Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation. Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation and its significance in the context of the Great Patriotic War Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

KLINSKO-SOLNECHNOGORSK OFFENSIVE OPERATION

(6.12-25.12 1941)
The counteroffensive against the main strike group of German troops was launched by the forces of the 30th, 1st shock, 20-1, 16th and the right wing of the 5th armies of the Western Front. These troops consisted of 20 rifle, one motorized rifle, one tank and 9 cavalry divisions, 17 rifle and 11 tank brigades, as well as several separate tank, machine gun and ski battalions. The enemy's 3rd and 4th tank groups operating in their offensive zone, consisting of four motorized and two army corps, had 17.5 divisions (7 infantry, 7 tank, 3 motorized and one motorized brigade). The average strength of a rifle division on the Western Front at this time was a little over 7,200 people, and a rifle brigade - about 4,400 people. The operational density of our troops was approximately 4.2 km per division.
During the attack on Moscow, the 4th Tank Group performed a maneuver to bypass the Istra Reservoir through the city of Klin. The route of the 3rd Panzer Group, which by the end of November provided the left flank of the German offensive, passed through the same city. The wedge became the most important communications hub, on which divisions of several corps of two tank groups depended. At the same time, D.D. Lelyushenko’s 30th Army, thrown back in the initial phase of the offensive to the north and northeast, hung over the rear of the German troops, being dangerously close to Klin. The Soviet command had ample opportunities to intercept the communications of German tank and infantry divisions that had reached the near approaches to Moscow. At the same time, the determining factor in planning operations was the transition to a counteroffensive after a long period of defensive actions. This led to the fact that the arriving reserves were distributed relatively evenly along the front occupied by the five armies. The 1st shock and 20th armies occupied their original position, closing a large gap formed as a result of the rupture of the elbow connection of the 30th and 16th armies. The absence of a clearly defined striking fist forced the operation to be planned in the form of several crushing blows delivered by all the armies participating in the offensive.
The idea of ​​the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation was to cut into pieces the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy in the area with attacks from the 30th army from the north, the 1st shock, 20th and 16th armies from the east Klin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk and create favorable conditions for the further development of the offensive to the west. The 5th Army advanced its right-flank formations along the northern bank of the river. Moscow was supposed to provide the left flank of the 16th Army. In accordance with these tasks, a strike force was created in each army.
In the 30th Army (107th motorized, 185, 365, 371, 379 and 348th rifle divisions, 8th and 21st tank brigades, 18, 24, 46 and 82nd cavalry divisions) it was decided to attack two blows - main and auxiliary. The main efforts were concentrated in the center, where it was planned to attack Klin with the forces of the 365th and 371st rifle divisions with the support of the 8th and 21st tank brigades. An auxiliary attack was carried out on the left flank by the forces of the 348th Infantry, 18th and 24th Cavalry Divisions in the direction of Rogachevo. German historians often call the units that carried out the counteroffensive near Moscow “Siberian.” The use of this term is very conditional. For example, the 348th Infantry Division of Colonel A.S. Lyukhtikov was Ural, the 371st Rifle Division of Lieutenant Colonel I.F. Shcheglov was Chelyabinsk, and the 82nd Cavalry Division of N.V. Gorin was formed in Bashkiria.
In accordance with the assigned task, on December 6, the troops of the 30th Army broke through the front of two enemy motorized divisions defending against them. By the end of the day, D.D. Lelyushenko’s troops advanced 17 km, expanding the breakthrough area to 25 km along the front. At noon on December 7, the advanced units of the 30th Army reached the village of Shchapovo, eight kilometers northwest of Klin, where the command post of the LVI Motorized Corps was located. The headquarters of the German formation was saved from destruction only by numerous anti-aircraft guns, designed to protect it from attacks by Soviet aircraft. By the end of the day on December 7, having bypassed Shchapovo and other centers of resistance, the troops of the 30th Army advanced towards Klin to a depth of 25 km. The German command began to pull nearby combat groups of tank divisions towards the city. The first to come to the rescue of the Klin garrison were the vanguard of the 25th Tank Regiment of the 7th Tank Division, led by Lieutenant Orlov, already known to us from the battles for Alytus. However, despite the increasing resistance, by the evening of December 9, D.D. Lelyushenko’s troops came close to the northern and northwestern outskirts of Klin.
In the 1st Shock Army, two directions of attacks were also planned. The main efforts were concentrated on the right flank and in the center, in the Yakhroma area. By December 6, the army, which had entered battle with its units on December 29, for the most part (29, 50, 44, 56, 71 and 55th rifle brigades, 133rd and 126th rifle divisions) was already fighting fierce battles, overcoming stubborn resistance enemy.
On December 6, troops of the 20th and 16th armies fought local battles against the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups advancing on Moscow. The transition to a counteroffensive by these two armies was the most difficult, since they were not opposed by flank screens stretched along the front, but by relatively strong formations that had not yet lost their combat capabilities. In these conditions, the narrowing of the band of the strengthened 16th Army to 20 km, almost four times less than in mid-October 1941 near Volokolamsk, did not help. The first day of the offensive, December 7, did not bring significant successes to the troops of the 16th Army; the actions of the majority of the formations subordinate to K.K. Rokossovsky could be described as “attacked, but were not successful.” Saturating the army with artillery did not help either. At the beginning of December, the 16th Army had 320 field and 190 anti-tank guns, significantly more than the rest of the armies of the right wing of the Western Front. Suffice it to say that in total the four advancing armies had 785 field and 360 anti-tank guns. Some success was evident only on December 8, and on December 9 the German troops opposing the 16th Army began to withdraw in the northwestern and western directions.
Under attacks from Soviet troops, the enemy's 3rd and 4th tank groups began retreating to the Istra Reservoir line on the night of December 10. To the north of the latter, the enemy tried to retain the Klin area, where by the evening of December 11 he concentrated a strong group of his troops consisting of four tank and one motorized divisions. In connection with the approach to the Istra Reservoir, the 16th Army lost its key importance, and the 7th and 8th Rifle Divisions were withdrawn from its composition to the front reserve. To operate on the flanks and behind enemy lines, the commander of the 16th Army created two strike groups, one to operate north of the reservoir, and the second to the south of it. Both groups went on the offensive on the morning of December 10th.
The main battles on the right wing of the Western Front took place around Klin, where troops of the 20th, 1st Shock and 30th armies tried to encircle and destroy enemy formations departing from Moscow. By the evening of December 13, the advancing armies had semi-encircled the Klin enemy group in the city and its immediate surroundings. However, the city itself and its surroundings were by that time a “tough nut to crack”, in which parts of several mechanized formations that had moved away from Moscow gathered. Klin itself was defended by the 1st Tank Division from December 9th. Due to the impossibility of taking Klin by storm, the struggle developed for communications. The main “corridor” for withdrawal by the German command was the Klin-Vysokovsk highway, leading west in the direction of Volokolamsk. Soviet troops advancing around Klin from the west encountered strong enemy counterattacks and were unable to cut the Klin-Vysokovsk highway.
An important communications hub on the way from Klin to Volokolamsk was Teryaeva Sloboda. This small settlement for some time became the talk of the town in the operational documents of the Soviet and German command. After capturing Klin, both tank corps of the 3rd Panzer Group were deprived of the opportunity to retreat along the same route that they took to Moscow in November 1941. Accordingly, both the XLI and LVI corps retreated along the same road. By capturing Teryaeva Sloboda, the troops of the 30th Army could intercept the retreat route for the main forces of the 3rd Tank Group. The task of capturing Teryaeva Sloboda was assigned to the mobile group of the commander of the 107th motorized rifle division P.G. Chanchibadze (regiment of the 107th motorized rifle division and the 82nd cavalry division). On the German side, the 1st Tank Division became the main participant in the defensive battles in the Teryaeva Sloboda area. The capture of this settlement was so tempting that the command of the Western Front even decided to drop parachute troops in this area. For the landing operation, 14 TB-3 aircraft of the 23rd Air Division were allocated. The order to land came at the end of the night on December 14th. However, due to organizational troubles, instead of two flights transporting 300 people by air, each plane made only one flight. A total of 147 people were landed. Such a detachment could not have a significant impact on the withdrawal of German mechanized formations. Chanchibadze’s group took Teryaeva Sloboda only in the middle of the day on December 18th.
Already during the offensive, the 30th Army was reinforced by the 363rd Infantry Division from Sverdlovsk, which arrived on December 14. But the Klin garrison was driven out of the city even before the fresh division entered the battle. The offensive of the troops of the 30th Army in the area north and northwest of Klin and the entry of the right-flank units of the 1st Shock Army to the southeastern outskirts of the city resulted in its liberation. On December 14, units of the 7th Tank and 14th Motorized Divisions left the city. On the night of December 15, units of the 371st and 348th rifle divisions of the 30th Army entered Klin. A fierce battle for the city continued for 24 hours. After its completion, on December 16, 1941, the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
While the 1st shock and 30th armies were fighting for Klin, the 16th and 20th armies were moving west. They moved along the same route that K.K. Rokossovsky’s troops were forced to retreat in November 1941. Only now the 16th Army shared its former zone with A.A. Vlasov’s 20th Army. To capture the Istra line, the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, created two strike groups. The first, consisting of the 145th Tank Brigade, 44th Cavalry Division and 17th Infantry Brigade, was intended to bypass the Istra Reservoir from the north. The second, consisting of the 9th Guards Rifle Division, 17th Tank, 36th and 40th Rifle Brigades and the 89th Separate Tank Battalion, bypasses the reservoir from the south. Part of the forces of the 16th Army crossed the reservoir and launched a frontal attack.
At the turn of the reservoir, German troops tried to provide serious and prolonged resistance to our troops. The water from the reservoir was drained by the enemy, the ice sank several meters and was covered with a layer of water of 35-40 cm on the western shore. In addition, the western shore of the reservoir was mined. The artillery of the 16th Army, which was rapidly advancing, fell behind. All this created additional difficulties for our advancing troops and made it easier for the enemy to conduct defensive actions. However, on December 15, the exit of two flank groups north and south of the reservoir forced the German command to quickly retreat westward. Thus, the enemy’s defenses at the line of the Istra Reservoir were broken through. Our troops were able to develop an offensive in the direction of Volokolamsk. However, it should be pointed out that the crossing of the Istra Reservoir by the troops of the 16th Army dragged on for three days, due to the fact that measures were not taken in a timely manner to ensure the crossing. This made it easier for the Germans to retreat and organize defense on the river. Ruse.
In the second ten days of December, the 5th Army of Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov joined the offensive of the right wing of the Western Front. The echelon for the development of success in the army was the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Major General L.M. Dovator, transferred on December 7 from the 16th Army to the 5th Army. On December 13, the front of German troops 10 km southwest of Zvenigorod was broken through. Dovator's corps, with the support of rifle formations of the 5th Army, began to develop an offensive to the northwest in the direction of lake. Trostenskoye to the rear of the enemy troops defending west of Zvenigorod. The breakthrough of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps put the LVII Motorized Corps, which was not attacked in the first days of the offensive, under attack and excluded its use by the German command in the Volokolamsk direction.
It must be said that cavalry played an exceptional role in the battle for Moscow in both its defensive and offensive phases. The Soviet command did not have independent mechanized mobile formations of the tank or motorized division class at that time. The largest mobile units were cavalry divisions. Tank brigades numbering about one and a half thousand people themselves were rather weak as an independent means of fighting.
Therefore, the pursuit of the retreating German troops in the December offensive was carried out by mobile groups consisting of cavalry and tank units.
On December 16, the command of the Western Front assigned the task of pursuit to all (!) armies that were part of it. Now offensive tasks were assigned not only to the armies of the right and left wings of the front, but also to the 33rd, 43rd and 49th armies that had hitherto been defending in the center of the formation of Soviet troops in the Moscow direction. The main task of the armies was formulated as “non-stop pursuit of the enemy” (Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4-1). M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 191). As a means of solving tactical problems, the Front Military Council demanded “more active use of mobile forward detachments to capture road junctions, bridges and tactically important lines. To parallelly pursue the enemy, ski teams should be widely used to move across virgin lands” (ibid., p. 192).
During this period, the German command sent orders to its troops that were in many ways reminiscent of the directives of the Soviet command in October and November. In particular, the commander of Army Group Center von Bock addressed the following words to the headquarters of the 2nd, 4th, 9th and 2nd Panzer Armies on December 16, 1941:
“Only where the enemy encounters fierce resistance will he be forced to abandon new attempts at a breakthrough. Retreat will not induce him to do this. It will not be possible to completely break away from the enemy in the current situation. Retreat only has purpose and meaning when it creates more favorable conditions for fighting or frees up reserves. Since any retreat affects neighbors, seemingly minor local movements can lead to severe operational consequences. Therefore, I order that any withdrawal can be made with the permission of the army commander, and the retreat of formations from the division and above can only be done with my personal permission. The opinion that defensive combat is the job of infantry divisions and that motorized formations should be withdrawn from the battle is currently incorrect. No one can be removed from the front line. Reinforcements are not expected in the near future. You need to look reality in the eye” (Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T.15(4-1). M.: TERRA, 1997, p.213).
According to the received directives, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front continued the pursuit on the morning of December 17. The enemy withdrew the remnants of the 3rd and 4th tank groups to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, covering themselves with rearguards. They were preparing to occupy the line of defense to hold it in accordance with the ideas described above in von Bock's order. But in the period from December 17 to 20, the fighting on the front of the 1st Shock, 20th and 16th armies was in the nature of a continuous pursuit of the Germans. Formations of two tank groups rolled back to the west, losing people and equipment. On December 19, the artillery fleet of the entire 3rd Tank Group consisted of sixty-three 10.5 cm light, twenty-one 15 cm heavy field howitzers and one(!) 10 cm cannon.
The rapid retreat from Moscow led to personnel changes in the leadership of Army Group Center and the high command of the German army. Field Marshal Brauchitsch was forced to surrender his duties as commander-in-chief of the ground forces on December 19, and Hitler now took command of the army personally. On the same day, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock was removed from his post as commander of Army Group Center, and his place at 11.00 on December 19 was taken by the former commander of the 4th Army, Gunther von Kluge. To lead the 4th Army, General of the Mountain Troops Ludwig Kübler was called up from Army Group South, who had proven himself well during the summer and autumn campaigns as commander of the XLIX Mountain Corps of the 17th Army.
As the front of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups was reduced, the resistance of German troops to the advance to the west gradually increased. This was demonstrated quite clearly during the battles for Volokolamsk. The city was located in the offensive zone of the 20th Army. Army commander A.A. Vlasov directed the main efforts of the troops subordinate to him on December 17 to capture Volokolamsk. The capture of Volokolamsk was entrusted to the group of General Remizov (131st and 145th tank brigades, 17th rifle and 24th tank brigades). Due to increased enemy resistance (parts of the 106th Infantry, 2nd and 5th Tank Divisions), the task of the day was not completed. Since the morning of December 18, General Remizov’s group, together with General Katukov’s group (1st Guards and 17th Tank Brigades, 89th Separate Tank Battalion) of the 16th Army, fought with the enemy in the Chismen area throughout the day. The fighting continued until December 19. Only on December 20, units of the 106th Infantry and 5th Tank Divisions were driven out of the city of Volokolamsk.
Meanwhile, on the afternoon of December 20, the right-flank units of the 1st Shock Army, developing the pursuit of the enemy, reached the river. Lame. So the advancing armies of the right wing of the Western Front reached the river line. Lama and Ruza, where the German command planned to stop the Soviet offensive. The attempt of the 1st Shock, 16th and 20th Armies to break through the enemy’s defenses on the move did not produce significant results, and they were forced to stop in front of this fortified line. Until December 25, the troops of the right wing of the front fought in order to improve their position, and then began organizing thorough preparations for breaking through the enemy’s defenses at this line. The fighting at the border of the two rivers became protracted.
Results of the operation
During the period from December 6 to December 25, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front fought their way westward to a depth of 100 km (the average daily rate was up to 6 km). This relatively low pace is explained by the fact that the advancing Soviet troops did not include large mechanized formations that could rush forward and intercept the escape routes. Large mechanized formations were replaced primarily by cavalry, and in the case of an attempt to intercept the communications of the 3rd Panzer Group, “vertical coverage” was even used with the help of a parachute landing.
From an operational point of view, the scenario for the development of events was quite typical. During the offensive, German troops stretched their flanks, as a result of which the density of formation of troops on them decreased. This allowed the Soviet command to strike at the stretched infantry and motorized divisions and put two tank groups on the brink of encirclement. The withdrawal to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers led, due to an increase in the density of troops, to the construction of a relatively strong defense, the breakthrough of which on the move, without lengthy preparation, was impossible. A characteristic feature of the operation, like other battles of the winter campaign of 1941/42, was the massive use of Soviet cavalry. The wooded area northwest of Moscow selected by German troops in November facilitated the use of large masses of cavalry by the Soviet command in December. The massive use of cavalry formations was also favored by the relatively low activity of enemy aviation.
At the tactical level, based on the results of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation, the following conclusions can be drawn. Artillery continued to be the main means of fighting tanks. According to statistics, tank losses on the Western Front in December 1941 were distributed as follows. 65% were knocked out by anti-tank and medium-caliber artillery. 15% were damaged by enemy tanks. 10% were blown up by mines and 5% each were due to technical malfunctions and enemy fire from large-caliber machine guns (20-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns). There were no losses from aviation. For the German tank formations, the rapid withdrawal led to the abandonment of damaged, faulty and unfueled tanks and other equipment. For example, by the end of December the 6th Tank Division was left without any tanks at all, and the artillery regiment was reduced to two divisions.

Source

Isaev A. A short course on the history of the Second World War. Marshal Shaposhnikov's offensive. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 384 p. / Circulation 8000 copies. isbn 5-699-10769-X.

In the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation there was a place for many brave and memorable deeds. There were sailors on skis, riders on tanks and soldiers throwing their sheepskin coats onto the snow in the bitter cold. Tank attacks ended in hand-to-hand combat. Meanwhile, the command was looking for opportunities to strengthen its own positions and not give respite to the enemy.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

By the time of the first autumn in World War II, the situation near Moscow was ambiguous: if there was a danger of breaking through the defense of Soviet troops and surrendering Moscow, which meant loss, then at the same time German troops were expecting a counterattack from the enemy every minute. Both armies were exhausted, and only strategically correct decisions by the command could help. Stalin played an important role, but this does not diminish the marshal’s merits. Zhukov's role in the battle for Moscow is listed as decisive - his orders came on time, which is why the Red Army troops had a chance to win.

On December 1, Stalin ordered the Western Front to bypass the armies of the Verkhmat and go to their rear. The Klin tank group had to be destroyed. This order applied to the 1st Shock, 30th, 20th, 16th and 5th Armies, which were located at that time on the river near Sverdlovo, Krasnaya Polyana and Dmitrev. So that the 1st Shock and 30th Army could encircle the German tanks of the 3rd Panzer Group, almost 75% of the air forces of the Western Front were allocated.

In addition, around the same time, the 31st and 29th Armies were fighting with the Kalinin 9th Tank Group. After a successful (and this was expected) outcome, they were supposed to head to Klin. Still, at that time, Verkhmat had superiority in the number of tanks and artillery, losing only in the number of soldiers. To eliminate the numerical superiority of German troops in weapons, Ural divisions, T-34 tanks and the 64th brigade were transferred to the Western Front. The latter consisted of sailors from the Pacific front - tall, well-trained soldiers.

Main events

Having grouped, in the evening of December 5-6, all units entered positions for attack. Already on December 7, as a result of a day of fighting, the 30th Army broke through the border north of Klin, and the 1st Army advanced 25 km across the river, heading parallel to the 30th. So, they were supposed to surround the 3rd tank group. Realizing this, the Nazi command pulls the 6th tank and 14th motorized divisions to a dangerous place.

On the same day, fighting began in Krasnaya Polyana, where, in the event of a close encounter between opponents, they often turned into hand-to-hand combat. Realizing the importance of supporting the 20th and 16th armies, the 64th brigade did the unusual: most of the soldiers mounted tanks and rode to attack the enemy. Further, when the snow prevented movement, they took off their sheepskin coats and ran towards the enemy. This is 20 degrees below zero!

On December 9, the Germans were forced to withdraw. This does not suit Zhukov: he planned the operation as a faster one, and therefore demands that the Leningradskoye highway be blocked. This was to be done by a mobile detachment of sailors numbering 800 people. When it was necessary to send a small group around on skis, they, not knowing how to stay on them, all volunteered to complete the task! Together with the main forces, on December 10, the detachment blocked the highway, cutting off the road.

Throughout December 11, battles were fought for Solnechnogorsk, and by the end, victory passed into the hands of the Red Army. At this time, the 30th and 1st armies surrounded Klin, besieging the Germans. Zhukov invited the besieged soldiers to surrender, but they still had to open fire. To be even more convincing, troops from the 214th brigade landed on the road to Klin - this was the first airborne assault in 1941. When, by December 15, Soviet troops completely cleared Klin of the enemy, street by street, the Germans had to advance to Volokolamsk. Their path was blocked by the previously landed troops. As a result, more than 400 soldiers were killed, not counting the disabled combat vehicles.

The 20th Army, using ski troops and a detachment of the naval brigade, approached Volokolamsk, where the only largest Verkhmat tank groups remained on the Western Front. On December 20, the enemy was completely driven out of Volokolamsk by Soviet troops.

Bottom line

As a result of the events, an operational pause was again organized on the Western Front, which was possible thanks to the elimination of the threat from the western side. From here the Germans could no longer attack. When the alliance between London and Moscow was signed on May 26, 1942, the envoy of the British side saw the consequences of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive, and this was the decisive factor in making a decision in favor of the alliance. Thus, this operation influenced the course of world politics.

11.10.2007 22:17

Klin-Solnechnogorsk defensive operation, 1941.
The operation of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, carried out on November 15 - December 5, 1941 during the Battle of Moscow. After the failure of the October offensive on Moscow, the fascist German command prepared a new attack by Army Group Center with the aim of capturing the Soviet capital by bypassing it from the north and south. For the offensive north of Moscow (Operation Volga Reservoir), the enemy's 3rd and 4th tank groups (7 tank, 3 motorized and 4 infantry divisions) were concentrated on the Kalinin-Volokolamsk-Ruza front. Defending in front of them were the 30th (Major General D.D. Lelyushenko) and 16th (Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky) armies, which formed the right wing of the Western Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov).

The fascist German troops had a numerical superiority in men by 1.6 times, guns and mortars by 2 times, and tanks by 3.4 times. The Soviet command promptly guessed the enemy's plan and carried out a number of measures to strengthen the defense, but was unable to change the balance of forces and means by the start of the operation (with the exception of aviation, which began to outnumber the enemy). The plan of the Soviet command provided for a stubborn defense to thwart the enemy's plans, to gain time to concentrate strategic reserves in order to subsequently launch a counteroffensive. On November 15, the enemy's 3rd Tank Group attacked the 30th Army; On November 16, the 4th Tank Group went on the offensive against the 16th Army. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 30th Army were forced to retreat to the Volga, and south of the Volga Reservoir - to the line east of Zavidovo, Yamug, which allowed the enemy to build on their success in the Klin direction. Particularly stubborn battles took place in the Volokolamsk-Istra direction, where formations of the 16th Army fought selflessly. On November 23, Nazi troops bypassed Soviet troops northeast and southwest of Klin. To avoid encirclement, units of the 16th Army left the city. The enemy also managed to capture Solnechnogorsk, Yakhroma, Krasnaya Polyana, and several villages on the eastern bank of the Canal. Moscow.

There were about 30 km left to the Soviet capital. By this time, the 1st Shock and 20th armies were transferred from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, and reinforced with fresh units of the 30th and 16th armies. By the end of November - beginning of December, as a result of counterattacks in the areas of Dmitrov, Yakhroma, Krasnaya Polyana and Kryukov, Soviet troops stopped the advance of the enemy, who, having suffered huge losses, was forced to go on the defensive. As a result of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk defensive operation, as well as the Tula defensive operation, the Soviet command gained time to concentrate strategic reserves in the Moscow direction and provided the necessary conditions for launching a decisive offensive.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation, 1941.
The operation of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, carried out from December 6 to December 25, 1941 during the Battle of Moscow; part of the counteroffensive near Moscow. The goal of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation is the defeat of the enemy’s 3rd and 4th tank groups (7 tank, 3.5 motorized and 9 infantry divisions) in the Klin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk region, eliminating the threat of bypassing Moscow from the north, creating favorable conditions for further advance to the west. By the beginning of the operation, the troops of the right wing (30th, 1st Shock, 20th, 16th, 5th Armies) of the Western Front (General G.K. Zhukov) occupied the line west of Sverdlov, Dmitrov, Kr. Polyana, Nara River. The plan of the Soviet command provided for attacks on the enemy in converging directions from the northeast and east by the forces of the 30th, 1st Shock, 20th and 16th armies. The 5th Army, by advancing its right-flank formations along the left bank of the Moscow River, was supposed to secure the left flank of the strike group. To support the offensive from the air, up to 75% of the front's aviation, as well as reserve aviation of the Supreme High Command, were allocated.

The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev), advancing to the rear of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk enemy group (Kalinin operation 1941-42), interacted with the troops of the Western Front. The enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in artillery by 1.2 times, in tanks by 1.5 times, only in human resources did the armies of the right wing of the front have a superiority of 1.6 times. On December 6, Soviet troops launched an offensive, which developed at an increasing pace. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and repelling his counterattacks, during the 1st half of December they advanced up to 40-60 km, liberated Istra (December 11), Solnechnogorsk (December 12), Klin (December 15), Vysokovsk (December 16) and then continued to pursue the retreating enemy. Cavalry and tank groups and detachments under the command of Generals L.M. Dovator, M.E. Katukov, F.T. Remizov and Colonel P.G. Chanchibadze destroyed the enemy rearguards, widely using flanking maneuver. On December 20, Volokolamsk was liberated. On December 21, Soviet troops reached the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where they met organized enemy resistance in previously prepared positions. Until December 25, Soviet troops fought in order to improve their position. As a result of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front defeated: the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy, threw back their broken formations 90-110 km, destroyed and captured a large number of guns, tanks, other military equipment, ammunition and various property, eliminated the threat of bypassing Moscow from the north.

After the failure of the October offensive on the capital of the USSR, the German command decided to prepare a new attack by the troops of Army Group Center with the aim of encircling and capturing Moscow by enveloping it from the north and south.

To strike north of Moscow on the Kalinin-Volokolamsk-Ruza front, the 3rd and 4th tank groups under the command of G. Reinhardt and E. Hoepner (7 tank, 3 motorized and 4 infantry divisions) were concentrated. On the USSR side, the defense was held by the 30th Army under the command of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko and the 16th Army under the command of Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky. These armies formed the right wing of the Western Front, the front was commanded by Army General G.K. Zhukov.

German troops had a significant superiority: 1.6 times in manpower, 2 times in guns and mortars, and 3.4 times in tanks. Only in the air force was the advantage on the side of the Red Army. The Soviet command was able to promptly unravel the plans of the Germans. Measures were taken to strengthen the defense, although they could not change the balance of forces and means. The Soviet command planned to thwart the German plans with a stubborn defense and gain time to bring up strategic reserves. And then counterattack.

On November 15, the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht began to attack the 30th Army, and on the 16th, the 4th Panzer Group attacked the 16th Army. The 30th Soviet Army, under enemy pressure, retreated to the Volga, and south of the Volga Reservoir - to a line east of Zavidov, Yamuga. This allowed the Wehrmacht to develop success in the direction of Klin.

Fierce fighting took place in the Volokolomsko-Istra direction, where units of Rokossovsky’s 16th Army held the defense. So it was in those battles that the 316th Rifle Division (later the 8th Guards Division), under the command of Major General Ivan Vasilyevich Panfilov, which fought a difficult defensive battle against the 2nd and 11th German tank divisions in the Volokolamsk direction, received immortality.

On November 23, German units were able to bypass Klin from the southwest and northeast. In order not to fall into the “cauldron”, the formations of the 16th Army gave up the city. The Germans also captured Solnechnogorsk, Yakhroma, Krasnaya Polyana, their advanced detachments reached the eastern bank of the canal. Moscow. There are only about 30 kilometers left to Moscow. The situation was stabilized when the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK) transferred the 1st Shock Army and the 20th Army from the reserve to the right flank of the Western Front. By the end of November - early December, the 16th and 30th armies launched several counterattacks and stabilized the position of the front. The Germans suffered significant losses and went on the defensive. The opportunity arose to launch a counteroffensive.

Plan Rates, strengths of the parties

By the beginning of the offensive operation, the troops of the right flank of the Western Front under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukov (30th, 1st Shock, 20th, 16th, 5th armies) occupied the defense line west of Sverdlovo - Dmitrov - Krasnaya Polyana - Nara River.

The plan of the SVGK provided for the delivery of strong blows to the German troops in converging directions from the northeast and east by formations of the 30th, 1st Shock, 20th and 16th armies. According to the Headquarters plan, the advancing Soviet armies were supposed to cut through the orders of the main forces of the German 3rd and 4th tank groups (they included 7 tank, 3 motorized and 9 infantry divisions) in the Klin, Istra, and Solnechnogorsk areas. Eliminate the threat of bypassing the capital of the USSR from the northern direction. And this will create favorable conditions for the development of offensive actions to the west. The 5th Army was supposed to secure the left flank of the strike group by moving its right-flank units along the left bank of the Moscow River.

To support the offensive of the armies from the air, up to 75% of the Western Front Air Force, as well as squadrons from the Supreme High Command reserve, were allocated. The forces of the left flank of the Kalinin Front under the command of Colonel General I.S. Konev interacted with the armies of the Western Front, who had the task of advancing to the rear of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk enemy group, after blocking the Kalinin group of the Wehrmacht.

The Wehrmacht in this direction was superior to the Red Army in tanks by 1.5 times, in artillery by 1.2 times, and only in human resources the formations of the right flank of the Western Front were superior by 1.6 times.

Offensive

On December 6, the Soviet armies went on the offensive and picked up a good pace in a number of directions. Units of the 30th Army (D.D. Lelyushenko), and it was reinforced by 6 Siberian and Ural divisions, broke through the German front north of Klin, initially it was defended by two enemy divisions - motorized and infantry. The 365th, 371st, 379th rifle divisions and the 82nd cavalry division acted in the direction of the main attack.

By the end of the day on December 7, the 1st Shock Army (under the command of Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) established a crossing across the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Dmitrov area, and advanced 25 km in depth, expanding the breakthrough along the front to 35 km. The army concentrated its main efforts on the right flank and in the center, in the Yakhroma area.

The German command urgently pulled together additional forces in the direction of the main attack and threw the 14th motorized and 6th tank divisions into battle. Army commander Lelyushenko brought the second echelon of the army into the battle - the 379th Infantry Division of Colonel Chistov and the 8th Tank Brigade of Colonel Rotmistrov. These units rushed forward and cut the Leningradskoye Highway. On December 8, the 348th Infantry Division of the 30th Army liberated Rogachevo.

A more complex situation developed in the offensive zone of the 20th (under the command of Major General A. A. Vlasov) and 16th armies (K. K. Rokossovsky). It was not possible to break through the front on the move. Only on December 9th did the Germans begin to retreat in the northwestern and western directions. It should be noted that the Wehrmacht constantly took counterattacking actions, offering stubborn resistance, trying to stop the Soviet armies.

On December 11, the 5th Army (under the command of Lieutenant General L.A. Govorov) went on the offensive. On the first day, the army was able to push the Germans back from their positions on the northern bank of the Moscow River. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps under Major General L.M. Dovator was introduced into the breakthrough.

Overcoming fierce resistance from the Wehrmacht and repelling its counterattacks, the Soviet armies covered 40-60 km during the 1st half of December. On December 11, Istra was liberated, on the 12th - Solnechnogorsk, on the 15th - Klin, on the 16th - Vysokovsk. The cavalry and tank formations under the command of Generals L.M. Dovator, M.E. Katukov, F.T. Remizov and Colonel P.G. Chanchibadze became famous, who widely used outflanking maneuvers and destroyed the enemy’s rearguards and rear areas.

The Germans put up fierce resistance at the line of the Istra Reservoir. A strong defensive line was created there. In order to break the enemy's resistance, two mobile groups were created - generals F.T. Remizov and M.E. Katukov. They were able to bypass this water line from the north and south. The troops of the 16th Army were able to overcome this line of defense and developed an offensive towards Volokolamsk. German units quickly retreated to the west.

On December 20, Volokolamsk was recaptured. On December 21, the Red Army reached the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where Soviet units met well-organized resistance from German troops at previously prepared lines. Until December 25, the Soviet armies fought to improve their position.

Features of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

A feature of this operation was the fairly active use of army mobile groups of tanks, infantry and cavalry. Fortunately, the armies of the right flank of the Western Front, unlike, say, the Kalinin Front, had a fairly significant number of tank formations - 9 tank brigades and 6 separate tank battalions.

This is how the army groups of Colonels P.G. acted as part of the 30th Army. Chanchibadze and P.A. Rotmistrov, in the 16th Army - a group of generals F.T. Remizov and M.E. Katukov, in the 5th Army - groups of generals L.M. Dovator and I. Konstantinov. Mobile army groups, as in the defensive period, were heterogeneous in composition. For example, the army group of Colonel Chanchibadze, which had the task of deeply covering the Klin group of the Wehrmacht, was formed from the 107th motorized rifle division and the 145th separate tank battalion. The mobile group of General Remizov, which was given the task of bypassing the Istra group of Germans from the north with the subsequent pursuit of enemy forces in the Volokolamsk direction, consisted of 3 tank brigades (24th, 31st and 145th) and one rifle brigade (17th I). They tried to take settlements on the move; in the event of serious enemy resistance, an assault group was formed from the forward detachment, while the main forces of the mobile army group continued to move around this fortified point.

Results of the operation

The threat to the capital of the USSR from the north-west was eliminated.

The 3rd and 4th tank groups of the Wehrmacht were defeated and suffered heavy losses. German formations were thrown back 90-110 km. Soviet troops liberated a number of settlements and cities. A significant number of guns, tanks, other weapons, ammunition depots and various property were destroyed and captured.

KLINSKO-SOLNECHNOGORSK OFFENSIVE OPERATION
(December 6—December 25, 1941)
The counteroffensive against the main strike group of German troops was launched by the forces of the 30th, 1st shock, 20-1, 16th and the right wing of the 5th armies of the Western Front. These troops included 20 rifle, one motorized rifle, one tank and 9 cavalry divisions, 17 rifle and 11 tank brigades, as well as several separate tank, machine gun and ski battalions. The enemy's 3rd and 4th tank groups operating in their offensive zone, consisting of four motorized and two army corps, had 17.5 divisions (7 infantry, 7 tank, 3 motorized and one motorized brigade). The average strength of a rifle division on the Western Front at this time was a little over 7,200 people, and a rifle brigade - about 4,400 people. The operational density of our troops was approximately 4.2 km per division.
During the attack on Moscow, the 4th Tank Group performed a maneuver to bypass the Istra Reservoir through the city of Klin. The route of the 3rd Panzer Group, which by the end of November provided the left flank of the German offensive, passed through the same city. The wedge became the most important communications hub, on which divisions of several corps of two tank groups depended. At the same time, D.D. Lelyushenko’s 30th Army, thrown back in the initial phase of the offensive to the north and northeast, hung over the rear of the German troops, being dangerously close to Klin. The Soviet command had ample opportunities to intercept the communications of German tank and infantry divisions that had reached the near approaches to Moscow. At the same time, the determining factor in planning operations was the transition to a counteroffensive after a long period of defensive actions. This led to the fact that the arriving reserves were distributed relatively evenly along the front occupied by the five armies. The 1st shock and 20th armies occupied their original position, closing a large gap formed as a result of the rupture of the elbow connection of the 30th and 16th armies. The absence of a clearly defined striking fist forced the operation to be planned in the form of several crushing blows delivered by all the armies participating in the offensive.
The idea of ​​the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation was to cut into pieces the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy in the area with attacks from the 30th army from the north, the 1st shock, 20th and 16th armies from the east Klin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk and create favorable conditions for the further development of the offensive to the west. The 5th Army advanced its right-flank formations along the northern bank of the river. Moscow was supposed to provide the left flank of the 16th Army. In accordance with these tasks, a strike force was created in each army.
In the 30th Army (107th motorized, 185, 365, 371, 379 and 348th rifle divisions, 8th and 21st tank brigades, 18, 24, 46 and 82nd cavalry divisions) it was decided to attack two blows - main and auxiliary. The main efforts were concentrated in the center, where it was planned to attack Klin with the forces of the 365th and 371st rifle divisions with the support of the 8th and 21st tank brigades. An auxiliary attack was carried out on the left flank by the forces of the 348th Infantry, 18th and 24th Cavalry Divisions in the direction of Rogachevo.
German historians often call the units that carried out the counteroffensive near Moscow “Siberian.” The use of this term is very conditional. For example, the 348th Infantry Division of Colonel A.S. Lyukhtikov was Ural, the 371st Rifle Division of Lieutenant Colonel I.F. Shcheglov was Chelyabinsk, and the 82nd Cavalry Division of N.V. Gorin was formed in Bashkiria.
In accordance with the assigned task, on December 6, the troops of the 30th Army broke through the front of two enemy motorized divisions defending against them. By the end of the day, D.D. Lelyushenko’s troops advanced 17 km, expanding the breakthrough area to 25 km along the front. At noon on December 7, the advanced units of the 30th Army reached the village of Shchapovo, eight kilometers northwest of Klin, where the command post of the LVI Motorized Corps was located. The headquarters of the German formation was saved from destruction only by numerous anti-aircraft guns, designed to protect it from attacks by Soviet aircraft. By the end of the day on December 7, having bypassed Shchapovo and other centers of resistance, the troops of the 30th Army advanced towards Klin to a depth of 25 km. The German command began to pull nearby combat groups of tank divisions towards the city. The first to come to the rescue of the Klin garrison were the vanguard of the 25th Tank Regiment of the 7th Tank Division, led by Lieutenant Orlov, already known to us from the battles for Alytus. However, despite the increasing resistance, by the evening of December 9, D.D. Lelyushenko’s troops came close to the northern and northwestern outskirts of Klin.
On December 6, troops of the 20th and 16th armies fought local battles against the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups advancing on Moscow. The transition to a counteroffensive by these two armies was the most difficult, since they were not opposed by flank screens stretched along the front, but by relatively strong formations that had not yet lost their combat capabilities. In these conditions, the narrowing of the band of the strengthened 16th Army to 20 km, almost four times less than in mid-October 1941 near Volokolamsk, did not help. The first day of the offensive, December 7, did not bring significant successes to the troops of the 16th Army; the actions of the majority of the formations subordinate to K.K. Rokossovsky could be described as “attacked, but were not successful.”
Saturating the army with artillery did not help either. At the beginning of December, the 16th Army had 320 field and 190 anti-tank guns, significantly more than the rest of the armies of the right wing of the Western Front. Suffice it to say that in total the four advancing armies had 785 field and 360 anti-tank guns. Some success was evident only on December 8, and on December 9 the German troops opposing the 16th Army began to withdraw in the northwestern and western directions.
The main battles on the right wing of the Western Front took place around Klin, where troops of the 20th, 1st Shock and 30th armies tried to encircle and destroy enemy formations departing from Moscow. By the evening of December 13, the advancing armies had semi-encircled the Klin enemy group in the city and its immediate surroundings. However, the city itself and its surroundings were by that time a “tough nut to crack”, in which parts of several mechanized formations that had moved away from Moscow gathered. Klin itself was defended by the 1st Tank Division from December 9th. Due to the impossibility of taking Klin by storm, the struggle developed for communications. The main “corridor” for withdrawal by the German command was the Klin-Vysokovsk highway, leading west in the direction of Volokolamsk. Soviet troops advancing around Klin from the west encountered strong enemy counterattacks and were unable to cut the Klin-Vysokovsk highway.
An important communications hub on the way from Klin to Volokolamsk was Teryaeva Sloboda. This small settlement for some time became the talk of the town in the operational documents of the Soviet and German command. After capturing Klin, both tank corps of the 3rd Panzer Group were deprived of the opportunity to retreat along the same route that they took to Moscow in November 1941. Accordingly, both the XLI and LVI corps retreated along the same road. By capturing Teryaeva Sloboda, the troops of the 30th Army could intercept the retreat route for the main forces of the 3rd Tank Group. The task of capturing Teryaeva Sloboda was assigned to the mobile group of the commander of the 107th motorized rifle division P.G. Chanchibadze (regiment of the 107th motorized rifle division and the 82nd cavalry division). On the German side, the 1st Tank Division became the main participant in the defensive battles in the Teryaeva Sloboda area. The capture of this settlement was so tempting that the command of the Western Front even decided to drop parachute troops in this area. For the landing operation, 14 TB-3 aircraft of the 23rd Air Division were allocated. The order to land came at the end of the night on December 14th. However, due to organizational troubles, instead of two flights transporting 300 people by air, each plane made only one flight. A total of 147 people were landed. Such a detachment could not have a significant impact on the withdrawal of German mechanized formations. Chanchibadze’s group took Teryaeva Sloboda only in the middle of the day on December 18th.
Already during the offensive, the 30th Army was reinforced by the 363rd Infantry Division from Sverdlovsk, which arrived on December 14. But the Klin garrison was driven out of the city even before the fresh division entered the battle. The offensive of the troops of the 30th Army in the area north and northwest of Klin and the entry of the right-flank units of the 1st Shock Army to the southeastern outskirts of the city resulted in its liberation. On December 14, units of the 7th Tank and 14th Motorized Divisions left the city. On the night of December 15, units of the 371st and 348th rifle divisions of the 30th Army entered Klin. A fierce battle for the city continued for 24 hours. After its completion, on December 16, 1941, the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
While the 1st shock and 30th armies were fighting for Klin, the 16th and 20th armies were moving west. They moved along the same route that K.K. Rokossovsky’s troops were forced to retreat in November 1941. Only now the 16th Army shared its former zone with A.A. Vlasov’s 20th Army. To capture the Istra line, the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, created two strike groups. The first, consisting of the 145th Tank Brigade, 44th Cavalry Division and 17th Infantry Brigade, was intended to bypass the Istra Reservoir from the north. The second, consisting of the 9th Guards Rifle Division, 17th Tank, 36th and 40th Rifle Brigades and the 89th Separate Tank Battalion, bypasses the reservoir from the south. Part of the forces of the 16th Army crossed the reservoir and launched a frontal attack.
At the turn of the reservoir, German troops tried to provide serious and prolonged resistance to our troops. The water from the reservoir was drained by the enemy, the ice sank several meters and was covered with a layer of water of 35-40 cm near the western shore. In addition, the western shore of the reservoir was mined. The artillery of the 16th Army, which was rapidly advancing, fell behind. All this created additional difficulties for our advancing troops and made it easier for the enemy to conduct defensive actions. However, on December 15, the exit of two flank groups north and south of the reservoir forced the German command to quickly retreat westward. Thus, the enemy’s defenses at the line of the Istra Reservoir were broken through. Our troops were able to develop an offensive in the direction of Volokolamsk. However, it should be pointed out that the crossing of the Istra Reservoir by the troops of the 16th Army dragged on for three days, due to the fact that measures were not taken in a timely manner to ensure the crossing. This made it easier for the Germans to retreat and organize defense on the river. Ruse.
In the second ten days of December, the 5th Army of Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov joined the offensive of the right wing of the Western Front. The echelon for the development of success in the army was the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Major General L.M. Dovator, transferred on December 7 from the 16th Army to the 5th Army. On December 13, the front of German troops 10 km southwest of Zvenigorod was broken through. Dovator's corps, with the support of rifle formations of the 5th Army, began to develop an offensive to the northwest in the direction of lake. Trostenskoye to the rear of the enemy troops defending west of Zvenigorod. The breakthrough of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps put the LVII Motorized Corps, which was not attacked in the first days of the offensive, under attack and excluded its use by the German command in the Volokolamsk direction.
It must be said that cavalry played an exceptional role in the battle for Moscow in both its defensive and offensive phases. The Soviet command did not have independent mechanized mobile formations of the tank or motorized division class at that time. The largest mobile units were cavalry divisions. Tank brigades numbering about one and a half thousand people themselves were rather weak as an independent means of fighting.
Therefore, the pursuit of the retreating German troops in the December offensive was carried out by mobile groups consisting of cavalry and tank units.
On December 16, the command of the Western Front assigned the task of pursuit to all (!) armies that were part of it. Now offensive tasks were assigned not only to the armies of the right and left wings of the front, but also to the 33rd, 43rd and 49th armies that had hitherto been defending in the center of the formation of Soviet troops in the Moscow direction. The main task of the armies was formulated as “non-stop pursuit of the enemy” (Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 15 (4-1). M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 191). As a means of solving tactical problems, the Front Military Council demanded “more active use of mobile forward detachments to capture road junctions, bridges and tactically important lines. To parallelly pursue the enemy, ski teams should be widely used to move across virgin lands” (ibid., p. 192).
During this period, the German command sent orders to its troops that were in many ways reminiscent of the directives of the Soviet command in October and November. In particular, the commander of Army Group Center von Bock addressed the following words to the headquarters of the 2nd, 4th, 9th and 2nd Panzer Armies on December 16, 1941:
“Only where the enemy encounters fierce resistance will he be forced to abandon new attempts at a breakthrough. Retreat will not induce him to do this. It will not be possible to completely break away from the enemy in the current situation. Retreat only has purpose and meaning when it creates more favorable conditions for fighting or frees up reserves. Since any retreat affects neighbors, seemingly minor local movements can lead to severe operational consequences. Therefore, I order that any withdrawal can be made with the permission of the army commander, and the retreat of formations from the division and above can only be done with my personal permission. The opinion that defensive combat is the job of infantry divisions and that motorized formations should be withdrawn from the battle is currently incorrect. No one can be removed from the front line. Reinforcements are not expected in the near future. You need to look reality in the eye” (Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 15 (4-1). M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 213).
According to the received directives, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front continued the pursuit on the morning of December 17. The enemy withdrew the remnants of the 3rd and 4th tank groups to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, covering themselves with rearguards. They were preparing to occupy the line of defense to hold it in accordance with the ideas described above in von Bock's order. But in the period from December 17 to 20, the fighting on the front of the 1st Shock, 20th and 16th armies was in the nature of a continuous pursuit of the Germans. Formations of two tank groups rolled back to the west, losing people and equipment. On December 19, the artillery fleet of the entire 3rd Tank Group consisted of sixty-three 10.5 cm light, twenty-one 15 cm heavy field howitzers and one(!) 10 cm cannon.
The rapid retreat from Moscow led to personnel changes in the leadership of Army Group Center and the high command of the German army. Field Marshal Brauchitsch was forced to surrender his duties as commander-in-chief of the ground forces on December 19, and Hitler now took command of the army personally. On the same day, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock was removed from his post as commander of Army Group Center, and his place at 11.00 on December 19 was taken by the former commander of the 4th Army, Gunther von Kluge. To lead the 4th Army, General of the Mountain Troops Ludwig Kübler was called up from Army Group South, who had proven himself well during the summer and autumn campaigns as commander of the XLIX Mountain Corps of the 17th Army.
As the front of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups was reduced, the resistance of German troops to the advance to the west gradually increased. This was demonstrated quite clearly during the battles for Volokolamsk. The city was located in the offensive zone of the 20th Army. Army commander A.A. Vlasov directed the main efforts of the troops subordinate to him on December 17 to capture Volokolamsk. The capture of Volokolamsk was entrusted to the group of General Remizov (131st and 145th tank brigades, 17th rifle and 24th tank brigades). Due to increased enemy resistance (parts of the 106th Infantry, 2nd and 5th Tank Divisions), the task of the day was not completed. Since the morning of December 18, General Remizov’s group, together with General Katukov’s group (1st Guards and 17th Tank Brigades, 89th Separate Tank Battalion) of the 16th Army, fought with the enemy in the Chismen area throughout the day. The fighting continued until December 19. Only on December 20, units of the 106th Infantry and 5th Tank Divisions were driven out of the city of Volokolamsk.
Meanwhile, on the afternoon of December 20, the right-flank units of the 1st Shock Army, developing the pursuit of the enemy, reached the river. Lame. So the advancing armies of the right wing of the Western Front reached the river line. Lama and Ruza, where the German command planned to stop the Soviet offensive. The attempt of the 1st Shock, 16th and 20th Armies to break through the enemy’s defenses on the move did not produce significant results, and they were forced to stop in front of this fortified line. Until December 25, the troops of the right wing of the front fought in order to improve their position, and then began organizing thorough preparations for breaking through the enemy’s defenses at this line. The fighting at the border of the two rivers became protracted.
Results of the operation
During the period from December 6 to December 25, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front fought their way westward to a depth of 100 km (the average daily rate was up to 6 km). This relatively low pace is explained by the fact that the advancing Soviet troops did not include large mechanized formations that could rush forward and intercept the escape routes. Large mechanized formations were replaced primarily by cavalry, and in the case of an attempt to intercept the communications of the 3rd Panzer Group, “vertical coverage” was even used with the help of a parachute landing.
From an operational point of view, the scenario for the development of events was quite typical. During the offensive, German troops stretched their flanks, as a result of which the density of formation of troops on them decreased. This allowed the Soviet command to strike at the stretched infantry and motorized divisions and put two tank groups on the brink of encirclement. The withdrawal to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers led, due to an increase in the density of troops, to the construction of a relatively strong defense, the breakthrough of which on the move, without lengthy preparation, was impossible. A characteristic feature of the operation, like other battles of the winter campaign of 1941/42, was the massive use of Soviet cavalry. The wooded area northwest of Moscow selected by German troops in November facilitated the use of large masses of cavalry by the Soviet command in December. The massive use of cavalry formations was also favored by the relatively low activity of enemy aviation.
At the tactical level, based on the results of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation, the following conclusions can be drawn. Artillery continued to be the main means of fighting tanks. According to statistics, tank losses on the Western Front in December 1941 were distributed as follows. 65% were knocked out by anti-tank and medium-caliber artillery. 15% were damaged by enemy tanks. 10% were blown up by mines and 5% each were due to technical malfunctions and enemy fire from large-caliber machine guns (20-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns). There were no losses from aviation. For German tank formations, the rapid withdrawal led to the abandonment of damaged, faulty and fuel-less tanks and other equipment. For example, by the end of December the 6th Tank Division was left without any tanks at all, and the artillery regiment was reduced to two divisions.

Source
Isaev A. A short course on the history of the Second World War. Marshal Shaposhnikov's offensive. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 384 p. / Circulation 8000 copies. isbn 5—699—10769-Х.