The Franco-Prussian War was a cause for war. War between France and Prussia for hegemony in continental Europe
Franco-Prussian War
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, a war between France, on the one hand, and Prussia and other states of the North German Confederation and Southern Germany (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt) on the other.
Goals of the parties
Prussia sought to complete the unification of Germany under its hegemony, weaken France and its influence in Europe, and France, in turn, to maintain predominant influence on the European continent, seize the left bank of the Rhine, delay the unification (prevent the unification) of Germany, and prevent the strengthening of Prussia’s position , and also prevent the growing crisis of the Second Empire through a victorious war.
Bismarck, who already considered a war with France inevitable since 1866, was looking only for a favorable reason to enter into it: he wanted France, and not Prussia, to be the aggressive party that declared war. Bismarck understood that to unite Germany under Prussian leadership, an external impulse was needed that could ignite a national movement. The creation of a powerful centralized state was Bismarck's main goal.
Reason for war
The reason for the war was a diplomatic conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of the Prussian King William, to the vacant royal throne in Spain. These events caused deep discontent and protest on the part of Napoleon III, since the French could not allow the same Hohenzollern dynasty to rule in both Prussia and Spain, creating a danger to the French Empire on both sides.
On July 13, 1870, Prussian Chancellor O. Bismarck, trying to provoke France into declaring war, deliberately distorted the text of the recording of the conversation between the King of Prussia (William I) and the French ambassador (Benedetti), giving the document an insulting character for France (Ems Dispatch). However, at the end of this meeting, William I immediately tried to bring to the attention of both Leopold himself and his father, Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, that it would be desirable to renounce the Spanish throne. Which was done.
But the French government was eager for war and on July 15 it began conscripting reservists into the army. On July 16, mobilization began in Germany. On July 19, the government of Napoleon III officially declared war on Prussia. Bismarck's diplomacy, taking advantage of the miscalculations of French foreign policy, ensured the neutrality of the European powers - Russia, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, which was beneficial to Prussia. The war began in an unfavorable situation for France, due to diplomatic isolation and the absence of allies.
Ready for war
Entering the war, Napoleon III hoped to isolate the North German Confederation from the South German states with a rapid invasion of the French army into German territory before the completion of mobilization in Prussia, and thus ensure at least the neutrality of these states. The French government was confident that, having gained a military advantage at the very beginning of the campaign, after the first victories over Prussia it would gain allies in the form of Austria, and possibly Italy.
The Prussian command had a carefully developed campaign plan, the author of which was Field Marshal Moltke. The French army, weakened by the colonial wars and corruption reigning at all levels of the state apparatus, was not ready for war. After mobilization, the French army in the metropolis as of August 1 numbered just over 500 thousand people, including 262 thousand in the active Rhine Army (275 thousand by August 6). The German states mobilized over 1 million people, including over 690 thousand in the field troops.
The French army was inferior to the Germans. in terms of quantity and quality of artillery weapons. German steel rifled guns with a firing range of up to 3.5 km far surpassed French bronze guns in their combat qualities. In infantry armament, the advantage was on the side of the French (!). Franz. rifled needle gun system Chaspo was better than Prussian guns Draize. German ground forces states were superior to the French army in terms of organization and level of combat training of personnel. The French Navy was stronger than the Prussian Navy, but did not influence the course of the war.
Progress of military operations. First stage
From the very beginning, military operations developed extremely unsuccessfully for France. When Napoleon III, who declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces, arrived at the fortress of Metz (Lorraine) to cross the border the next day in accordance with the campaign plan, he found here only 100 thousand soldiers, poorly provided with equipment and provisions. And when the first serious clashes between the two warring parties took place on August 4 at Werth, Forbach, and Spichern, his army was forced to take a defensive position, which further worsened its position.
On August 14 they imposed on the units Army of the Rhine battle near the village of Borni. It did not bring victory to either side, but delayed the crossing of the French troops across the Moselle for a whole day, which had dire consequences for them - the Prussian command had the opportunity to involve the French in two new bloody battles - on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour - Resonville and August 18 at Gravlot - Saint-Privat. These battles, despite the heroism and courage shown by the French soldiers, determined the further fate of the Army of the Rhine - retreat and waiting for the moment of its complete defeat. The main culprit for this can be considered Bazina, which left the troops without the necessary leadership and reinforcements. Showing complete inactivity, he brought matters to the point that the army under his command was cut off from communications with Paris and blocked at the Metz fortress by a 150,000-strong Prussian army.
On August 23, a French army of 120 thousand men under the command of the marshal, hastily formed at Chalons, went to the aid of Bazin’s army. McMahon, without any clearly thought out strategic plan. The situation was also complicated by the fact that the advance of the French troops was extremely slow due to forced deviations from the main road in search of food.
The Prussians, advancing the bulk of their troops to the northeast at a much greater speed than MacMahon, captured the crossing of the Meuse River. On August 30, they attacked MacMahon's army near Beaumont and defeated it. The French were driven back to the surrounding area Sedana, where the emperor's headquarters was located. The 5th and 11th Prussian corps bypassed the French left flank and reached the vicinity of Sedan, closing the encirclement ring. Surrounded and disorganized, French troops concentrated in the fortress. He also took refuge there Napoleon III.
Sedan
On the morning of September 1, the Prussian army, without allowing the French to come to their senses, began the battle of Sedan (at that time it numbered 245 thousand people with 813 guns). She attacked the French division defending a village on the left bank of the Meuse. On the right bank, the Prussians managed to occupy the village of La Monselle. At 6 o'clock in the morning McMahon was wounded. The command was taken first by General Ducrot, and then by General Wimpfen. The first planned to break through the encirclement through Mezyar, and the second through Carignan. The road to Carignan was completely cut off, and it was too late to break through to Maizières, and the French army was forced to lay down its arms. By order of the emperor, a white flag was also raised on the central fortress tower of Sedan. The next day, September 2, the act of surrender of the French army was signed.
In the Battle of Sedan, French losses amounted to 3 thousand killed, 14 thousand wounded, 84 thousand prisoners (of which 63 thousand surrendered in the Sedan fortress). Another 3 thousand soldiers and officers were interned in Belgium. The Prussians and their allies lost 9 thousand people killed and wounded. More than 100 thousand captured French soldiers, officers, generals led by Napoleon III, 17 thousand killed and wounded, 3 thousand disarmed on the Belgian border, over 500 guns surrendered.
The Sedan disaster served as an impetus for the revolution on September 4, 1870. The Second Empire fell. France was proclaimed a republic. A government of bourgeois republicans and Orléanists, led by General L. J. Trochu (“government of national defense”) came to power.
Second stage of the war
Since September 1870 the nature of the war has changed. It became fair, liberating on the part of France and aggressive on the part of Germany, which sought to secede Alsace and Lorraine from France. To guide France's war efforts, the so-called government delegation to Tours (then to Bordeaux); from October 9 it was headed by L. Gambetta. Thanks to the active participation of the people in the defense of the country, the Turkish delegation managed to form 11 new corps with a total number of 220 thousand people in a short time. from reservists and mobiles (untrained army reserve).
The strategic position of France was difficult, the 3rd German. the army moved through Reims - Epernay to Paris; to the north, through Laon-Soissons, the Meuse army was advancing. On September 19, Paris was surrounded. There were about 80 thousand regular troops and about 450 thousand national guards and mobiles in the city. The defense of Paris relied on the bastions of the ramparts and 16 forts. The German command did not have sufficient forces for the assault and limited itself to a blockade.
Garrisons of many French. fortresses remaining in the German rear. troops continued to resist. South of Orleans was created Loire Army, in the Amiens area – Northern Army and in the upper Loire - Eastern Army. In the occupied territory of France, a guerrilla struggle of franc-tireurs (free riflemen) began (up to 50 thousand people). However, the operations of the newly created French armies were carried out without sufficient preparation and were not coordinated with the actions of the Paris garrison and between themselves and did not lead to decisive results. The surrender of Marshal Bazaine, who surrendered a large army in Metz on October 27 without a fight, freed up significant enemy forces.
At the end of November, German troops pushed the Northern Army back from Amiens to Arras, and in January 1871 they defeated it at Saint-Quentin. In early November, the Loire Army carried out a successful attack on Orleans, but in early December and January 1871 it was defeated. In November, the Eastern Army launched an offensive from Besançon to the east, but in January 1871 it was defeated west of Belfort and retreated to Besançon, and then part of it retreated to Swiss territory and was interned. Attempts by the Parisian garrison to break through the blockade ring also ended in failure. In general, the “government of national defense” was unable to organize an effective rebuff to the enemy. Attempts to find support and assistance abroad were unsuccessful. Passivity and indecisive action contributed to the further defeat of France.
On January 18, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles. The Prussian king became Emperor of Germany.
End of the war. Truce and peace
The capitulation of Paris took place on January 28, 1871. The Trochu-Favre government fully accepted the difficult and humiliating demands of the winner for France: payment of 200 million francs indemnity within two weeks, surrender of most of the Parisian forts, field guns of the Parisian garrison and other means of resistance.
On February 26, a preliminary peace treaty was signed at Versailles. On March 1, German troops entered Paris and occupied part of the city. After receiving news of the ratification (March 1) of the preliminary treaty by the French National Assembly, they were withdrawn from the French capital on March 3.
The government's anti-people policy and the sharp deterioration in the situation of the working people led to a revolutionary explosion. On March 18, a popular uprising won in Paris (Paris Commune, massacres, Sacré-Coeur). In the fight against the Paris Commune, the German occupiers assisted the counter-revolutionary Versailles government (from February 1871 it was headed by A. Thiers). On May 28, the Commune fell, drowned in blood.
According to the Peace of Frankfurt 1871 (the agreement was signed on May 10), France transferred Alsace and the north-eastern part of Lorraine to Germany and pledged to pay 5 billion francs. indemnity (until March 2, 1874), until payment of which Germans were located in part of the country. occupation forces. The French government assumed all costs of maintaining the German occupation forces.
Conclusion
No one in Europe had any illusions about the durability of the peace treaty concluded in Frankfurt am Main. Germany understood that the results of the war would only lead to increased Fraco-German antagonism. France suffered not only a military defeat, but also a national insult. Revanchism was to capture the minds of many subsequent generations of the French. Having won the war, Germany achieved:
A) unification, transformation into a strong centralized state,
B) weakening France as much as possible in order to gain the strategic advantages necessary for success in the inevitable future war.
Alsace and Lorraine gave Germany more than just economic benefits. Thus, Alsace was of great defensive importance for Germany, because the offensive from France was now complicated by the chain of the Vosges Mountains. And Lorraine provided a springboard for an attack on France and access to Paris.
The Franco-Prussian War influenced not only the further development of relations between France and Germany, but also the entire course of history. Relative stability in Europe until 1871 was ensured by the fact that in the center of the European continent there was one strong state - France, which was surrounded by weak and small states acting as a “buffer”. This prevented the clash of interests of large states that did not have common borders. After the end of the war of 1871, France found itself surrounded by 2 warlike states that completed the unification (Germany and Italy).
One of the most important results of the war was the national unification of Germany. At the same time, the national unification of another country, Italy, ended. If earlier there was a buffer between the great powers of the continent, somewhat softening the contact between the great powers, now there was none. Instead, two new states emerged that wanted to establish themselves in the world.
The hostility between France and Germany grew to unprecedented proportions.
The growth of hostility was affected not only by the war and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine by France. France found itself economically and militarily weakened. As a result of the Franco-Prussian War, industrial production in France sharply declined, the export of finished goods, and the import of raw materials, machinery and coal decreased. French finances were in such a deplorable state that, at the request of Thiers, the report compiled for the National Assembly was kept strictly secret for some time. Production was disorganized, the railways were clogged with military trains. By the time hostilities ceased, the French army virtually did not exist as an independent military force. During the war, France lost 1835 field guns and 5373 fortress guns. The human losses were enormous at that time: 756,414 soldiers (of which about half a million were prisoners), about 300 thousand civilians died Obolenskaya S.V. Bismarck's politics and the struggle of parties in Germany in the 70s of the XIX century. / S.V. Obolenskaya. - M., 1992. Pp. 220.
Even after the signing of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty, in the years 1871-1875, Franco-German relations were just a truce. Already on September 13, 1870, Bismarck wrote from Reims about the possibility of a new war in the near future, formulating false accusations against France, which at that time was forced to pursue only a defensive policy in Europe.
Weighing the chances of success of a new aggression immediately after the signing of the peace treaty, German government circles thought only about completely defeating France and permanently erasing it from the map of Europe as a significant political and military force. Throughout 1871, German diplomacy used every opportunity, even the slightest, for new anti-French provocations. Gorchakov’s report to the Tsar noted that Franco-German relations in 1871 remained extremely tense due to the fact that German representatives endlessly delayed negotiations in Frankfurt on minor issues not covered in the peace treaty.
Many foreign representatives in Berlin argued that Bismarck feared that France would recover too quickly, despite the devastation that resulted from its defeat. Therefore, already from 1871, he developed active anti-French diplomatic activity. He sought to completely isolate France in foreign policy, to deprive it of possible allies in the future, entering into close friendly relations with them and trying to use them in his fight against France. In 1873, an alliance of three emperors (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary) was concluded. The parties assumed the obligation to reach an agreement in the event of disagreements on specific issues. If one of the parties is attacked by any power not participating in the treaty, the remaining parties must agree with each other on a “joint line of conduct.” The agreement was non-specific and vague. The first complications in the international situation showed its inconsistency. Thus, during the anti-French campaign of 1874, organized by the German ruling circles, Russia, together with Austria-Hungary, supported France Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe 1814-1878.-t. 2 - Rostov-on-Don, 1995. - p. 107.
Thus, Bismarck’s policy towards France after the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty not only did not contribute to the establishment of a strong and lasting peace between the two countries, but, on the contrary, pursued the goal of preparing for a new war, for a new defeat of France.
After the war, France was no longer able to resist Germany’s aggressive plans on its own. In the first half of the 70s of the last century, France needed reliable friends not to jointly wage a revanchist war, but to help protect the country’s security from a new German attack. This opinion was held with rare unanimity by representatives of various French political parties. The French ruling circles were well aware of the fact that “France needed peace in the coming years: the country was too weakened to start a war again. Not only Jules Favre, Thiers and their supporters, but also their opponents considered a new war with Germany in the 70s completely impossible for a weakened France.
The task of eliminating France's foreign policy isolation in Europe and rapprochement with one or more European states to combat Germany's aggressive plans was put forward in 1871-1875. to the forefront of French foreign policy.
After the conclusion of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty from England, French diplomacy could not receive energetic help and assistance in its primary issue - protecting the country's security. The French government considered an alliance with England unprofitable, based, first of all, on the fact that it did not have a strong land army, which, in the event of a new Franco-German conflict, could have a serious influence on the course of events and prevent an armed conflict. Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe 1814-1878.-t. 2.- Rostov-on-Don, 1995.- p.110.
On the part of England itself, there was also no particular desire to enter into an alliance with France, since until the beginning of the 20th century, the British ruling circles stubbornly followed the policy of the so-called “brilliant isolation.” British diplomacy hoped to use the struggle on the European continent only to strengthen and expand its colonial empire, without caring about the interests of France.
France could not count on rapprochement with Austria-Hungary, where in October 1871 a government of German liberals came to power, standing for close friendship with Germany. Paris also took into account the strengthening of Austro-German relations as a result of the meetings in Gastein, Salzburg and Ischl, which took place during 1871, and feared Bismarck's intention to drag Austria-Hungary into his anti-French policy.
Of the large European states, Russia remained. Indeed, after the Franco-Prussian War, only from Russia could France receive serious help and support in the fight against the real threat of a new German attack. The path of rapprochement with Russia was in 1871-1875. the only path that French diplomacy could and did take in search of help and support in Europe.
French diplomacy took into account the first symptoms of the emergence of Russian-German contradictions, while friendly ties between Russia and France after the Frankfurt Peace tended to become increasingly stronger.
Thus, just a few months after the signing of the Frankfurt Peace, the first elements of friendly Russian-French diplomatic contact, which had existed in 1871-1875, arose. of utmost importance for France. Already on May 27, 1871, in a conversation with Gabriak, the Russian Tsar stated that he had only one desire - “to establish the best relations with France.”
The “Russian course” of French foreign policy after the signing of peace was based on the expectation that the ruling circles of Russia would not allow a new defeat of France and, consequently, the further strengthening of Germany.
And indeed, on the one hand, the weakening of France and its international influence, on the other, the emergence of the German Empire, the significant military, economic and foreign policy strengthening of Germany caused serious concern and alarm among the Russian ruling circles in connection with the consequences that these changes in the situation in Europe could have in the future for Russia.
Already in 1871, Gorchakov wrote with alarm about the danger posed to Russia by the too great weakening of France and the excessive power of Germany. Therefore, the Russian chancellor spoke, first of all, about the need to restore the European balance, disrupted in favor of Germany. History of diplomacy.-vol.1 / ed. V.A. Zorina. - M., 1964. p.732. From the new situation created in Europe after the war of 1870-1871, St. Petersburg concluded that it was necessary to prevent the further weakening of France and thwart Bismarck’s attempts to provoke new Franco-German conflicts.
Thus, after the war of 1870-1871, Germany managed to upset the balance of power in Europe. The prerequisites for the creation of two powerful coalitions arose: pro-German countries and France-Russia. The Triple Entente Alliance does not yet exist, but their appearance can already be predicted. Therefore, it is fair to say that the Frankfurt Peace was an act of great historical significance - the first seeds of the war of 1914-1918 were laid in it.
The French Emperor Napoleon III Bonaparte sought to prevent the unification of Germany under the scepter of the Prussian King William I of Hohenzollern. The Prussian king and his chancellor, Prince Otto Bismarck, aimed not only to complete the process of unification of Germany, but also to take away the border provinces with a German-speaking population from the Faction.
The reason for the outbreak of war was the dispute over the candidacy for the Spanish throne. A distant relative of Wilhelm, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, was invited to this throne. Napoleon was sharply against this candidacy, fearing that Spain would eventually become an ally of Prussia. He got Prince Leopold to refuse the tempting offer, and demanded that the Prussian king confirm this refusal.
The Prussian army was better prepared for war than the French and outnumbered the potential enemy. Therefore, Bismarck sought to provoke the outbreak of war as soon as possible. Wilhelm's telegram, where he confirmed Leopold's refusal, was changed by the Prussian chancellor upon publication in such a way that it acquired an insulting meaning to the French side. The outraged Napoleon declared war on Prussia on July 14, 1870.
The armies of the North German Confederation, led by Prussia, as well as the troops of the southern German states - Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg - fought on the side of Prussia. The French troops were one and a half times inferior to the enemy in numbers and even more so in the level of combat training.
The army of the French Marshal Bazin was blocked in the Metz fortress. On August 23, the newly formed 120,000-strong army of another marshal, P. McMahon, moved to her aid. At Beaumont on August 30, McMahon's troops encountered Masca and the enemy's 3rd German armies and were defeated. The French retreated across the Meuse to the Sedan fortress.
On September 1, the battle of Sedan began, as did Cannes, which became a symbol of the successful encirclement of the troops of one of the sides - McMahon had 120 thousand people and 419 guns. The Prussian troops opposing him, commanded by General G. von Moltke, numbered 245 thousand people with 813 guns. The French were deprived of escape routes. The path to Carignan was blocked by the Meuse Army, and to Mezières by the 3rd German Army. A retreat to Belgium through the Illy would have led to McMahon’s capitulation to the Belgian army, which had taken up positions on the border on August 31st.
On September 1, the Bavarian corps attacked the French division defending the village of Bazeilles on the left bank of the Meuse. On the right bank, the Prussians managed to occupy the village of La Monel. Here at 6 o'clock in the morning MacMahon was wounded. He handed over command to General Ducrot. He, seeing the threat of encirclement, ordered the main forces to retreat to Mezières, not knowing that it was there that the Prussian army was waiting for them. This withdrawal was stopped by the commander of the 5th Corps, General Wimpfen, who demanded that command be transferred to him as a senior commander. Ducrot complied.
Wimpfen decided that a breakthrough to Carignan would give a better chance of success. To do this, it was necessary to push the Bavarians away from Bazey, and then defeat the enemy’s right wing. However, the French offensive was stopped by superior forces of German troops. At noon, the 12th Saxon and Guards Corps occupied the valley of the Zhivoy stream and, having installed artillery on the left slope of the Zhivoy ravine, began to fire at the French troops on the eastern slope and in the Garen forest. The road to Carignan was completely cut off, but it was too late to break through to Maizières.
The 5th and 11th Prussian corps bypassed the French left flank and reached the vicinity of Sedan, closing the encirclement ring. MacMahon's army was subjected to brutal crossfire and suffered heavy losses. After several unsuccessful breakthrough attempts by infantry and cavalry. French troops in the Garen Forest laid down their arms. The Sedan fortress, where Napoleon was located, also surrendered. The next day, September 2, the French emperor signed the surrender.
Source - B.V. Sokolov, “100 Great Wars”, M., Veche, 2001.
From the book "History of Military Art"
The opponent of the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia was not only Austria, but also France, who sought to preserve fragmented Germany in order to dominate the continent of Europe.
The state of the armed forces of France and Prussia. Plans of the parties.
Prussian troops were divided into field (active, or standing, army and reserve), reserve and garrison, recruited from the Landwehr (militia). In total, there were over 944 thousand people in wartime states. By the beginning of the war with France, all Prussian infantry were armed with needle guns, and artillery with steel guns. However, Prussian troops. began the war with France, trained according to the outdated regulations of 1847. The new regulations were approved in August 1870, when hostilities had already begun and it was too late to retrain the troops.After the start of the war, instructions were sent out, which ordered the line infantry to use company columns as the main formation when attacking. This battle formation still led to heavy losses.
The French ground forces consisted of active (standing) troops, reserves and the national guard. According to the wartime states, these troops numbered approximately 770 thousand people. The French infantry were armed with the Chassepot needle gun, which was loaded from the breech. This gun was 2.5 times superior to Dreyse's gun in terms of firing range (1500 m). But the Germans had a significant superiority in artillery. French bronze cannons of the La Guitta system were muzzle loaded and fired at a distance of only about 2.8 km. Linear reluctance was trained to act when attacking in company columns.
The active French troops were united into one Army of the Rhine.
The main idea of the Prussian plan was to defeat the main group of French troops with superior forces, throw their remnants north, to the Belgian border, and move on to Paris.
The mobilization of the Prussian army began on July 16. In 18 days, an army of more than a million (including the South German states) was brought under arms, and during the same time almost half a million people were transported by rail to the French border.
The active troops were divided into three armies: the 1st and 2nd armies were supposed to invade Lorraine, and the 3rd Armenian - Alsace.
Periods of war. The first period lasted from the beginning of the war until the surrender of French troops led by Napoleon III at Sedan. During this period, “the war of 1870-1871,” wrote V.I. Lenin, was historically progressive on the part of Germany, until Napoleon III was defeated, for he, together with the tsar, oppressed Germany for many years, maintaining feudal fragmentation in it . And as soon as the war turned into the robbery of France (annexation of Alsace and Lorraine), Marx and Engels decisively condemned the Germans.” ,
In the second period (from Sedan to the capitulation of Paris), the war on the part of Germany became aggressive and unfair.
First period. In the first battles with the German army, in the battle on August 6 of the 3rd Prussian Army with the French Alsatian Army, the advantage of the French Chassepot gun over the Prussian Dreyse gun was revealed. However, the fire of the Prussian steel cannons was more destructive for the French infantry. 25-barreled mitrailleuses (shotguns) - the predecessors of machine guns - turned out to be a strong defensive weapon in the hands of the French. Mitrailleuses had a rate of fire of up to 250 rounds per minute, fired effectively at a distance of up to 1500 m, were mounted on carriages and moved by horse harness. Shortcomings in the tactics of the warring parties were also revealed. The German attacks were carried out in close formations, which, due to the enormous increase in fire, led to heavy losses. The Prussian command piled up large masses of troops in front of the enemy front, striving for frontal attacks instead of an enveloping maneuver. The French violated the principle of mutual support, which led to defeat in parts.
Until August 13, the Germans lost contact with the enemy. On August 9, the Prussian command set the task of the cavalry in a new way. In the Austro-Prussian War, the cavalry followed behind the infantry; now it moved forward for raids and reconnaissance, supported by vanguards advanced from the infantry.
Three battles took place near the Metz fortress: August 14 - on the eastern bank of the river. Mosel. August 16 - on the western bank of the river. Moselle and August 18 - at Saint-Privat - Gravelot.
The Sedan disaster ended the first period of the war.
The second period is fundamentally different from the first period of the war. On September 4, a revolution broke out in Paris, a republic was proclaimed and a bourgeois government was formed. A popular movement developed in defense of the country. In an incredibly short time, three new armies were formed.
On September 19, the blockade of Paris began, lasting more than four months. The partisan movement of the French people developed widely. On October 27, after 72 days of blockade, Marshal Bazin surrendered Metz with an army of 150,000 to the enemy. This was a strong blow to Republican France. The bourgeois government, fearing an armed people, hastened on January 28, 1871, to sign a difficult and humiliating truce. In response to the betrayal, the proletariat of Paris began an uprising on March 18, 1871, which led to the formation of the Paris Commune.
For the development of military art“The Franco-Prussian war,” wrote Engels, “marks a turning point that has a completely different meaning than the previous ones.” Huge forces took part in the hostilities on both sides - about 2 million people. The defeat of the opposing field armies did not yet mean winning the war. As the war progressed, France created even larger armies to replace those lost. The changing nature of warfare (the people are increasingly involved in warfare), the country’s ability to recover the losses of entire armies, rejected the strategy of “blitzkrieg” through a general battle.
The war showed the enormous importance of advanced military equipment, more advanced weapons - the French Chassepot gun and German artillery.
The deployment of millions of armies in the theater of war led to the opportunity to operate on a wide front. A wider front made it possible to carry out a maneuver to envelop the enemy. The strategy was faced with the task of bringing troops to the enemy occupying defensive positions in such a way that both of his flanks were attacked. Near Sedan, the approach of two German armies towards each other led to the complete encirclement of the French army.
A radical change occurred in the formation of infantry combat formations. Closed battle formations (even company columns) could not overcome the increased effectiveness of rifle fire from long distances. Closed formations of infantry battle formations were replaced by a rifle chain.
PrussiaFor secret defensive alliances (-):
Bavaria
Baden
Württemberg
Hesse-Darmstadt
139,000 dead and 143,000 wounded
Franco-Prussian War- - military conflict between the empire of Napoleon III and Prussia, which was seeking European hegemony. The war, provoked by the Prussian Chancellor O. Bismarck and formally started by Napoleon III, ended with the defeat and collapse of the French Empire, as a result of which Prussia managed to transform the North German Confederation into a unified German Empire.
Background to the conflict
Main article: Luxembourg question
The most important thing in this passage is the instruction to “limit the extent of military operations.” It belonged to Austria and kept her from intervening in the war on the side of France.
Italy and the Franco-Prussian War
During the Franco-Prussian War, France, Austria-Hungary and Prussia tried to win Italy over to their side. But neither country was successful. France still held Rome and had a garrison in that city. The Italians wanted to unite their country, including Rome, but France did not allow this. France did not intend to withdraw its garrison from Rome, thereby losing a possible ally. Prussia feared that Italy might start a war with France, and tried in every possible way to achieve Italian neutrality in the outbreak of the war. Fearing the strengthening of Italy, Bismarck himself personally wrote to the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, asking him not to interfere in the war with France. Although there were proposals from Austria for an alliance against Prussia, they did not have the same effect as Bismarck’s words. The Prussian Chancellor managed to achieve neutrality from Italy in this war.
Austria-Hungary and the Franco-Prussian War
German artillerymen near Paris.
Consequences of the war
Beginning of the war
The main reason that led to the fall of the Second Empire was the war with Prussia and the catastrophic defeat of the army of Napoleon III. The French government, given the strengthening of the opposition movement in the country, decided to solve the problem in the traditional way - to channel discontent through war. In addition, Paris solved strategic and economic problems. France was vying for leadership in Europe, which was being challenged by Prussia. The Prussians won victories over Denmark and Austria (1864, 1866) and decisively moved towards the unification of Germany. The emergence of a new, strong, united Germany was a strong blow to the ambitions of Napoleon III's regime. A united Germany also threatened the interests of the French big bourgeoisie.
It is also worth considering that in Paris they were confident in the strength of their army and victory. The French leadership underestimated the enemy; an appropriate analysis of the latest military reforms in Prussia and the change in sentiment in German society, where this war was perceived as just, was not carried out. In Paris they were confident of victory and even expected to seize a number of lands on the Rhine, expanding their influence in Germany.
Moreover, internal conflict was one of the leading reasons for the government’s desire to start a war. One of the advisers to Napoleon III, Sylvester de Sassy, regarding the motives that pushed the government of the Second Empire to enter the war with Prussia in July 1870, wrote many years later: “I did not resist an external war, because it seemed to me the last resource and the only means of salvation for the empire ... The most menacing signs of civil and social war appeared on all sides... The bourgeoisie was obsessed with some kind of insatiable revolutionary liberalism, and the population of the working-class cities was obsessed with socialism. It was then that the emperor took a decisive bet - a war against Prussia.”
Thus, Paris decided to go to war with Prussia. The reason for the war was the conflict that arose between the two great powers over the candidacy of the Prussian Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the vacant royal throne in Spain. On July 6, three days after it became known in Paris that Prince Leopold had agreed to accept the throne offered to him, French Foreign Minister Gramont made a statement in the Legislative Corps that sounded like an official challenge to Prussia. “We do not think,” said Gramont, “that respect for the rights of neighboring people obliges us to tolerate that an outside power, having placed one of its princes on the throne of Charles V..., could upset the existing balance of power in Europe to our detriment and put us under a threat to the interests and honor of France..." If such an “opportunity” were realized, Gramon continued, then “strong with your support and the support of the nation, we will be able to fulfill our duty without hesitation or weakness.” This was a direct threat of war if Berlin did not abandon its plans.
On the same day, July 6, French Minister of War Leboeuf, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, made an official statement about the full readiness of the Second Empire for war. Napoleon III made public the diplomatic correspondence of 1869 between the governments of France, Austria and Italy, which created the false impression that the Second Empire, entering the war, could count on the support of Austria and Italy. In reality, France had no allies in the international arena.
The Austrian Empire, after defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, wanted revenge, but Vienna needed time to build up. The Prussian blitzkrieg prevented Vienna from taking a tougher stance towards Berlin. And after the battle of Sedan in Austria, thoughts of war against the entire North German Union led by Prussia were completely buried. In addition, the position of the Russian Empire was a limiting factor for Austria-Hungary. Russia, after the Crimean War, when Austria took a hostile position, did not miss the opportunity to repay its former treacherous ally. There was a possibility that Russia would intervene in the war if Austria attacked Prussia.
Italy remembered that France did not bring the war of 1859 to a victorious end, when the troops of the Franco-Sardinian coalition defeated the Austrians. In addition, France still held Rome, its garrison was located in this city. The Italians wanted to unite their country, including Rome, but France did not allow this. Thus, the French prevented the completion of the unification of Italy. France did not intend to withdraw its garrison from Rome, thereby losing a possible ally. Therefore, Bismarck's proposal to the Italian king to maintain neutrality in the war between Prussia and France was received favorably.
Russia, after the Eastern (Crimean) War, focused on Prussia. St. Petersburg did not intervene in the wars of 1864 and 1866, and Russia did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian War. In addition, Napoleon III did not seek friendship and alliance with Russia before the war. Only after the outbreak of hostilities was Adolphe Thiers sent to St. Petersburg, who asked for Russian intervention in the war with Prussia. But it was already too late. St. Petersburg hoped that after the war Bismarck would thank Russia for its neutrality, which would lead to the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace of 1856. Therefore, at the very beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, the Russian declaration of neutrality was issued.
The British also decided not to intervene in the war. In London's view, the time had come to limit France, as the colonial interests of the British Empire and the Second Empire were colliding around the world. France made efforts to strengthen the fleet. In addition, Paris laid claim to Luxembourg and Belgium, which were under British protection. England was the guarantor of Belgian independence. Great Britain saw nothing wrong with strengthening Prussia to create a counterbalance to France.
Prussia also sought war to complete the unification of Germany, which was being thwarted by France. Prussia wanted to seize industrialized Alsace and Lorraine, as well as take a leading position in Europe, for which it was necessary to defeat the Second Empire. Since the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Bismarck was convinced of the inevitability of an armed conflict with France. “I was firmly convinced,” he later wrote, referring to this period, “that on the way to our further national development - both intensive and extensive - on the other side of the Main, we would inevitably have to wage war with France, and that in our internal and In foreign policy, we must under no circumstances lose sight of this opportunity.” In May 1867, Bismarck openly announced among his supporters about the upcoming war with France, which would begin “when our new army corps are strengthened and when we have established stronger relationships with various German states.”
However, Bismarck did not want Prussia to look like an aggressor, which would complicate relations with other countries and negatively affect public opinion in Germany itself. It was necessary for France to start the war itself. And he was able to pull this off. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was used by Bismarck to provoke a further deterioration in Franco-Prussian relations and a declaration of war by France. For this, Bismarck resorted to gross falsification of the text of the dispatch sent to him on July 13 from Ems by the Prussian King Wilhelm for forwarding to Paris. The dispatch contained the Prussian king's response to the French government's demand that he formally approve the decision expressed the day before by Prince Leopold's father to renounce the Spanish throne for his son. The French government also demanded that William give a guarantee that claims of this kind would not be repeated in the future. Wilhelm agreed to the first demand and refused to satisfy the second. The text of the Prussian king's reply dispatch was deliberately changed by the Prussian chancellor in such a way that the dispatch as a result acquired a tone offensive to the French.
On July 13, the day the dispatch from Ems was received in Berlin, Bismarck, in a conversation with Field Marshal Moltke and the Prussian military commander von Roon, openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the conciliatory tone of the dispatch. “We must fight...,” said Bismarck, “but success largely depends on the impressions that the origin of the war will cause in us and others; it is important that we be the ones attacked, and Gallic arrogance and resentment will help us in this.” By falsifying the original text of the so-called Ems Dispatch, Bismarck achieved his intended goal. The defiant tone of the edited text of the dispatch played into the hands of the French leadership, which was also looking for a reason for aggression. War was officially declared by France on July 19, 1870.
Calculation of Reffi's mitrailleuse
Plans of the French command. State of the Armed Forces
Napoleon III planned to begin the campaign with a rapid invasion of French troops into German territory before the completion of mobilization in Prussia and the connection of the troops of the North German Confederation with the troops of the southern German states. This strategy was made easier by the fact that the French personnel system allowed for a much faster concentration of troops than the Prussian Landwehr system. In an ideal scenario, the successful crossing of the Rhine by French troops disrupted the entire further course of mobilization in Prussia, and forced the Prussian command to throw all available forces to the Main, regardless of their degree of readiness. This allowed the French to defeat the Prussian formations piece by piece as they arrived from different parts of the country.
In addition, the French command hoped to seize communications between the north and south of Germany and isolate the North German Confederation, preventing the states of Southern Germany from joining Prussia and maintaining their neutrality. In the future, the southern German states, taking into account their concerns about Prussia's unification policy, could support France. Also, after the successful start of the war, Austria could also take the side of France. And after the strategic initiative passed to France, Italy could also take its side.
Thus, France was counting on a blitzkrieg. The rapid movement of the French army was to lead to the military and diplomatic success of the Second Empire. The French did not want to prolong the war, since a protracted war led to destabilization of the internal political and economic situation of the empire.
French infantrymen in uniform from the Franco-Prussian War
Prussian infantry
The problem was that the Second Empire was not ready for war with a serious enemy, and even on its own territory. The Second Empire could only afford colonial wars, with a obviously weaker enemy. True, in his speech from the throne at the opening of the legislative session of 1869, Napoleon III argued that the military power of France had achieved the “necessary development”, and its “military resources are now at a high level corresponding to its global purpose.” The Emperor assured that the French land and naval armed forces were “firmly constituted”, that the number of troops under arms was “not inferior to their number under previous regimes.” “At the same time,” he declared, “our weapons have been improved, our arsenals and warehouses are full, our reserves have been trained, our Mobile Guard is being organized, our fleet has been transformed, our fortresses are in good condition.” However, this official statement, like other similar statements by Napoleon III and boastful articles in the French press, had only the purpose of hiding the serious problems of the French armed forces from their own people and from the outside world.
The French army was supposed to be ready for the campaign on July 20, 1870. But when Napoleon III arrived in Metz on July 29 to transport troops across the border, the army was not ready for the offensive. Instead of the 250 thousand army needed for the offensive, which should have been mobilized and concentrated on the border by this time, only 135-140 thousand people were here: about 100 thousand in the vicinity of Metz and about 40 thousand near Strasbourg. They planned to concentrate 50 thousand in Chalons. a reserve army in order to further advance it to Metz, but they did not have time to assemble it.
Thus, the French were unable to quickly mobilize in order to pull the forces necessary for a successful invasion to the border in a timely manner. The time for an almost calm offensive almost to the Rhine, while German troops were not yet concentrated, was lost.
The problem was that France was unable to change the outdated recruitment system of the French army. The depravity of such a system, which Prussia abandoned back in 1813, was that it did not provide for the advance recruitment, in peacetime, of combat-ready military units, which could be used in the same composition during the war. The so-called French peacetime “army corps” (there were seven of them, corresponding to the seven military districts into which France was divided since 1858) were formed from heterogeneous military units located on the territory of the corresponding military districts. They ceased to exist with the country's transition to martial law. Instead, they began to hastily form combat formations from units scattered throughout the country. As a result, it turned out that the connections were first disbanded and then created anew. Hence the confusion, confusion and loss of time. As General Montauban, who commanded the 4th Corps before the start of the war with Prussia, noted, the French command “at the moment of entering into war with a power that had long been ready for it, had to disband the troops that were part of large formations and re-create active ones from them.” army corps under the command of new commanders who were barely known to the troops and in most cases did not know their troops well.”
The French command was aware of the weakness of its military system. It was discovered during the military campaigns of the 1850s. Therefore, after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, an attempt was made to reform the mobilization plan of the French army in case of war. However, the new mobilization plan prepared by Marshal Niel, which was based on the presence of permanent army formations suitable for both peacetime and wartime, and also envisaged the creation of a mobile guard, was not put into practice. This plan remained on paper.
The French prepare to defend the estate, barricading the gates and using pickaxes to make shooting holes in the wall.
Judging by the orders of the French command of July 7 and 11, 1870, at first there was talk of three armies, they were proposed to be created according to Niel’s mobilization plans. However, after July 11, the plan for the military campaign was radically changed: instead of three armies, they began to form one united Army of the Rhine under the supreme command of Napoleon III. As a result, the pre-prepared mobilization plan was destroyed and this led to the fact that the Rhine Army, at the moment when it was supposed to launch a decisive offensive, turned out to be unprepared and understaffed. Due to the absence of a significant part of the formations, the Rhine Army remained inactive on the border. The strategic initiative was given to the enemy without a fight.
The formation of reserves was especially slow. Military warehouses were, as a rule, located at a distance from the places where combat units were formed. To obtain uniforms and the necessary equipment, the reservist had to travel hundreds, and sometimes thousands of kilometers, before he arrived at his destination. Thus, General Vinois noted: “During the war of 1870, persons who were in the reserve regiments of the Zouave located in the departments of northern France were forced to travel across the entire country in order to board a steamer in Marseille and head to Colean, Oran, Philippinville (in Algeria) to receive weapons and equipment, and then return to the unit located in the place from which they left. They traveled in vain 2 thousand km by rail, two crossings, at least two days each.” Marshal Canrobert painted a similar picture: “A soldier drafted at Dunkirk was sent to equip himself in Perpignan or even Algeria, and then forced to join his military unit located in Strasbourg.” All this deprived the French army of precious time and created a certain disorder.
Therefore, the French command was forced to begin concentrating mobilized troops on the border before the mobilization of the army was completely completed. These two operations, which were carried out simultaneously, overlapped and mutually violated each other. This was facilitated by the disorderly operation of the railways, the preliminary plan for military transportation of which was also violated. On the railways of France in July - August 1870 a picture of disorder and confusion reigned. It was well described by the historian A. Schuke: “Headquarters and administrative departments, artillery and engineering troops, infantry and cavalry, personnel and reserve units, were packed into the trains to capacity. People, horses, materiel, provisions - all this was unloaded in great disorder and confusion at the main assembly points. For a number of days, the station in Metz presented a picture of chaos, which seemed impossible to understand. People did not dare to free the carriages; the arriving provisions were unloaded and loaded again onto the same trains to be sent to another point. From the station the hay was transported to the city warehouses, while from the warehouses it was transported to the train stations.”
Trains with troops were often delayed en route due to the lack of accurate information about their destination. In a number of cases, the troops changed their troop concentration points several times. For example, the 3rd Corps, which was supposed to be formed in Metz, received an unexpected order on July 24 to go to Bouley; The 5th Corps, instead of Beach, had to gather in Sarrgemin; the imperial guard instead of Nancy - to Metz. A significant part of the reservists got to their military units very late, already on the battlefield or even got stuck somewhere along the way, never reaching their destination. The reservists who were late and then lost their part formed a large mass of people who wandered along the roads, huddled wherever they could and lived on alms. Some began to loot. In such confusion, not only soldiers lost their units, but also generals and unit commanders could not find their troops.
Even those troops that were able to concentrate on the border did not have full combat capability, since they were not provided with the necessary equipment, ammunition and food. The French government, which had already considered war with Prussia inevitable for several years, nevertheless frivolously did not pay due attention to such an important issue as supplying the army. From the testimony of the quartermaster general of the French army, Blondeau, it is known that even before the very beginning of the Franco-Prussian war, when discussing the plan for the 1870 campaign in the state military council, the question of supplying the army “did not occur to anyone.” As a result, the question of supplying the army arose only when the war began.
Therefore, from the first days of the war, the War Ministry received numerous complaints about the lack of food supply for military units. For example, the commander of the 5th Corps, General Fahy, literally cried out for help: “I am in Beach with 17 infantry battalions. No funds, a complete lack of money in the city and building cash registers. Send hard cash to support the troops. Paper money does not circulate." The division commander in Strasbourg, General Ducrot, telegraphed the Minister of War on July 19: “The food situation is alarming... No measures have been taken to ensure the delivery of meat. I ask you to give me the authority to take measures dictated by the circumstances, or I will not be responsible for anything...” “In Metz,” the local commissary reported on July 20, “there is no sugar, no coffee, no rice, no alcoholic beverages, there is not enough lard and crackers. Urgently send at least one million daily portions to Thionville.” On July 21, Marshal Bazin telegraphed to Paris: “All commanders persistently demand vehicles and camp supplies, which I am not able to supply them with.” The telegrams reported a shortage of ambulance carts, wagons, kettles, camp flasks, blankets, tents, medicines, stretchers, orderlies, etc. Troops arrived at the concentration sites without ammunition or camp equipment. But there were no reserves locally, or they were extremely scarce.
Engels, who was not only a famous Russophobe, but also a major expert in the field of military affairs, noted: “Perhaps we can say that the army of the Second Empire has so far been defeated only by the Second Empire itself. Under such a regime, in which its supporters were generously paid by all the means of the long-established system of bribery, it could not be expected that this system would not affect the commissary in the army. The real war... was prepared long ago; but the procurement of supplies, especially equipment, seems to have received the least attention; and just now, at the most critical period of the campaign, the disorder that reigned precisely in this area caused a delay in action for almost a week. This slight delay created a huge advantage in favor of the Germans."
Thus, the French army was not ready for a decisive and rapid offensive on enemy territory, and missed an opportune moment to strike due to the disorder in its own rear. The plan for the offensive campaign collapsed due to the unpreparedness of the French themselves for war. The initiative passed to the Prussian army, the French troops needed to defend themselves. And in a protracted war, the advantage was on the side of the North German Confederation, led by Prussia. German troops completed mobilization and could go on the offensive.
France lost its main advantage: superiority of forces at the mobilization stage. The wartime Prussian army was superior to the French. At the time of the declaration of war, the French active army numbered on paper about 640 thousand people. However, it was necessary to deduct the troops that were stationed in Algiers, Rome, the garrisons of the fortresses, the gendarmerie, the imperial guard, and the personnel of the military administrative departments. As a result, the French command could count on about 300 thousand soldiers at the beginning of the war. It is understood that the army's strength was subsequently increased, but only these troops could meet the first enemy attack. The Germans concentrated about 500 thousand people on the border in early August. Together with garrisons and reserve military units, the German army, according to its commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Moltke, had about 1 million people. As a result, the North German Confederation, led by Prussia, received a numerical advantage at the initial, decisive stage of the war.
In addition, the location of the French troops, which would have been successful in the event of an offensive war, was not suitable for defense. French troops were stretched along the Franco-German border, isolated in fortresses. After the forced abandonment of the offensive, the French command did nothing to reduce the length of the front and create mobile field groups that could fend off enemy attacks. Meanwhile, the Germans grouped their forces into armies concentrated between the Moselle and the Rhine. Thus, German troops also received a local advantage, concentrating troops in the main direction.
The French army was significantly inferior to the Prussian army in its fighting qualities. The general atmosphere of degradation and corruption that was characteristic of the Second Empire also engulfed the army. This affected the morale and combat training of the troops. One of the most prominent military specialists in France, General Touma, noted: “The acquisition of knowledge was not held in high esteem, but cafes were held in high esteem; officers who stayed at home to work came under suspicion as being alien to their comrades. To succeed, it was necessary first of all to have a smart appearance, good manners and proper posture. In addition to these properties, it was necessary: in the infantry, standing in front of the authorities, keep your hands at your sides as appropriate and direct your eyes 15 steps forward; in the cavalry - memorize the theory and be able to ride a well-trained horse around the barracks yard; in artillery - to have deep contempt for technical studies... Finally, in all types of weapons - to have recommendations. Truly a new scourge has fallen on the army and the country: recommendations...”
It is clear that the French army had well-trained officers, people who conscientiously treated their duties, and commanders with combat experience. However, they did not define the system. The high command was unable to cope with its tasks. Napoleon III had neither military talents nor the personal qualities necessary for skillful and firm leadership of troops. In addition, by 1870, his health had deteriorated significantly, which had a detrimental effect on his clarity of mind, decision-making and operational coordination of government actions. He was treated (urinary tract problems) with opiates, which made the emperor lethargic, sleepy and indifferent. As a result, the physical and mental crisis of Napoleon III coincided with the crisis of the Second Empire.
The French General Staff at that time was a bureaucratic institution that had no influence in the army and could not rectify the situation. In the years preceding the Franco-Prussian War, the French General Staff was almost completely excluded from participation in the government's military activities, which were conceived mainly in the bowels of the War Ministry. As a result, when the war began, the General Staff officers were not ready to fulfill their main task. The generals of the French army were cut off from their troops and often did not know them. Command posts in the army were distributed to persons who were close to the throne, and who were not distinguished by military successes. Thus, when the war with Prussia began, seven out of eight corps of the Army of the Rhine were commanded by generals who belonged to the emperor’s inner circle. As a result, the organizational skills and level of military theoretical training of the command staff of the French army lagged significantly behind the military knowledge and organizational skills of the Prussian generals.
In terms of armament, the French army was practically not inferior to the Prussian one. The French army adopted the new Chassepot rifle of the 1866 model, which was several times superior in many characteristics to the Prussian Dreyse needle rifle of the 1849 model. Chassepot rifles could conduct aimed fire at distances of up to a kilometer, while Prussian Dreyse needle guns fired only at 500-600 meters and misfired much more often. True, the French army, due to the poor organization of the quartermaster service and the extreme disorder in the army supply system, did not have time to completely re-equip these rifles; they constituted only 20-30% of the total weapons of the French army. Therefore, a significant part of the French soldiers were armed with rifles of outdated systems. In addition, the soldiers, especially from the reserve units, did not know how to handle the guns of the new system: the low level of military training of the rank and file of the French army made itself felt. In addition, the French were inferior in artillery. The bronze cannon of the La Gitta system, which was in service with the French, was significantly inferior to the German Krupp steel cannons. The La Guitta gun fired at a distance of only 2.8 km, while the Krupp guns fired at a distance of up to 3.5 km, and, unlike them, were loaded from the muzzle. But the French had 25-barrel mitrailleuses (shotguns) - the predecessors of machine guns. Reffi's mitrailleuses, extremely effective in defense, hit one and a half kilometers, firing bursts of up to 250 bullets per minute. The Germans did not have such weapons. However, there were few of them (less than 200 pieces), and mobilization problems led to the fact that crews could not collect them. Many crews were insufficiently trained in handling mitrailleuses, and sometimes had no combat training at all, and they also had no idea about the sighting or rangefinder characteristics. Many commanders did not even know about the existence of these weapons.