Kursk Bulge dates and events. Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

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The Battle of Kursk, according to historians, was a turning point in c. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. This has never happened in world history, and it probably will never happen again.

The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy and. The size of the Soviet army amounted to more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, from the air, the Soviet infantrymen were supported by 2 thousand aircraft. The Germans opposed the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900 thousand soldiers, 10 thousand cannons and more than two thousand aircraft.

The plan of the Germans was as follows. They were going to seize the Kursk salient with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned the exact time of the offensive and the purpose of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.

The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On the Germans gathered in front of the front line, heavy fire from Soviet artillery fell, causing great damage to them. The enemy offensive stalled, and was delayed by a couple of hours. During the day of the fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and in 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 kilometers. This state of affairs hardly suited the German command.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle in history took place near the village of Prokhorovka. The battle brought together 800 tanks on each side. It was an impressive and terrifying sight. On the battlefield, tank models of the Second World War were better. Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. Also in that battle "St. John's wort" was tested. 57mm cannon that penetrates the Tiger's armor.

Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was low, and the damage inflicted took the tank out of battle. The German offensive stalled, the tired enemy began to retreat to their former positions.

Our counteroffensive soon began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, broke through the German defenses. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted for about 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand cannons, 15 thousand tanks. Human losses of the Wehrmacht at the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war looms over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles of the Kursk Bulge were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured in the following time frames: July 5 - August 23, 1943.

The Great Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles of the Second World War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. It lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights and was a combination of strategic defensive (July 5-23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations in the Great Patriotic War, conducted by the Red Army in the Kursk salient in order to disrupt a major German offensive and defeat the enemy's strategic grouping.

As a result of the winter 1942-1943. the offensive of Soviet troops and the forced withdrawal during the Kharkov defensive operation in 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge was formed. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts located on it threatened the flanks and rear of the German army groups "Center" and "South". In turn, these enemy groupings, occupying the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, had favorable conditions for delivering powerful flank attacks against the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region. At any moment, the enemy could surround and defeat the forces of the Red Army stationed there with powerful counter blows. This fear was confirmed by intelligence information about the intentions of the German command to undertake a decisive offensive near Kursk.

In order to realize this opportunity, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive in this direction. It counted on delivering a series of powerful counter-strikes to crush the main forces of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The concept of the operation (code name "Citadel") provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk salient on the 4th day of the operation to encircle and then destroy the Soviet troops. Subsequently, it was planned to strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in the northeastern direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. To carry out Operation Citadel, the best generals of the Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a large number of separate units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the army group " Center "(Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the 4th Tank Army and Operational Group" Kempf "of Army Group" South "(Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by the aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets. In total, this group consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated in a sector that was only about 14% of its length.

In order to achieve a quick success in its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V ("panther"), T-VI ("tiger"), which entered service with the German army, and the assault guns "Ferdinand" had good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct firing range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times higher than the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to the high initial velocity of the shells, increased armor penetration was achieved. The armored self-propelled howitzers Hummel and Vespe, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, excellent Zeiss optics were installed on them. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with the German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to ensure the retention of air supremacy and reliable support for tank divisions.

The German command attached particular importance to the surprise of Operation Citadel. To this end, it was envisaged to carry out disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. For this, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the South Army zone. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were advanced, ferry means were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, agent actions were activated, rumors spread, etc. On the contrary, in the zone of Army Group Center, everything was carefully camouflaged. But although all the activities were carried out with great care and methodicality, they did not give effective results.

To secure the rear areas of their strike groups, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. So, more than 10 divisions operated against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhytomyr region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.

When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK) intended to conduct a broad offensive, striking the main blow in the southwestern direction in order to defeat Army Group South, liberate the Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the river. Dnieper.

The Soviet command began to develop a plan for the upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, all front commanders defending the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan provided for the main attack in the southwest direction. Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set the date for the start of the operation.

The Soviet command was faced with a difficult task - to choose a method of action: to attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the general situation and on his views on the actions of the Red Army for the summer of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area, Marshal G.K. Zhukov reported: “I consider it inexpedient for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days with the aim of preempting the enemy. It will be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, by introducing fresh reserves, by going over to the general offensive, we will finally finish off the main grouping of the enemy. " The chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky: "A thorough analysis of the situation and foreseeing the development of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts should be concentrated to the north and south of Kursk, to bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go over to the counteroffensive and carry out his defeat."

As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to go over to the defensive in the region of the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in the regions north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal course of action - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, Generals N.F. Vatutin and R. Ya. Malinovsky continued to insist on a preemptive strike in the Donbass. They were supported by S.K. Timoshenko, K.E. Voroshilov and some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when it became known for sure about the Citadel plan. Subsequent analysis and the actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense in conditions of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.

The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was drawn up by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: it was necessary to expel the German invaders behind the Smolensk - r. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive "eastern rampart" of the enemy, as well as eliminate the enemy bridgehead in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be delivered in the south-west, and the second in the west. On the Kursk salient, it was decided to deplete and bleed the shock groupings of German troops by deliberate defense, and then complete their defeat by going over to the counteroffensive. The main efforts were concentrated in the regions north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of Soviet troops did not always withstand massive enemy attacks, which led to tragic consequences.

To this end, it was supposed to make the most of the advantages of the previously created multi-lane defense, to bleed the main tank groupings of the enemy, wear out his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air supremacy. Then, going over to a decisive counteroffensive, complete the rout of the enemy groupings in the region of the Kursk salient.

The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts were mainly involved in the defensive operation near Kursk. The headquarters of the Supreme Command understood that the transition to deliberate defense is associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd reserve, 24, 53, 66, 47, 46, 5th Guards Tank Army, 1st, 3rd and 4th Guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th Tank, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the districts of Kastorny, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossosh and Ostrogozhsk. The front's field command was located not far from Voronezh. In the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command, five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, and a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated. From April 10 to July, 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments entered the Central and Voronezh fronts. A total of 5635 guns, 3522 mortars, and 1284 aircraft were transferred to two fronts.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts and the Steppe Military District numbered 1,909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units (ACS), about 2.9 thousand . aircraft.

After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, it was planned to transfer the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy (plan "Kutuzov") was assigned to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel General VD Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General MM Popov) and the right wing of the Central Fronts. The offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (plan "Commander Rumyantsev") was planned to be carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (General of the Army R. Ya. Malinovsky). The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukova and A.M. Vasilevsky, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov, and aviation - to Air Marshal A.A. Novikov.

The troops of the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, including 8 defensive zones and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft defense with deep echeloning of battle formations and fortifications, with a well-developed system of strong points, trenches, communication routes and obstacles.

A state defense line was set up on the left bank of the Don. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front, and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. Each front had three army and three front-line defensive lines, equipped in engineering terms.

Both fronts had six armies each: the Central Front - 48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6, 7th guards, 38, 40, 69th combined arms and 1st tank. The width of the defense lines of the Central Front was 306 km, and of the Voronezh Front - 244 km. All combined-arms armies were located in the first echelon on the Central Front, and four combined-arms armies on the Voronezh front.

The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th combined arms army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the 13th Army's defensive zone from 56 to 32 km and bring its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational formation became two-echelon.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy's main attack. Therefore, the defense zone of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was she who defended in the direction of the main attack of the enemy's 4th Panzer Army) was 64 km. In the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division in its composition, the army commander was forced to form the army's troops in one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.

Thus, the depth of defense of the 6th Guards Army was initially less than the depth of the 13th Army's zone. Such an operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of the rifle corps, in an effort to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.

Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groups. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy strikes. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery of the High Command's reserve in battle, the assignment of artillery reinforcement regiments to the armies and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.

In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, on the proposed direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (taking into account the second echelon and front reserves). Moreover, in the zone of the 13th Army, where the tip of the attack of the main enemy forces was aimed, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was reinforced with the 4th Breakthrough Artillery Corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery mounts. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). Such a density of artillery was not found in any of the previous defensive operations.

Thus, the desire of the command of the Central Front to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, did not give the enemy the opportunity to break out of it, was clearly outlined, which significantly complicated the further struggle.

The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved in a slightly different way. Since the troops of the front were built in two echelons, the artillery was also distributed between the echelons. But even on this front, on the main axis, which constituted 47% of the entire front line of defense, where the 6th and 7th Guards armies were stationed, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density - 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. 67% of the front's guns and mortars and up to 66% of the RVGK artillery (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.

The command of the Central and Voronezh fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the overwhelming majority of anti-tank weapons, were on the Voronezh front. On the Central Front, more than one third of all artillery anti-tank weapons became part of the front's artillery anti-tank reserve, as a result, the commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky was able to quickly use his reserves to combat enemy tank groupings in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh Front, the bulk of the anti-tank artillery was transferred to the armies of the first echelon.

Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping at Kursk in personnel by 2.1, artillery by 2.5, tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.8, aircraft - by 1.4 times.

On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike groupings, weakened by the preemptive artillery counter-training of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 against the defenders in the Oryol-Kursk direction, and about 700 tanks and assault guns in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defensive zone of the 13th Army and the flanks of the 48th and 70th armies adjacent to it in a 45 km wide strip. The main blow was delivered by the enemy's northern grouping with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th army of General N.P. Pukhova. Four infantry divisions advanced against the right flank of the 13th and left flanks of the 48th Army (commanded by General P.L. Romanenko) at Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions struck on the right flank of the 70th army of General I.V. Galanin in the direction of Gnilets. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn battles ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, which did not expect to meet such a powerful rebuff, was forced to re-conduct an hour-long artillery training. In increasingly fierce battles, soldiers of all types of troops fought heroically.

But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly push forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, rifle formations, and field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, stepping up the actions of his aviation, also brought heavy tanks into battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.

Having met the stubborn resistance of the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought in almost all the formations of the shock group of Army Group Center into battle, but they could not break through the defenses. In seven days, they managed to advance only 10-12 km without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that the enemy did not conduct active offensive operations in other sectors of the defense zone of the Central Front troops.

After repelling enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive operations.

On the southern face of the Kursk salient, in the zone of the Voronezh front, the struggle was also extremely intense. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the outposts of the 6th Guards Army of General I.M. Chistyakov. By the end of the day, they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - on Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary hit on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod region to Korocha.

The German command sought to build on the success achieved by continuing to build up its efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to wedge into it about 9 km south-west of Prokhorovka. However, he did not manage to break out into the operational space.

On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to bring about a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, the auxiliary strike group struck at Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was brought up to the Prokhorovka direction, which included the elite divisions "Reich", "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler", as well as parts of the 3rd Panzer Corps.

Having discovered the enemy's maneuver, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin moved the 69th Army to this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. Back on July 9, she ordered the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev to move the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer to the subordination of General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army. The troops of the Voronezh Front were to disrupt the enemy's offensive, inflicting a powerful counterattack (five armies) on his grouping, which had wedged in on the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11, they failed to deliver a counterstrike. On this day, the enemy captured the line designated for the deployment of tank formations. Only by the introduction into battle of four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov managed to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, the oncoming battles of the vanguard detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.

On July 12, both opposing groupings went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovka direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle unfolded. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the north-west, formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies were attacking Yakovlevo. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. East of Belgorod, the attack was undertaken by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 launched an offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.

Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psel in the zone of defense of the 5th Guards Army launched an offensive tank division "Death's Head". However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which directly opposed the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, preparing them overnight for defense. In a rather narrow section from Berezovka (30 km north-west of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle between two tank strike groups took place. The battle lasted all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The struggle was extremely fierce. The losses of the Soviet tank corps were 73% and 46%, respectively.

As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk area, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to enter the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy's path to Kursk was closed. The motorized SS divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Reich" and "Death's Head" stopped their attacks and consolidated their positions. The 3rd German Panzer Corps, advancing on Prokhorovka from the south, was able to press the 69th Army's formations by 10-15 km that day. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

Despite the fact that the counterstrike of the Voronezh Front slowed down the enemy's advance, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy's strike group was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk, bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterstrike of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the Soviet counterstrike - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines that they occupied. During these 5-6 days (after July 12) there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.

On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received an order from the commander of the Voronezh Front to go over to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.

One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops struck at the most powerful grouping of the enemy, but not on the flank, but on the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the advantageous configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike under the base of the enemy penetration in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire group of German forces operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, the Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole did not yet have proper combat skills, and the military leaders did not yet possess the art of the offensive. The omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground troops with aviation, between formations and units also had an effect.

On the Prokhorovka field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army included 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 Churchill III heavy tanks with a 57-mm cannon, received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, but not a single SU-152. The Soviet medium tank had the ability with an armor-piercing projectile to penetrate 61 mm armor at a distance of 1000 m and 69 mm - at 500 m. Tank armor: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, tower - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. An armor-piercing projectile of his 75-mm cannon at a distance of up to 1500 m pierced armor of more than 63 mm. The German heavy tank T-VIH "tiger" with an 88-mm cannon had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, turret - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing round penetrated 115 mm of armor. He pierced the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to 2000 m.

Opposing the army, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy tanks "tiger" (88-mm cannon), dozens of high-speed (34 km / h) medium tanks "panther", modernized T-III and T-IV ( 75-mm cannon) and heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" (88-mm cannon). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to approach it by 500 m, which was not always possible; the rest of the Soviet tanks had to get even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. Fighting with the hope of success in such conditions could only be done in close combat. As a result, losses grew. At Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of the tanks (500 out of 800), and the German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). It was a disaster for them. For the Wehrmacht, such losses were difficult to replace.

The repulse of the most powerful strike by the troops of Army Group South was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of the formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, perseverance and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the military.

The Soviet counteroffensive began on July 12 with strikes from the northeast and east of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center, which were defending in the Oryol sector. On July 15, the troops of the Central Front attacked Kromy from the south and southeast.

Concentric strikes by the front forces broke through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense. Coming in converging directions to Oryol, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the approaches to Bryansk.

As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's Oryol grouping (defeated 15 divisions) and advanced to the west up to 150 km.

The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing retreating enemy troops, reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation by July 23, and launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction on August 3.

With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf operational group, and on August 5 they liberated Belgorod.

On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod. Developing the offensive and repelling strong enemy counterattacks in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, the troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov on August 23. In three weeks, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern directions and expanded the offensive front, which amounted to 300-400 km.

The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of the Second World War. On both sides, more than 4 million people were involved in it, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tank) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft ... The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could only attack in winter. The collapse of the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally consolidated their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy on the "Fire arc" became an important stage in achieving a fundamental turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.

As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of the actions of the American-British troops in Italy, the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany. Influenced by the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.

In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command creatively approached the planning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The peculiarity of the decision was that the side with strategic initiative and general superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single campaign process, following the defense, it was planned to launch a decisive counteroffensive and launch a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully resolved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counterpreparations on the scale of two fronts, by extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and by delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme Command skillfully determined the concept of conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. So, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by crushing and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break in of the strong and deep defense of the enemy, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the Kharkov defensive area of the enemy.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts that participated in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers constrained the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here their troops near Kursk).

The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional, insuperable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the front forces made it possible during a defensive battle to firmly hold the second and army lines of defense and front lines, preventing the enemy from breaking through into the operational depth. The broad maneuver of the second echelons and reserves, the conduct of artillery counterpreparations and the delivery of counterattacks gave high activity and great stability to the defense. During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved by decisively massing forces and assets in the areas of the breakthrough (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skilful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation. , which carried out an air offensive in full on the scale of the fronts, which to a large extent ensured the high rates of offensive of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in waging tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive while repelling counterattacks by large enemy armored groups (in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka). The problem of ensuring stable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing command posts closer to the combat formations of troops and by widely introducing radio equipment into all bodies and command posts.

At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were also significant shortcomings that adversely affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of Soviet troops, which amounted to: irrecoverable - 254 470 people, ambulances - 608 833 people. They were due in part to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy offensive, the development of the plan for artillery counterpreparations in the fronts had not been completed, tk. reconnaissance was unable to accurately identify the places of concentration of troops and the placement of targets on the night of 5 July. Counterpreparations began prematurely, when the enemy forces had not yet fully occupied the starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, the fire was carried out across areas, which allowed the enemy to avoid large losses, to bring the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day to wedge into the defenses of the Soviet troops by 3-6 km. Counterstrikes of the fronts were hastily prepared and were often launched against the enemy who had not exhausted their offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the transition of the counterattacking troops to the defensive. During the Oryol operation, excessive haste was allowed in the transition to the offensive, not due to the situation.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the rank of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachevsky.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the German fascist invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command was preparing an offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I decided, as soon as the weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." The swift tanks "tigers" and "panthers", super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The Military Council of the Front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two twenty minutes, silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until 23 August.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into a defeat for the Hitlerite groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead - crushing blows using surprise at the forces of the Soviet Army, their encirclement and destruction. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Kursk battle

The actions of the Army Group Center and the Operational Group Kempf of the Army South, which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were supposed to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulsion of the blow from the direction of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from the side of Belgorod.

The steppe front, as part of the rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field under the Prokhorovka railway station took place the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand casualties. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovskoye field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, launching Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From 16 to 18 July, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk triangle and began pursuing it with the support of the air forces. The combined forces of the Hitlerite units were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk

An unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key in the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the 1943 campaign plans;
As a result of the implementation of the "Kutuzov" plan and the "Commander Rumyantsev" operation, units of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads were liquidated;
The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance westward, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Kursk battle

The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Hitlerite company against the Soviet Union;
A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and the whole as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

A dilapidated dugout somewhere not far away

We came to our youth on the frontiers,

Bow to the unwavering Kursk Bulge! "

Kim Dobkin

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the way to victory in the Great Patriotic War. In terms of scope, tension and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. More than 4 million people, more than 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. On the part of the Wehrmacht, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. "If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk presented it with a catastrophe."

The purpose of my work is to determine the significance of the Battle of Kursk in the Great Patriotic War.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set:

study the history of the Battle of Kursk;

determine the significance of the Battle of Kursk.

THE HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF KURS

Started on July 5, 1943. The Soviet command opposed the offensive of the German fascist troops against the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient with a solid active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to drive a wedge into the defenses of the Soviet troops for 10 - 12 km. The grouping, advancing on Kursk from the south, advanced 35 km, but did not reach the target.

On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by massive strikes by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 threw the enemy back to the west by 140 - 150 km, liberated Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metalworker, a designer, an engineer, a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, a sapper. The soldier's feat of arms merged with the selfless work of the home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much merit in the defeat of the German fascist troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF KURS

First, the Hitlerite army suffered a severe defeat,

huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilization. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state to defeat the aggressor on its own. Irreparable damage was done to the prestige of German weapons. Thirty German divisions were defeated. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, together with Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the pilots of the French squadron "Normandy" fought selflessly, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles. The most heavy losses were suffered by enemy tank forces. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht's tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... The initiative finally passed to the Russians. "

Secondly, in the battle of Kursk, the enemy's attempt to return

lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad.

The offensive strategy of the German troops suffered a complete collapse. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical change in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Hitlerite command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go over to the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of World War II, are trying in every possible way to diminish the significance of the Red Army's victory at Kursk. Some of them argue that the Battle of the Kursk Bulge is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of World War II, others in their voluminous writings either simply keep silent about the Battle of Kursk, or talk about it sparingly and unintelligibly, other falsifiers are trying to prove that the German The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler's “miscalculations” and “fatal decisions”, due to his unwillingness to listen to the opinion of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in contradiction with the facts. The inconsistency of such statements was admitted by the German generals and field marshals themselves. "Operation Citadel was the last attempt to preserve our initiative in the east," admits the former Hitlerite Field Marshal, commander of Army Group South, E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this respect, the Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. "

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of the Soviet military

art. During the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of the Hitlerite army. The Battle of Kursk enriched the domestic military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply echeloned, active, sustainable defense, conducting flexible and decisive maneuvers of forces and means during defensive and offensive operations.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the 1943 summer-autumn campaign. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side, possessing strategic initiative and general superiority in forces, went over to the defense, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single campaign process, following the defense, it was planned to go over to a decisive counteroffensive and deploy a general offensive. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully resolved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counterpreparations on the scale of two fronts, by extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and by delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme Command skillfully determined the concept of conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. So, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by crushing and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break in of the strong and deep defense of the enemy, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the Kharkov defensive area of the enemy.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional, insuperable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved by decisively massing forces and assets in the areas of the breakthrough (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skilful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation. , which carried out an air offensive in full on the scale of the fronts, which to a large extent ensured the high rates of offensive of the ground forces. A valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive while repelling counterattacks by large enemy armored groups.

The successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans. Striking at the rear of the enemy, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out about 1,500 raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1,000 steam locomotives and defeated over 400 military echelons.

Fourth, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Kursk

the battle was of great military-political and international importance. He significantly increased the role and international authority of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that by the power of Soviet weapons, fascist Germany was faced with an inevitable defeat. The sympathies of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for a speedy liberation were strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of groups of fighters of the Resistance movement in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway intensified, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifth, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had

deep impact on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops, faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence over its allies, the divisions within the fascist bloc increased, which later led to a political and military crisis. The beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army at Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go over to the defensive in all the theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, the

cooperation of the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. She had a great influence on the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran conference was held, at which the leaders of the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain, I.V. Stalin; F. D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government W. Churchill noted: "Three huge battles - for Kursk, Oryol and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front."

In this battle, the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht finally failed, its attempt to wrest the strategic initiative and turn the course of the war in its favor failed. The Soviet command fully secured the strategic initiative and did not let it slip until the end of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces and means drastically changed in favor of the Soviet Army. The armed forces of Nazi Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of the Second World War.

Conclusion

The victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military-economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured the victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In the fierce battle, such mighty sources of the victories of the Soviet people and its army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, faith in their own strengths and success were manifested with all their might. Soviet fighters and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, fortitude and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the rank of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Orlov, Belgorod, Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by decrees of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory ".

LIST OF USED LITERATURE

History of military art: A textbook for higher military educational institutions. Under total. ed. I.Kh.Bagramyan. M., Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1970.

Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Events. People. Documents: Brief history. Directory. Under total. ed. O.A. Rzheshevsky. Compiled by E.K. Zhigunov. M .: Politizdat, 1990.

USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. (Brief Chronicle). Ed. S.M. Klyatskin and A.M. Sinitsyna. M., Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1970

http :// www Kursk battle was laid down precisely at the stage ... there was almost no German army. Kursk battle was won on operational maps ...

Kursk battle (10)
Abstract >> History
Fascist invaders. Relevance of the issue. Kursk battle- one of the grandiose ... explained the military and political significance Kursk battles... All party political work .... 3. Conclusion. As a result Kursk battles the last attempt at German was thwarted ...
Kursk battle (8)
Abstract >> Historical figures
Belgorod and Kharkov. 4 Wehrmacht lost in Kursk battle 30 selected divisions, including ... ground troops. Conclusion. Battle under Kursk was the main event of the summer-autumn ... war in favor of the USSR. Battle under Kursk forced the fascist German command ...
Kursk battle- radical fracture during the Second World War
Abstract >> History
3.3) COUNTER OFFENSIVE OF SOVIET FORCES UNDER KURSK……………… .. 3.4) HEROES KURSKY BATTLES……………………………………………………………………… Error: cross-reference source ... Belgorod-Kharkiv. August 23 Kursk battle ended. After Kursk battles increased power and glory ...

History is always written by the winners, exaggerating their own importance and sometimes belittling the dignity of the enemy. Much has been written and said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk for all mankind. This great epic battle was another bitter lesson that claimed the lives of many people. And it will be a great blasphemy for future generations not to draw the right conclusions from those past events.

General situation on the eve of the General battle

By the spring of 1943, the Kursk salient that had formed did more than just interfere with normal rail traffic between the German Army groups "Center" and "South". An ambitious plan to encircle 8 Soviet armies was associated with him. Until now, the Hitlerites have not carried out anything of the kind, even in a more favorable period for them. According to some historians, the deliberately unrealistic plan was rather an act of despair. Allegedly, Hitler was most afraid of the Allied landings in Italy, so with such measures his army tried to protect itself in the East, having finished with the Soviets.

This point of view does not stand up to scrutiny. The significance of the Stalingrad and Kursk battles lies in the fact that it was in these military theaters that crushing blows were inflicted on the well-coordinated military machine of the Wehrmacht. The long-awaited initiative fell into the hands of the Soviet troops. After these great historical events, the wounded fascist beast was dangerous and snapped, but even he himself understood that he was dying.

Preparing for the decisive moment

One of the key aspects in the meaning of the battle is the determination with which the Soviet soldiers were ready to demonstrate to the enemy that two terrible years were not in vain for them. This does not mean that the Red Army was reborn at one fine moment, having solved all its old problems. There were still enough of them. This was primarily due to the low qualifications of military personnel. The personnel shortage was irreplaceable. To survive, I had to come up with new approaches to solving problems.

One of such examples is the organization of anti-tank strongpoints (PTOP). Previously, anti-tank guns were lined up in one line, but experience has shown that it is more effective to concentrate them in a kind of well-fortified islets. Each PTOP gun had several positions for firing in all directions. Each of these strongholds was located at a distance of 600-800 meters from each other. If enemy tanks tried to drive a wedge and pass between such "islets", they would inevitably fall under cross-fire artillery. And on the side, the tank armor is weaker.

How this would work in a real combat situation was to be found out during the Battle of Kursk. The importance of artillery and aviation, which the Soviet command paid close attention to, can hardly be overestimated due to the emergence of a new factor, on which Hitler pinned great hopes. We are talking about the emergence of new tanks.

In the spring of 1943, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, reporting to Stalin on the state of affairs, noticed that the Soviet troops did not have weapons capable of effectively fighting the new enemy tanks. It was necessary to urgently take measures to eliminate the backlog in this area, and in the shortest possible time. By order of the State Defense Committee, production of 57-mm anti-tank guns was resumed. A feverish modernization of the already existing armor-piercing shells was also carried out.

However, all these measures were ineffective due to the lack of time and necessary materials. A new PTAB bomb entered service with aviation. Weighing only 1.5 kg, it was capable of hitting 100 mm upper armor. These "gifts for the Fritzes" were loaded into a container of 48 pieces. The Il-2 attack aircraft could take on board 4 such containers.

Finally, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed in especially important areas. They were carefully camouflaged, with orders not to fire on enemy aircraft in any way.

From the measures described above, it is clear what importance the Soviet soldiers attached to the Battle of Kursk. In the most difficult moment, the determination to win and natural ingenuity came to the rescue. But this was not enough, and the price, as always, was huge human losses.

The course of the battle

A lot of conflicting information and various myths created for propaganda purposes do not allow us to put a final point on this issue. History has long brought to the judgment of descendants the results and significance of the Battle of Kursk. But all the new details revealed once again make one marvel at the courage of the soldiers who won in this hell.

The grouping of the "genius of defense" Model launched an offensive in the north of the Kursk salient. Natural conditions limited the room for maneuver. The only possible place for the appearance of the Germans was a section of the front 90 km wide. This advantage was competently disposed of by the Red Army under the command of Konev. The Ponyri railway station became a "fire sack" in which the advance units of the fascist troops fell.

The Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of "flirting guns". When enemy tanks appeared, they began to hit with direct fire, thereby chaining fire on themselves. The Germans rushed towards them at full speed to destroy, and came under fire from other disguised Soviet anti-tank guns. The side armor of tanks is not as massive as the frontal armor. At a distance of 200-300 meters, Soviet cannons could completely destroy armored vehicles. At the end of Day 5, Model's attack in the north of the ledge collapsed.

The southern direction under the command of one of the best commanders of the twentieth century, Heinrich von Manstein, had a better chance of success. There was nothing to limit the room for maneuver. To this must be added high training and professionalism. 2 out of 3 lines of Soviet troops were broken through. From the operational report for July 10, 1943, it followed that the retreating Soviet units were pursued closely by German troops. For this reason, there was no way to block the road going from Teterevino to Ivanovsky settlement with anti-tank mines.

Battle of Prokhorovka

To cool the ardor of the presumptuous Manstein, the reserves of the Steppe Front were urgently involved. But by this time, only a miracle did not allow the Germans to break through the 3rd defense line at Prokhorovka. They were greatly hampered by the threat from the flank. Exercising caution, they waited for the SS Death's Head to cross over to the other side and destroy the gunners.

At this moment, Rotmistrov's tanks, which were timely warned by the German aviation, approached Prokhorovka, assessed the future battlefield. They were to advance in a narrow corridor between the Psel River and the railroad tracks. The task was complicated by an impassable ravine, and in order to go around it, it was necessary to line up at the back of each other's heads. Thus, they became a convenient target.

Going to certain death, at the cost of incredible efforts and colossal sacrifices, they stopped the German breakthrough. Prokhorovka and its importance in the Battle of Kursk are assessed as the culmination of this general battle, after which large-scale attacks of such a scale were not undertaken by the Germans.

The ghost of Stalingrad

The result of the operation "Kutuzov", which began with an offensive in the rear of Model's group, was the liberation of Belgorod and Orel. This good news was marked by the roar of guns in Moscow, saluting in honor of the winners. And on August 22, 1943, Manstein, violating Hitler's hysterical order to keep Kharkov, left the city. Thus, he completed a series of battles for the rebellious Kursk salient.

If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Kursk, then here we can recall the words of the German commander Guderian. In his memoirs, he said that with the failure of Operation Citadel on the Eastern Front, calm days disappeared. And in this one cannot but agree with him.