which Soviet bombs were called "Molotov bread baskets" in Finland). At the same time, there was no official declaration of war.

In Soviet propaganda, and then in historiography, the responsibility for the outbreak of the war was assigned to Finland and the Western countries: “ The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939, they managed to provoke the Finnish reactionaries to the war against the USSR.».

Mannerheim, who, as commander-in-chief, had the most reliable data on the incident near Mainil, reports:

... And now the provocation, which I had been expecting since mid-October, has come true. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn beyond the fortification line, from where no battery could fire a shot outside the border ... ... Moscow negotiations: "Now it will be the soldiers' turn to talk." On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation, now known as "Shots at Mainila" ... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized ...

Nikita Khrushchev says that in late autumn (meaning it was November 26), he dined at Stalin's apartment with Molotov and Kuusinen. Among the latter, there was a conversation about the implementation of the already adopted decision - the presentation of an ultimatum to Finland; then Stalin announced that Kuusinen would head the new Karelo-Finnish SSR with the annexation of the "liberated" Finnish regions. Stalin believed "That after Finland will be presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature and if she rejects them, it will be necessary to start hostilities" noticing: "This business will start today"... Khrushchev himself believed (in accordance with Stalin's mood, as he claims) that “Loud enough to tell them<финнам>, if they don’t hear, then fire the cannon once, and the Finns will raise their hands up, agree with the requirements ”... The Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.I.Kulik (artilleryman) was sent to Leningrad in advance to organize the provocation. Khrushchev, Molotov and Kuusinen sat at Stalin's for a long time, waiting for the Finns to answer; everyone was convinced that Finland would get scared and agree to the Soviet conditions.

At the same time, it should be noted that the internal Soviet propaganda did not advertise the Mainil incident, which served as an openly formal reason: it emphasized that the Soviet Union was making a liberation campaign in Finland in order to help the Finnish workers and peasants overthrow the oppression of the capitalists. A striking example is the song "Take us, Suomi-beauty":

We come to help you straighten out,
Pay more for the shame.
Take us, Suomi is a beauty
In a necklace of transparent lakes!

At the same time, the mention in the text of the "low sun autumn"Gives rise to the assumption that the text was written ahead of time with the expectation of an earlier start of the war.

War

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began to evacuate the population from the border regions, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and the Northern Ladoga area. The bulk of the population gathered in the period November 29 - December 4.

The beginning of the battles

The period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 is usually considered the first stage of the war. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing on the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.

The 7th Army's offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman. For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence information about concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the allocated forces to break through the "Mannerheim Line" were completely insufficient. The troops were completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the support zone of the line and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the zone on the move did not succeed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi. Breakthrough attempts continued until the end of December, but they were unsuccessful.

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen. Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.

The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by Task Force Northern Finland (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä) under the command of Major General Villjo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was leading an offensive from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy's defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The forces of the 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. By interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Some researchers and memoirists are trying to explain Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to -40 ° C) and deep snow - up to 2 m.However, both the data of meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939 on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +1 to -23.4 ° C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below -23 ° C. Frosts down to -40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a calm at the front. Moreover, these frosts prevented not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Significant problems for the Soviet troops were brought about by the use by Finland of mine-explosive devices, including home-made ones, which were installed not only on the front line, but also in the rear of the Red Army, on the routes of movement of troops. On January 10, 1940, in the report of the authorized People's Commissariat of Defense, Army Commander II of Rank Kovalev, to the People's Commissariat of Defense, it was noted that, along with enemy snipers, the main losses to the infantry were inflicted by mines. Later, at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army on the collection of experience in military operations against Finland on April 14, 1940, the chief of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. this mines were used in combination with non-explosive engineering barriers.

An unpleasant surprise was the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks. For 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

During the war, Soviet troops first used radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Terijoki government

On December 1, 1939, the newspaper Pravda published a message stating that the so-called People's Government had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In the historical literature, the government of Kuusinen is usually referred to as "Terijoki", because after the outbreak of the war it was located in the village of Terijoki (now the city of Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.

On December 2, in Moscow, negotiations were held between the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by VM Molotov, at which the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.

The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease to Hanko). The exchange provided for the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia to Finland and monetary compensation. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in the training of specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and, if a year before the expiration of the agreement, none of the parties announced its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The treaty entered into force from the moment of its signing by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki”.

In the following days, Molotov met with officials from Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.

It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, no longer ruled the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

Accepted comrade. Molotov, on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government" which had already left the city of Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore no question could now be raised about any negotiations with this "government". The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement with it on mutual assistance and friendship, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

The "people's government" was formed in the USSR from the Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty with it, testifying to friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining Finland's independence, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing corruption in the army and in the rear.

Finnish People's Army

On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanlandia", began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

By November 26, there were 13 405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand servicemen who wore their national uniform (sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured Polish uniform armies are wrong - only part of the greatcoats were used from it).

This "people's" army was supposed to replace the occupying units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they will be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a draft instruction “How to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word„ communists“Crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white rule”, which indicated practical measures to create a popular front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these measures.

Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, the scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the sector of the 8th Army: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and during the capture of Vyborg.

When it became clear that the war was dragging on, and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government receded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations on the issue of concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. On January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Foreign military aid to Finland

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from different countries of the world began to arrive in Finland. In total, over 11 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, including 8 thousand from Sweden (“Swedish Volunteer Corps (English) Russian.”), 1 thousand from Norway, 600 from Denmark, 400 from Hungary (“Detachment Sisu "), 300 from the USA, as well as citizens of Great Britain, Estonia and a number of other states. A Finnish source cites a figure of 12 thousand foreigners who arrived in Finland to take part in the war.

• Among those who fought on the side of Finland were Russian White émigrés: in January 1940, B. Bazhanov and several other Russian White émigrés from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS) arrived in Finland, after a meeting on January 15, 1940 with Mannerheim, they received permission to form anti-Soviet armed detachments from the prisoners of the Red Army. Later, from the prisoners, several small "Russian People's Detachments" were created under the command of six officers-white emigrants from the ROVS. Only one of these detachments - 30 former prisoners of war under the command of "Captain K." within ten days he was on the front line and managed to take part in hostilities.
• Jewish refugees from a number of European countries entered the Finnish army.

Great Britain delivered 75 aircraft to Finland (24 Blenheim bombers, 30 Gladiator fighters, 11 Hurricane fighters and 11 Lysander reconnaissance aircraft), 114 field guns, 200 anti-tank guns, 124 automatic small arms, 185 thousand artillery shells, 17,700 bombs, 10 thousand anti-tank mines and 70 anti-tank rifles Boyes arr. 1937.

France decided to supply Finland with 179 aircraft (donate 49 fighters and sell 130 more aircraft of various types), but in fact during the war 30 MS406C1 fighters were donated and six Caudron C.714 arrived after the end of hostilities and in the war did not participate; Finland also received 160 field guns, 500 machine guns, 795 thousand artillery shells, 200 thousand hand grenades, 20 million cartridges, 400 sea mines and several thousand sets of ammunition. Also, France became the first country to officially allow the enrollment of volunteers to participate in the Finnish war.

Sweden has supplied Finland with 29 aircraft, 112 field guns, 85 anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 units of automatic small arms, 80,000 rifles, 30,000 artillery shells, 50 million rounds of ammunition, as well as other military equipment and raw materials. In addition, the Swedish government authorized the Finnish cause is our business campaign in the country to collect donations for Finland, and the Swedish State Bank provided Finland with a loan.

The Danish government sold to Finland about 30 pieces of 20-mm anti-tank guns and shells for them (at the same time, in order to avoid accusations of violation of neutrality, the order was called "Swedish"); sent an ambulance convoy and skilled workers to Finland, and authorized a fundraising campaign for Finland.

Italy sent 35 Fiat G.50 fighters to Finland, but five of them were destroyed during their ferry and mastering. Also, the Italians transferred 94.5 thousand Mannlicher-Carcano rifles mod. 1938, 1500 Beretta pistols arr. 1915 and 60 Beretta M1934 pistols.

The Union of South Africa donated 22 Gloster Gauntlet II fighters to Finland.

A US government spokesman made a statement that the entry of American citizens into the Finnish army does not contradict the US neutrality law, a group of American pilots was sent to Helsinki, and in January 1940 the US Congress approved the sale of 10 thousand rifles to Finland. Also, the USA sold 44 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters to Finland, but they arrived too late and did not have time to take part in the hostilities.

Belgium supplied Finland with 171 MP.28-II submachine guns and 56 Parabellum P-08 pistols in February 1940.

Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano in his diary mentions the assistance of Finland from the Third Reich: in December 1939, the Finnish envoy to Italy reported that Germany "unofficially" sent to Finland a batch of captured weapons captured during the Polish campaign. In addition, on December 21, 1939, Germany entered into an agreement with Sweden in which it promised to supply Sweden with the same amount of weapons as it would transfer to Finland from its own stocks. The agreement became the reason for the increase in the volume of Swedish military aid to Finland.

In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles and other weapons, as well as 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland.

Fighting in December - January

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of the Red Army troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, there was a strengthening of troops, replenishment of material reserves, reorganization of units and formations. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods of dealing with defensive structures were developed, personnel were trained. For the assault on the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the military council of the Leningrad Military District Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a tremendous amount of work was done to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.

For the destruction of the fortifications on the "Mannerheim Line" divisions of the first echelon were assigned destruction artillery groups (AR) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups included 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns of 203, 234, 280 m caliber.

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of partisan warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked the troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest, where the bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the most dangerous were snipers, "cuckoos" who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken forward were constantly surrounded and bursting back, often abandoning equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi gained wide popularity in Finland and abroad. The village of Suomussalmi was occupied on December 7 by the forces of the Soviet 163rd Infantry Division of the 9th Army, which was given the responsible task of striking Oulu, reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and, as a result, cutting Finland in half. However, after that, the division was surrounded by (smaller in number) Finnish forces and cut off from supplies. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to her aid, which, however, was blocked on the road to Suomussalmi, in a defile between two lakes near the village of Raate by the forces of two companies of the 27th Finnish Regiment (350 people). Without waiting for her approach, the 163rd division at the end of December, under constant attacks from the Finns, was forced to break out of the encirclement, while losing 30% of its personnel and most of the equipment and heavy weapons. After that, the Finns transferred the released forces to encircle and eliminate the 44th division, which by January 8 was completely destroyed in the battle on the Raat road. Almost the entire division died or was captured, and only a small part of the servicemen managed to get out of the encirclement, abandoning all the equipment and baggage (the Finns got 37 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 350 machine guns, 97 guns (including 17 howitzers), several thousand rifles, 160 vehicles , all radio stations). The Finns won this double victory with forces several times smaller than those of the enemy (11 thousand, according to other sources - 17 thousand) people with 11 guns versus 45-55 thousand with 335 guns, more than 100 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. The command of both divisions was placed under a tribunal. The commander and commissar of the 163rd division were removed from command, one regimental commander was shot; in front of the formation of his division, the command of the 44th division was shot (brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov).

The victory at Suomussalmi was of tremendous moral importance for the Finns; strategically, it buried the plans for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Bothnia, extremely dangerous for the Finns, and so paralyzed the Soviet troops in this sector that they did not take active action until the very end of the war.

At the same time, south of Suomussalmi, in the Kuhmo area, the Soviet 54th Infantry Division was surrounded. The victor at Suomussalmi, Colonel Yalmar Siilsavuo, promoted to major general, was sent to this sector, but he was never able to eliminate the division, which remained surrounded until the end of the war. At Lake Ladoga, the 168th Infantry Division advancing on Sortavala was surrounded, which was also surrounded until the end of the war. In the same place, in South Lemetti, in late December and early January, the 18th Infantry Division of General Kondrashov was surrounded, along with the 34th Tank Brigade of Kombrig Kondratyev. Already at the end of the war, on February 28, they tried to break out of the encirclement, but upon leaving they were defeated in the so-called "valley of death" near the town of Pitkyaranta, where one of the two leaving columns was completely destroyed. As a result, out of 15,000 people, 1237 people left the encirclement, half of them were wounded and frostbitten. The brigade commander Kondratyev shot himself, Kondrashov managed to get out, but was soon shot, and the division was disbanded due to the loss of the banner. The death toll in the "valley of death" was 10% of the total number of those killed in the entire Soviet-Finnish war. These episodes were vivid manifestations of the Finnish tactics called mottitaktiikka, the tactics of motti - "ticks" (literally motti - a rasp of firewood, which is put in the forest in groups, but at a certain distance from each other). Taking advantage of the advantage in mobility, detachments of Finnish skiers blocked the roads clogged with sprawling Soviet columns, cut off the advancing groups and then exhausted them with unexpected attacks from all sides, trying to destroy them. At the same time, the encircled groups, unable, unlike the Finns, to fight off the roads, usually huddled together and occupied a passive all-round defense, making no attempt to actively resist the attacks of the Finnish partisan detachments. Their complete destruction for the Finns was hampered only by the lack of mortars and, in general, heavy weapons.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defensive zone. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparation of a new offensive by counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden) with 50 crew members, a Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I.A. The S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2,080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the battle zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were accommodated in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelka of the Pryazhinsky region, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae, Kondopozhsky region, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevala region. They lived in barracks and were obliged to work in the forest in logging. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, pulling up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Sum. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand rounds on the fortifications of the Mannerheim line. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to succeed.

On February 6, an offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both west and east.

On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander 1st Rank S. Timoshenko, sent a directive No. 04606 to the troops, according to which, on February 11, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front were to go on the offensive.

On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Naval Flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the land units of the North-Western Front.

Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa area did not bring success, the main blow was shifted to the east, in the direction of Lyakhde. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery barrage and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.

In the course of three-day intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first defense line of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, since there was a threat of encirclement.

On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.

By 21 February, 7th Army had reached the second line of defense, and 13th Army - towards the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with the coastal detachments of the Baltic Fleet sailors, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

At the final stage of the operation, the 13th army advanced in the direction of Antrea (present-day Kamennogorsk), and the 7th - on Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

England and France: plans of hostilities against the USSR

Great Britain provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, "one would have to fight one way or another." Finnish representative in London Georg Gripenberg (fi: Georg Achates Gripenberg) asked Halifax on December 1, 1939 to authorize the supply of war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Nazi Germany (with which Britain was at war). The head of the Department of the North (en: Northern Department) Laurence Collier (en: Laurence Collier) at the same time believed that the British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while speaking out, however, against the proposed Finland used the Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Thomas Snow (eng. Thomas Snow), the British representative in Helsinki, continued to support the idea of ​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), expressed by him before the war.

Amid government controversy, the British army began supplying weapons in December 1939, including artillery and tanks (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).

When Finland requested the supply of bombers for attacks on Moscow and Leningrad, as well as for the destruction of the railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns to destroy the road will allow Great Britain to “avoid the same operation later, independently and in less favorable conditions. " McLean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with McLean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Herrard, the plans to intervene in the war against the USSR, which were then born in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war with Germany that they were waging at that moment. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing point of view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasing the aggressors was wrong; now the enemy, in contrast to his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains McLean and Collier's position not ideological, but humanitarian considerations.

The Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in "circles close to the government" there is a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and direct Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that on a conscious level, the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to trade one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely related.

From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense due to the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany by means of a blockade. The Soviet supply of raw materials led to the fact that the German economy continued to grow, and the French began to realize that after a while, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In such a situation, although the transfer of the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, inaction was an even worse alternative. Chief of the French General Staff Gamelin gave instructions to plan an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging a war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.

Great Britain did not support some French plans: for example, an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an offensive on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also close to opening a second front against the USSR.

On February 5, 1940, at a joint military council (which Churchill attended, but did not speak), it was decided to seek the consent of Norway and Sweden to conduct a British-led operation in which the expeditionary force was to land in Norway and move east.

The French plans, as the situation in Finland deteriorated, became more and more one-sided.

On March 2, 1940, Daladier announced his readiness to send 50,000 French soldiers and 100 bombers to Finland for the war against the USSR. The British government was not informed in advance of Daladier's statement, but agreed to send 50 British bombers to Finland. The coordination meeting was scheduled for March 12, 1940, but due to the end of the war, the plans remained unfulfilled.

End of war and conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line", Finland was deliberately unable to contain the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of complete capture of the country, which would be followed by either annexation to the USSR, or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops on the morning of March 13 stormed the city.

According to J. Roberts, Stalin's conclusion of peace on relatively moderate terms could have been caused by the realization that an attempt to forcibly Sovietize Finland would have run into massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the side of Germany.

For participation in the Finnish war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 412 servicemen, over 50 thousand were awarded orders and medals.

Results of the war

All officially announced territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, “ the war ended after 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom, set before Finland, turned out to be correct».

The USSR gained full control over the water area of ​​Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).

In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build on its territory a railway connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.

On October 11, 1940, the USSR and Finland signed the Agreement on the Aland Islands in Moscow, according to which the USSR had the right to place its consulate on the islands, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone.

For unleashing the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the massive international protests against the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aviation, including the use of incendiary bombs. US President Roosevelt joined the protests.

US President Roosevelt announced a "moral embargo" to the Soviet Union in December. On March 29, 1940, Molotov announced to the Supreme Soviet that Soviet imports from the United States had even increased over the previous year, despite the obstacles imposed by the American authorities. In particular, the Soviet side complained about the obstacles to Soviet engineers in admission to aircraft factories. In addition, under various trade agreements in the period 1939-1941. The Soviet Union received 6,430 machine tools from Germany for 85.4 million marks, which compensated for the decline in equipment supplies from the United States.

Another negative result for the USSR was the formation in the leadership of a number of countries of the idea of ​​the weakness of the Red Army. Information about the course, circumstances and results (a significant excess of Soviet losses over Finnish ones) of the Winter War strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany. In early January 1940, the German envoy to Helsinki Blucher presented to the Foreign Ministry a memorandum with the following assessments: despite the superiority in manpower and equipment, the Red Army suffered one defeat after another, left thousands of people in captivity, lost hundreds of guns, tanks, aircraft and to a decisive extent was unable to conquer the territory. In this regard, German ideas about Bolshevik Russia should be revised. The Germans proceeded from false assumptions when they believed that Russia was a first-class military factor. But in reality the Red Army has so many shortcomings that it cannot cope even with a small country. In reality, Russia does not pose a threat to such a great power as Germany, the rear in the East is safe, and therefore it will be possible to speak with the gentlemen in the Kremlin in a completely different language than it was in August-September 1939. For his part, Hitler, according to the results Winter War, called the USSR a colossus with feet of clay.

W. Churchill testifies that "The inability of the Soviet troops" caused public opinion in England "contempt"; “In English circles, many congratulated themselves on the fact that we were not very zealous in trying to win the Soviets over to our side<во время переговоров лета 1939 г.>, and prided themselves on their foresight. People too hastily concluded that the purge had destroyed the Russian army and that all this confirmed the organic rottenness and decline of the state and social system of the Russians. ".

On the other hand, the Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in the winter, on a wooded and swampy territory, the experience of breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting the enemy using the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In clashes with Finnish troops equipped with a Suomi submachine gun, the importance of the submachine guns that had been removed from service was clarified: the production of PPD was hastily restored and a technical task was given for the creation of a new submachine gun system, which resulted in the appearance of the PPSh.

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which she made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after the major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to probe possible changes. Relations were cool at first, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from Western allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently organized a meeting with Hermann Goering, the second person in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström in the late 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “ Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest.". Kivimäki immediately reported this in Helsinki.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; in addition, they could in a certain way influence the leadership of the Reich in relation to plans for an attack on the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis countries has been called the Continuation War in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began at an accelerated pace to build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
2. Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
3. Part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas (the Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland).
4. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
5. Rent of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years.

In total, as a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand km² of Finnish territories. Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, at the early stages of World War II, and in 1944 they again became part of the USSR (see Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944)).

Finland's losses

Military

According to 1991 data:

• killed - approx. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people);
• wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people);
• prisoners - 1000 people.

Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. Brief information about each of the victims from the Finnish side has been published in a number of Finnish publications.

Up-to-date information on the circumstances of the death of Finnish military personnel:

• 16,725 were killed in action, the remains were evacuated;
• 3433 were killed in action, the remains were not evacuated;
• 3671 died in hospitals from injuries;
• 715 died for non-combat reasons (including diseases);
• 28 died in captivity;
• 1727 are missing and declared dead;
• the cause of death of 363 servicemen is unknown.

A total of 26,662 Finnish soldiers died.

Civil

According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombing of Finnish cities (including Helsinki), 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 lightly wounded, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

Loss of foreign volunteers

During the war, the Swedish Volunteer Corps lost 33 people killed and 185 wounded and frostbitten (and frostbitten constituted the overwhelming majority - about 140 people).

Two Danes were killed - the pilots who fought in the LLv-24 fighter air group, and one Italian who fought in the LLv-26.

Losses of the USSR

Monument to the Fallen in the Soviet-Finnish War (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy)

The first official figures of Soviet losses in the war were published at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

According to reports from the troops on 03/15/1940:

• wounded, sick, frostbitten - 248,090;
• killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 65 384;
• died in hospitals - 15 921;
• missing - 14,043;
• total irrecoverable losses - 95,348.

Name lists

According to the lists by name drawn up in 1949-1951 by the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, the losses of the Red Army in the war were as follows:

• died and died from wounds at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 71,214;
• died in hospitals from wounds and diseases - 16,292;
• missing - 39 369.

In total, according to these lists, irrecoverable losses amounted to 126,875 servicemen.

Other loss estimates

In the period from 1990 to 1995, new, often contradictory data on the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies appeared in Russian historical literature and in journal publications, and the general trend of these publications was the increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M.I.Semiryaga (1989) the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacist in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, then, according to P. A. Aptekar, their number is more than double the results of the study of Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people. According to the data of the Soviet military archives and hospitals, sanitary losses amounted to (by name) 264,908 people. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the losses were from frostbite.

Losses in the Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 based on the two-volume History of Russia. XX century ":

"Karelian question"

After the war, the local Finnish authorities, the provincial organizations of the Karelian Union, created to protect the rights and interests of the evacuated residents of Karelia, tried to find a solution to the issue of returning the lost territories. During the Cold War, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen repeatedly negotiated with the Soviet leadership, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. The Finnish side did not openly demand the return of these territories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of transferring territories to Finland was raised again.

In matters concerning the return of the seceded territories, the Karelian Union acts jointly with the foreign policy leadership of Finland and through it. In accordance with the Karelia program adopted at the Karelian Union congress in 2005, the Karelian Union seeks to encourage the political leadership of Finland to actively monitor the situation in Russia and begin negotiations with Russia on the return of the seceded territories of Karelia as soon as a real basis arises. and both sides will be ready for it.

Propaganda during the war

At the beginning of the war, the tone of the Soviet press was bravura - the Red Army looked ideal and victorious, while the Finns were portrayed as a frivolous enemy. On December 2 (2 days after the start of the war) Leningradskaya Pravda will write:

You involuntarily admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles, shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of the two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peaceful, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle about. And the weapon is, frankly, old and worn. Not enough for more gunpowder.

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the "Mannerheim Line", difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, got stuck in the Finnish forests. Beginning with Molotov's report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable "Mannerheim Line", similar to the "Maginot Line" and "Siegfried Line", begins to live. which until now have not yet been crushed by a single army... Later Anastas Mikoyan wrote: “ Stalin, an intelligent, capable man, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented a reason that we “suddenly” discovered the well-equipped Mannerheim Line. A special motion picture was released showing these structures to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win a victory.».

If Finnish propaganda portrayed the war as the defense of the homeland from cruel and merciless invaders, combining communist terrorism with traditional Russian great power (for example, in the song "No, Molotov!" the struggle against autonomy), then the Soviet Agitprop presented the war as a struggle against the oppressors of the Finnish people for the sake of the freedom of the latter. The term White Finns used to designate the enemy was intended to emphasize not the interstate or interethnic, but the class nature of the confrontation. "They took away your homeland more than once - we come to return it", says the song "Take us, Suomi Beauty," in an attempt to fend off accusations of taking over Finland. The order for the troops of the Leningrad Military District of November 29, signed by Meretskov and Zhdanov, says:

We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of the landlords and capitalists.

We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the Kajander-Erkno government, which is oppressing the Finnish people and provoking a war with the USSR.
We respect the freedom and independence of Finland, which the Finnish people received as a result of the October Revolution.

Mannerheim Line - Alternative

Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify the long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the "incredibly strongly fortified" "Mannerheim line" is firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the chanting of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla("On the Mannerheim Line"). Technical advisor for the construction of fortifications, Belgian General Badu, who participated in the construction of the Maginot Line, stated:

Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous "Mannerheim Line" was built from wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete. The greatest fortress of the "Mannerheim Line" is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not regret concrete.

According to the Russian historian A. Isaev, “in reality, the 'Mannerheim Line' was far from the best examples of European fortification. The overwhelming majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, reinforced concrete structures partially buried in the ground in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the “million” type had two levels, three more pillboxes - three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their battle casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly recessed into the ground with embrasures and completely recessed, connecting galleries with barracks. There were very few structures with what could be called floors. " It was much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov line, not to mention the Maginot line with multi-storey caponiers equipped with their own power plants, kitchens, lounges and all amenities, with underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow-gauge railways. Along with the famous granite boulders, the Finns used low-quality concrete bumps designed for outdated Renault tanks and proved to be weak against the guns of the new Soviet technology. In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located on the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other and rarely had cannon armament.

As O. Mannien notes, the Finns had enough resources to build only 101 concrete bunkers (made of low-quality concrete), and they took less concrete than the building of the Helsinki Opera House; the rest of the Mannerheim Line's fortifications were wood-earthen (for comparison: the Maginot Line had 5800 concrete fortifications, including multi-storey bunkers).

Mannerheim himself wrote:

... Even during the war, the Russians used the myth of the "Mannerheim line". It was argued that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus was based on an unusually strong and state-of-the-art defensive wall, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The breakthrough of the Russians was "a feat that has not been equal in the history of all wars" ... All this is nonsense; in reality, the state of affairs looks completely different ... Of course, there was a defensive line, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new bunkers built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the "Mannerheim Line". Its strength was the result of the steadfastness and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.

- Mannerheim, K.G. Memoirs. - M .: VAGRIUS, 1999 .-- S. 319-320. - ISBN 5-264-00049-2.

Perpetuation of memory

Monuments

• The Cross of Sorrow is a memorial to the Soviet and Finnish soldiers who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war. Opened June 27, 2000. Located in the Pitkyaranta region of the Republic of Karelia.
• The Kollasjärvi memorial is a memorial to the fallen Soviet and Finnish soldiers. Located in the Suoyarvsky district of the Republic of Karelia.

Museums

• School Museum "Unknown War" - opened on November 20, 2013 at the MOU "Secondary School No. 34" in the city of Petrozavodsk.
• The War Museum of the Karelian Isthmus was opened in Vyborg by the historian Bair Irincheev.

War fiction

• Finnish wartime song "No, Molotov!" (mp3, with Russian translation)
• "Take us, Suomi-beauty" (mp3, with Finnish translation)
• The song "Talvisota" by the Swedish power metal band Sabaton

• "Song of the battalion commander Ugryumov" - a song about Captain Nikolai Ugryumov, the first Hero of the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Finnish war
• Alexander Tvardovsky."Two lines" (1943) - a poem dedicated to the memory of Soviet soldiers who died during the war
• N. Tikhonov, "Savolaksky huntsman" - a poem
• Alexander Gorodnitsky, "Finnish Border" - song.
• x / f "Front-line girlfriends" (USSR, 1941)
• film "Behind Enemy Lines" (USSR, 1941)
• x / f "Mashenka" (USSR, 1942)
• x / f "Talvisota" (Finland, 1989).
• film "Chapel of an Angel" (Russia, 2009).
• feature film "Military Intelligence: Northern Front (TV series)" (Russia, 2012).
• Blitzkrieg computer game
• Computer game "Talvisota: Icy Hell".
• Computer game Squad Battles: Winter War.

Documentaries

• "The Living and the Dead". A documentary about the "Winter War" directed by V. A. Fonarev
• "Mannerheim Line" (USSR, 1940)
• "Winter War" (Russia, Viktor Pravdyuk, 2014)

75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. For a long time, the winter war was almost unknown to the inhabitants of Russia. In the 1980s-1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme the history of Russia-USSR with impunity, the dominant point of view was that “bloody Stalin” wanted to seize “innocent” Finland, but a small but proud northern people rebuffed the northern “empire of evil”. Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was “forced” to enter into an alliance with Nazi Germany in order to resist the “aggression” of the Soviet Union.

Many books and articles denounced the Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They called absolutely fantastic figures of Soviet losses, reported about the heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, the stupidity of Soviet generals and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the Kremlin's actions have been denied. They say that the irrational malice of the "bloody dictator" is to blame.

In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to recall the history of Finland. For a long time Finnish tribes were on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Russia, became "Russians". The fragmentation and weakening of Russia led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subdued by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the tradition of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, it was spoken by the nobles and the entire educated stratum of the population.

Russia having taken Finland away from Sweden in 1809, in fact, gave the Finns statehood, made it possible to create the main state institutions, and form the national economy. Finland received its own government, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. The Finnish language, while maintaining the status of the Swedish language, received the status of the state language. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification in Finland was not carried out for a long time (some elements appeared only in the late period, but it was already too late). The resettlement of Russians to Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included the lands that Russia seized from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg was of great military-strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - St. Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian "prison of peoples" lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building the empire and its defense from numerous enemies.

The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with imperial Germany, and then with the powers of the Entente ( more in a series of articles - How Russia created the Finnish statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with imperial Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish War; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland occupied a hostile position towards Russia, inclining towards an alliance with the Third Reich.

The majority of Russian citizens associate Finland with a “cozy little European country”, with peaceful and cultured people. This was facilitated by a kind of "political correctness" towards Finland, which reigned in late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after being defeated in the 1941-1944 war, learned a good lesson and made the most of its proximity to the vast Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They preferred to forget about it for the sake of good relations.

Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.The separation of Finland from Russia was not peaceful. A civil war broke out between white and red Finns. The Whites were supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns gained the upper hand. The winners created a network of concentration camps, unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the hostilities themselves, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns "cleaned out" the Russian community in Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and the Soviet regime. Former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children ... Significant material values ​​belonging to the Russians were confiscated.

The Finns were going to put the German king on the throne of Finland. However, the defeat of Germany in the war led to the fact that Finland became a republic. After that, Finland began to focus on the Entente powers. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, claiming Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical leaders made plans to build a "Great Finland" with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (the Urals and Western Siberia are considered the ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).

The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders, preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all of its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power "from sea to sea." More or less they know about this in Russia. But few people know that the Finnish elite raved about a similar idea, the creation of "Greater Finland". The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they claimed Soviet lands that were larger than Finland itself. The radicals had unlimited appetites, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.

And to begin with, they wanted to seize Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. Thus, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim declared that "he will not put the sword into its sheath until Eastern Karelia is freed from the Bolsheviks." Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the line White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of the new lands. It was also planned to include the Pechenga region (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula in the Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a "free city" like Danzig. On May 15, 1918, Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.

Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so it did not have the strength to defeat its insolent neighbor. However, the Finnish offensive against Petrozavodsk and Olonets, the campaign against Petrograd across the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of the white army of Yudenich, the Finns had to go to peace. Peace negotiations were held in Tartu from 10 to 14 July 1920. The Finns demanded that Karelia be handed over to them, the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove out the last Finnish detachments from the Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for help from the West, the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to obtain the Pechenga Volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredny Peninsula and the islands west of the boundary line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.

This did not satisfy Helsinki. The plans for the construction of "Greater Finland" were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921 Finland again tried to resolve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.

But even after this failure, the Finns did not cool down. The situation on the Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge powerful power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how small Finland could threaten the huge northern "empire of evil". However, the USSR in the 1920s-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and potential. The real policy of Moscow was then super-cautious. In fact, for quite a long time Moscow, until it got stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often yielding, did not climb on the rampage.

For example, the Japanese plundered our waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula for a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only cleaned out all the living creatures from our waters for millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores for repairing, processing fish, obtaining fresh water, etc. Before Khasan and Khalkin-gol, when The USSR grew stronger thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the red commanders had strict orders to restrain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the border. A similar situation was in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took out warships to the White Sea.

Of course, Finland no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud noted: "Any enemy of Russia should always be a friend of Finland." Against this background, Finland has made friendship even with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for training. In Finland, as in Poland, they feared any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war of some great Western power with Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from the Russian lands. ... Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducting practically open propaganda for the attack on Russia and the seizure of its territories. All sorts of provocations on land, in the sea and in the air constantly took place on the Soviet-Finnish border.

After the hopes for an imminent conflict between Japan and the USSR did not materialize, the Finnish leadership embarked on a course towards a close alliance with Germany. The two countries were linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (“Cellarius Bureau”) was established in the country. Its main task was to conduct intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data on the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, had built a network of military airfields, which was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. Quite indicative is the fact that even before the outbreak of the war of 1939-1940. The Finnish swastika was the mark of the Finnish Air Force and armored forces.

Thus, by the beginning of the big war in Europe, we had a clearly hostile, aggressively-minded state on the north-western borders, the elite of which dreamed of building “Greater Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.

The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the north-western borders. Of particular importance was Leningrad - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could shell the city from its border, and ground troops could reach Leningrad in one dash. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to move the land border on land, as well as to restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, having received a place for fortifications on the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had only one base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range guns from the Finnish coastal defense. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.

The issue with Estonia was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, a mutual assistance agreement was signed between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was brought into Estonia. The USSR received the rights to establish military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, in Paldiski and Haapsalu.

It was not possible to come to an amicable agreement with Finland. Although negotiations began back in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She offered to conclude a mutual assistance agreement and jointly defend the Gulf of Finland zone, give the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the Finnish coast (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger territory of Eastern Karelia, soft loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all the proposals met with a categorical refusal of the Finnish side. One cannot fail to note the inflammatory role of London. The British told the Finns that they needed to take a firm stand and not succumb to pressure from Moscow. This has encouraged Helsinki.

In Finland, began a general mobilization and evacuation of the civilian population from the border areas. At the same time, left-wing leaders were arrested. Incidents have become more frequent at the border. So, on November 26, 1939, a border incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery fired at Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR provocation to be the culprit. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland. The war broke out on November 30. Its results are known. Moscow has solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. We can say that only thanks to the Winter War, the enemy was unable to capture the second capital of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

Currently Finland is again drifting towards the West, NATO, so it is worth keeping a close eye on it. A "cozy and cultured" country can again recall the plans of "Greater Finland" up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, while the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into NATO's forward staging areas for aggression against Russia. And Ukraine is becoming an instrument for the war with Russia in the southwestern direction.

In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was practically consigned to oblivion for many years. This was facilitated by its not very successful results, and a kind of "political correctness" practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid of offending any of the "friends" than fire, and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.

Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of AT Tvardovsky about the "unremarkable war" today, this war is very "famous". Books dedicated to her are published one after another, not to mention the many articles in various magazines and collections. But this "celebrity" is very peculiar. The authors, who made denouncing the Soviet "evil empire" their profession, cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied ...

By the end of the 1930s, there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union. It is quite indicative that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. the identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who, by his actions, pushed Finland into the Hitlerite camp, prefer not to remember this. As well as why the peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of accepting 10 times more aircraft than there were in the Finnish air force. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.

Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the country's second largest and most important city. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy probed the issue of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but in Helsinki they categorically refused.

The denouncers of the "crimes of the Stalinist regime" like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country, which itself disposes of its territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to an exchange. In this regard, one can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis to impose a naval blockade on the Island of Liberty, much less to launch a military strike against it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and fully corresponded to the norms of international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start World War III if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as “sphere of vital interests”. For our country, in 1939, a similar sphere included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Cadet Party PN Milyukov, who did not at all sympathize with the Soviet regime, in a letter to IP Demidov, expressed the following attitude to the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”

On November 26, the famous incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery fired at our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet servicemen were killed and 9 wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish side's claims that their artillery was stationed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Mainila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.

I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefront of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive zone on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to trench warfare.

What are the reasons for the failure of the initial period of the war? First of all, in underestimating the enemy. Finland carried out mobilization in advance, increasing the size of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied the defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to carry out full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.

The Soviet intelligence was not up to par, too, which could not reveal complete and reliable information about the Finnish fortifications.

Finally, the Soviet leadership harbored unfounded hopes for the "class solidarity of the Finnish workers." It was widely believed that the population of the countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately "rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army," that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.

As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. So, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important sector of the front, the Finnish side in December 1939 had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 calculation battalions. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle and machine gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 estimated rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, then the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet - 169 thousand people. On the whole, 425 thousand Red Army fighters acted against 265 thousand Finnish soldiers along the entire front.

Defeat or victory?

So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won, as a result of which the winner is in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?

As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So the situation has not worsened in this respect. On the other hand, it is known that an unbelted bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was established there. Despite the persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time it was banned in December of the same year, it had 40,000 members. Such a mass character testifies that not only supporters of the communists entered the Society, but also simply sane people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with a great neighbor.

According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of World War II, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km, and even in exchange for a twice as large territory, as a result of the war, he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.

It should also be noted that in the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the value of the property left by the Finns. According to the estimates of the Finnish side, even in the case of a transfer of a small piece of land, which it agreed to cede to us, it was about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would have gone to many billions.

But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers in the Nystadt Peace Treaty, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation ".

Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the seized territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand cars, a significant number of cars to the USSR.

Of course, in the course of hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the personal lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. killed, died and went missing 126 875 soldiers of the Red Army. The losses of the Finnish troops were, according to official figures, 21 396 killed and 1434 missing. However, in the domestic literature, another figure of Finnish losses is often found - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.

Be that as it may, the Soviet losses are several times greater than the Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the hostilities in Manchuria, the losses of both sides turn out to be approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more Japanese. However, during the assault on the fortress of Port Arthur, the losses of the Japanese far exceeded the Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even an unfinished one. Quite naturally, the storming forces suffered much higher losses. The same situation developed during the Soviet-Finnish war, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.

As a result, the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got an occasion to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.

Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier said that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. This is a great victory for Russia "... However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.

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1. Units of the Red Army are crossing the bridge to the territory of Finland. 1939 g.

2. Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of ​​the former Finnish border outpost. 1939 g.

3. Artillery crew at their gun at a firing position. 1939 g.

4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain Kapustin I.V., who landed with a landing on the island of Seiskaari, inspecting the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939 g.

5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are advancing from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

6. The outfit of border guards on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the outpost of the Finns of Beloostrov. 1939 g.

8. Sappers at the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border outpost Yapinen. 1939 g.

9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front lines. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

10. Soldiers of the 7th Army are firing at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

11. The reconnaissance group of skiers receives the task of the commander before leaving for reconnaissance. 1939 g.

12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborgsky district. 1939 g.

13. Fighters-skiers on a hike. 1940 g.

14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of ​​hostilities with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940 g.

15. Soldiers for cooking in the woods at the stake during a break between battles. 1939 g.

16. Cooking lunch in the field at 40 degrees below zero. 1940 g.

17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940 g.

18. Signalers for the restoration of the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

19. Soldiers - signalmen restore the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939 g.

20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at the Terijoki station. 1939 g.

21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939 g.

22. Signalers on the negotiating front line in the area of ​​the Kemyarya station. 1940 g.

23. Rest of the Red Army after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940 g.

24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast from a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939 g.

25. View of the Suoyarva station, taken by soldiers of the Red Army. 1939 g.

26. Soldiers of the Red Army guard a petrol pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939 g.

27. General view of the destroyed "Mannerheim Fortification Line". 1939 g.

28. General view of the destroyed "Mannerheim Fortification Line". 1939 g.

29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940

30. General view of the destroyed "Mannerheim Fortification Line". 1939 g.

31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939 g.

32. A soldier of the Red Army puts a letter into a field mailbox. 1939 g.

33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers examines the Shutskor's banner taken from the Finns. 1939 g.

34. Howitzer B-4 on the front line. 1939 g.

35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at a height of 65.5. 1940 g.

36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939 g.

37. View of the destroyed bridge near the town of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939 g.

38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940 g.

39. Red Army soldiers at the captured gun left after fighting with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940 g.

40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940 g.

41. Telecontrolled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.

42. Soviet soldiers on the captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940 g.

43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940 g.

44. Soldiers of the Red Army on the fortifications in the city of Vyborg. 1940 g.

45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940 g.

46. ​​Soldiers of the Red Army clear snow from the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940 g.

47. Icebreaker "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940 g.

48. Soviet skiers are advancing to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.

49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxied for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet-Finnish war.

50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940

51. Crossing the Finnish border by Soviet units in the area of ​​the village of Hautavaara. 11/30/1939

52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The picture was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940 g.

53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. 11/30/1939

54. Finnish Fokker C.X. aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939

55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) unloads a mine.

56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 shells the Finnish fortifications. 02.12.1939 g.

57. The commanders of the Red Army examine the captured Finnish tank Vickers Mk.E. March 1940

58. Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) at the I-16 fighter. 1940 g.