The Soviet-Finnish military conflict, which began on November 30, 1939, cannot be considered outside the context of the historical events that took place in Europe after the Munich Agreement and the German invasion of Poland - the Second World War began on September 1, 1939.

In an increasingly aggravated situation, the Soviet leadership simply could not help thinking about the state of its borders, including in the northwestern direction, since Finland was an unconditional military supporter of Nazi Germany. Back in 1935, General Mannerheim visited Berlin, where he held negotiations with Goering and Ribbentrop, the result of which was an agreement on granting Germany the right to deploy its troops on Finnish territory in case of war. In return, the German side promised Finland Soviet Karelia.

In connection with the agreements reached, as a springboard for future hostilities, the Finns built an impassable chain of barriers on the Karelian Isthmus, called the "Mannerheim Line". In Finland itself, the Finnish fascist organization "Lapuanskoe Movement" actively raised its head, the program of which included the creation of "Great Finland", which included Leningrad and all of Karelia.

Throughout the second half of the 30s, secret contacts between the highest Finnish generals and the leadership of the Wehrmacht were carried out; in August 1937 Finland hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines, and in 1938 direct preparations began for the introduction of a German expeditionary force into Finland. By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields had been built in Finland, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. By the way, their identification mark, as well as tank troops, became a blue swastika. On the part of Finland on the border with the USSR, all kinds of provocations, including armed ones, were constantly organized on the ground, in the sky and at sea.

In connection with the current situation and in order to secure the north-western borders of the USSR, the Soviet leadership began to make attempts to persuade the Finnish government to mutually beneficial cooperation.

On April 7, 1938, Boris Rybkin, a resident of the INO NKVD in Helsinki, who is also the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland Yartsev, was urgently summoned to Moscow and received in the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. Stalin said that there was a need for secret negotiations with the Finnish side, the main purpose of which should be an agreement on the transfer of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad. It was proposed to interest the Finns with a proposal to transfer much larger territories in exchange, but on a different site. In addition, given that in the central part of Finland almost all forest has been cut down, and woodworking enterprises are idle, the Finns were promised additional supplies of wood from the USSR. Another goal of the negotiations was to conclude a bilateral defense treaty in case Germany attacked the USSR through Finland. At the same time, the Soviet side will give guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of Finland. All forthcoming negotiations, Stalin emphasized, should be of an exclusively secret nature.

On April 14, 1938, Rybkin arrived in Helsinki, immediately phoned the Finnish Foreign Ministry and asked to connect him with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kholsty, to whom he turned with a proposal for an immediate meeting, which took place on the same day. On it, Rybkin explained to the minister everything Stalin had said and added that if Germany was allowed to freely land its troops on the territory of Finland, then the Soviet Union was not going to passively wait for the Germans to arrive at Rajek (now Sestroretsk, 32 km from Leningrad), but would abandon their armed forces deep into Finnish territory, as far as possible, after which battles between German and Soviet troops will take place on Finnish territory. If the Finns resist the landing of German troops, the USSR will provide Finland with all possible economic and military assistance with the obligation to withdraw its armed forces immediately after the end of the military conflict. Rybkin stressed the need for special secrecy when considering this issue.

Kholsty reported to Prime Minister Kayander about the conversation with Rybkin, but after discussing the situation, they decided to continue the negotiations, but to take the maximum wait-and-see attitude, without promising anything. Rybkin went to Moscow with a report to Stalin, who at that time was satisfied at least by the very fact of the start of negotiations with the Finnish side.

Three months later, on July 11, on the initiative of the Finnish side, Rybkin was received by Prime Minister Kayander. to the Soviet proposals, belittling their level and finally choosing the tactics of procrastination.

Nevertheless, on August 5, 10, 11 and 18 Rybkin met with Tanner, during the last of which the Soviet proposals were finally concretized.

1. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can conclude a secret military agreement with the USSR, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's written obligation to be ready to repel a possible attack and to accept Soviet military assistance for this purpose.

2. Moscow is ready to agree to the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, necessary for the security of both Finland and Leningrad. But on condition that the USSR will be given the opportunity to take part in their strengthening.

3. As a reciprocal service, Moscow hopes that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to build a defensive air and naval base on the Finnish island of Sur-Sari (Gogland).

If the Finnish side accepts these conditions, the USSR guarantees Finland the inviolability of its borders, if necessary, will help her with weapons on favorable terms and is ready to conclude a profitable trade agreement with her that would favor the development of both agriculture and industry.

Tanner reported on the Soviet proposals to Prime Minister Kayader, and he found them unacceptable, which on September 15 was reported to Rybkin: the Finnish side is not curtailing the secret negotiations, they are even ready to buy some weapons, but the proposals on the Aland Islands and Gogland Island are rejected without counter proposals.

Stalin recommended Rybkin to continue the negotiation process, which he did until December 1938, and only when it finally became clear that the positions of the parties were too different, it was decided to recall him to Moscow and continue negotiations at the official level.

Such negotiations with Finland began in Moscow in March 1939. However, the exchange of views proceeded sluggishly, the Finnish government was increasingly inclined towards close cooperation with Nazi Germany, and no progress was made.

But the aggravation of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of the Second World War forced the Soviet leadership to once again urge the Finnish side to continue the negotiations, which began in Moscow on October 12. On them, the Kremlin in a sharp form demanded that Finland fulfill the previously proposed conditions, and, above all, the transfer of the border from Leningrad in exchange for another territory. Stalin said so bluntly: "We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line be 70 km. These are our minimum requirements, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad, therefore the border line must be moved. "(the territorial waters of Finland reached almost the outer roadstead of the Leningrad port).

The Finnish government, and above all, President Kallio, who stands on implacably tough pro-German positions, relying on the help of Germany, which secretly supplied the Finns with weapons, instructed their delegation, after its repeated departures and returns, ostensibly for consultations in the chosen delay tactics, to break off the negotiations on November 13 finally and leave, rejecting all fundamental Soviet proposals.

A mutual assistance pact was already proposed at different stages; lease, purchase or exchange for the Soviet territory of the islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; the exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for a much larger part of Soviet territory in Eastern Karelia near Rebola and Porosozero (5529 sq. km versus 2761 sq. km); setting up a Soviet air and naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, etc.

But all is in vain. Even despite the fact that the USSR had already signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and reached agreements on spheres of influence. By the way, when the returning Finnish delegation crossed the border, the Finnish border guards opened fire on the Soviet border guards. After all this, at the military council, Stalin declared: "We will have to fight Finland," and it was decided to ensure the security of the north-western borders by force, and therefore, until the end of November, Soviet troops were hurrying to the border.

On November 26 at 15.45 in the border area near the village of Mainila, an incident occurred with artillery shelling of Soviet troops, as a result of which, according to official reports, 4 Red Army soldiers were killed and 9 wounded.

On the same day, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to the Finnish side and demanded, in order to prevent similar incidents in the future, to withdraw its troops from the border line by 20-25 km.

In a response note, the Finnish government denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the shelling of Mainila and suggested that "the case is about an accident that occurred during training exercises on the Soviet side ..." on a double bend at a known distance from the border ".

In a new note dated November 28, the Soviet government qualified the Finnish response as "a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government to the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between the two countries to the extreme." The note stated that the proposal for a mutual withdrawal of troops was unacceptable for the USSR, since in this case the Red Army units were to be drawn to the suburbs of Leningrad, while Soviet troops did not threaten any vital center of Finland. In this regard, the Soviet government "considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact ..."

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Irie Koskinen was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which rests entirely with the government of Finland, "the government of the USSR came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the government of Finland and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland." This was a break in diplomatic relations, which meant the penultimate step that separated the world from the war.

In the early morning of the next day, the last step was taken. As stated in the official message, "on the orders of the Red Army High Command, in view of new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other regions at 8 am on November 30."

The war began, later called the Winter War, which at that moment promised to be simple and end in two or three weeks. But due to the underestimation of the enemy, who managed to increase the number of its armed forces from 37 to 337 thousand, its own insufficient combat readiness, excessive illusions about the "class solidarity of Finnish workers" who would almost come out with flowers to meet the soldiers of the Red Army, the war lasted 105 days , can hardly be recognized as completely successful for the Soviet side, and ended only on March 12, 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty.

On the whole, 425 thousand soldiers of the Red Army acted along the entire front against 265 thousand Finnish servicemen, on the impregnable "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus against 130 thousand Finns - 169 thousand soldiers of the Red Army.

Losses in the war of the Finnish side: 21396 killed and 1434 missing. Our losses are much greater: 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died and went missing.

As a result of the war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters without any compensatory exchange. km of Finnish territories (and it was proposed to give 5529 sq. km instead of only 2761 sq. km), including the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. As a result, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

Also, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation, Finland had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons and cars.

And it is very important that the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got a reason to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. Just over a year remained until June 22, 1941, and Stalin knew about it.

Soviet - Finnish war 1939 - 1940

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (Fin. talvisota - Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand residents lost their homes and moved into the interior of Finland, creating a number of social problems.

According to a number of foreign historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland belongs to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict that is not part of World War II, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR was declared a military aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.

A group of Red Army soldiers with the captured Finnish flag

Background
Events 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR appealed to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war broke out in Finland, in which the “red” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “white”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the "whites". After the victory in Finland, the troops of the Finnish "whites" supported the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The outbreak of the first Soviet-Finnish war during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) peace treaty was concluded between these states. Some Finnish politicians such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded this treaty as "too good a peace", believing that the superpowers will compromise only when urgently needed.

Juho Kusti Paasikivi

Mannerheim, former activists and leaders of separatists in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a shame and betrayal of compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Finn HH (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Nevertheless, relations between Finland and The USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula, were ceded to Finland in the North, in the Arctic Circle, were not friendly, but also openly hostile too. In Finland, they feared Soviet aggression, and the Soviet leadership practically ignored Finland until 1938, focusing on the largest capitalist countries, primarily Great Britain and France.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, which was embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles in Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their armaments. In Finland, the government and most of the members of parliament have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, due to economy, no military exercises were held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to support the army. The issue of spending on the provision of weapons in the parliament was not considered. Tanks and military aircraft were completely absent.

Interesting fact:
The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Coast Guard battleship "Väinämöinen"

Finnish coastal defense battleship: "Väinemäinen" entered service in 1932. It was built at the Creighton Volcano shipyard in Turku. It was a relatively large ship: its total displacement was 3900 tons, length 92.96, width 16.92 and draft 4.5 meters. The armament consisted of 2 two-gun 254-mm cannons, 4 two-gun 105-mm cannons and 14 40-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The ship had strong armor: the thickness of the side armor was 51, the deck armor was up to 19, the turrets were 102 millimeters. The crew consisted of 410 people.

Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Karl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in Russia, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: "The plague coming from the east can be contagious." In a conversation with Risto Ryti, then Governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, held in the same year, he outlined his views on the need for an early solution to the issue of creating a military program and its financing. Ryti, after listening to the reasoning, asked the question: "But what is the use of providing the military department with such large sums if war is not foreseen?"

Since 1919, Väinö Tanner has been the leader of the Socialist Party.

Väine Alfred Tanner

During the Civil War, the warehouses of his firm served as a base for the Communists, and then he became the editor of an influential newspaper, a determined opponent of the appropriation for defense. Mannerheim refused to meet with him, realizing that by doing so he would only reduce his efforts to strengthen the state's defenses. As a result, by decision of the parliament, the defense expenditure item of the budget was further cut.
In August 1931, after inspecting the fortifications of the Enckel line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for the conditions of modern warfare, both due to its poor location and destruction over time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the 1934 budget, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was deleted.

Tanner observed that the Social Democratic faction of parliament:
... still believes that a prerequisite for maintaining the independence of the country is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that it is worth all the costs of defense.
Mannerheim describes his efforts as "a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow and resin-filled pipe." It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future meet a blank wall of incomprehension and indifference. And he filed a petition to be removed from his post.
Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939

The negotiations were initiated by the USSR, initially they were conducted in secret mode, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain "free hands" in an unclear perspective in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials, the announcement of the fact of the negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view in terms of domestic policy, since the population of Finland generally had a negative attitude towards the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the USSR's position: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side blow through Finland. Therefore, Finland's attitude to the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait at the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland puts up resistance to the Germans, the USSR will provide her with military and economic assistance, since Finland is not capable of repelling the German landing itself. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Finance Minister Väinö Tanner. The guarantees of the Finnish side that Finland would not allow violating its territorial inviolability and invading Soviet Russia through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, first of all, during an attack by Germany, to participate in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands and to obtain military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Finn. Suursaari). No territorial claims were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to rent the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari, Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they could not be defended or used to protect the Karelian Isthmus. The negotiations ended in vain on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact. Under a secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-intervention in case of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later on September 1, 1939. Soviet troops entered Poland on September 17.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded agreements on mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR suggested that Finland consider the possibility of concluding a similar pact of mutual assistance with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the USSR's treaty with Germany has already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finland.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow to negotiate "on specific political issues." The negotiations were held in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4, and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.
During these negotiations, for the first time, it comes to the proximity of the border to Leningrad. Joseph Stalin remarked: "We cannot do anything about geography, just like you ... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border away from it."
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side to the Finnish delegation in Moscow looked as follows:

1.Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
2. Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four thousandth military contingent there for its defense.
3.The Soviet military fleet is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Fin.) Russian.
4. Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari, Seiskari to the USSR.
5. The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groupings and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
6. Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
7. The USSR transfers to Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one (5 529 km?).
8. The USSR undertakes not to object to the arming of the Aland Islands by Finland's own forces.


Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories in which Finland would receive more vast territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi (Fin.) Russian .. These were the territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace the treaty remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR announced its demands before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted, and there is no need to rely on Germany's help.
The State Council did not agree to fulfill all the requirements of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the concession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Maly), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and closest to Leningrad territories in Terioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deepened into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
Earlier, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland has chosen something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden made it clear about its position of neutrality, and there were no serious assurances of help from other states.
In the middle of 1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, at the Main Military Council of the USSR, an operational plan for an attack on Finland was discussed, and starting in mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the "Mannerheim line" was being completed. On August 7-12, large military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, during which they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attachés were invited, except for the Soviet one.

President of Finland Risto Heikki Ryti (center) and Marshal K. Mannerheim

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions, since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issues of ensuring the security of Leningrad, in turn trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the USSR's consent to arming the Aland Islands, whose demilitarized status governed by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the Mannerheim Line.
The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the number of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. "Do you want to provoke a conflict?" / V. Molotov /. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist before his parliament on the need to find a compromise, saying that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, first learning about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.
The negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side issued a statement: “We, civilians, have not made any progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers. "
However, Stalin again made concessions the next day, proposing instead of leasing the Hanko Peninsula to buy it or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, who was then finance minister and was part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that the proposals opened the way for an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: "We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, not looking at anything, breaking all and all kinds of obstacles on the way to the goal." On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received instructions on the preparation of military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin outwardly demonstrated a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases, but the Finns refused to discuss it and on November 13 they departed for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered to confirm the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article entitled "The Fool Pea as Prime Minister", which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign.

K. Mannerheim and A. Hitler

On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the settlement of Mainila, staged by the Soviet side, which is confirmed by the relevant orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore had previously withdrawn the troops from the border to a distance that precluded the occurrence of misunderstandings. The leadership of the USSR blamed Finland for this incident. In the Soviet media, a new term was added to the terms widely used to name hostile elements: White Guards, White Poles, White émigrés, a new one - White Finn.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were ordered to go over to the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to the statements of the Soviet side, the goal of the USSR was to achieve by military means what it could not do peacefully: to ensure the safety of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of a war (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours) of the war.
They say that the measures we are taking are directed against the independence of Finland or at interference in its internal and external affairs. This is the same malicious slander. We consider Finland, whatever regime exists, an independent and sovereign state in all its foreign and domestic policy. We firmly stand for the fact that the Finnish people themselves decide their internal and external affairs, as they themselves consider necessary.

Molotov more sharply assessed the policy of Finland in his report on March 29, where he spoke of "hostility towards our country in the ruling and military circles of Finland" and praised the peaceful policy of the USSR:

The foreign policy of the USSR, imbued with peacefulness, was demonstrated here with complete certainty. The Soviet Union immediately declared that it was in a position of neutrality and steadily pursued this policy throughout the entire period that had elapsed.

- Report of V.M. Molotov at the VI session of the Supreme USSR on March 29, 1940
Did the Government and the Party do the right thing to declare war on Finland? This question concerns the Red Army especially.
Couldn't war have been dispensed with? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since the peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, for its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require the transfer of the border. Requirements for the lease of Hanko, hundreds of kilometers to the west, dubiously increased the security of Leningrad. There was only one constant in the requirements: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland, and near its coast, to oblige Finland not to ask for help from third countries, except the USSR.
On the second day of the war, a puppet was created on the territory of the USSR. Terijoki government led by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen.

Otto Wilhelmovich Kuusinen

On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contact with the legitimate government of Finland, headed by Risto Ryti.

It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty: if things at the front were going in accordance with the operational plan, then this "government" would arrive in Helsinki with a certain political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called [...] to overthrow the "government of the executioners". Kuusinen's address to the soldiers of the "Finnish People's Army" directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" on the building of the president's palace in Helsinki.
However, in reality this "government" was used only as a means, albeit not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov's statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow Assarsson on March 4, 1940 that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortaval to the Soviet Union, then the subsequent Soviet conditions peace will be even more rigid, and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the "government" of Kuusinen.

- M.I.Semiryaga. “Secrets of Stalinist Diplomacy. 1941-1945 "

There is an opinion that Stalin planned, as a result of the victorious war, to include Finland in the USSR, which was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR in accordance with the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, and negotiations with conditions deliberately unacceptable for the then government of Finland were conducted only for that so that after their inevitable breakdown there is a reason to declare war. In particular, the desire to annex Finland explains the creation in December 1939 of the Finnish Democratic Republic. In addition, the plan for the exchange of territories provided by the Soviet Union assumed the transfer of territories beyond the Mannerheim Line to the USSR, thus opening a direct road for Soviet troops to Helsinki. The conclusion of peace could be prompted by the realization that an attempt to forcibly Sovietize Finland would have run into massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the side of Germany.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan

The plan of the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to conduct a direct breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" Mannerheim himself was surprised to learn the existence of such a line of defense) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of landings of Finland's western allies from the Barents Sea. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on a flat territory that did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the fullest possible way. It was supposed, after breaking through the fortifications, to carry out an offensive on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. In parallel, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and an exit to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned.

Red Army party meeting in the trenches

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to long-term resistance. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops was also incorrect - "it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions." In addition, the Soviet command did not take into account the presence of a serious line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, having only "fragmentary intelligence information" about them by the beginning of the war.
Finland plan
The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim line", consisting of several fortified defensive zones with concrete and wood-based weapon emplacements, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes of frontal fire, 48 new and modernized pillboxes with from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery pillboxes and one machine-gun artillery caponier. In total, 130 permanent fire installations were located along a line about 140 km long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Very powerful and complex fortifications were built in 1930-1939. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the financial capabilities of the state, and the people called them "millionaires" because of their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was reinforced with numerous artillery batteries on the coast and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to serve as the coordination of the fire of the Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work - Estonia by the beginning of the war provided its territories for the military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

Finnish soldier with a machine gun Lahti SalorantaM-26

Finnish soldiers

Finnish sniper - “cuckoo” Simo Höhe. On his combat account there are about 700 soldiers of the Red Army (in the Red Army he was nicknamed -

" White death ".

FINLAND ARMY

1. Soldier in uniform 1927 (the toes of the boots are pointed and bent up). 2-3. Soldiers in the form of a sample of 1936 4. A soldier in the form of a sample of 1936 with a helmet. 5. A soldier with equipment, introduced at the end of the war. 6. Officer in winter uniform. 7. Huntsman in a snow mask and winter camouflage coat. 8. A soldier in a winter guard uniform. 9. Pilot. 10. Aviation Sergeant. 11. German helmet model 1916 12. German helmet model 1935 13. Finnish helmet, approved by the time of war. 14. German helmet model 1935 with the emblem of the 4th detachment of light infantry, 1939-1940. They also wore helmets captured from the Soviet soldier. All these headdresses and uniforms of different types were worn at the same time, sometimes in the same unit.

FINLAND NAVY

Insignia of the Finnish Army

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The border section north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, in advance, preparations were made for partisan actions, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain, where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads, on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to receive aircraft from the Western Allies.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee a quick stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then conduct a counteroffensive in Karelia.

The armed forces of the opponents
The balance of forces by November 30, 1939:

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the stocks available in the warehouses were enough:
-Cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns for - 2.5 months
- Shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - 1 month
-Fuel and lubricants - for 2 months
-Aviation gasoline - for 1 month

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state cartridge plant, one gunpowder plant and one artillery plant. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

Soviet bomber DB-3F (IL-4)

The Finnish division consisted of: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one sapper company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division consisted of three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one anti-tank gun battery, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, and one engineer battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in number (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

The Soviet division in terms of the aggregate firepower of machine guns and mortars was twice as great as the Finnish one, and in terms of the firepower of artillery - three times. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially offset by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; they had numerous tank brigades at their disposal, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.
Regarding the difference in the level of weapons on December 2 (2 days after the start of the war) "Leningradskaya Pravda" will write:

You involuntarily admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles, shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of the two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peaceful, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle about. And the weapon is, frankly, old and worn. Not enough for more gunpowder.

Red Army soldier with SVT-40 rifle

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the "Mannerheim Line", difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, got stuck in the Finnish forests. Beginning with Molotov's report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable "Mannerheim Line", similar to the "Maginot Line" and "Siegfried Line", which until now has not yet been crushed by any army, begins to live.
Reason for war and breakdown of relations

Nikita Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin said: “Let's start today ... We'll just raise our voices a little, and the Finns will only have to obey. If they persist, we will only fire one shot, and the Finns will immediately raise their hands and surrender. "
The official reason for the war was the "Mainil incident": On November 26, 1939, the Soviet government sent an official note to the Finnish government stating that four Soviet servicemen were killed and nine were wounded as a result of an artillery shelling from Finland. Finnish border guards recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day. The fact of the shots and the direction from which they were fired were recorded, and a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government has proposed the creation of an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish mutual non-aggression agreement.
The next day, Molotov accused Finland of “wanting to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling” and said that the USSR “from now on considers itself free from obligations” taken by virtue of the non-aggression pact concluded earlier. Many years later, the former head of the Leningrad TASS bureau, Ancelovich, said that he had received a package with the text of the message about the "mining incident" and the inscription "open by special order" two weeks before the incident. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops were ordered to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and start hostilities. War was never officially declared.
Mannerheim, who, as commander-in-chief, had the most reliable data on the incident near Mainil, reports:
... And now the provocation, which I had been expecting since mid-October, has come true. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn beyond the fortification line, from where no battery could fire a shot outside the border ... ... Moscow negotiations: "Now it will be the soldiers' turn to talk." On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation, now known as "Shots at Mainila" ... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized ...
In Soviet textbooks on the history of the USSR, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was assigned to Finland and the Western countries: “The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939, they succeeded in provoking the Finnish reactionaries to a war against the USSR. England and France actively helped the Finns with the supply of weapons and were preparing to send their troops to help them. German fascism also rendered covert assistance to the Finnish reaction. The defeat of the Finnish troops thwarted the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists. In March 1940, the war between Finland and the USSR ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow. "
In Soviet propaganda, the need for a pretext was not advertised, and in the songs of that time, the mission of Soviet soldiers was presented as a liberation one. An example would be the song “Take us, Suomi-beauty”. The task of freeing the workers of Finland from the oppression of the imperialists was an additional explanation for the start of the war, suitable for propaganda within the USSR.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Finn. AarnoYrj? -Koskinen), was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note of the Soviet government. It said that in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which lies with the government of Finland, the government of the USSR came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a break in diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland.
In the early morning of November 30, the last step was also taken. As stated in the official report, "by order of the Red Army's High Command, in view of new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other regions at 8 am on November 30."
War

Order of the Leningrad Military District The patience of the Soviet people and the Red Army came to an end. It's time to teach a lesson to the presumptuous and insolent political gamblers who have thrown a brazen challenge to the Soviet people, and to completely destroy the hotbed of anti-Soviet provocations and threats to Leningrad! Comrades, Red Army men, commanders, commissars and political workers! Fulfilling the sacred will of the Soviet government and our great people, I order: The troops of the Leningrad Military District cross the border, defeat the Finnish troops and once and for all ensure the security of the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union and the city of Lenin, the cradle of the proletarian revolution. We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of the landowners and capitalists. We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the Kajander-Erkko government, which is oppressing the Finnish people and provoking a war with the USSR. We respect the freedom and independence of Finland, which the Finnish people received as a result of the October Revolution and the victory of Soviet power. Russian Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Stalin fought for this independence together with the Finnish people. For the safety of the northwestern borders of the USSR and the glorious city of Lenin! For our beloved Motherland! For the Great Stalin! Forward, sons of the Soviet people, soldiers of the Red Army, to the complete destruction of the enemy! Commander of the Leningrad Military District Comrade K.A. Meretskov Member of the Military Council Comrade A.A. Zhdanov Kirill Afanasievich Meretskov Andrey Alexandrovich Zhdanov

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began to evacuate the population from the border regions, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and the Northern Ladoga area. The bulk of the population gathered in the period November 29 - December 4.


Signal flares over the Soviet-Finnish border, the first month of the war.

The period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 is usually considered the first stage of the war. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing on the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

The main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 03/13/1940

	USSR Finland	Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement
	Finland	General mobilization announced
		The formation of the 1st corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division) began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians. By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps. The corps did not participate in hostilities
	USSR Finland	Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow
		The Soviet government appealed to the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland in the area of ​​the border village of Mainila, four soldiers of the Red Army were killed and eight were wounded.
		Denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland announced
		The severance of diplomatic relations with Finland
		Soviet troops were ordered to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities
		Troops of the Leningrad Military District (commander of the 2nd rank army commander K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov):
		7A attacked on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander of the 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov)
		8A (4 rifle divisions; commander of the divisional commander I.N. Khabarov, since January - commander of the 2nd rank G.M.Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction
		9A (3rd rifle division; commander of corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia
		14A (2nd RD; Divisional Commander V.A.Frolov) advanced in the Arctic
		The port of Petsamo was taken on the Murmansk direction
		In the town of Terijoki, the Finnish communists formed the so-called People's Government, headed by Otto Kuusinen
		The Soviet government signed an agreement of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the "Finnish Democratic Republic" Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland headed by Risto Ryti
		Troops 7A overcame the operational obstacle zone 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense zone of the "Mannerheim Line"
		USSR expelled from the League of Nations
		An offensive of the 44th rifle division from the Vazhenvara area on the road to Suomussalmi in order to provide assistance to the 163rd division surrounded by the Finns. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and chief of staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to get out of the encirclement, abandoning equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the fighters died, 700 people left the encirclement, surrendered - 1200. For cowardice Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division's formation
		The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander of corps commander V.D.Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A.Parusinov), which were reinforced by troops
		The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland
		Front stabilization on the Karelian Isthmus
		Repulsed the attack of the Finns on the part of the 7th Army
		On the Karelian Isthmus, the North-Western Front was formed (commander of the 1st rank commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: - 7A (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments) - 13A (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments)
		A new 15A was formed from parts of the 8th Army (commander, commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev)
		After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of defense of the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus
		Summ's Fortified Knot taken
	Finland	The commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. In his place was appointed Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps
		Units 7A went to the second line of defense
		7A and 13A launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay
		A foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay was seized
	Finland	The Finns opened the sluices of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg)
		50th corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway
	USSR Finland	Arrival of the Finnish delegation to Moscow
	USSR Finland	Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The USSR inherited the Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajarvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. Finland returned to the Petsamo area, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border according to the Treaty of Nishtad with Sweden in 1721)
	USSR Finland	The assault on Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities

The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.

Soviet tank T-28

The 7th Army's offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksenarmeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence information about concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the allocated forces to break through the "Mannerheim Line" were completely insufficient. The troops were completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the support zone of the line and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the zone on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.

Breakthrough attempts continued until the end of December, but they were unsuccessful.

Scheme of military operations in December 1939 - January 1940

The scheme of the offensive of the Red Army units in December 1939

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IVarmeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.
The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by Task Force Northern Finland (Pohjois-SuomenRyhm?) Under the command of Major General Villjo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was leading an offensive from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy's defenses at 35? 45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. By interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists are trying to explain Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to −40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both the data of meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939 on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +2 to -7 ° C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below 23 ° C. Frosts up to 40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a calm at the front. Moreover, these frosts interfered not only with the attackers, but also with the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet tank T-26

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks. For 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Winter War Molotov cocktail

During the war, Soviet troops first used radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line (Finn. Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to contain a possible offensive strike from the USSR. The line was about 135 km long and about 90 km deep. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders the plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the complex was created, at the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish winter war in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification works. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of the former adjutant of Mannerheim Jorm Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the outbreak of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the buildings.
History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, the construction itself continued with interruptions until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.
The first plan of the line was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
The work on the defense plan was continued by the German Colonel Baron von Brandenstein (O. vonBrandenstein). It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish training sapper battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oscar Enkel. Major design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built in 1920-1924, of which 114 were machine-gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They took the greatest scope in 1932, when, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabricius, six two-embrasure bunkers were built.

Fortifications
The main defensive zone consisted of a system of defense nodes stretched out in a line, each of which included several wood-earthen field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The nodes of defense themselves were placed on the main defensive line extremely unevenly: the gaps between individual nodes of resistance sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense unit had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If the account is kept from the coast of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in the following order: Pillbox scheme

"N" - Humaljoki [now Ermilovo] "K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] "N" - Nyayukki [not a creature.]
"Ko" - Kolmikeyala [not being.] "Well" - Hulkeyala [not being.] "Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
"Sk" - Summakulya [not being.] "La" - Lyahde [not being,] "A" - Eyuryapyaa (Leipyasuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankyla [now Mushroom] "Ma" - Sikniemi [not a being.] "Ma" - Mälkela [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [non-existent.] "No" - Neisniemi [now Cape] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Port] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive zone. The system of fortifications also included a rear defensive zone covering the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense nodes:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now does not exist] "Kai" - Kaipiala [not being.]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoe] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe] "Le" - Leviyainen [not being.]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Saine [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Julia-Saine [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyukyulya [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The center of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine-gun and artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between the resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one or three shooters.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for shooting. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line rested against the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by coastal batteries of large caliber, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The fortifications were based on the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered with large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and rivers. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests, rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere. Belgian general Badu wrote: "Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia."
Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim line" are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and the second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers examines the armored hood at the Finnish pillbox

The pillboxes of the first generation were small, one-story, for one or three machine guns, did not have shelters for the garrison and internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coverage - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million” or millionaire pillboxes, since the value of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, who obtained additional appropriations from the country's parliament. Some of the most modern and heavily fortified pillboxes were Sj4 Poppius, which had flanking fire embrasures in the western casemate, and Sj5 Millionaire, with flanking fire embrasures in both casemates. Both pillboxes fired flanking fire across the entire hollow, covering each other's front with machine guns. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were called the Le Bourget casemate, after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread during the First World War. Some pillboxes in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into casemates of flanking fire, while the frontal embrasure was walled up. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were well camouflaged by stones and snow, which made it difficult to detect them, in addition, it was almost impossible to pierce the casemate with artillery from the front. "Millions" pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm cannons of the 1900 model of the year on casemate machines Durlyakher and 37-mm anti-tank guns "Bofors" of the model 1936 on casemates. Less common were the 76-mm mountain cannons of the 1904 model of the year on pedestal mounts.

The weak points of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: the inferior quality of concrete in buildings of the first term, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, the absence of the first term of rigid reinforcement in buildings.
The strong qualities of the pillboxes consisted in a large number of firing embrasures that shot through the immediate and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, in the saturated filling of gaps.

Destroyed pillbox

Engineering barriers
The main types of antipersonnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were slightly different from the Soviet slingshots or Bruno's spirals. These antipersonnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank obstacles. Nadolbs were usually placed in four rows, two meters from one another, in a checkerboard pattern. Rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with barbed wire, and at other times by ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel ones at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at an altitude of 65.5 near bunker No. 006 and at Khotinen near bunkers No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdbolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At bunker No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high embedded in concrete. Nadolby in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the nadolba, it was necessary to pass 18 rows of wire under three to four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the enemy's front line. In some cases, the area between the bunkers and the bunkers was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of the settlement and were built of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. The Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications when needed. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of barbed wire along the main line of defense. In practice, when, in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive zone and began to make attempts to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of survivability tests of anti-tank obstacles using the then in service Finnish army of several dozen outdated light tanks "Renault", proved to be untenable in front of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the nadolbs moved from their place under the pressure of T-28 medium tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the nadolby with explosive charges, thereby arranging passageways for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback was undoubtedly a good view of the anti-tank lines from the enemy's distant artillery positions, especially on open and flat terrain, such as, for example, in the area of ​​the Sj (Summa-yarvi) defense junction, where 11.02 was. 1940 the main defensive zone was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the nadolbs were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank nadolb there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Blockages of stones, barbed wire and in the distance the SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, the newspaper Pravda published a message stating that the so-called People's Government had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In the historical literature, Kuusinen's government is usually referred to as "Terijoki", because after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, in Moscow, negotiations were held between the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by VM Molotov, at which the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease to Hanko). The exchange provided for the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia to Finland and monetary compensation. Also, the USSR pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if, a year before the expiration of the contract, none of the parties announced its termination, it was automatically renewed for another 25 years. The treaty entered into force from the moment of its signing by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki”.
In the following days, Molotov met with officials from Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, no longer ruled the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR OF WINTER

Accepted comrade. Molotov, on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government", which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore no question could now be raised about any negotiations with this "government". The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen.

The "people's government" was formed in the USSR from the Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty with it, testifying to friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining Finland's independence, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing corruption in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanlandia", began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand servicemen who wore their national uniform (sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish army , erroneous - only part of the greatcoats was used from it).
This "people's" army was supposed to replace the occupying units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they will be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a draft instruction "How to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word" communists "is crossed out by Zhdanov) in the areas liberated from the white rule, which indicated practical measures to create of the Popular Front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was applied in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these measures.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, the scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA performed special sabotage missions in the sector of the 8th Army: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and during the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on, and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government receded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations on the issue of concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. On January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns, citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from different countries of the world began to arrive in Finland. The largest numbers of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers were citizens of many other states, including England and the United States, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the "Russian People's Detachments", formed by the Finns from among the prisoners of the Red Army. But since the work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities, only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, there was a strengthening of troops, replenishment of material reserves, reorganization of units and formations. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods of dealing with defensive structures were developed, personnel were trained. For the assault on the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the military council of the Leningrad Military District Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a tremendous amount of work was done to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
For the destruction of the fortifications on the "Mannerheim Line" divisions of the first echelon were assigned destruction artillery groups (AR) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups included 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns with a caliber of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6,000 machine guns, about 100,000 rifles, 650,000 hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland. [Source not specified 198 days] Fought on the side of the Finns about 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries.


Finnish autonomous skier squads armed with machine guns

Finnish machine gun M-31 "Suomi"

TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti

Applicable cartridge	9x19 Parabellum
Sighting line length
Barrel length
Weight without cartridges
Weight of a box magazine for 20 cartridges empty / loaded
Weight of a box magazine for 36 cartridges empty / loaded
Weight of a box magazine for 50 rounds empty / loaded
Mass of a disk magazine for 40 rounds empty / loaded
Mass of a disk magazine for 71 cartridges empty / loaded
Rate of fire	700-800 rpm
Bullet muzzle velocity
Sighting range	500 meters
Magazine capacity	20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc)

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of partisan warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked the troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest, where the bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the greatest danger was posed by snipers - "cuckoos" who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken forward were constantly surrounded and bursting back, often abandoning equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvar area along the road to Suomussalmi to the aid of the 163rd division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing the defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train on the battlefield. More than a thousand people from among those who left the encirclement were wounded or frostbite, some of the wounded were taken prisoner, since they were not taken out during the flight. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division's formation.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defensive zone. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparation of a new offensive by counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden) with 50 crew members, a Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov sank (probably blown up by a mine). The S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

crew of the submarine "S-2"

On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2,080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the battle zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were accommodated in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelka of the Pryazhinsky District, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae, Kondopozhsky District, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevala District. They lived in barracks and were obliged to work in the forest in logging. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, pulling up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Sum. Artillery preparation also began. Since that day, every day for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, the Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and conduct from closed positions and mainly in areas, since the reconnaissance of targets and adjustments were poorly adjusted. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to succeed.
On February 6, an offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both west and east.
On February 9, the commander of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the 1st Rank S. Timoshenko, sent a directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to her, on February 11, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Naval Flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the land units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa area did not bring success, the main blow was shifted to the east, in the direction of Lyakhde. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery barrage and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
In the course of three-day intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the "Mannerheim Line", introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, since there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, 7th Army had reached the second line of defense, and 13th Army - towards the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with the coastal detachments of the Baltic Fleet sailors, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th army advanced in the direction of Antrea (present-day Kamennogorsk), and the 7th - on Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.


On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

England and France: plans of intervention

England from the very beginning provided assistance to Finland. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, "one would have to fight one way or another." Finnish representative in London Georg Gripenberg (fi: GeorgAchates Gripenberg) asked Halifax on December 1, 1939, to authorize the supply of war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Germany (with which England was at war). The head of the Department of the North (en: NorthernDepartment) Laurence Collier (en: LaurenceCollier) at the same time believed that the British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, against the application proposed by Finland Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Snow continued to support the idea of ​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), expressed by him before the war. Amid government disagreements, the British army began supplying weapons in December 1939, including artillery and tanks (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested the supply of bombers for attacks on Moscow and Leningrad, as well as for the destruction of the railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns to destroy the road would allow Great Britain “to avoid the same operation later , independently and in less favorable conditions. " McLean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with McLean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Herrard, the plans to intervene in the war against the USSR, which were formed in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about their war with Germany at that moment. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing point of view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasing the aggressors was wrong; now the enemy, in contrast to his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains McLean and Collier's position not ideological, but humanitarian considerations.
The Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in "circles close to the government" there is a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and direct Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that on a conscious level, the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to trade one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely related.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense due to the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany by means of a blockade. The Soviet supply of raw materials led to the fact that the German economy continued to grow and the realization that after a while, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In this situation, although the transfer of the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, the alternative was an even worse inaction. Chief of the French General Staff Gamelin gave instructions to plan an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging a war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Great Britain did not support many French plans, including an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an offensive on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also close to opening a second front against the USSR. On February 5, 1940, at a joint military council (which was attended but did not speak - which was unusual - Churchill), it was decided to seek the consent of Norway and Sweden to conduct a British-led operation in which the expeditionary force was to land in Norway and move east ... As the situation in Finland deteriorated, the French plans became more and more one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR, if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled following the end of the war, much to the relief of many involved in the planning.

End of war and conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line", Finland was deliberately unable to contain the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of complete capture of the country, which would be followed by either annexation to the USSR, or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12, a peace treaty was signed, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops on the morning of March 13 stormed the city.
Results of the war

For unleashing the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.
Also, a "moral embargo" was imposed on the USSR - a ban on the supply of aviation technology from the United States, which negatively affected the development of the Soviet aviation industry, which traditionally used American engines.
Another negative result for the USSR was the confirmation of the weakness of the Red Army. According to the Soviet history textbook of the USSR, before the Finnish war, the military superiority of the USSR, even over such a small country as Finland, was not obvious; and European countries could count on Finland's victory over the USSR.
Although the victory of the Soviet troops (the pushed back border) showed that the USSR was not weaker than Finland, information about the losses of the USSR, significantly exceeding the Finnish ones, strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany.
The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in the winter, on a wooded and swampy territory, the experience of breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting the enemy using the tactics of guerrilla warfare.
All officially announced territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, "The war ended in 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom, set before Finland, turned out to be correct."
The USSR gained full control over the water area of ​​Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build on its territory a railway connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
The peace treaty also provided for the creation of a Soviet consulate in Mariehamn (Aland Islands), and the status of these islands as a demilitarized territory was confirmed.

Finnish citizens leave for Finland after the transfer of part of the territory of the USSR

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which she made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after the major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to probe possible changes. Relations were cool at first, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from Western allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently organized a meeting with Hermann Goering, the second person in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström in the late 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest. " Kivimäki immediately reported this in Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; they also influenced Hitler's decision to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in the Second World War on the side of the Axis countries is called the Continuation War in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1.Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build 2 fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
3.Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
4. District Petsamo (Pechenga), occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
6. Lease of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years.

Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. In 1944, these territories again became part of the USSR.
Finland's losses
Military
According to an official statement published in the Finnish press on May 23, 1940, the total irretrievable losses of the Finnish army during the war amounted to 19,576 killed and 3,263 missing. Total - 22 839 people.
According to modern estimates:
Killed - approx. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people)
Wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people)
Prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. out of about 250 thousand who participated, that is, about 25%. Brief information about each of the victims from the Finnish side has been published in a number of Finnish publications.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombing of Finnish cities, 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 lightly wounded, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

Losses of the USSR

Official figures of Soviet losses in the war were announced at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

Monument to those killed in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy).

war memorial

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by lengthy negotiations over the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that followed soon after, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, no heroic films are made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song "Take us, Suomi-beauty"), there is still debate about the reasons for this conflict. What was Stalin counting on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even include it in the USSR as a separate union republic, or were his main goals the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad? Can the war be considered a success or, given the aspect ratio and scale of losses, a failure?

Background

A propaganda poster from the times of the war and a photo of the Red Army party meeting in the trenches. Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations took place in pre-war Europe. All large states feverishly sought allies for themselves, sensing the approach of a new war. The USSR also did not stand aside, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who were considered the main enemies in the Marxist dogma. In addition, events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed to action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer together.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed a mutual assistance treaty clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global Eastern pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, had to enter a single system of collective security, which would fix the existing status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the end of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, which Britain also joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of aggressive actions by Germany, which had already taken a part of Czechoslovakia, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to make contacts with a proposal to stay away from a future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of "suitors" lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, but the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which aroused Stalin fears that in the end only the USSR would fight, and the Germans promised a whole heap of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more in line with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with Britain and France came to a standstill because of the Poles' disagreement to let Soviet troops pass through their territory in the event of a war (which was inevitable in a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay away from the war, concluding a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with Finns

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939. Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Against the background of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations began with the Finns. In 1938, the USSR offered the Finns to allow him to establish a military base on the island of Gogland. The Soviet side feared the possibility of a German strike from Finland and offered the Finns an agreement of mutual assistance, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in case of aggression by the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any alliances and place military bases on their territory) and feared that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, what good, would lead to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude an agreement in secret, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time the USSR wanted to lease a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. The negotiations also ended in vain.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR was largely free of its hands. This time the USSR offered to arrange the exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give up very large territories of Eastern Karelia, even larger than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a very developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and not there there was nothing but the forest. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not entirely equivalent.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but they could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which was not only a developed territory with a large population, but also the Mannerheim defensive line was located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. On the contrary, the USSR was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would allow moving the border from Leningrad at least a few tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Mainil incident

In the photos: a Suomi submachine gun and Soviet soldiers dig a pole at the Mainila border post, November 30, 1939. Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The negotiations ended in vain on November 9. And on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Mainila, which was used as a pretext for starting a war. According to the Soviet side, an artillery shell flew from Finnish territory to Soviet territory, which killed three Soviet soldiers and the commander.

Molotov immediately sent a formidable demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers. The Finns, on the other hand, stated that, as a result of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by suggesting that both sides withdraw troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation of the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of treachery and hostility, and announced the severance of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were severed and Soviet troops went on the offensive.

Currently, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain the casus belli for an attack on Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was only a pretext.

War

In the photo: a Finnish machine-gun crew and a wartime propaganda poster. Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The main direction for the strike of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the direction most suitable for a massive strike, also allowing the use of tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. The secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive hostilities were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the north.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. She was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and a lack of understanding of the situation reigned in the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers ran into the Mannerheim line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

Things were even worse in Central Karelia. Local woodlands opened up a wide scope for partisan tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not ready. Small detachments of Finns attacked the columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and lay in forest caches. The mining of roads was also actively used, because of which the Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that Soviet troops had insufficient camouflage gowns and soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter conditions. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

In the Karelian direction, the 163rd Soviet division was advancing, whose task was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. The shortest direction between the Soviet border and the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen for the offensive. In the area of ​​the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th division, which had arrived at the front, reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. On the road from the north and south, barriers were set up, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-exposed area, after which the forces of small detachments cut the division into several mini-"boilers" on the road.

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbitten and prisoners, lost almost all equipment and heavy weapons, and the division command, which got out of the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of the Soviet tribunal. Soon, several more divisions were surrounded in this way, which managed to break out of the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of the equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to break out of the encirclement, with the division's staff numbering 15 thousand. The command of the division was also shot by a Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from the exit to the Barents Sea.

Finnish democratic republic

Campaign leaflets, Finland, 1940. Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

Almost immediately after the start of the war in the border town of Terijoki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called. the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist leaders of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance treaty with it, according to which all the pre-war requirements of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

Also, the formation of the Finnish People's Army began, in which it was planned to include soldiers of the Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and it had to be replenished at the expense of soldiers of the corresponding nationalities who had already served in the Soviet army, of which there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but setbacks on the battlefield and unexpectedly stubborn resistance from the Finns led to a prolonged war, which was clearly not part of the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and since mid-January they no longer remember it, the USSR again recognizes the one that remained in Helsinki as the official government.

End of the war

Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In January 1940, no active hostilities were conducted due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought up heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

In early February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery barrage and was much better thought out, which made it easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first several lines of defense were broken, and in early March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The original plan of the Finns was to contain the Soviet troops as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. In these conditions, further continuation of resistance was fraught with the loss of independence, so the Finns agreed to negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war demands of the Soviet side.

What Stalin wanted to achieve

Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

There is still no definite answer to the question of what were Stalin's goals in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad a hundred kilometers, or was he counting on the Sovietization of Finland? The first version is supported by the fact that Stalin made the main emphasis on this in the peace treaty. The second version is supported by the creation of the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen.

For almost 80 years there have been disputes about this, but, most likely, Stalin had a minimum program, which included only territorial claims in order to move the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in case of a favorable coincidence of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the places of the Soviet army's offensive, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party do the right thing to declare war on Finland? Couldn't war have been dispensed with? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since the peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three largest powers have grabbed each other's throats; When will the question of Leningrad be decided, if not in such conditions, when our hands are busy and we see a favorable situation in order to hit them at that moment?

Results of the war

Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but this came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, significantly greater than the Finnish army. The figures in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a much larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbitten than the Finnish one.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army was not only unable to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The course of hostilities was closely followed in Germany and Britain, and were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain, they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of the officers and were glad that they did not drag the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

Collage © L! FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, in reality, this was a very gross exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line consisted of wood and earth fortifications or old structures of low quality concrete that were outdated for 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was fortified by several million-strong pillboxes (so they were called, because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it was still not impregnable. As practice has shown, with competent training and support of aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced line of defense can be broken, as happened with the French Maginot line.

In reality, the failures were explained by a number of blunders of the command, both the highest and the people on the ground:

1. underestimating the enemy. The Soviet command was confident that the Finns would not even lead to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was convinced that victory was a matter of several weeks. The Red Army had too great an advantage both in personal strength and in firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command structure of the Red Army was largely changed a year before the war as a result of massive purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not meet the necessary requirements, but even talented commanders had not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. The USSR was in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border, while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so the preparation for the offensive was carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan called for the main strike along the Mannerheim Line, while there was practically no intelligence data along the line. The troops had only extremely approximate and schematic plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults of the line took place blindly, in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications and to destroy them, heavy howitzers had to be brought in, which at first were practically absent in the advancing troops. Under these conditions, all assault attempts resulted in huge losses. Only in January 1940, normal preparations for a breakthrough began: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which finally made it possible to obtain plans for defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared for the conduct of hostilities in specific terrain in the winter. There were not enough camouflage gowns, there was not even a warm uniform. All this stuff lay in warehouses and began to arrive in units only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to take on a protracted nature. At the beginning of the war, the Red Army did not have a single unit of combat skiers, which were used with great success by the Finns. Submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was removed from service, since it was planned to replace it with a more modern and sophisticated weapon, but the new weapon was never received, and the old PPD went to warehouses;

5. the Finns enjoyed all the advantages of the area with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to capacity with equipment, were forced to move along the roads and practically could not operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited for the clumsy Soviet divisions to stretch out along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, delivered simultaneous strikes in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Trapped in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became an easy target for the Finnish squads of skiers and snipers. It was possible to break out of the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment, which had to be thrown on the road;

6. the Finns used the scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were supposed to occupy parts of the Red Army, all property was also taken out, and the empty settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on Soviet soldiers, to whom propaganda explained that they were going to liberate the brothers-workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and humiliation of the Finnish White Guard, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they met only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from their own mistakes right in the course of the war. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that they got down to business in a normal way, and at the second stage the army became much more organized and effective. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also developed extremely unsuccessfully in the first months.

Evgeniy Antonyuk
Historian

The official reasons for the outbreak of the war are the so-called Mainil incident. On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government about the shelling that was fired from Finnish territory. Finland was fully responsible for the outbreak of hostilities.

The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war took place at 8 am on November 30, 1939. On the part of the Soviet Union, the goal was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was located only 30 km from the border. Earlier, the Soviet government appealed to Finland with a request to push back its borders in the Leningrad region, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But Finland flatly refused.

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 caused a real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (minority of votes).

By the time hostilities began, the Finnish army numbered 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, and 250 thousand soldiers. However, the Western powers have pledged their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the border line. By the time the war began, the Red Army numbered 3,900 aircraft, 6,500 tanks and 1 million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish war of 1939 is divided by historians into two stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation, which was to last about three weeks. But the situation turned out differently.

The first period of the war

It lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the break of the Mannerheim Line). The fortifications of the Mannerheim line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. Better equipment of Finnish soldiers and more severe winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role.

The Finnish command was able to make excellent use of the terrain features. Pine forests, lakes, swamps slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The ammunition supply was difficult. Finnish snipers also caused serious problems.

Second period of the war

It lasted from February 11 to March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff developed a new plan of action. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim line was broken on February 11. A serious superiority in manpower, aviation, tanks allowed the Soviet troops to move forward, but at the same time suffering heavy losses.

The Finnish army experienced a severe shortage of ammunition and people. The Finnish government, which never received help from the West, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border was established.

After Finland will enter the war on the side of the Nazis.

After the Civil War of 1918-1922, the USSR received rather unsuccessful and poorly adapted borders. Thus, it was completely ignored that the Ukrainians and Belarusians were divided by the line of the state border between the Soviet Union and Poland. Another of these "inconveniences" was the close location of the border with Finland to the northern capital of the country - Leningrad.

In the course of the events preceding the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union received a number of territories, which made it possible to significantly push the border to the west. In the north, this attempt to move the border met with some resistance, called the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, war.

Historical background and origins of the conflict

Finland as a state appeared relatively recently - on December 6, 1917 against the backdrop of the crumbling Russian state. At the same time, the state received all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Finland together with Petsamo (Pechenga), Sortavala and territories on the Karelian Isthmus. Relations with the southern neighbor also went wrong from the very beginning: the civil war in Finland died down, in which anti-communist forces won, so there was clearly no sympathy for the USSR, which supported the Reds.

However, in the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, relations between the Soviet Union and Finland stabilized, being neither friendly nor hostile. Defense spending in Finland declined steadily in the 1920s, peaking in 1930. However, the coming to the post of Minister of War Karl Gustav Mannerheim changed the situation somewhat. Mannerheim immediately set out to re-equip the Finnish army and prepare it for possible battles with the Soviet Union. Initially, the fortification line was inspected, which at that time was called the Enkel Line. The condition of its fortifications was unsatisfactory, so the line was re-equipped, as well as the construction of new defensive lines.

At the same time, the Finnish government took vigorous steps to avoid conflict with the USSR. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed, the term of which was to end in 1945.

Events 1938-1939 and the reasons for the conflict

By the second half of the 30s of the XX century, the situation in Europe was gradually heating up. Hitler's anti-Soviet statements made the Soviet leadership take a closer look at neighboring countries that could become Germany's allies in a possible war with the USSR. The position of Finland, of course, did not make it a strategically important foothold, since the local nature of the terrain inevitably turned hostilities into a series of small battles, not to mention the impossibility of supplying huge masses of troops. However, Finland's close position to Leningrad could still turn it into an important ally.

It was these factors that forced the Soviet government in April-August 1938 to begin negotiations with Finland regarding guarantees of its non-alignment with the anti-Soviet bloc. However, in addition, the Soviet leadership also demanded the provision of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland for Soviet military bases, which was unacceptable for the then government of Finland. As a result, the negotiations ended in vain.

In March-April 1939, new Soviet-Finnish negotiations took place, at which the Soviet leadership demanded the lease of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish government was forced to reject these demands as well, as it feared "Sovietization" of the country.

The situation began to escalate rapidly when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939, in a secret addition to which it was indicated that Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, although the Finnish government did not have information regarding the secret protocol, this agreement made it seriously think about the future prospects of the country and relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.

Already in October 1939, the Soviet government put forward new proposals for Finland. They provided for the movement of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 90 km to the north. In return, Finland was to receive approximately twice the territory in Karelia, in order to significantly secure Leningrad. A number of historians also express the opinion that the Soviet leadership was interested in, if not Sovietizing Finland in 1939, then at least depriving it of its protection in the form of a line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, already then called the Mannerheim Line. This version is very consistent, since further events, as well as the development by the Soviet General Staff in 1940 of a plan for a new war against Finland, indirectly indicate precisely this. Thus, the defense of Leningrad, most likely, was only a pretext for turning Finland into a convenient Soviet bridgehead, like, for example, the Baltic countries.

However, the Finnish leadership rejected the Soviet demands and began to prepare for war. The Soviet Union was also preparing for war. In total, by mid-November 1939, 4 armies were deployed against Finland, which had 24 divisions with a total strength of 425 thousand people, 2300 tanks and 2500 aircraft. Finland had only 14 divisions with a total strength of about 270 thousand people, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

In order to avoid provocations, the Finnish army in the second half of November received an order to withdraw from the state border on the Karelian Isthmus. However, on November 26, 1939, an incident occurred, for which both sides blame each other. Soviet territory was shelled, as a result of which several soldiers were killed and wounded. This incident took place in the area of ​​the village of Mainila, from which it got its name. Clouds thickened between the USSR and Finland. Two days later, on November 28, the Soviet Union denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and two days later Soviet troops were ordered to cross the border.

The beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)

On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops launched an offensive in several directions. At the same time, the hostilities immediately took on a fierce character.

On the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th Army was advancing, Soviet troops managed to capture the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) at the cost of heavy losses on December 1. It was here that the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Finland was announced, headed by Otto Kuusinen, a prominent figure in the Comintern. It was with this, the new "government" of Finland that the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. At the same time, in the first decade of December, the 7th Army was able to quickly seize the foreground and rested on the first echelon of the Mannerheim Line. Here the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and their advance practically stopped for a long time.

North of Lake Ladoga, in the direction of Sortavala, the 8th Soviet Army was advancing. As a result of the first days of fighting, she managed to advance 80 kilometers in a fairly short time. However, the Finnish troops opposing her managed to carry out a lightning-fast operation, the purpose of which was to encircle part of the Soviet forces. The fact that the Red Army was very strongly tied to the roads also played into the hands of the Finns, which allowed the Finnish troops to quickly cut off its communications. As a result, the 8th Army, having suffered serious losses, was forced to retreat, but until the end of the war it held part of the Finnish territory.

The least successful were the actions of the Red Army in central Karelia, where the 9th Army was advancing. The task of the army was to lead an offensive in the direction of the city of Oulu, in order to "cut" Finland in half and thereby disorganize the Finnish troops in the north of the country. On December 7, the forces of the 163rd Infantry Division occupied the small Finnish village of Suomussalmi. However, the Finnish troops, having superiority in mobility and knowledge of the terrain, immediately surrounded the division. As a result, Soviet troops were forced to take up a perimeter defense and repulse surprise attacks by Finnish ski detachments, as well as suffer significant losses from sniper fire. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to the aid of the encircled, which soon also found itself surrounded.

Assessing the situation, the command of the 163rd Infantry Division decided to fight its way back. At the same time, the division suffered losses of about 30% of its personnel, and also abandoned almost all of its equipment. After its breakthrough, the Finns managed to destroy the 44th Infantry Division and practically restore the state border in this direction, paralyzing the actions of the Red Army here. This battle, called the Battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in rich trophies taken by the Finnish army, as well as an increase in the overall morale of the Finnish army. At the same time, the leadership of the two divisions of the Red Army was subjected to repression.

And if the actions of the 9th Army were unsuccessful, then the troops of the 14th Soviet Army, advancing on the Rybachy Peninsula, acted most successfully. They managed to seize the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and large nickel deposits in the area, as well as reach the Norwegian border. Thus, Finland lost access to the Barents Sea during the war.

In January 1940, the drama also played out south of Suomussalmi, where the scenario of that recent battle was repeated in general terms. The 54th Rifle Division of the Red Army was surrounded here. At the same time, the Finns did not have enough forces to destroy it, so the division was surrounded by the end of the war. A similar fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which was surrounded in the Sortavala region. Another division and a tank brigade were surrounded in the Lemetti-South area and, having suffered huge losses and having lost almost all their materiel, nevertheless made their way out of the encirclement.

On the Karelian Isthmus, by the end of December, the fighting to break through the Finnish fortified line died down. This was explained by the fact that the command of the Red Army was well aware of the futility of continuing further attempts to strike at the Finnish troops, which brought only serious losses with a minimal result. The Finnish command, understanding the essence of the lull at the front, launched a series of attacks in order to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, these attempts failed with heavy losses for the Finnish troops.

However, on the whole, the situation remained not very favorable for the Red Army. Her troops were drawn into battles in foreign and poorly studied territory, in addition, in adverse weather conditions. The Finns did not have superiority in numbers and technology, but they had a well-oiled and well-developed tactics of partisan warfare, which allowed them, acting with relatively small forces, to inflict significant losses on the advancing Soviet troops.

The February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)

On February 1, 1940, a powerful Soviet artillery preparation began on the Karelian Isthmus, which lasted 10 days. The task of this training was to inflict maximum damage on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops and wear them out. On February 11, the troops of the 7th and 13th armies moved forward.

Fierce battles unfolded along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus. The main blow was struck by the Soviet troops on the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. However, here, like two months ago, the Red Army again began to get bogged down in battles, so soon the direction of the main attack was changed, on Lyakhda. Here, the Finnish troops could not contain the Red Army, and their defenses were broken, and a few days later - and the first strip of the Mannerheim line. The Finnish command was forced to begin to withdraw troops.

On February 21, Soviet troops approached the second line of the Finnish defense. Here fierce battles unfolded again, which, however, by the end of the month ended with the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in several places. Thus, the Finnish defense collapsed.

In early March 1940, the Finnish army was in a critical situation. The Mannerheim Line was broken, the reserves were practically depleted, while the Red Army was developing a successful offensive and had practically inexhaustible reserves. The morale of the Soviet troops was also high. At the beginning of the month, the troops of the 7th Army rushed to Vyborg, the fighting for which continued until the ceasefire on March 13, 1940. This city was one of the largest in Finland, and its loss could be very painful for the country. In addition, in this way, the way to Helsinki was opened for Soviet troops, which threatened Finland with the loss of independence.

Considering all these factors, the Finnish government set a course for the beginning of peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 7, 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to cease fire from 12 noon on March 13, 1940. The territories on the Karelian Isthmus and Lapland (the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala and Salla) withdrew to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was also leased.

Results of the Winter War

Estimates of the losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war differ significantly and, according to the data of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, there are approximately 87.5 thousand people killed and died from wounds and frostbite, as well as about 40 thousand missing. 160 thousand people were injured. Finland's losses were significantly lower - about 26 thousand killed and 40 thousand wounded.

As a result of the war with Finland, the Soviet Union was able to ensure the security of Leningrad, as well as strengthen its position in the Baltic. First of all, this concerns the city of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, on which Soviet troops began to be based. At the same time, the Red Army gained combat experience in breaking through a fortified enemy line in difficult weather conditions (the air temperature in February 1940 reached -40 degrees), which no other army in the world had at that time.

However, at the same time, the USSR received in the north-west, albeit not a powerful, but enemy, who already in 1941 let German troops into its territory and contributed to the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of Finland's performance in June 1941 on the side of the Axis countries, the Soviet Union received an additional front with a fairly large length, which diverted from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions in the period from 1941 to 1944.

Great Britain and France also closely followed the conflict and even had plans to attack the USSR and its Caucasian fields. At present, there is no complete data on the seriousness of these intentions, but it is likely that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union could simply "quarrel" with its future allies and even get involved in a military conflict with them.

There are also a number of versions that the war in Finland indirectly influenced the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line and practically left Finland defenseless in March 1940. Any new invasion by the Red Army into the country could well become fatal for it. After the defeat of Finland, the Soviet Union would have approached a dangerously short distance to the Swedish mines at Kiruna, one of Germany's few sources of metal. Such a scenario would put the Third Reich on the brink of disaster.

Finally, the not very successful offensive of the Red Army in December-January strengthened the belief in Germany that Soviet troops were essentially non-combatant and did not have a good command staff. This misconception continued to grow and peaked in June 1941 when the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR.

As a conclusion, it can be indicated that as a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union nevertheless acquired more problems than victories, which was confirmed in the next few years.

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